

**Attitudes Toward Democracy in Seven Countries :  
Dimensional Structure and Behavioral Correlates**

**Richard Gunther,**  
*The Ohio State University*

with **José Ramón Montero**







the one hand, or are largely undifferentiated, on the other, could be regarded as well within the realm of sterile academic debate were it not for the fact that scholars have asserted that regime support, stability and even survival is highly contingent on popular satisfaction with the performance of governments and, more broadly, democratic institutions. Weatherford (1987, 13), for example, states that "Over the long run, of course, legitimacy is wholly determined by policy performance." And Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson add that "The stability of representative democracy depends not just on the trend in satisfaction but also on the level of satisfaction" (1995, 342). And given the findings of numerous studies that the level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy is strongly associated with the degree of satisfaction with the current condition of the economy, coupled with the fact many new democratic regimes (particularly among countries of the former Soviet bloc) are or have been confronting extremely severe economic crises, they assert that the prospects for democratic stability and the very survival of these regimes may hinge on their capacity to solve intractable economic problems. For example, Adam Przeworski (1991, 95) wrote shortly after the collapse of Soviet Communism, "As everyone agrees, the eventual survival of the new democracies will depend to a large extent on their economic performance. And since many among them emerged in the midst of an unprecedented economic crisis, economic factors are against their survival." Some scholars have even suggested that the legitimacy of established Western democracies is increasingly dependent on their performance (see Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, 440).

Detailed case studies, however, cast doubt on such claims. Spain's new democracy, for example, became consolidated in the early 1980s (according to a broad consensus of opinion among scholars and politicians alike), at about the same time that its economy was passing through its most severe economic crisis. Despite widespread dislocation resulting from the dislocation associated with economic restructuring, and from unemployment rates that exceeded 20 percent, support for democracy in Spain rose to levels comparable to other West European democracies by the mid 1980s, and has remained solid ever since, despite subsequent economic difficulties arising out of a

profound decentralization of the state, political scandals and continuing Basque terrorism (see Maravall 1997, ch. 5). Extensive analysis of relevant survey data from Spain over a period spanning two decades, using several different analytical techniques, further revealed that these attitudes could not be regarded as constituting one single dimension. In fact, three distinctly different dimensions could be clearly defined conceptually and measured empirically: these are what we referred to regime legitimacy (which, out of deference to the terminology used in the introductory chapter of this volume, we shall here call democratic support), political discontent, and a third set of attitudinal orientations that can be regarded as part of a broad syndrome of political disaffection. We also found that the origins of these attitudes, their stability or volatility over time, their behavioral correlates, and their implications for the survival of democratic regimes and the "quality of democracy" are distinctly different.

In this chapter we present the results of a parallel exploratory analysis of other newly established democratic systems to determine if the structure of attitudinal dimensionality can be found in these political systems as well. As we shall see, a replication of this analysis in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Hungary and Uruguay produces identical findings. We will also see that attitudinal clustering in Bulgaria differs somewhat from the three dimensions found in the other five countries, while Chile is markedly different in one important respect: in that latter case, support for democracy and satisfaction with the political and economic situation are highly correlated. We shall argue that these departures from the previously observed patterns are the products of considerable differences in the nature of the transitions to democracy in these countries, and in particular, of the roles in that process played by key political elites and parties. And from a methodological point of view, we will also claim that many of the confusing and contradictory findings in this field of research are the product of improper inferences drawn from the use of inappropriate indicators based upon an unwarranted assumption that the many commonly used empirical indicators are interchangeable, if not conceptually equivalent. Some scholars have used what we regard as measures of satisfaction in their analyses (e.g.,

Fuchs and Klingemann 1995, 427; Fuchs and Roider 1996, 63-64; Anderson and Guillory 1997; and Anderson 1998b). Others have explicitly asserted that these are adequate and sufficient indicators of system support "at a relatively low level of generalization" (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995, 330), or have argued that indicators of satisfaction are equivalent to, interchangeable with, measures of legitimacy (Tóka 1995, 359; Weil 1989, 691), have equated dissatisfaction with political alienation (Lockerbie 1993). Some have used terms that we believe are firmly rooted in the disaffection syndrome (e.g., Warnerford 1984; Craig 1993; Fuchs 1993), while others (e.g., Franz 1986) shift back and forth between dissatisfaction and disaffection measures. And yet, in most cases, they refer to "legitimacy," "system support," "regime support," or simply "political support," to which they commonly add speculative comments about stability and prospects for survival of the democratic regime.

Our conceptual differentiation among these three sets of attitudes towards democracy leads us to a second point of departure from established theoretical perspectives regarding the origins of support for democracy. The two primary theoretical perspectives contend that "diffuse support" for democracy is a product of childhood socialization processes (Easton and Dennis 1969) or, alternatively, of instrumental judgments of government performance (e.g., Rogowski 1974). The fact that we base our analysis on data collected in countries whose citizens have lived under both authoritarian and democratic regimes allows us to test the relative impact on democratic support of socialization influences and of assessments of economic and political assessments (Mishler and Rose 2002; Weil 2000). If early childhood socialization were the only source of these attitudes, then we would find that the new democracies of Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria and Portugal could not have been consolidated or be regarded as legitimate by a majority of the population since most of their citizens had been socialized under authoritarian or post-totalitarian regimes whose formal socialization efforts were explicitly anti-democratic. And even though authoritarian interludes in Uruguay, Greece and Chile were so brief as to not have dominated the childhood socialization of such a large portion of these countries' populations,

