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**Country Assessment Report on the State of
Democratic Governance
Japan: Pessimism in Mature Democracy**

By

Masahiro Yamada et al.

Kwansei-Gakuin University

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JAPAN: Pessimism in Mature Democracy

Masahiro Yamada*, Gill Steel, Kazunori Inamasu, Ken'ichi Ikeda, and Naoko Taniguchi

I. Introduction and summary

Japan experienced democratic governance after World War II. In spite of experiencing a sustained democracy, citizens' evaluations of governmental performance are low, citizens' have low senses of personal efficacy, low expectations of their government, do not participate much in politics, and are pessimistic about freedom. On the other hand, they are very interested in politics and eagerly follow political news. Analysis suggests that political competition can salvage some sense of democratic optimism.

II. Historical background

In 1867, the rule of the samurai (military) class under the Tokugawa clan ended, and Japan began to rebuild its polity under an Emperor. In 1889, the Meiji Constitution was promulgated, and Japan became a constitutional monarchy. In 1890, the first national election for the House of Representatives (HR) was held; suffrage was limited to men who paid high taxes, who comprised just over 1 percent of the population.

* Corresponding author Tel.: +81 798 546415.
E-mail address: myamada@kwansei.ac.jp (M. Yamada).

Even under these restrictions, Japanese party politics began to develop. Multiple parties competed in elections, and in 1918, the Meiji Emperor appointed Takashi Hara prime minister; the first party leader with a seat in the HR to become prime minister.

By 1925, universal male suffrage was established. Public pro-democracy sentiments and citizen movements had pushed for an expanded electorate and more political rights and culminated in the so-called “Taisho Democracy” of this period.

Terrorism and an attempted military coup dampened the pro-democracy mood, particularly following the 5.11 incident in 1932 in which Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai was assassinated by some members of the armed forces, after which party leaders with seats in the HR were not appointed as the prime minister, and the power of military rose.

Full democracy in Japan is generally considered to have begun with the General Headquarters (GHQ) occupation under General Douglas McArthur after the Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945. The postwar reforms under the GHQ produced a democratic regime in which national sovereignty resided with the people, a new constitution guaranteed basic human rights and freedoms, and introduced a new parliamentary system with universal suffrage.

It is now customary to view the postwar development of Japanese politics as having gone through three historical stages: 1945-1955, 1955 to 1993, and 1993 to the present. For the first decade of the postwar period, Japan’s parliamentary democracy represented a typical multiparty system under which several major parties, from both

conservative and progressive camps, competed for legislative seats and took turns forming government. Most of the governments formed during this period were either coalition or minority governments, and only one (of nine governments formed before 1955) was based on a single-party legislative majority. This early period also witnessed constant party switching by individual politicians and a series of mergers and breakups of political parties, and thus was characterized by a fluid partisan alignment.

Second, the multiparty framework was replaced by a new party system in 1955, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was established, following the amalgamation of the conservative forces. For the next thirty-eight years, the LDP continuously formed a majority government. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), also created in 1955, never became a viable alternative to the LDP.¹ The LDP did suffer a long-term decline in its vote share during the 1960s, with the two centrist parties entering the electoral race for the House of Representatives, the more important lower house, namely the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komei Party. During the period between 1983 and 1986, the LDP entered a coalition with the New Liberal Club (NLC), a small conservative group that had broken away from the LDP in 1976. But for this exception, however, the LDP consistently formed a series of single-party governments throughout these years.²

The third and current phase began in the early 1990s, when the LDP's regime crumbled owing to sweeping political distrust born out of a series of scandals involving high-profile politicians. In 1993, the largest faction within the LDP broke into two

¹ In 1991, the party changed its official English name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan. In order to avoid confusion with the Democratic Socialist Party, however, the name Japan Socialist Party is used for this part of the paper.

² The coalition with the NLC barely interrupted the LDP dominance, since the two parties were so different in size. A large part of the NLC was absorbed by the LDP after the 1986 election.

groups, one of which eventually joined the opposition in passing a non-confidence bill against the LDP government. In the subsequent election, the LDP failed to obtain a majority and was thus forced to hand over its power to a non-LDP coalition government. However, due to not only the policy difference among various participating parties but also the dissonance of personal nature among their leaders, the non-LDP government collapsed within less than a year. The LDP then managed to form a coalition with its long-time rival, the JSP, and a small party called Sakigake, to establish a majority government. Subsequently, the LDP has survived the next three general elections as the plurality party and has been able to alternate coalition partners at each critical occasion in order to maintain its government. The non-LDP camp, on the other hand, has since suffered a continuous partisan realignment, having so far failed to regain the governing power.

As is clear from this summary, the most important and unarguable characteristic of postwar Japanese politics is the legislative dominance of a single conservative party, the LDP, during the second period described above. The political success of the LDP was remarkable, considering the fact that over the period the party was in power, Japan underwent radical and continuous change in its socially and economically, including its industrial structures, occupational distribution, and living standards. The LDP was often compared with other dominant parties, such as the Social Democrats in Sweden and the Christian Democrats in Italy, but the LDP's record was truly exceptional in terms of both its longevity and the degree of its dominance. Of course, the LDP's long-standing rule led to much criticism, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many observers believed that the sources of various problems, such as the LDP's chronic factionalism, its money-driven disposition, and the lack of policy innovations in

the age of globalizing economy, lay in the peculiar electoral system used in Japan since 1947, the multimember, single nontransferable vote system for the House of Representatives.

