

**Political Style in Eight East Asian Countries:
A Preliminary Analysis**

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The term of "political style" abounds in journalists' commentaries and common men's daily discourse regarding political phenomena in different societies. Since Harold D. Lasswell (1949) introduced the theory of style into the language of politics, political style has been a convenient term to delineate the configuration of key political elements in a society or of important political characteristics of political leaders. However, the concept of political style has rarely been applied to survey research, nor has its properties been thoroughly cross-culturally analyzed.

Given the popular usage of the term, it would be hard to say that political style has been fully exploited as a handy and useful concept in delineating a country's body politics in empirical political studies. This paper has three aims. First, I will try to re-conceptualize the concept of political style following the theoretic tradition of the political culture literature and state clearly its important empirical traits. Second, my preliminary analysis will explore the similarities and differences of political style in East Asian countries based on mass survey data.¹ Third, in so doing I hope to bring empirical study of political style back to enrich the theory of political culture, in which part Almond and Verba (1963) might have left out in their Civic Culture study.

What is "Political style?"

Dictionaries define style in a very broad sense. One of meanings of style is "the way in which anything is made or done." In social science usage, E. H. Gombrich (1968) further elaborates and defines style as "any distinctive, and therefore recognizable, way in which an act is performed or an artifact made or ought to be performed and made." (quoted in Burant 1987) Following this definition, Stephan R.

¹ These eight countries are Japan, South Korea, Mainland China, Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong Kong (which, though not a country, is a special administrative unit functioning as a semi- autonomous state of the PRC). These data sets are made available by the collaborative project, *East Asia Barometer: A Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Changes (EADVC)*.

Burant points out that an analysis of style calls attention to appearance and that political style demands a public display. He goes on to say: "In as much as it is public, political style also possesses a rhetorical dimension. Elite political style is a means of persuasion, because it communicates any idea or system ideas to the ruled." (p.274) Burant's conception of "style" and "political style" is similar to that of our precursor in political science, Lasswell (1949) who earlier takes style as the pattern of political leaders' linguistic expression embodied in the arrangement of "symbols" and "signs" in communication, which is molded by surrounding socio-personal factors. He also claims that the "...study of style may make its largest contribution in relation to the problem of interpreting significant political trends." (p.38). Later, James David Barber (1972/1992), one of the frequently quoted scholars of political leadership, applies style to describe the presidential character, and takes it as "...the President's habitual way of performing his three political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework."(p.5) The stress on rhetoric in defining political style is not only found in the study of political leadership, but also applied in communication study with text analysis. Robert Hariman (1995) sees political style as "the artistry of power" to distinguish four typologies of political style, namely, realist style, court style, republican style and bureaucratic style. Even in the field of political thought, Dutch political theorist F. R. Ankersmith (2002:151) also makes some observation about the concept of "style" so as to apply to political theory. He takes style as: "With regard to human actions strangely combines a focus on what can publicly be *seen* (as in behaviorism) with an interest in unique individual personality (with all its traditional Cartesian reminiscences). Style therefore presents us with a mix of objectivism and subjectivism in our conception of human behavior that puts it apart from most of contemporary philosophy of actions." He also points out that "style does not (attempt to) *explain*, it *characterizes*; style does not tell us *why*, but *how* individuals think or

act.” (p. 150, emphasis is original) To these pioneering scholars who define and apply the concept of style, the focus of political style analysis is thus directed to look at the distinctive pattern(s) of thinking, acting, and communicating that political leaders (or elites) display in public. Political style in their dealing is then at most examined by individualistic or persona-specific patterns that are mainly composed of the individual’s personality characteristics,² tailoring both to characterize “how” political elites perform their roles and to interpret important political trends they bring about.

Few scholars have taken seriously the importance of political style beyond the realm of leadership study. Among them, Frank D. Gilliam (1996) urges further study to probe political style and design appropriate measures of it, after comparing the effects of Tom Bradley’s and Jesse Jackson’s efforts to empower minorities on the political interest of African Americans in Los Angeles. Michael McGerr (1990:865), an American historian, takes style in a broad sense as “the different ways that people perceive, speak and act politically.” To him, “Political styles act as a kind of filtering lens that colors some objects, reshapes others, and obscures many altogether.” He thus applies the concept to describe the evolutions of women’s political styles in relation to male political styles in struggling for autonomy and equality. McGerr sees political style as a bottom-up phenomenon, focusing more on patterns at the mass level than on constellations of traits or ways of doing things at the individual level.