we should expect to find deep divisions of opinion concerning fundamental support for democracy. With regard to the "instrumental assessment of performance" hypothesis, if citizens were to base their support for democracy exclusively or primarily on their evaluations of changing and (given the economic downturns experienced by most countries in the early 1990s) generally unfavorable economic and political conditions, we should expect to find that democratic support would fluctuate over time and would be quite weak in several of the new democracies examined here. In accord with the childhood socialization hypothesis, we will find that some attitudes (particularly those belonging to a cluster that we will call dissatisfaction) do appear to have been the product of early socialization, and have remained remarkably durable despite major changes in the political environment. Similarly, consistent with the "instrumental assessment" hypothesis, we will see that some political attitudes (pertaining to what we call discontent) fluctuate substantially over time in close relationship with changing economic and political circumstances. However, neither of these predictions is borne out with regard to basic support for democracy in the countries examined in this study. We fundamentally disagree with these "classic" arguments, at least with regard to political regimes that have undergone transitions to democracy. Instead, we will see that democratic support or legitimacy is much more profoundly affected by political learning later in life, particularly during the crucial early stages of the transition to democracy. In short, we shall argue that these mass-level attitudinal underpinnings of stable democracy are the products of adult learning or socialization processes that are closely linked to the behavior of political elites and their supporting partisan organizations during critical, formative stages of the democratization process. In short, dissatisfaction has its origins in early socialization, and discontent reflects assessments of the current condition of the country and the government's responsibility for it, but democratic support is in large measure a product of the varying stands taken by key political elites during critical phases of the transition to democracy.

This chapter will also examine some of the behavioral consequences and theoretical implications of these attitudinal dimensions. Perhaps the most important of these ramifications

involves the oft-stated assertion that democratic consolidation depends on the condition of the economy. This common claim is based on the proposition that democratic support is the product of satisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions and, in turn, with the condition of the economy. We test this proposition by examining measures of association between items tapping democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and satisfaction with the performance of democracy and with the economy, on the other. We will also explore a more modest and less regime-threatening behavioral correlate of discontent, based on the simple notion that those who are dissatisfied with the performance of a democratic government will express their displeasure in a manner fully consistent with classic democratic theory--by voting against the incumbent government. We then turn our attention to a more extreme behavioral correlate of a lack of basic support for democracy that would have disruptive implications for the future of democracy in a particular country (and that is commonly regarded as a symptom of a lack of democratic consolidation of a regime--see Linz 1978a; Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996): active support for anti-system parties. A strong association between a lack of widespread democratic legitimacy and support for anti-system parties would reinforce the construct validity of our conceptualization of legitimacy or diffuse support for democracy--indicating that it is, indeed, a meaningful concept with real implications for governability and the persistence of new democratic regimes.

Finally, we will explore some behavioral consequences of political disaffection. As we shall argue, one facet of the broader disaffection syndrome is marginalization from the political system, manifested in low levels of involvement in democratic politics. The extensive battery of "political intermediation" variables included in CNEP data makes it possible for us to examine a broad array of types of involvement with the political system--from the more active, such as work for a political party or participating in campaign activities, to the more passive, as measured by the frequency with which an individual follows politics through news coverage in the print and broadcast media. As we shall see, political disaffection is strongly associated with low levels of interest in, exposure to and

information about politics, to infrequent discussion of politics with peers, and to low levels of organizational membership. At the same time, and somewhat surprisingly, it does not consistently lead to low levels of participation in elections. Instead, the overall effect of widespread disaffection is to undermine the "quality of democracy," insofar as large numbers of uninformed and uninvolved "citizens" nonetheless cast ballots to elect national governments.

### Three Concepts and Seven Countries

The first two concepts that we shall explore—democratic support and performance satisfaction or its obverse, political discontent—are roughly similar to Easton's distinction between diffuse and specific support. Democratic support pertains to citizens' belief that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. This is the key attitudinal component of regime legitimacy. Such beliefs focus on the political regime in the aggregate, and should be expected to be stable over time and immune from the influence of such factors as the popularity of the government and partisanship—specifically, the correspondence between the citizen's partisan preference and the party of the incumbent government. Democratic support is a relative concept; no system should be expected to be regarded as fully legitimate in the eyes of each and every citizen, and the intensity of positive support for these institutions varies from one person to another. Accordingly, legitimacy may be considered to be "the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, political institutions are better than any others that might be established" (Linz 1988, 65; 1978a, 16). This idea is also relative insofar as it refers to the belief that a democratic political system is the "least bad" of all forms of government. As Linz (1978b, 18) has written, "ultimately, democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular juncture, no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals."

In contrast, political discontent is based on "peoples' judgments about the day-to-day actions of

political leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes" (Kornberg and Clarke 1992, 20). In other words, political dissatisfaction is based from citizens' evaluations of the performance of the regime or authorities, as well as of their political outcomes (Farr, Barnes and Heunks 1979). In contrast with fundamental support for democracy, it should thus be expected to fluctuate over time in accord with the government's performance, the condition of the society and economy, or the performance of key political institutions. And since it is focused on partisan political leaders and the governments they lead, it would not be surprising that, other things being equal, citizens supporting the same party as that of the incumbent government would be more positive in their assessments than those who voted for the opposition.

The third cluster of attitudes that we shall explore, political disaffection, is conceptually distinct from both of those described above, although it is often indiscriminately lumped together with measures of citizen support for and satisfaction with democracy. Following DiPalma (1970, 30; also see Torcal 2002a, ch. 3), we regard political disaffection as a certain estrangement of members of the polity from both its core political institutions and, more generally, from politics. As described by Torcal (2002c, 15), political disaffection refers to "the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime. This syndrome is characterized by a number of specific symptoms including disinterest in politics, a sense of personal inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, a general sense of detachment from the political system and/or disengagement from its most relevant institutions (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). While this syndrome shares with the discontent dimension a negative attitude towards politics, it is different in one important respect. Political discontent may be regarded as the result of a discrepancy between generally positive expectations regarding the political system, on the one hand, and a negative evaluation of the way it is currently functioning, on the other. In contrast, political disaffection is a reflection of a fundamentally distrusting and suspicious vision of political life. And

unlike discontent (which should be expected to ebb and flow in accordance with current assessments of the performance of incumbents or democratic institutions), attitudes of disaffection are likely to have been fixed at some stage of the socialization process, and should subsequently be more resistant to change. In addition, while discontent is usually charged with a partisan component (with supporters of opposition parties generally more critical of the performance of the government and dissatisfied with its policy outputs than those who identify with the incumbent party), disaffection is more far-reaching and indiscriminate in its objects of negativity. In short, the disaffected hold political attitudes that are distinctly different from those who have been referred to as "satisfied democrats" (Klingemann 1999, 54; Hofferbert and Klingemann 2001).