In this context, the 1993 non-LDP coalition government's top priority was to revise the electoral law. By introducing the single-member district portion of the system under its parallel system called the "Heiritsu-sei", some hoped that a viable two party system would finally emerge in Japan. The establishment of the New Frontier Party (NFP) in December 1994 as an amalgamation of various non-LDP parties further raised these hope, especially since the LDP had already returned to power by then. The hope, however, was short-lived. Even at the time the NFP was created, some parties, including the ever-defiant Japan Communist Party (JCP), remained independent from both the newly established NFP and the LDP. Just before the dissolution of the lower house in 1996, a third party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was created and won a non-negligible share of the parliamentary seats in the general election. Meanwhile, the NFP's disappointing performance in the election eventually led to its dissolution, which made hopes of establishing a two-party system seem decreasingly likely. The non-LDP camp, since then, has gone through several more phases of realignment.

By the 2003 general election, the DPJ had established itself as the alternative political force, and was closing the gap in popular support vis-à-vis the LDP. But in the next and latest general election in 2005, the LDP-Komei Coalition won 327 seats (68% of the total HR seats). This number is important because the Constitution contains an override provision: if the upper house (the House of Councilors, HC) rejects a bill that has been approved by the lower house, the bill can then be sent back to the lower house, where if it passes with a two-thirds majority, the bill will become law.

In the 2007 upper house election, the LDP and the Komei Party lost control of the house. Although the LDP-Komei coalition still controls the lower house, governing is more problematic with the DPJ controlling the HC. Under Japanese bicameralism, the power of the upper house is comparatively strong (Iio 2007), different parties controlling each house will slow the passage of legislation even more (Tsebelis and Money 1998). In addition, by April 2008, the current cabinet led by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has a mere 20% approval rate, and this is expected to contribute to the fluidity of current party politics in Japan.

Japanese political behavior and political consciousness have changed. From the end of the World War II to 1970s, major Japanese activism centered on opposition to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, labor issues, and the anti-pollution movement. But in the 1980s, with most Japanese people enjoying the fruits of economic development, political activism declined. A series of criminal cases concerning political corruption during the 1980s and 1990s prompted party de-alignment and the number of independents increased, voter turnout decreased, and political apathy grew.

Nowadays, economic stagnation, the issues associated with the rapid aging of society, and the widening the gap in living standards make Japanese people feel uneasy. But political participation in Japan remains low (Yamada, 2008)³.

III. Socio-Political Profile of the Country

Economy and National Welfare

³ See Shoppa (2006) for an explanation of company employees' and women's low levels of political activism.

Japan is one of wealthy countries: its GDP per capita in 2006 was \$32,385, which is ranked 19th according to “PPP GDP 2006 & Population 2006” in the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank, and is almost double the average among other East Asian countries. But Japan has fallen from 11th place in 2004 in the GDP per capita rankings.

In terms of income distribution, some economists and sociologists emphasize that the income gap between the rich and the poor is growing (Otake 2006; Tachibanaki and Urakawa 2006). The Gini coefficient has increased steadily since the 1980s, from .25 in 1985 to .28 in 2005 (this is partly a consequence of the rapidly ageing population). Although it is still lower than the average among East Asian countries, many Japanese worry about the growing gap between the rich and the poor.

In addition, the press reported that the Social Insurance Agency had lost track of 50 million pension payment records, leaving people worried about their future pensions. At around the same time as the media publicized a string of financial and other scandals involving members of the cabinet.

Number of Effective Parties

The number of effective parties in the last lower house (the House of Representatives) election in 2005 was 3.72. In that election, the LDP won 63% of the seats with 48% of the votes in the SMDs and 38% of the votes in the PR portion. The LDP-Komei Party coalition government won 70% of the seats in the lower house, which, as we discussed above, gives the governing coalition in the lower house an override in cases of disagreement between the houses.

The opposition parties, the DPJ, the JCP, the SDP, the People's New Party, and the New Party Nippon and independents have 30% of the seats in the HR⁴. The DPJ - the largest opposition party - has 24% of the seats in the HR.

Freedom House Scores

Freedom House rates political rights and civil liberties in Japan highly: both scores have been stable and high (1 or 2) since 1976. In 2006, the political rights score was 1 and the civil liberties score 2. The lower civil liberties score is a result of the press clubs, which are viewed as an obstacle to press freedom, prison officials who use physical and psychological intimidation to enforce discipline or elicit confessions, and some kinds of discrimination⁵.

World Bank Governance Indicator (WBGI)

On the four World Bank Governance Indicators: the Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, and Control of Corruption, Japan was higher than the East Asian average on all four, and scored the highest in the region on Voice and Accountability.

IV. The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) in Japan

The first wave in the Japan survey (EAB 2003) was conducted by the Department of Social Psychology, University of Tokyo, in January and February 2003.

⁴ This number is at the time of January 22, 2008 from the website of the HR. The URL is; http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_kousei.htm.

⁵ Discrimination by gender, ethnic minority, foreigners, and the descendants of feudal-era outcasts are reported (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7202>).

It yielded 1,418 valid cases out of 2,000 sampled cases, giving a response rate of 70.9%. The target population was the voting age population in all forty-seven prefectures. The method was a two-stage random sample from the population of individual males and females twenty years and older throughout Japan. Fieldwork was undertaken by regularly employed interviewers of Central Research Services, a marketing and public opinion research firm.