To our research purpose, however, Sydney Verba’s (1965:544-5) discussion of political style in reference to political culture is most relevant and crucial. Based on comparative political culture study, he has recast the concept of political style as two aspects of political belief systems that mediate the operation of political processes and thus regulate the goal-achievement activity of the political system. To him, political

² While talking about Clinton’s political style, Greenstein refers to it as “a constellation of traits that vary in their ascendancy depending upon the circumstances in which he finds himself,” and stresses “The traits themselves are not unique, but their patterns.” (1998: 179)

style refers to “the structural or formal properties of political belief systems (the way in which beliefs are held)” and “those informal norms of political interactions that regulated the way in which fundamental political beliefs are applied.” To see political style as a part of political culture is such a keystone in applying the concept to empirical-comparative political studies. In the following, I will extend Verba’s insight and adopt his approach to explore the political styles in eight Asian countries using survey data.

The Measurement of Political Style

Political style analysis has focused on examining the distinctive synthetic pattern of persona-specific characteristics or traits in political leadership studies. However, if political style is reframed as an aspect of political culture in Verba’s manner, the study of political style is then shifted to referring to the mass political belief systems that mediate the operation of political process and regulate the goal-achievement activity of the political system. To compromise, the measure of political style in the *East Asia Barometer: A Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Changes* has been designed to tap the mass attitudes towards political leaders in the context of role-taking activity. The battery of political style measures is comprised of the following four-point “agree-disagree” question items:

- (1) *The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedures.*
- (2) *If a political leader really believes in his position, he should refuse to compromise regardless of how many people disagree.*
- (3) *A political leader should tolerate the views of those who challenge his political ideals.*

- (4) *As long as a political leader enjoys majority support, he should implement his own agenda and disregard the view of the minority.*

These items measure citizen's beliefs in, or expectations of, the ways that political leaders should perform their roles in the political processes. First, political leaders are the main and decisive actors in the political process, and the ways in which they take on their roles can be publicly seen and objectively identified. Second, mass attitudes toward political leaders are forming part of political belief systems or "ethos"³ that give legitimacy or limit to political leaders in performing their political roles.

Obviously, these measure items are designed to tap the mass beliefs in four aspects of procedural norms regarding how political leaders should perform their roles in political interaction. The first item gauges citizen's beliefs in the "rule by law," or about the "norm-oriented tendency" of political leaders, in which the "end-means" norms are posed, to assess whether political leaders are allowed to use ends to justify means in pursuing their political goals. The second item taps citizen's expectations of the "tough-soft" minded characteristic of political leaders in doing things, or the degree of "political compromise" that citizen grant to them, to see if political leaders are expected to be tough-minded or soft-minded when facing a bargaining situation. The third item measures citizen's attitudes toward political leaders' "tolerance," to assess whether or not political leaders are expected to tolerate different views or put up with potential opposition. The fourth item taps mass beliefs in the "monolithic-pluralist" orientation, to see if political leaders should also take account the views of minorities in the political process.

Based on above measures, our conceptualization of political style departs from

³ This term is derived from my reading Theodor Heuss's (1953) discussion about the forces and elements forming a political style. He takes architectural style as a basis for comparison and points out "...the problems of 'political style' will call for an investigation into the parallel existence of spiritual, social, and technical forces." (p.473) And in the end, Heuss argues that "the desire for freedom" and "the feeling of one's own dignity" are formative elements in the change of political styles. (p. 498-9)

Verba's definition in that our measure focuses mainly on what he denotes as "norms of political interactions that regulated the way in which fundamental political beliefs are applied," rather than "the structural or formal properties of political belief systems." However, the merit of our measure is that, by specifying "political leaders" as the major actors in the political process performing goal-achievement activity of the political system, it cuts right to the essence of the study of political leadership. Through exploring mass attitudes toward political leaders' ways of pursuing political goals, the structural or formal properties of political beliefs systems could thus be empirically uncovered, such as the way to know someone by consulting someone's neighbors or friends. In so doing, "political style" or "style culture"⁴ is identified accordingly as particular patterns of citizen's attitudes toward procedural norms that constrain the ways political leaders perform their roles. To compare, our approach to defining political style or style culture is same as that in Almond and Verba's (1963) definition of political culture, which is seen as the particular patterns of political orientation toward political objects among members of the nation.