In an earlier empirical study of Spain (Moro, Gunther and Torcal 1997), we found strong evidence that these three dimensions--political satisfaction, disaffection and democratic legitimacy--are empirically distinct.<sup>9</sup> Analyzing survey data in several different ways, we concluded that the conceptual distinctions described above are clearly reflected in Spanish citizens' responses to the relevant questionnaire items. First, we examined time-series data over two decades and found that two different measures of democratic legitimacy (both of which are used in this chapter) were quite stable over time: support for democracy rose from a comparatively low level in the late 1970s and early 1980s to one comparable to those of established European democracies by the mid 1980s, and remained remarkably constant thereafter. This finding provides empirical corroboration that Spanish democracy had become consolidated at the massive by the mid 1980s (as argued in Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros 1995; Linz and Stepan, *chapter 6* elsewhere). Attitudes falling within the disaffection syndrome were also quite stable over this same time period. In contrast, measures of discontent fluctuated substantially over this same period. What is noteworthy is that several different measures of satisfaction were strikingly parallel to one another in their evolution over time regardless of the wording of the questionnaire item, whether the face content of the survey item focused on satisfaction with "the way democracy is functioning in Spain," with the performance of the

incumbent government, with the political situation of the country, or even with the current condition of the economy, all measures of satisfaction were positive at the time the new democracy was coming into existence around 1977. They all fell to a very low level in 1981 (which coincided with the depths of Spain's economic and political crises) but all rose to a peak around 1990 following nearly a decade of stable Socialist government and strong economic growth, and declined again as a series of scandals beset that same incumbent Socialist government and the economy slid into recession in 1992 and 1993; and they all then rose as the economy recovered in the mid 1990s. The sharp contrast between the stability over time of attitudes pertaining to democratic legitimacy and disaffection, on the one hand, and the considerable fluctuation of disaffection with the performance of democracy/the incumbent government/the condition of the economy/etc., on the other, provided prima facie evidence of the distinctiveness of these attitudinal dimensions.

These findings were further corroborated by an analysis of the evolution of these attitudes over a period of 14 years among various age cohorts (Torcal, Gunther and Torcal 1997; and Torcal 2000a, ch.7). Strong "period effects" were observed on all age groups with regard to measures of satisfaction, suggesting that they fluctuated over time among Spaniards of all ages in accord with short-term economic and political conditions. In contrast, the evolution of attitudes tapping into the legitimacy and disaffection dimensions were characterized by strong cohort effects: once Spanish democracy was consolidated (around 1982), they changed little over time. But they also reflected consistent differences among age cohorts, suggesting that such attitudes were influenced by early socialization experiences--which varied enormously, ranging from the violence and polarization of the civil war era to four decades of authoritarianism to full democracy beginning in 1977. Moreover, dimensional analysis based upon cross-sectional surveys further confirmed the distinctiveness of these three dimensions.

To what extent do these conceptual distinctions also find empirical corroboration from analyses of other new democracies? Given a lack of comparable time-series data for the other countries in this

current study, this cross-national analysis will be preliminary and nonpartisan in its testing of these propositions: it will be based primarily on a combination of factor analyses (both "exploratory" and "confirmatory") and measures of bivariate association among the relevant political attitudes and their hypothesized behavioral consequences in several of the 13 countries currently included within the CNEP,<sup>12</sup> as well in Portugal.

Post-election surveys undertaken in Spain (1993), Greece (1996), Uruguay (1994), Bulgaria (1996), Portugal (2002), Hungary (1998) and Chile (1993) included identical or very similar items measuring the three core concepts: democratic support, political discontent and political disaffection. (In addition, the inclusion of some of these items in the 1985 Four Nation Study, and the 1996 Italian and 2000 Chilean CNEP surveys makes it possible to test one crucial hypothesis, although so many of the other items were not included in these surveys as to preclude broader comparisons with the other countries in this analysis.) Not only does the geographical, institutional and social diversity of the cases analyzed in this study facilitate our effort to test the generalizability of our earlier findings from Spain, but the greatly different historical experiences and democratization trajectories give us a better opportunity to speculate about the origins of these democratic attitudes in widely varying contexts, as well as to explore their behavioral consequences and implications for regime stability. As can be seen in Table 1, moreover, these countries spanned the full range of democracies arrayed in accord with our core measures of democratic legitimacy, with Greece near the very top in terms of the extent of support for democracy, while support for democracy in Bulgaria is much lower. The Portuguese data (derived, as noted, from a 2002 survey that was not part of the CNEP project) utilized a response format that precludes a direct comparison of marginals with these others, but the overwhelming level of support for democracy in Portugal would have placed it near the top of this rank-ordering of countries.<sup>13</sup>

[Table 1]

The surveys conducted in Spain, Uruguay and Chile included as a measure of support for

democracy the respondent's agreement or disagreement with the proposition that "Democracy is the best political system for a country like ours," which is labeled DemBes in the following tables. The other surveys also included a second measure of democratic support, DemAuth, which asks respondents to choose among the following three statements: "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government;" "Under some circumstances, authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system;" and "For people like me, one regime is the same as another" (with the latter recoded to fall between the other two as an intermediate category). Most of the CNEP surveys also included three different measures of discontent: these are DemSat (the respondent's degree of dissatisfaction with "the way democracy is functioning in Spain [...Greece, Uruguay, etc.]), PolitSat (the level of discontent over "the political situation of the country"); and EconSat (the extent of dissatisfaction with "the economic situation of the country"). Three indicators of disaffection were also included in the questionnaires administered in each of these countries: PolComp reflects agreement or disagreement with the statement, "Generally, politics is so complicated that people like me cannot understand what is happening;" PolCare is the respondent's agreement or disagreement with the proposition that "Politicians do not worry much about what people like me think;" and PolInflu taps into the respondent's belief in or rejection of the idea that "People like me do not have any influence over what the government does."