The second wave of the ABS in Japan was conducted between February and March 2007 and yielded 1,067 valid cases from a sample of 2,500 cases yielding a response rate of 42.7%. On both surveys, we used additional sub-sampling which also followed the same two-stage random sampling procedure. The response rate for Japan was lower than it has been on the EAB 2003 (the first wave of the ABS).⁶

First, the survey environment worsened in the fall of 2006 following changes in the law regulating survey research that banned commercial surveys from using the voters' lists or resident registries. This was widely known and many people misunderstood and thought that the restriction applied to academic surveys. Second, many hoax "surveys" were widely reported, these purported to be surveys, but were actually tools to sell consumer goods. Third, the questionnaire for the 2nd round of the ABS was quite long, the average time the respondents needed to finish was 50 minutes (as shown below) which is 10 minutes longer than the 2003 survey. Reflecting this situation, even the successful interviewees often seemed irritated (22%) and 9% refused to answer at least part of the questionnaire. In order to deal with these difficulties, we relied on the additional sub-sampling (5 each for metropolitan city districts and 3 for

⁶ We display the summary tables on gender, age, and education as an appendix.

other districts, yielding a total of 709) and used 611 of these as a substitute sample, if the original target was inaccessible due to a change of address, death, or long-term absence.

The interviews were also conducted by Central Research Services interviewers. Though the interviewers were skilled at this kind of fieldwork, they were still required to participate in an orientation training session for these particular interviews. Interviews were conducted in Japanese. The mean length of the interviews was 50.3 minutes, with a range from 19 to 178 minutes (the SD was 16.2). The survey was exclusively for the 2nd round of the ABS.

A. Rule of Law

Law-abiding Government

First, regarding perceptions of the rule of law, Table 1 shows that people are suspicious. Less than 50% people agree with the statement, “Our current courts always punish the guilty, even if they are high-ranking officials”. Only 13.5% strongly agreed with this statement. These values are the second lowest among the 11 Asian countries in the survey (the lowest is Taiwan)⁷. When we combine those who agree strongly with those who somewhat agree, still less than half agree (48.7%), which is also the second lowest (again, Taiwan is lowest). In sum, almost half of the Japanese public believes that courts are not neutral and the justice system works in the favor of high-ranking officials.

⁷ The 11 countries are Taiwan, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Japan.

(Table 1 about here)

Moreover, only 1.5% believe that national government officials always abide by the law. This is the worst rate among the other countries. Even when we combine those who believe they always do with those who believe they do most of the time, only 37.7% believe this. And even at less than half the population, this is the third highest among the countries.

These two results together show how poorly Japanese people evaluate the law-abiding nature of their government and how highly suspicious of the fairness of their own government and the courts most people are.

Controlling Corruption

The survey also asks about perceptions of political corruption. One of these questions is: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?” and the other is “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?” Table 2 compares the responses in 2003 with those in 2007. People now evaluate the national government more highly than they did in 2003, but that is not the case with local government. For local government, although the view “almost everyone is corrupt” decreased from 9.0% to 3.7%, the view that “most officials are corrupt” increased from 28.1% to 34.3%. Almost half (48%) think “most officials are corrupt”. But this value itself is not prominent among the East Asian countries (the shape of the distribution in Japan is most similar to Korea).

(Table 2 about here)

Table 3 presents people's perceptions about controlling political corruption comparing current and past regimes. In Japanese survey in 2003, we asked the respondents to compare the current regime with the war time regime, as this was more than 60 years ago, many respondents did not live at that time. And in 2007, we asked respondents to evaluate governmental efforts to keep political corruption in check ("In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?") using a 4-point scale. Here, the evaluations were also low. More than 60% answered that "it is not doing much", or "it is doing nothing", which was the highest among the countries in the survey.

(Table 3 about here)

When we compare these evaluations with WBGI indicators' or the report by Transparency International, Japanese tend to underestimate cleanness of own government⁸. The reasons for this underestimation should be investigated in further research. In postwar Japan, politicians and bureaucrats have been involved in scandal after scandal. The postwar history of Japanese politics cannot be discussed without reference to bribe-taking by officials. For example, without the Recruit Scandal in 1988, a criminal case in which a company was charged with bribing politicians, bureaucrats, and some intellectuals, the LDP might not have lost its majority in the 1989 upper house election, and the current coalition government might not have been realized.

B. Competition

⁸ The Transparency International report is located at:
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2007

Political competition is essential to liberal democracy (Dahl 1971). The ABS asked three questions on political competitiveness. One asks “How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties or candidates?” which in essence asks whether the current system provides real choice to the voters.

Table 4a cross-tabulates the question by partisanship. This table tells us two things. First, that 83.5% think elections offer the voters a real choice, at least occasionally. This is the third highest among the countries included in the survey. However this value was probably lower under the predominant party system in the 1980s. From the 1990s onwards, Japanese politics experienced a power shift and party system change from the predominant system to coalition government. This experience may influence the perceptions of the respondents.

(Table 4a about here)

The second finding is that this tendency is slightly stronger among partisans than among independents. This may be due to the influence of the power shift and the coalition government discussed above.

If equal access to the media is not guaranteed during election campaigns, fair competition does not exist. Table 4b shows us that approximately 60% of the people recognize political parties and candidates have equal access, even among the people who voted for parties that lost the election.

(Table 4b & 4c about here)

Table 4c indicates that most people thought that the last HR election in 2005

was free and fair. With 60% of the public believing this, Japan ranks 7th place among the countries in this study. Although, this perception is strongest among people who voted for the winning camp, but even 68% of those who voted for the losing camp shared this view. On the other hand, people who did not vote or who didn't know/whose answers were not available in the dataset were less likely to think this. This may imply that those people are politically alienated.