Political Style in Eight East Asian Countries

The leader-follower relationship is always taken as an important aspect of power, especially in Asian societies (Pye 1985). Our approach to exploring political style therefore takes this leader-follower dimension into consideration. In authoritarian societies, leaders are characterized as monopolists of political power, while in pluralist democracies they are expected to share it with other competing elites. Undoubtedly, the leader-follower relationship is one important linkage that citizens use to make sense of politics. Most East Asian countries are experiencing or have

⁴ Political style and style culture are taken as the same at the level of collectivity or aggregate distribution pattern of individuals. Unsatisfactory as it is, this seems to need further conceptual analysis, which is not attempted here.

recently experienced a regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy. That is to say, in the process of regime transition, the nature of the leader-follower relationship is also undergoing a change in which political leaders have gone from being granted more to less power by their followers. Since political leaders are major actors in the political process, the nature of the leader-follower relationship is embedded in the mass beliefs about procedural norms that constrain political leaders in their power plays. Political style thus conceptualized and measured is distinctive and distinguishable according to different level of democratic development.

We now turn to concrete data sets, which have been collected in Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea (hereafter, Korea), the People's Republic of China (hereafter, Mainland China or PRC), Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. As shown in Table 1, the norm of "end-over-means" is most prevalent in Mongolia (58.5%) and Thailand (55.7%), next in Philippines (38.5%), Japan (31.8%) and Mainland China (30.5%). In contrast, a majority of citizens in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea disagree that a political leader should disregard established procedural while accomplishing his goal. This finding is sensible. As Mongolia and Thailand are more authoritarian than the others, their political leaders have been granted more power in pursuing political goals. Put another way, in these societies citizens have not yet internalized the notion of rule by law. As a result, their political leaders enjoy a good deal of ultra-procedural expediency to justify their political actions.

[Table 1 about here]

Strongman-like or tough-minded political leadership is most welcome in Mongolia and Mainland China, then next in Japan, where a majority of citizens

would agree that political leaders should uphold their position regardless of how many people oppose them. In Hong Kong (43.2%), Korea (31.5%), the Philippines (42.7%), Taiwan (41.7%) and Thailand (33.7%), less than half of respondents would appreciate tough-minded political leadership. On the tolerance characteristic of political leadership, Japanese (83.1%) and Taiwanese (79.2%) are most demanding that their political leaders be tolerant, next are the people of Hong Kong (68.2%) and of Mainland China (67.1%). The great majority of Mongolians (72.8%) and Thais (93.2%) disagree that a political leader should tolerate dissenting views. Finally, more than fifty percent of Mainland Chinese (60.0%), Koreans (50.3%), and Mongolians (53.8%) would accept an authoritarian or monolithic orientation of their political leader in implementing his agenda if backed by majority support. In comparison, Japanese (85%) would expect their political leaders to be more pluralist-oriented by taking the view of minorities into consideration. In Hong Kong (48.6%), the Philippines (34.3%), Taiwan (41.7%), and Thailand (40.5%), less than half of respondents would prefer an authoritarian political leader.

To sum up by looking at percentages of “agree” responses of all measured item in each country, firstly, our analysis has shown that majority of people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are demanding that their political leaders follow democratic procedural norms in the political process. Political leaders in these two societies are expected to be more norm-oriented (the most emphasized), soft-minded, tolerant and pluralist-oriented in the political process while they pursue political goals. Secondly, the majority of Japanese would, on the one hand, demand their political leaders to be norm-oriented, tolerant and pluralist-oriented (the most emphasized), while, on the other hand, simultaneously endorsing tough-minded political leaders. Thirdly, the majority of Koreans expect their political leaders to be norm-oriented

(the most emphasized), soft-minded, and not so much pluralist-oriented, but at least tolerant. Korea and the Philippines are the two countries among the new democracies in our analysis whose majority of people prefer less tolerant political leaders. Except for the tolerance dimension, as shown in Table 1, the majority of people in the Philippines would like their political leader to be norm-oriented, soft-minded, and pluralist-oriented. Fourthly, in Mainland China, a majority of people would like to see their political leaders to be norm-oriented and soft-minded in doing things, as shown in Table 1, they also accept that their leaders need to be intolerant and monolithic to get things done. Finally, Mongolian and Thai political leaders are given more discretion to act, even when this means ignoring established procedures and dissenting views. In Mongolia, majority of people would accept political leaders' tough-mindedness in political interactions and bulldozing over the objections of minorities. However, Thai political leaders are expected by a majority of their people to be soft-minded and pluralist-oriented in performing political roles.