Spain, Greece and Uruguay

Our analysis begins with an exploration of the dimensionality of these various attitudes towards democracy. Table 2 presents the results of different approaches to analyzing the dimensional structures underpinning the clustering of these attitudes and behaviors in Spain, Uruguay and Greece. In the matrix represented by figures appearing in the first six or seven columns are measures of bivariate association (Tau-b) among only a few of these items. The final two or three columns in this table display the loadings that emerged from an exploratory factor analysis of all of these items following a Varimax rotation of the principal component solution. It is clear from data for all three of these

countries that Factor I is made up of items involving political discontent. As we hypothesized, all three measures of dissatisfaction belong to this cluster, the factor loadings and inter-item measures of association are all strong and statistically significant (at the .001 level or better). It is also noteworthy that the degree of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in all three countries was strongly linked to assessments of the economic and political conditions of the country. In sharp contrast, basic support for democracy, as measured by DemBest (where available) DemAuth, is weakly related to dissatisfaction with the economic or political situation of the country. In Uruguay, there is no statistically significant relationship between support for democracy and either of these two measures of discontent, while in Spain and Greece the relationships are quite weak (ranging between Tau-b scores of -.06 and -.11). Dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in each country is moderately associated with our measures of support (with Tau-b scores ranging from -.14 to -.22), but the factor analyses indicate that support for democracy and the discontent measures are not part of the same attitudinal domain. In Spain, DemBest simply fails to fit with the other items in the discontent cluster, while in both Uruguay and Greece the measures of democratic support constitute their own separate attitudinal dimension. It is also clear that, as hypothesized above, the various dissatisfaction items cluster to make up a third distinct attitudinal dimension. The weakness of the relationships between the dissatisfaction measures and those that relate to democratic support is particularly noteworthy.

[Table 2]

In order to subject these hypotheses to rigorous empirical tests, a "confirmatory factor analysis" was performed using the same variables clustered in accordance with the three latent factors described above. The results of these analyses confirmed the same dimensional structure for all three countries. All of the individual variables were found to be linked to one another as in the initial clusters that emerged from the exploratory factor analysis whose results are presented in Table 2. Moreover, the correlations among the factors further revealed that these clusters are independent of one another: these inter-factor correlations ranged between .00 and .09. Given our particular interest

in the relationship between discontent and fundamental support for democracy, is most noteworthy that these correlations were negligible in all three cases: .07 for Spain, .04 for Uruguay, and .07 for Greece. Overall, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) "goodness-of-fit" statistic reveals that these three-factor models adequately capture the nature of the relationships among these variables: the RMSEA statistic for Spain is .055, for Uruguay is .067, and for Greece is .054.

It is important to note that these findings are highly significant for theories of democratic consolidation: in none of these countries is dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation of the country strongly associated with fundamental support for democracy. Even the bivariate link between democratic legitimacy and the broader measure of dissatisfaction with the "performance of democracy" is only of moderate strength, and is not located in any of these factor analyses within the same attitudinal domain as support for democracy.

Portugal, Bulgaria and Hungary

To what extent do these same findings hold up in other countries, particularly those that have suffered worse economic and/or political crises than Spain, Greece or Uruguay? In contrast with the relatively tranquil transitions to democracy in Spain, Uruguay and Greece, the downfall of the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship in Portugal was followed by over a year of revolutionary chaos and tumult. Indeed, it was not until a year and a half later that a counter-coup by more moderate military officers set Portugal on the path towards democracy and democratic consolidation. As can be seen in Table 3, the pattern of relationships among these individual variables and dimensional factors is precisely the same as we saw above. There is no statistically significant relationship between dissatisfaction with the condition of the economy or the performance of the incumbent government, on the one hand, and an item that is quite similar to Democracy, on the other. And the degree of association between basic support for democracy and dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy (-.09) is significantly weaker than we saw in Spain, Uruguay and Greece. Similarly, the two disaffection measures included in this survey were not substantially associated with either the

democratic support or political discontent measures. Confirmatory factor analysis of these data are supportive of these findings: while the absence of some key variables and slight differences in item wording lead to weaker closeness of fit with the three-factor model than we have observed above (the RMSEA statistic is .090), and the factor loadings on items within each cluster are lower than we observed in analyses of Spain, Greece and Uruguay, the correlations among the Discontent, Disaffection and Democratic support factors are extraordinarily low, ranging between  $-.01$  and  $+.01$ . Among these findings, the latter data relating to the separability of the three dimensions is the most significant theoretically.

Unlike the democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, several East European countries experienced profound economic collapse at the same time they were undergoing their respective post-Soviet political transformations. One might suspect that, even though economic recessions, periods of stagnation or (in the case of Spain) persistently high levels of unemployment created social strains and contributed to political discontent in the Southern European and Latin American countries, the economic circumstances of most individuals were not so severe as to shake their support for democracy. Per capita income levels remained relatively stable in Spain, Greece and Uruguay, and a social-welfare safety net was already in existence in each country, helping to ease the economic strains on most individuals. What about the relationship between economic or political discontent and support for democracy in an Eastern European country whose economy has suffered a severe collapse, and where sociopolitical conditions have deteriorated substantially? The case of Bulgaria provides an excellent opportunity to reexamine the relationship between economic and political dissatisfaction and support for democracy. Between 1989 and 1994 per capita income in Bulgaria decreased by 57 percent, the country's industrial output and total exports fell by 50 percent, and agricultural production by more than 35 percent (Vassilev 2000, 219). Prima facie evidence of the severity of the impact of this economic collapse on personal well-being can be seen in the reduction in the average life-span from 70.9 years in the late 1980s to 67.6 years in the late 1990s (Vassilev 2000,

226). And this economic crisis was accompanied by a crime wave and a crippling of basic services provided by the state. What has been the impact of this economic decline on support for democracy?