C. Participation

Electoral Participation

The level of participation is an important index of the vigor of liberal democracy. Table 5a displays the level of Japanese electoral participation in the 2001 upper house election (the survey was conducted in 2003) and the 2005 lower house election (the survey was conducted in 2007)⁹. From Statistics Bureau data, we know that the actual turnout was 56.4% in 2001 and 67.5% in 2005, hence the self-reported turnout rate on both surveys is higher than the actual rate, and this was particularly the case in the 2001 election.

More people claimed to have attended rallies in 2007 than in 2003 (Table 5a shows that 21.1% attended rallies during last election). This value is not prominent among the countries and almost the same as Korea. On the other hand, the number of people who tried to influence the vote choice of other people is almost the same, and at 6.9%, is comparatively low.

⁹ We should be cautious about the quality of the data and the interpretation at this point.

(Table 5a about here)

Generally speaking, voter turnout in lower house elections is higher than in upper house elections. This may be due to the size of the electoral districts and the necessary number of votes required to ensure election. In the lower house, the SMDs are segments of prefectures and the PR seats are 11 regional blocs. In contrast, the upper house unit of local districts is the prefectures and the PR portion of the system is one single nationwide PR district. Thus, candidates who run in upper house elections need more votes than do lower house candidates. Moreover, lower house elections are directly related to government formation which means that lower house elections are a more serious and exciting game for the voters.

Japanese citizens participate in political activities at comparatively low rates; this conforms to our expectations from previous data and research (the CSES dataset and Nishizawa (2004) and Yamada (2004) indicate that most Japanese majority avoid committing political activities).

If men and those with socio-economic status participate more in politics, this may introduce a bias in the kinds of voices that are heard, and those that are not, in the democratic process. Men are more likely than women to report voting and attending rallies. But women are very slightly more likely than men to report attempting to influence the vote choice of others.

(Table 5b about here)

Higher education does not influence participation. In voting and attending rallies, the most active cluster is junior high school graduates. Here, as in all types of

participation activities, the most educated cluster participates least. As the average level of education varies with each generation, we created double-cross tabulation tables for three participation variables (“Voted in the last national election”, “Attending rallies during the last election”, and “Persuaded other people to vote for a particular candidate or party in the last election”) by age and education. Few significant relationships exist among these variables¹⁰.

To better understand the relationship between participating and socioeconomic categories, we estimated logistic regression models using the three participation variables as dependent variables and the socio-economic variables (age, income quintile of the household, subjective social status, gender, and years of education) as explanatory variables (see Table 5c). Education, age, gender and socio-economic status poorly explain participation. Only age is constantly significant across the three participation variables. Gender and education are insignificant. Income is significant only in the second quintile explained rally attending during the last election. Subjective social status is significant only contributed to explaining the voting in the last national election. These results imply that Japanese enjoy socio-economic neutrality in political participation.

(Table 5c about here)

Political Interest

Political interest remained about the same from 2003 to 2007, with about 60% of the public expressing interest in politics. The numbers of people who are not

¹⁰ Kabashima (1988) indicates that educational level has no significant effects on participation. See also Bowers (2004).

interested in politics decreased slightly, but at the same time, the numbers of people who are very interested also are decreased during the three years. The numbers of people who pay attention to political news remained at almost the same high level: about three quarters of the public follow political news every day.

The level of political interest in Japan is comparatively high. There are only four countries in which over 50% of the public is interested in politics, and among these, Japan ranks third. Of the countries in this study, more Japanese than citizens of any other nation follow political news. No other country has more than 70% following political news every day.

(Table 6a about here)

Political Efficacy

On the other hand, the sense of political efficacy among Japanese people worsened between 2003 and 2006 (see Table 6b). In 2006, less than 20% regarded themselves as able to participate in politics, and more than three-fourths disagreed.

But the percentage who disagreed with the statement “Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on” increased from 27.4% to 34.8%, and the percentage who agreed barely changed. Pessimistic views on political efficacy remain dominant in Japan. Compared with other Asian countries, external efficacy in Japan is lower than average, but the levels of internal efficacy are around the same.

(Table 6b about here)

Table 6c shows the correlation between the political efficacy index and gender and education. Men and the more educated have a higher sense of political efficacy.

(Table 6c about here)

D. Vertical Accountability

Vertical accountability refers to citizens' perceptions of whether the government can be held accountable for its actions. Table 7 shows people's evaluations of the relationship between themselves and their government. Item 1 is a measure of perceptions of people's power vis a vis the government. A majority (56.6%) believe that they can change the government if they do not like it. This is lower than the regional average which is 60.1%.

(Table 7 about here)

Item 2 shows evaluations of citizens' oversight of the government between elections. Here, 62.5% agree that "Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions". This value is the third highest in East Asia (the highest is Mongolia, and the second is Malaysia). This pessimistic feeling must be related with the Japanese low levels of political activity.

Item 3 measures trust in information disclosure by government officials. 55% of the public think that government officials withhold important information "always" or "most of time" from the public. This is higher than average (44.7%), and ranks fourth among the countries in this study.

E. Horizontal Accountability

Horizontal accountability is the function of checks-and-balances between the different branches of government. Table 8 shows the frequency distributions of people's perceptions of horizontal accountability. Item 1 is about the (in)competence of the legal system. 60.0% people believe the legal system to be incompetent. This is higher than average, and second among the countries in the survey (the first is 72.0% in Mongolia)

(Table 8 about here)

Item 2 is about legislative capability. 40.3% of the public responded that the legislature is capable of performing checks on the government. This value is also the second worst comparatively. Thus, many Japanese are pessimistic about the extent to which they are able to hold their own government accountable.