By looking at the overall distribution based on the pooled data set,⁵ we notice that, on average, only two items are endorsed by half of the people in East Asian countries: one is about “tough- or soft- mindedness”(50.8%) of political leadership, the other is about the political leaders’ “tolerance.”(49.9%) To recapitulate in terms of “authoritarian-democratic” orientation, it is useful to look at the mean score of the additive scale of political style scale as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. Political style is most democratic in Japan (11.78) and in Taiwan (11.15). Next come Korea (10.8), Hong Kong (10.71) and Philippines (10.64). Political style is less democratic in

⁵ The sample sizes of the eight data sets are fairly similar, except that the Hong Kong data set is smaller and the Mainland China data set is bigger. As a result, pooling them together in a single data set will not seriously bias our results, since the sample sizes are not skewed one way or another by oversampling specific nations.

Thailand (9.43), and the most authoritarian in Mongolian (8.41). This finding about the authoritarian-democratic orientation of political style among these countries is compatible with their levels of democratization and their length of experience with democratic institutions. Overall, political style or “style culture” in East Asia is in the middle stages of a change (10.52) from authoritarian to democratic orientations, characterized by people still holding strong beliefs about the need for “tough-mindedness” and “intolerant” political leaders.

[Figure 1 about here]

The Nature of Political Style and Other Correlates

Political Style in our analysis is measured by mass beliefs in procedural norms that political leaders should follow in doing their jobs. A factor analysis of these measured items is applied to each country dataset and the pooled dataset, and the result is reported in Table 2. As shown in the table, all these measured items are loaded onto a single component factor for all data sets including the pooled one, indicating that all these mass beliefs in elite procedural norms are highly correlated and comprise a common denominator factor, namely, the political style factor. This finding indicates that political style is structurally a one-dimensional belief system. However, in Korea, Mongolia and Thailand, two factors may be extracted with “tolerance” emerging as a separate component. The finding, in addition to above one, shows that political style in these three countries seems to be more a two-dimensional belief system, in which citizen’s evaluation of political leader’s tolerance is separate from other attitudes towards procedural norms. In fact, in Thailand the “tolerance” component is almost uncorrelated with the common factor. Recall from Table 1 that only 6.8% of Thai people accept non-tolerance as a political leader’s norm of political

action.

[Table 2 about here]

Taken as mass belief systems about procedural norms that a political leader should follow in political interaction, a nation's political style is a part of its political culture, namely, style culture of politics. It is expected that the measure of political style would be highly correlated with other measures of political culture such as democratic value, political efficacy, democratic legitimacy and trust in government. (Variables included in these indices are described in the appendix) In addition, one's orientation in the authoritarian-democratic orientation in political style is also presumably affected by one's socio-demographic characteristics. Naturally, citizens' evaluation of their national or personal economic situation may, at least temporarily, influence their attitudes toward political leaders. And, citizen's orientations to political style may be also linked to their interest in politics or psychological involvement in politics.

As shown in Table 3, a significant correlation between gender and political style is only found in Mainland China, where male respondents hold a stronger authoritarian orientation in political style. The significant correlation between age and political style orientation is found in Hong Kong, Mainland China, Mongolia and Taiwan. Unexpectedly, older Mongolian citizens are more democratic in their political style, which makes the Mongolian case exceptional. However, in Hong Kong, Mainland China and Taiwan, younger people, as expected, tend to have a more democratic orientation in political style. The significant relationship between education and political style is only found in Hong Kong, Japan and Mainland China, where citizens with higher education are more likely to hold democratic orientation in

political style. Especially in most changing societies, education is often considered the most important factor determining people's knowledge and consequentially their socio-political beliefs, and its absence in relation to political style in other countries probably indicates that its effect has been incorporated into other intervening factors. However, this needs to be further explored and ascertained in a causal model or multivariate analysis.

[Table 3 about here]

Of the relationship between evaluation of economic conditions and political style orientation, as shown in Table 3, we summarize our finding as follows: (1) Evaluations of the nation's current economic situation is significantly correlated with political style orientation only in Taiwan. In Taiwan, those who feel more positively about the national economy are more likely to have higher authoritarian orientation in political style. (2) A correlation of political style with evaluations of past national economic performance is found only in Mongolia, where citizen who rate the past economy better tend to more authoritarian in political style. (3) Citizen's optimism about the nation's future economy is related to political style only in Japan and Korea. In these two countries, citizens who are more optimistic about the nation's economic future are more authoritarian-oriented in political style. (4) The relationship between the respondent's family's economic experience and political style is found significant only in the Korean case, where those who evaluate their family's economic situation as being better tend to hold stronger authoritarian orientations in political style. (5) Only Mongolian people link the evaluation of their family's economic situation in the past five years with their views about procedural norms. The correlation is negative indicating that Mongolian who better rate their family's economic situation in the past

are more authoritarian-oriented in political style.