To be sure, the aggregate level of support for democracy in Bulgaria is lower than is to be found in most other democracies, as we saw in the margin from DemBest and DemAuth that were presented in Table 1. These two measures, which are strongly associated with each other,  $Tau-b=.47$ ) reveal that support for democracy in Bulgaria was relatively weak in the mid 1990s (although it is preferred over other types of political regime by most Bulgarians), while support for an authoritarian alternative under some circumstances was disturbingly strong.

The data presented in Table 3, however, indicate that the relationships between dissatisfaction with the economic and the political situation of Bulgaria, on the one hand, and two measures of support for democracy, on the other, are not only not statistically significant at the .05 level, but they are of the wrong sign! And the correlation between the latent factors of discontent and democratic support that were generated by the confirmatory factor analysis was just .02--a figure that was lower than comparable statistics for Spain, Uruguay and Greece. To some extent, the weakness of the relationship between support for democracy and dissatisfaction with the status of the economy is affected by a relative lack of variance on the EconSit item: in 1996, 35 percent of respondents rated the economic situation of the country as "bad" and 61 percent "very bad." Accordingly, we re-ran this analysis using a different measure of economic satisfaction, about which there were more diverse opinions: an assessment of the respondent's own economic situation. This slightly strengthened the relationship, to a  $Tau-b$  of  $-.11$  with DemBest and  $-.13$  with DemAuth. Still, the overall conclusion is that the link between support for democracy and assessment of the economic situation is surprisingly weak.

[Table 3]

The Bulgarian data also reveal that those attitudes that we hypothesized would fall within a distinct political disaffection cluster do, indeed, inhabit a separate attitudinal domain, and are only weakly (or not at all) associated with those making up the political discontent and democratic support.

This can be seen in the results of the exploratory factor analysis presented in Table 3, and also in the extremely low correlations between dissatisfaction and the two other latent factors in the confirmatory factor analysis: -.01 with discontent, and -.03 with the democratic support cluster.

As we saw in Spain, Greece, Uruguay and Portugal, dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in Bulgaria has somewhat longer bivariate linkages with each of our two measures of democratic legitimacy, but these relationships (Table 3) are still only of moderate strength (Table 3). Perhaps most importantly, factor loadings reveal that support for democracy and satisfaction with the political and economic situation of the country constitute two distinctly different attitudinal domains, with DemSat straddling the two dimensions. Given the logical overlap between the face content of that item (satisfaction with the performance of democracy) and our measures of democratic legitimacy (the belief that democracy is the best form of government for the country), this empirical overlap is not surprising. Accordingly, the RMSEA statistic for the three-factor model in Bulgaria (.081) reveals that the model fits these patterns of relationships among variables somewhat less well than we saw above in the Spanish, Uruguayan, Greek and Portuguese analyses, but that this model still provides a reasonable mapping of these relationships. It is important to note, however, that the correlations among three latent factors that resulted from the confirmatory factor analysis (ranging between -.03 and .02) are even lower than we saw in those three other countries, reflecting an even higher level of independence among those dimensions, and the factor loadings among the variables within each cluster are acceptably strong. In short, the Bulgarian case provides additional evidence of the empirical separability of these three attitudinal dimensions.

To what extent does Hungary resemble Bulgaria in this regard? The case of Hungary provides another opportunity to explore the dimensionality of democratic attitudes in a post-Communist country that has also had to confront serious economic difficulties (although by no means as severe as in Bulgaria) simultaneous with democratization. In this case, the key elites of the non-democratic predecessor regime initiated and willingly collaborated in far-reaching processes of economic and

political liberalization, as well as with the early stages of the democratization process itself. Accordingly, we can take advantage of this fundamental difference in the transition process to effectively manipulate one of our central explanatory variables--the formative role of political elites.

Unfortunately, none of our standard "satisfaction" items was included in this survey. The closest to our item tapping satisfaction with the economic situation of the country is a question (EconCon) measuring the respondent's confidence that the economy will improve in the coming year. The Hungarian questionnaire also had an item dealing with the respondent's level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy. As a means of teasing out the satisfaction dimension, a measure of the respondent's confidence that his/her personal situation will improve over the coming year (RespCon) was included in the analysis. Despite these differences in the face content of the satisfaction items, the data presented in Table 3 are perfectly compatible with our earlier findings: the two economic optimism measures are highly intercorrelated.

As can be seen in Table 3, the results of exploratory factor analysis and the bivariate measures of association clearly indicate that the two items in the satisfaction/optimism cluster are dimensionally distinct from those dealing with democratic support. The independence of these two clusters of attitudes is further reflected in the extremely low correlation between these two latent factors that was generated by the confirmatory factor analysis (.02). The clustering of attitudes constituting the disaffection dimension is also clear and quite consistent with our earlier findings. The latent factor of disaffection items correlates with those of democratic support and discontent at extremely low levels--.04 and .02, respectively. And neither the discontent nor disaffection item clusters is strongly related to either two measures of democratic legitimacy, which clearly constitute a third attitudinal dimension in the factor analysis. Thus, the three-dimensional structure of these attitudes found in Spain, Uruguay, Greece, Portugal, and Bulgaria also emerges from our analysis of Hungary. Indeed, the RMSEA statistic for Hungary (.044) indicates a closer fit with the three-factor model than in the first three countries we have analyzed.