F. Freedom

Two questions measure perceptions of freedom. One asks about freedom of speech, and the other, freedom of association. The first wave of the ABS in 2003 asked respondents to compare the two types of freedom under the contemporary system and under the wartime regime: a large majority answered that freedom is "much better" or "better" for both freedom of speech and freedom of association (Table 9).

On the 2007 survey, however, people were simply asked about the current situation. 51.9% people agreed with the statement "People are free to say what they think without fear". This is the second lowest among the countries. Also, "People can join any

organization they like without fear” only 56.5% of the public agreed. This was the third lowest level.

(Table 9 about here)

Just looking at the responses to these questions doesn’t tell us much about what kind of fear people have in speaking or in joining organizations. Even if they do not fear government intervention, they feel social pressure in exercising these freedoms. Clearly, people don’t feel that freedom of speech and association are readily available, just because the constitution guarantees them: Japanese are more pessimistic about actually enjoying these freedoms.

G. Equality

If people think their own government does not treat people equally or fairly, the legitimacy of the government may be suspect. In order to measure people’s perceptions of equal treatment, the ABS asks respondents whether they agree that “Everyone is treated equally by the government”. Table 10a cross-tabulates the responses with the subjective social status of the respondents. Here, 75.3% feel that the government does not treat everyone equally, and only 19.3% agree with the statement. This is the second lowest among the countries in the ABS (the lowest is Korea), and the distribution is the closest to that of Korea. Those of higher social status have more complaints about equality.

(Table 10a and 10b about here)

From Table 10b, we can see that 64.8% respondents agree that “People have

basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter. This value is around average among the countries. As in Table 10a, here also, those who think of themselves as higher in social status than others are less likely to agree and more likely to disagree. These tables show us that people with higher (subjective) social status tend to be more sensitive towards inequality than are others in Japan.

H. Responsiveness

The ABS asks two kinds of questions to measure people's evaluations of the responsiveness and expectations of the capability of their own governments. The former is "How well do you think the government responds to what people want?", and the latter is "How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?"

On the first question on governmental responsiveness, 33.3% people were positive. This percentage is lower than average. Similarly, on the question on the expectations of the capability of the government, 21.6% replied positively (the lowest percentage among the countries). These distributions resemble the Taiwanese. From Table 11, we can observe that lower evaluations of the responsiveness of government correlate with lower expectations of governmental capability.

(Table 11 about here)

I. A Summary of Assessments of the Quality of Governance

Figure 1 summarizes citizens' perceptions of the overall quality of governance in Japan in the ABS. All of the values are the mean score of the sample. The salient

features are the high political interest, but low efficacy, low levels of electoral participation, and low evaluations of the responsiveness of government.

(Figure 1 about here)

J. Quality of Governance and Regime Legitimacy

Table 12 presents four indicators of perceptions of regime legitimacy: satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy, detachment from authoritarianism, and diffuse regime support.

People's satisfaction with democracy is relatively highly correlated with competition (.34), responsiveness (.30), law-abiding government (.27), and equality (.27). At least in Japan, high evaluations of competitiveness, responsiveness, law-abiding government, and equal treatment by the government correlate with, and may contribute to, satisfaction with democracy.

The higher the political interest, the greater the support for democracy. Political interest is also positively correlated (.20) with detachment from authoritarianism. Finally, Diffuse Regime Support correlates positively with responsiveness (.29), equality (.25), competition (.23), law-abiding government (.23), controlling corruption (.21), vertical accountability (.12), and horizontal accountability (.10).

Economic performance can be an important factor for fostering democracy. Table 12a correlates four indicators of legitimacy with two indices of economic performance. Although both economic indices are positively correlated with each legitimacy indicator, they correlate most highly with satisfaction with democracy, the others are weaker.

Consequently, this table suggests that political factors such as competition and government responsiveness are more important than is economic performance for satisfaction with democracy in contemporary Japan. Similarly, economic performance correlates more weakly with the other indicators of legitimacy. This may be a reflection of economic prosperity in Japan.

(Table 12a about here)

To understand what influences perceptions of regime legitimacy, we performed regression analyses in which the dependent variables are the four indicators of regime legitimacy and the explanatory variables are satisfaction with democracy, law-abiding government, competition, freedom, equality, responsiveness, the country's economic condition, and personal economic condition. All are positively associated with regime legitimacy (see Table 12b). The effect of competition is particularly prominent (the value of the beta coefficient is .187). Personal economic condition (.143) and responsiveness (.134) also contribute strongly. These results indicate that competitiveness in the political system, good personal finances, and government responsiveness contribute to satisfaction with democracy in Japan.

We performed similar regression analyses on the other three variables. About support for democracy, controlling corruption, electoral participation, political interest, political efficacy, equality, and country's economic condition are significant variables to explain. Stronger political interest is connected with high support with democracy in Japan. Interestingly, equality is negatively associated with support for democracy. People who regard the current status as equal enough tend to weakly support democracy.

(Table 12b about here)

Political interest, political efficacy, and equality influence detachment from authoritarianism, among which, political interest is prominent. People who are strongly interested in politics are more detached from authoritarianism. On the other hand, efficacy and equality are negatively related, this means that people who regard the current situation as equal enough and who have stronger efficacy tend to be closer to authoritarianism.