We now turn to the relationships between other political culture characteristics and the authoritarian-democratic orientation in political style. As indicated in the Table 3, only in the Korean case is there a significant correlation between interest in politics and the orientation in political style. Those who are more interested in politics are more likely to hold a stronger authoritarian orientation in political style. Presumably, one's feeling about corruption should be linked to one's attitudes about the ways political leaders should get things done. Unexpectedly, in all East Asian countries in this study, there is no correlation between citizen's evaluations of the seriousness of corruption situation their orientations in political style.

As expected, people's orientation in political style is highly correlated with democratic values, political efficacy, democratic legitimacy and trust in government. First, more democratically oriented people will also tend to have higher democratic orientations in political style, and this relationship holds true across all East Asian cases. Second, citizens in East Asia who are more efficacious in politics are also more democratic-oriented in political style. The exception is Hong Kong, where people's political efficacy has nothing to with their orientation in political style. Third, as shown in Table 3, in all East Asian countries under study, those who believe more strongly in the legitimacy of democracy tend also to have a higher democratic orientation in political style. Finally, as expected, people's trust in government is significantly correlated with their orientation in political style. People who have high levels of trust in government are more democratically oriented in political style.

By way of Tentative Conclusion

Although we have an ambitious agenda, to re-conceptualize "political style" to be applicable to cross-cultural study, we have thus far only pulled out and reported

some very simple findings. Initially, to extend Verba's conception of political style and to incorporate the tradition of political leadership study, we chose to explore mass attitudes toward the norms that political leaders should abide by in performing their political roles. A survey of the literature reveals that the term "political style" has been either too narrowly defined, as in some leadership studies, or too loosely used, in many other areas. As a consequence, much of its empirical importance has been lost amidst language games. To refresh the concept to apply cross-cultural study, we have to first find its empirical referents and then measure its correlates. This is tentatively done in this preliminary analysis.

In our data analysis, we have found that political style in each country can be either differentiated in terms of the constellation of various emphasized components, or by anchoring the different location along its underlying common structure which we name the authoritarian-democratic orientation. We have measured it both ways and found each that country has a different constellation of endorsed norms of action for political leaders. However, there is a common factor underlying these different components. This common factor is the empirical manifestation of political style. In this way, political style or style culture can be comparatively identified to see its difference among countries. It is true that our preliminary analysis is rough and incomplete. Some causal and analytic models might further make good use of the rich dataset in hand. At this moment, our analysis has shown that political style is a part of political culture that is generally related to other dimensions of political culture. However, more elaborated analysis has yet to be completed.

In sum, as a very short paper, this analysis is just a beginning, which raises more questions than it provides answers. Future research will incorporate country-specific background knowledge needed to more effectively interpret our findings. For now, this is just a rough look at political style in hopes of putting some new wine into an

old bottle.

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Appendix: Variables and Measures

All indexes in the following are additive, and summated score are based on associated question listed.

1) Political Interest:

Q56. How interested would you say you are in politics?

2) Evaluation of Corruption:

Q114. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government? Would you say: (Hardly anyone is involved, Not a lot of officials are corrupt, Most officials are corrupt, Almost everyone is corrupt)

3) Democratic Values:

Q132. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly educated people.

Q133. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.

Q134. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.

Q135. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.

Q136. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

Q137. If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

Q138. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

Q139. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

4) Political Efficacy:

Q126. I think I have the ability to participate in politics.

Q127. Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

Q128. The nation is run by a powerful few and ordinary citizens cannot do much about it.

Q129. People like me don't have any influence over what the government does.

5) Trust in Government:

Q130. Whatever its faults maybe, our form of government is still the best for us.

Q131. You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.

6) Democratic Legitimacy:

Q121. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.

Q122. No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power.

Q123. The military should come in to govern the country.

Q124. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have the experts decide everything.

Q125. When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.