## Chile

It is only in the case of Chile in 1993 that we encounter evidence suggesting that support for democracy is significantly linked with the items in the discontent cluster. As can be seen in Table 4, the bivariate measures of association (Tau-b) linking the belief that democracy is the best form of government for Chile and dissatisfaction with the economy, with the political situation of the country and with the performance of democracy ranged between -.12 and -.24, and the exploratory factor analysis placed DemBest in the same cluster as those satisfaction measures.

[Table 4]

A confirmatory factor analysis testing our three-dimensional model, however, produced strikingly different results. While the correlation between the latent factors of democratic support and discontent is slightly higher (.10) than we found with the other cases, the overall pattern of correlations among latent factors (summarized in Table 5) definitely reveals the same clustering of items as in the other countries. Most striking in this regard, the RMSEA statistic produced by the Chilean confirmatory factor analysis (.031) indicates better fit with the three-factor model than in those other countries.

[Table 5]

Why are the findings of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for Chile inconsistent? One potential explanation lies in the combination of certain unusual characteristics of Chile's transition to democracy and the particular alignment of political forces at the time of the Chilean election survey. As we shall argue in the following section, these attitudinal patterns are to some extent the product of a deep cleavage in the Chilean polity separating those on the center and left with strongly pro-democratic attitudes, who tended overwhelmingly to vote for parties belonging to the Concertación coalition, from those on the right, who harbored reservations about the merits of democracy, favorably evaluated the economic accomplishments achieved under the military dictatorship, and gave their electoral support to candidates and parties that are generally sympathetic towards the Pinochet regime (Torcal and

Mainwaring 2003; Tironi and Agüero 1999). As we shall further argue, measures of discontent are strongly associated with one's partisan preferences: supporters of the incumbent party (in any democratic system) tend to be much more satisfied with the political and economic conditions of the country than are those who support the opposition party. We conclude that the link in Chile between low levels of support for democracy and dissatisfaction with various performance indicators is an artifact of the particular alignment of political forces at the time of this survey. Specifically, the pro-Pinochet party which consistently attracted votes from those who were not supportive of democracy was also the principal party of opposition; accordingly, supporters of this semi-loyal or antisystem party were predisposed towards discontent and dissatisfaction with politics and the economy as a reflection of that party's opposition status, thereby producing a significant correlation between the discontent and democratic support attitudinal dimensions. A broader implication of this argument is that many of these patterns of mass-level attitudes are strongly affected by the strategies and behavior of political elites and parties, particularly during crucial stages of the transition to democracy (see Torcal and Mainwaring 2003).

### Behavioral Correlates and/or Consequences

A more far-reaching examination of the correlates of these attitudes, especially those involving overt political behavior or with proto-behavioral implications, is important for several reasons. First, such additional data can strengthen (or undermine) the construct validity of the concepts that we delineated earlier in this paper. Second, these data speak directly to the most devastating of questions in the social sciences: "so what?" If we were to find that those holding one set of attitudes behaved in a manner indistinguishable from those with the opposite orientations, the very value of studying these aspects of political culture might be called into question. Third, and most importantly, empirical data concerning these behavioral or proto-behavioral correlates makes possible to explore some of the implications of such attitudes for the quality, the performance, and perhaps even the survival, of democratic regimes.

The first step in this stage of the analysis was to construct scales based upon the items that the preceding analysis confirmed are located on the attitudinal dimension. Accordingly, a Discontent scale was constructed out of responses to the EconSit, PolitSit and DemSat items, and a second scale was created by adding together responses to the Disaffection measures, PolComp, NoInflu and DontCare. One behavioral and one proto-behavioral measure was used in this analysis to distinguish between ballots in favor of the incumbent party, on the one hand, and support for all other parties, or blank ballots, on the other. Andolve is a scale dealing with the respondent's degree of involvement with politics. It is made up of one item measuring the frequency with which the respondent tries "to convince friends, relatives or co-workers to share [her] point of view;" a second, which is itself a multi-item scale gauging the respondent's ability to correctly identify prominent and not-so-prominent political figures; and a third tapping into the respondent's self-reported level of interest in politics. These behavioral or quasi-behavioral measures were included in Tau-b correlation matrices and factor analyses along with three types of attitudes towards democracy.

Table 6 presents the results of this analysis for Spain, Uruguay and Greece. As in the preceding tables, the first four or five columns present the bivariate Tau-b relationships, and the final two or three the factor loadings resulting from a Varimax rotation of the principal component solution. The results are remarkably similar for all three countries. Consistent with the theoretical delineation of concepts with which we began this study, satisfaction with the performance-of-democracy/the-political-situation-of-the-country/the-condition-of-the-economy is highly partisan in character, and is clearly associated with support for the incumbent government (as was also reported in many studies, such as Anderson and Guillory 1997; and Anderson and Tverdova 2001). As cognitive consistency theory would hypothesize, those who cast ballots in favor of the governing party are much more likely to assess these conditions favorably than those who supported opposition parties. One cannot, however, determine the direction of causality of this relationship on the basis of these data alone: it is not clear if the respondent's prior partisan preferences (which should be strongly linked to the

decision to vote for the governing party (or the opposition) color his or her feelings of satisfaction with the performance of the government/economy, etc., or whether dissatisfaction with the state of the polity or the economy leads the individual to cast a vote "to throw the bums out," as classic democratic theory would dictate. In either case, it is quite clear that discontent (with the situation of the economy, with the political situation of the country and/or with the performance of democracy) is strongly associated with a vote against the incumbent party. And, consistent with the results of the earlier item-by-item analysis, the discontent scale is not strongly associated with support for democracy (with Tau-b figures ranging between .02 and -.16), and, moreover, is located on a separate attitudinal dimension.