Finally, we turn to “diffuse regime support”, here, law-abiding government, controlling corruption, competition, freedom, equality, responsiveness are all significantly and positively correlated with diffuse regime support. Among these, responsiveness is most strongly related to diffuse regime support, which unsurprisingly means that people who feel their government is responsive government are more likely to support the regime.

Conclusion

The results of the data analysis show that Japanese people have a low sense of political efficacy and are critical of the performance of their government, but they are highly interested in politics and follow political news regularly. While Japanese democracy has been sustained for more than 60 years, its longevity does not contribute to citizens’ confidence in the management of politics or in their levels of trust in the system.

In their maturing democracy, Japanese people tend to be more critical of the performance of their own democracy than objective measures might indicate. They

are critical not only of their government, but also of themselves. They evaluate their own sense of efficacy and political competence negatively¹¹. While they are pessimistic and do not overly participate in politics, at the same time, they follow the news about politics and government regularly. Japanese may have experienced the reality of democratic governance with 60 years experience, but this does not make them hopeful.

From the findings of our analyses, two are particularly interesting. First, people who regard the current status as equal enough tend to weakly support democracy, and second, people who regard current situation as equal enough also have stronger feelings of efficacy and tend to be closer to authoritarianism. These findings correspond with the argument of Kabashima et al. (2000), that political alienation is comprised of two dimensions, political trust and civic-mindedness. Kabashima et al. also claim that LDP supporters are no more civic-mindedness than average, but are more trusting politically, and the JCP supporters are the reverse.

A seed of hope about democracy in Japan, may rest with political competition: competition is highly correlated with satisfaction of democracy. Lively political competition may increase people's sense of optimism with their own democracy.

¹¹ Ikeda et al. (2008), using the CSES dataset. finds that political participation promotes efficacious.

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Appendix. Frequency Tables of Gender, Age, and Education (%)

GENDER	2003	2007	AGE	2003	2007
male	45.3	47.3	20s	10.4	8.0
female	54.7	52.7	30s	18.8	13.8
total	100.0	100.0	40s	15.9	15.8
			50s	20.9	19.0
			60s	20.9	23.9
			upper 70s	13.1	19.5
			total	100	100

EDUCATION

2003		2007	
Incomplete elementary school	5.2	Little or No Education	0.2
Complete elementary school	14.1	Primary School	3.7
Incomplete high school	2.5	Junior High School	18.6
Complete high school	44.1	High School	41.7
Some university college education	16.6	College or above	33.8
University college degree	13.4		
Post graduate degree	1.7		
Don't know	2.4	DK/NA	2.0
total	100.0		100.0

Table 1. Evaluations of Law-Abiding Government: Japan

(Percent of total sample)

Items	2007 Survey					DK/NA
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree		
Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.						
Percent	13.5	35.2	35.0	7.2	9.1	
How often do national government officials abide by the law?	Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely		DK/NA
Percent	1.5	36.2	43.3	11.0	8.1	
N=1067						
Notes:						

Table 2. Perceptions of Political Corruption at the National and Local Levels: Japan in 2003 and 2007

(Percent of total sample)

Level of Government	2003 Survey		2007 Survey	
	National Government	Local Government	National Government	Local Government
Hardly anyone is involved	1.5	4.2	1.0	1.9
Not a lot of officials are involved	35.9	47.9	49.6	51.9
Most officials are corrupt	38.7	28.1	34.4	34.3
Almost everyone is corrupt	13.5	9.0	4.7	3.7
Don't know/no answer	10.4	10.8	10.3	8.2
Total				
	N=1418		N=1067	

Table 3. Perceptions of Controlling Political Corruption

(Percent of total sample)

2003 Survey	
Comparing the current regime with the past regime under the Martial Law	
Corruption in politics and government is under control.	Much better than Before Somewhat Better Much the Same Somewhat Worse Much Worse DK/NA
Percent	3.9 22.1 22.1 23.0 18.6 10.2
N=1418	
2007 Survey	
In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?	It is doing its best It is doing something It is not doing much It is doing nothing DK/NA
Percent	3.5 28.8 48.7 13.1 5.9
N=1067	
Notes:	

Table 4a. Partisanship and Quality of Electoral Choice: Japan 2007 Survey

		Quality of Electoral Choice					
		How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?					
Partisanship		Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	DK/NA	Total
Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?	Feel close to a particular party	3.6	44.6	38.7	7.8	5.4	760 (71.2%)
	Do not feel close to any party	1.6	34.8	40.1	11.3	12.1	247 (23.1%)
	DK/NA	0.0	25.0	45.0	10.0	20.0	60 (5.6%)
	Total	31 (2.9%)	440 (41.2%)	420 (39.4%)	93 (8.7%)	83 (7.8%)	1067 (100%)
N=1067							
Notes:							

Table 4b. Partisan Choice and Perceptions of Media Access: Japan
2007 Survey

		Equal Access to Media					
		Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.					
Partisan Choice		Strongly Agree	Somewh at Agree	Somewh at Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK/NA	Total
Vote choice in the 2005 general election	Voted for the winning camp	21.3	43.0	22.8	3.0	9.9	395 (37.0%)
	Voted for the losing camp	14.7	42.2	29.0	7.5	6.6	348 (32.6%)
	Did not vote	17.8	41.7	25.2	3.7	11.7	163 (15.3%)
	DK/NA	13.0	39.8	23.6	3.1	20.5	161 (15.1%)
Total		185 (17.3%)	449 (42.1%)	270 (25.3%)	49 (4.6%)	114 (10.7%)	1067 (100%)
N=1067							
Notes:							