Table 1: The Percentage of the “Strongly and Somewhat Agree” response

	<i>HK</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>PRC</i>	<i>Mong</i>	<i>Phil</i>	<i>TW</i>	<i>Thai</i>	<i>ALL*</i>
1) The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedures.	15.4	31.8	22.8	30.5	58.5	38.5	15.9	55.7	34.1
2) If a political leader really believes in his position, he should refuse to compromise regardless of how many people disagree.	43.2	56.1	31.5	70.5	80.2	42.7	41.7	33.7	50.8
3) A political leader should tolerate the views of those who challenge his political ideals.	68.2	83.1	38.0	67.1	17.2	44.9	79.2	6.8	49.9
4) As long as a political leader enjoys majority support, he should implement his own agenda and disregard the view of the minority.	48.6	15.0	50.3	60.0	53.8	34.3	41.7	40.5	44.3
Minimal Valid N	688	1151	1497	2097	1054	1200	1206	1534	10538

Additive Scale									
Mean	10.71	11.78	10.80	10.09	8.41	10.64	11.15	9.62	10.52
Stddev	1.47	2.18	1.85	1.38	2.19	2.54	1.68	2.25	1.74
Valid N	644	1059	1494	1819	1047	1200	1136	1524	9929

Figure 1: Mean score of Political style scale by country




Table 2: Factor Analysis (principal component) of Political Style measures

	<i>HK</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>PRC</i>	<i>Mong</i>	<i>Phil</i>	<i>TW</i>	<i>Thai</i>	<i>ALL</i>
1) The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedures.	0.59	0.69	0.66	0.76	0.52	0.72	0.67	0.70	0.73
2) If a political leader really believes in his position, he should refuse to compromise regardless of how many people disagree.	0.74	0.65	0.66	0.46	0.78	0.66	0.71	0.73	0.63
3) A political leader should tolerate the views of those who challenge his political ideals.**	0.77	0.72	0.42	0.75	0.58	0.54	0.74	0.05	0.57
4) As long as a political leader enjoys majority support, he should implement his own agenda and disregard the view of the minority.	0.62	0.70	0.73	0.66	0.46	0.70	0.61	0.75	0.65
			*		*			*	
Eigen value	1.87	1.90	1.59	1.79	1.42	1.74	1.88	1.58	1.68
% Variance explained	46.7	47.5	39.7	44.7	35.5	43.4	47.0	39.7	42.0
Minimal Valid N	688	1151	1497	2097	1054	1200	1206	1534	10614

*Two factors are extracted in Korea, Mongolia and Thailand datasets, reported here is loadings on the first principal component factor

** : All items are recoded and adjusted in accordance to the authoritarian-democratic direction with a 1 to 4 scale.

Table 3: Pearson Correlation among political style scale with some selected variables

	<i>HK</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>PRC</i>	<i>Mong</i>	<i>Phil</i>	<i>TW</i>	<i>Thai</i>
Sex	-.0502	.0059	-.0118	-.0769*	-.0064	-.0485	-.0383	-.0632
Age	-.1766**	-.0344	-.0491	-.1798**	.1089**	.0242	-.0853*	.0043
Years of Education	.1477**	.0942*	.0383	.2282**	-.0702	.0424	.0695	.0101
Eval. of the economy today	-.0522	-.0263	-.0483	-.0343	-.0683	.0071	-.1109**	.0845**
Eval. of the economy past 5 yrs	-.0323	-.0464	-.0375	-.0084	-.1068**	-.0271	-.0598	.0559
Eval. of the economy next 5 yrs	-.0037	-.1075**	-.0952**	.0300	-.0427	.0345	-.0442	-.0748*
Eval. of family economy today	.0776	-.0382	-.0967**	.0490	.0197	.0567	-.0205	.0562
Eval. of family econ. past 5 yrs	.0332	-.0106	-.0415	-.0167	-.1587**	.0359	-.0317	.0779*
Eval. of family econ. next 5 yrs	.0456	-.0796	-.0638	.0505	-.0503	.0469	-.0380	-.0238
Interest in politics	.0353	-.0166	-.1054**	.0177	-.0430	.0159	.0637	-.0212
Eval. corruption situation	-.0309	-.0635	-.0277	-.0014	-.0463	-.0132	-.0371	.0204
Democratic values	.2880**	.3596**	.3384**	.2182**	.2178**	.2452**	.3038**	.2937**
Political efficacy	.0505	.1507**	.2158**	.0698*	.2637**	.1529**	.1191**	.0996**
Democratic legitimacy	.3592**	.4812**	.4089**	.3634**	.3166**	.3098**	.2974**	.4195**
Trust in Government	.2154**	.2357**	.2904**	.1202**	.2180**	.2148**	.1894**	.3043**
Minimal valid N	418	824	1489	1318	953	1179	901	1406

* p<.01; ** p<.001. All significant tests are two-tailed.