[Table 6]

Also in accord with our conceptualization of these three clusters of attitudes towards democracy, the principal proto-behavioral correlate of the disaffection scale is a low level of involvement in politics--both in the attitudinal sense (as measured by self-reported interest in politics) and behaviorally (as measured by the frequency of efforts to convince others of the wisdom of one's political preferences, and by the respondent's amount of political information). In the concluding section of this chapter, we will explore the impact of disaffection on involvement with or exposure to the three basic types of political intermediation.

The data presented in Table 7 reveal precisely the same patterns of association among these attitudinal dimensions in Portugal and Hungary. In both countries, discontent is strongly associated with a propensity to vote against the incumbent party, while disaffection is equally strongly associated with low levels of political involvement. And in neither of these countries is there is close association between discontent and support for democracy: no statistically significant relationship between variables in these clusters can be found in Portugal, while in Hungary the association between discontent and our two measures of democratic support are weak (as indicated by Tau-B coefficients of -.07 and -.10).

[Table 7]

To this point, we have seen that analysis of data from Spain, Uruguay, Greece, Portugal and Hungary reveal strong relationships linking discontent with voting against the governing party, and disaffection with low levels of political involvement. But no behavioral correlates of low levels of support for democracy have been identified. Table 8, however, some more intriguing and suggestive patterns begin to emerge. The most striking findings are that support for democracy in Bulgaria and Chile is strongly linked to votes cast for parties closely identified with the non-democratic predecessor regime. In contrast, support for the Socialist (former Communist) party of Hungary is not at all linked to overall attitudes regarding the legitimacy of democracy, as reflected in statistically insignificant Tau-B correlations of +.01 and -.04 with the two democratic support measures. How can we explain cross-national differences of this kind?

[Table 8]

These differing patterns, we contend, can be accounted for by the "transition effect" hypothesized by Torcal (2002a and 2002b) that is, the strategies and behavior of prominent political elites and organizations during particularly salient stages in the democratization process may have a major impact on the political attitudes of their respective cohorts of followers. In both Bulgaria and Chile, the leaders of the former non-democratic regime resisted the democratization process (at least initially), and this had a lasting impact on attitudes toward democracy among supporters of their successor parties, even long after the latter had gone to great lengths to demonstrate their loyalty to the new democratic regime. In the other countries, in contrast, figures prominently associated with the former dictatorships either became completely irrelevant to the conduct of national politics in the democratic era (e.g., the military officers who dominated the Uruguayan junta), or actively collaborated with the transition to and construction of the new democracy (e.g., political elites of the authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain who became leaders of democratic conservative parties and did loyally participate in the new democratic system).

The decision to vote for or against the Bulgarian Socialist (former Communist) Party is more

strongly associated with support for democracy than with any of the three items in the discontent cluster. One interpretation of this finding is that the anti-democratic stance of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and that party's extremely late democratic transition have had a lasting impact on attitudes towards democracy among both its loyal supporters and opponents. Bulgaria's pre-democratic regime remained harshly authoritarian, precisely, post-totalitarian, in the terminology of Linz and Stepan [1996, ch. 7]) until shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall. Despite pressures from below and from sectors within the Communist party itself, the government of Todor Zhivkov refused to allow significant political liberalization, even, in 1988, to the extent of purging from the Politburo several prominent proponents of the kinds of reforms introduced in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev. Indeed, no significant progress towards political liberalization or democratization occurred until after Zhivkov's ouster from power on November 10, 1989. It was only after his replacement by more moderate and reformist Communist leaders (who subsequently won Bulgaria's first democratic election) that rapid liberalization and a peaceful transition to democracy could take place (see Karasimeonov 1990). What is most surprising is that the negative relationship between attitudes towards democracy and support for the former Communist party remained strong in the mid 1990s, by which time the Bulgarian Socialist Party had established a consistent record for loyal competition within and support for the democratic regime; in contrast, its principal rival, the UDF (which grew out of the anti-communist opposition), has sometimes engaged in disruptive semi-loyal behavior (Vassilev 2000). Despite the BSP's commitment to democracy, the reluctance of UDF elites to accept the legitimacy of a "formal democracy" governed by BSP, and its semi-loyal strategies pursued during critical states of the transition to democracy appear to have had a lasting impact on the political attitudes of Bulgarians. To this must be added the legacy of post-totalitarianism and the extraordinary weakness of civil society, as well as a notable political strain of attitudes among both masses and elites (see Linz and Stepan 1996, 341 and 343).

The Chilean data reveal a pattern similar to that in Bulgaria: support for the presidential

candidate most closely associated with the regime of the Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, was strongly associated with a lack of attitudinal support for democracy. This is not surprising, given the extremely unusual trajectory of the Chilean transition to democracy, particularly in its early stages. At the time of our 1993 survey, the former authoritarian dictator was still an active player in the political life of the country, and Pinochet was successful in vetoing every policy designed by the Concertación to establish civilian supremacy over the military and, more generally, made no secret of his skepticism about the value of democracy. From the very beginning, the transition to democracy was only reluctantly tolerated by Pinochet, who continued to cling to positions of power for nearly a decade following the 1989 election. Pinochet had never intended to liberalize the political system, and only initiated the transition to democracy inadvertently, unexpectedly losing a plebescite that he had anticipated would further strengthen his grip on power. Even after the first democratic elections and the election of a civilian president (Patricio Aylwin), he retained control over the armed forces, which enabled him to constrain government policy decisions and crudely threaten the democratic regime from time to time--all of which led Linz and Stepan (1996, 206) to describe Chile's transition as "the most democratically 'disloyal' transfer of [any of the Southern European and Southern Cone cases]." Furthermore, upon stepping down from his military post in 1998, Pinochet hoped to continue to influence Chilean politics as self-appointed Senator for Life, in alliance with a bloc of non-elected Senators and those of right-wing parties. Pinochet's stubborn refusal to withdraw from politics and his occasional anti-system threats meant that Chile's transition to democracy would be protracted and would remain unconsolidated: indeed, prior to the abandonment of reserved powers over the military, Chile's regime could not be regarded as fully democratic. Moreover, throughout the first decade of Chile's restored democracy, the political system was deeply divided by cleavage separating parties that were fully democratic in their ideologies and behavior (the parties that made up the governing Concertación alliance--including the Christian Democrats and Socialists), on the one hand, and those that were semi-loyal and (until 1999) pro-Pinochet (Fal and Mainwaring 2003). It is likely that the