Table 4c. Partisan Choice and Perceptions of Fairness: Japan 2007 Survey

		Free and Fair Election					
		On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?					
Partisan Choice		Completely Free and Fair	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Free and fair, with major problems	Not free and fair	DK/NA	Total
Vote choice in the 2005 general election	Voted for the winning camp	26.8	47.6	10.9	1.5	13.2	395 (37.0%)
	Voted for the losing camp	21.3	47.1	17.0	3.7	10.9	348 (32.6%)
	Did not vote	13.5	34.4	17.8	4.3	30.1	163 (15.3%)
	DK/NA	9.3	39.1	19.3	3.7	28.6	161 (15.1%)
Total		217 (20.3%)	471 (44.1%)	162 (15.7%)	32 (3.0%)	185 (17.3%)	1067 (100%)
N=1067							
Notes:							

Table 5a. The Level of Electoral Participation in
Japan in 2003 and 2007
(Percent of total sample)

<i>Electoral Participation</i>	2003 Survey	2007 Survey
Voted in the last parliamentary election	74.2	69.6
Attended rallies during the last election	14.7	21.1
Persuaded others to vote for a particular candidate or party in the last election	6.5	6.9
Did all of the above	4.4	4.3
	N=1418	N=1067

Table 5b. Demographic Background and Electoral Participation: Japan
2007 Survey

Demographic Background								
Electoral Participation	Gender		Education					Total
	Male	Female	College or above	High School	Junior High School	Primary School	Little or No Education	
Voted in the last national election	76.6	63.3	68.1	71.0	72.7	67.5	50.0	69.6
Attended rallies during the last election	22.4	19.9	14.4	23.1	28.3	25.0	0.0	21.1
Persuaded other to vote for a particular candidate or party in the last election	6.3	7.5	5.5	8.1	7.6	2.5	0.0	6.9
Did all of the above	4.4	4.3	2.2	5.8	4.5	2.5	0.0	4.3
N=1067	505 (47.3%)	562 (52.7%)	361 (33.8%)	445 (41.7%)	198 (18.6%)	40 (3.7%)	2 (0.2%)	100%
Note:								

Table 5c. Logistic Regression for Participation Variables

explanatory vars.	Voted in the last national election					
	B	std. err.	Wald	degree of freedom	prob.	Exp (B)
age	0.053	0.009	34.925	1	0.000	1.054
income			4.459	4	0.347	
income(1)	-0.275	0.409	0.452	1	0.501	0.760
income(2)	0.242	0.373	0.423	1	0.515	1.274
income(3)	-0.076	0.364	0.043	1	0.835	0.927
income(4)	0.462	0.365	1.603	1	0.205	1.588
status			7.319	4	0.120	
status(1)	36.838	85762235.943	0.000	1	1.000	9971268048418940.000
status(2)	1.552	0.609	6.490	1	0.011	4.723
status(3)	1.169	0.472	6.147	1	0.013	3.220
status(4)	1.140	0.536	4.526	1	0.033	3.125
gender:						
male=1; female=0	-0.419	0.234	3.209	1	0.073	0.658
years of education	0.076	0.055	1.959	1	0.162	1.079
constant	-2.731	1.141	5.731	1	0.017	0.065
n=758	Fitness of the model		-2LL			520.605
			Cox & Snell R-square			0.075
			Nagelkerke R-square			0.141
explanatory vars.	Attended rallies during the last election					
	B	std. err.	Wald	degree of freedom	prob.	Exp (B)
age	0.038	0.007	26.138	1	0.000	1.039
income			11.948	4	0.018	
income(1)	-0.283	0.353	0.644	1	0.422	0.753
income(2)	0.590	0.296	3.983	1	0.046	1.804
income(3)	0.490	0.325	2.272	1	0.132	1.632
income(4)	0.094	0.313	0.089	1	0.765	1.098
status			3.886	4	0.422	
status(1)	-0.739	1.189	0.387	1	0.534	0.477
status(2)	0.380	0.517	0.541	1	0.462	1.463
status(3)	-0.100	0.459	0.048	1	0.827	0.904

status(4)	0.134	0.503	0.071	1	0.790	1.143
gender:						
male=1; female=0	-0.105	0.191	0.302	1	0.582	0.900
years of education	-0.070	0.041	3.006	1	0.083	0.932
constant	-2.822	0.921	9.395	1	0.002	0.060
n=770	Fitness of the model	-2LL				718.020
		Cox & Snell R-square				0.079
		Nagelkerke R-square				0.124
explanatory vars.	Persuaded other to vote for a particular candidate or party in the last election					
	B	std. err.	Wald	degree of freedom	prob.	Exp (B)
age	0.015	0.011	1.976	1	0.160	1.015
income			3.001	4	0.558	
income(1)	0.798	0.531	2.257	1	0.133	2.221
income(2)	0.605	0.479	1.595	1	0.207	1.831
income(3)	0.776	0.509	2.324	1	0.127	2.172
income(4)	0.418	0.479	0.759	1	0.384	1.518
status			8.754	4	0.068	
status(1)	0.892	1.323	0.455	1	0.500	2.440
status(2)	1.116	0.824	1.833	1	0.176	3.051
status(3)	0.077	0.768	0.010	1	0.920	1.080
status(4)	0.615	0.810	0.577	1	0.448	1.850
gender:						
male=1; female=0	0.255	0.289	0.779	1	0.377	1.291
years of education	0.043	0.062	0.485	1	0.486	1.044
constant	-4.938	1.451	11.583	1	0.001	0.007
n=770	Fitness of the model	-2LL				387.813
		Cox & Snell R-square				0.017
		Nagelkerke R-square				0.043