extremely high salience of this political cleavage helps to explain the normal pattern of relationships among the attitudinal variables analyzed in Table 4, as well as the association between vote and support for democracy in Table 8. In accord with this interpretation, non-democratic rightists looked favorably on the rapid economic development of the Pinochet era and disparaged the economic slowdown of the early 1990s (under governments of the anti-Pinochet Concertación coalition). Conversely, supporters of the incumbent Concertación parties perceived the economic and political situation more favorably. Accordingly, we contend that the stronger linkage between satisfaction with economic and political conditions, on the one hand, and support for democracy, on the other, is at least in part a product of this constellation of partisan forces.

The Chilean case is also unusual insofar as political discontent is also linked to political disaffection and levels of involvement with politics. In Table 8, the bivariate relationships between discontent, on the one hand, and disaffection and involvement, on the other (with Tau-b coefficients of .18 and -.28, respectively) are much stronger than these same bivariate relationships in other countries. And as in the case of Bulgaria, the stability of the impact of elite behavior during the transition on attitudes towards democracy is striking. By the time of the 1999/2000 election (over a decade after the first democratic elections), General Pinochet was under house arrest in London and under indictment for human rights abuses, and the presidential candidate of the conservative party, Joaquín Lavín, had taken great pains towards moderating his past ideology, programs and public image, as well as to distance himself from Pinochet as much as possible. And yet, as we shall see later in this chapter, the strong association between partisan preference and support for democracy remained a distinguishing characteristic of Chilean electoral behavior.

The behavior of key political elites and parties in the other countries surveyed here was quite different.<sup>29</sup> The Hungarian Communist Party, for example, played a role greatly different from its Bulgarian counterpart both prior to and during the transition to democracy. In Hungary, economic reforms had been introduced by the Communists decades before the abrupt collapse of Eastern

European communism in 1989, and even prior to the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev in Russia the Communist government of Hungary allowed for more civil liberties and organized pluralism than was to be found elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc (except, perhaps, for Poland at certain times). The pace of reform accelerated in the 1980s, culminating in a series of roundtable negotiations with representatives of the non-Communist opposition in 1989 (prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall) that paved the way for free democratic elections (see Linz and Stepan 1996, 1296-316). Thus, in contrast with the Bulgarian Communist Party, which remained a conservative and firmly opposed to democratization until the collapse of Eastern European communism appeared inevitable, the Communist party of Hungary had initiated significant economic, social and political reforms, and played an active and positive role in the transition to democracy (see Elster 1996; Tökés 1997). Hence, it is not surprising to see that supporters of its successor Socialist party are no less committed to democracy than are those who cast ballots for rival parties.<sup>30</sup> This stands in sharp contrast with the political legacy of the Communist party under Bulgaria's pre-democratic regime, but it is noteworthy that the electorates of these parties continued to reflect these differences years after the end of the transition to democracy (see Kitschelt et al 1999, ch.8).

Similarly, in Spain and Greece the principalities of the right played leading roles in the dismantling of right-wing dictatorships and the founding of new democratic regimes. This was particularly noteworthy in Spain, since the leaders of the major conservative parties (Adolfo Suárez of the center-right Unión de Centro Democracia and Manuel Fraga of Alianza Popular, which transformed itself into the Partido Popular in 1989) both served as high-ranking officials under the Franco regime. They and their parties were, nonetheless, unstinting in their support for democracy throughout the transition, and Suárez served as principal orchestrator of the democratization process. In Greece, as well, Constantine Karamanlis played an overwhelmingly dominant role in liquidating the Colonels' right-wing regime and establishing a fully democratic system. In both cases, the parties of the right, which had traditionally been skeptical at downright hostile to democracy,

established reputations as fully loyal democratic competitors at early stages in the transition, and their most prominent leaders as the founding fathers of new democracies. And in Portugal, individuals who had been involved with Marcelo Caetano's half-hearted regime liberalization (such as Francisco Sá Carneiro and Francisco Pinto Balsemão) regarded the revolutionary period as opponents of the left-wing junta which had seized power following the collapse of the Salazar/Caetano regime, and played key roles in establishing a new democratic regime in the course of Portugal's "second transition." In short, in these countries political leaders with roots in the predecessor authoritarian regime were able to lead democratic parties to become staunch supporters of the democratization process. As a result, the parties which they founded or joined could not be regarded as "anti-system" or "semi-loyal" in their commitment to democracy.

The "transition effect" hypothesis received additional confirmation through analysis of mass-level behavioral measures, such as vote for anti-system or semi-loyal parties. In most established democracies, testing these relationships is difficult if not impossible: support for democracy is so widespread as to be taken for granted, the democratic regime is not undergoing a real threat, and support for anti-system parties is so low as to preclude analysis using survey data based upon samples of 1,000 to 1,500 respondents. Fortunately (from a purely methodological standpoint, that is!), two of the countries we have examined above are faced with have confronted serious challenges to their survival.

One of these CNEP countries is Spain, whose democracy was not fully consolidated until about 1982 (more than five years after coming into existence). In the general election of 1979, a coalition of extreme right-wing anti-system parties secured sufficient electoral support to send one of their own (the die-hard Falangista Blas Piñar) to the Congress of Deputies. Just two years later, moreover, a coup attempt came frighteningly close to seriously interrupting the consolidation process and perhaps terminating Spain's democratic regime. As can be seen in Table 9, a substantial plurality of those who voted for ultraright-wing parties or coalitions in the 1979 Spanish election (Unión



















































