Table 6a. Levels of Political Interest: Japan in 2003 and 2007

(Percent of total sample)

1. How interested would you say you are in politics?

	Very interested	Somewhat interested	Not very interested	Not at all interested	DK/NA
2003 Survey (N=1418)	19.6	44.9	28.8	6.3	0.4
2007 Survey (N=1067)	14.1	54.6	27.6	3.2	0.5

2. How often do you follow news about politics and government?

	Everyday	Several times a week	Once or twice a week	Not even once a week	Practically never	DK/NA
2003 Survey (N=1418)	75.5	14.0	6.1	2.1	2.1	0.2
2007 Survey (N=1067)	73.6	15.0	6.8	1.8	2.6	0.2

Notes:

Table 6b. Levels of Political Efficacy: Japan in 2003 and 2007					
(Percent of total sample)					
1. I think I have the ability to participate in politics.					
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK/NA
2003 Survey (N=1418)	3.7	20.5	26.1	32.5	17.2
2007 Survey (N=1067)	3.8	15.2	37.9	39.7	3.4
2. Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.					
	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree	DK/NA
2003 Survey (N=1418)	7.2	20.2	47.2	16.6	8.8
2007 Survey (N=1067)	9.2	25.6	43.4	18.6	3.3
Notes:					

Table 6c. Demographic Background and Political Efficacy: Japan 2007 Survey

Percent of People with Efficacy

Demographic Background

Political Efficacy	Gender		Education					Total
	Male	Female	College or above	High School	Junior High School	Primary School	Little or No Education	
I think I have the ability to participate in politics.	25.5	13.2	28.8	16.4	9.6	7.5	0.0	19.0
Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.	44.4	26.2	46.3	30.3	26.8	15.0	0.0	34.8
Both	17.6	4.6	18.3	8.5	4.0	0.0	0.0	10.8
N=1067	505 (47.3%)	562 (52.7%)	361 (33.8%)	445 (41.7%)	198 (18.6%)	40 (3.7%)	2 (0.2%)	100%

Note:

Table 7. Evaluations of Vertical Accountability: Japan in 2007					
(Percent of total sample)					
Items					
1. People have the power to change a government they don't like	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK/NA
Percent	14.1	42.5	32.0	7.5	4.0
2. Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions.	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK/NA
Percent	24.0	37.5	23.9	3.8	10.8
3. How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?	Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely	DK/NA
Percent	14.6	40.4	36.1	2.4	6.5
N=1067					
Notes:					

Table 8. Evaluations of Horizontal Accountability: Japan in 2007

(Percent of total sample)

Items					
1. When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK/NA
Percent	22.3	37.7	20.9	5.8	13.3
2. To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?	Very capable	Capable	Not capable	Not at all capable	DK/NA
Percent	4.6	35.7	43.2	4.9	11.6
N=1067					
Notes:					

Table 9. Evaluations of Freedom under the Current Regime

(Percent of total sample)

2003 Survey	Comparing the current regime with the past regime under Martial Law					
	Much better than Before	Somewhat Better	Much the Same	Somewhat Worse	Much Worse	DK/NA
1. Everyone is free to say what they think.	50.7	39.8	3.6	1.3	0.4	4.2
2. You can join any organization you like.	33.7	45.5	8.4	1.7	0.3	10.4
N=1418						
2007 Survey	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK/NA	
1. People are free to speak what they think without fear.	12.6	39.3	33.6	10.5	4.1	
2. People can join any organization they like without fear.	16.6	39.9	30.5	7.7	5.3	
N=1067						
Notes:						

Table 10a. Social Status and Equal Treatment: Japan 2007 Survey

Subjective Social Status

People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of being high or low. Imagine a ladder with 10 steps. At step one stand the lowest status and step 10 stand the highest. Where would you place your family on the following scale?

Equal Treatment		High (7~10)	Middle (5~6)	Low (1~4)	DK/NA	Total
Everyone is treated equally by the government.	Agree	16.2	19.4	21.7	21.7	206 (19.3%)
	Disagree	80.3	76.4	73.6	53.6	803 (75.3%)
	DK/NA	3.5	4.2	4.7	24.6	58 (5.4%)
	Total	172 (16.2%)	696 (65.2%)	129 (12.1%)	69 (6.5%)	1067 (100%)


Table 10b. Social Status and Basic Needs: Japan 2007 Survey

Subjective Social Status						
People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of being high or low. Imagine a ladder with 10 steps. At step one stand the lowest status and step 10 stand the highest. Where would you place your family on the following scale?						
Basic Needs		High (7~10)	Middle (5~6)	Low (1~4)	DK/NA	Total
People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.	Agree	63.6	64.9	70.5	55.1	691 (64.8%)
	Disagree	34.7	31.8	28.7	23.2	334 (31.3%)
	DK/NA	1.7	3.3	0.8	21.7	42 (3.9%)
	Total	173 (16.2%)	696 (65.2%)	129 (12.1%)	69 (6.5%)	1067 (100%)

Table 11. Evaluation of System Responsiveness: Japan in 2007

Percent							
Items	How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?						
	Very likely	Likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely	DK/NA	Total	
How well do you think the government responds to what people want?	Very responsive	20.0	20.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	5 (0.5%)
	Largely responsive	2.9	28.6	52.6	5.7	10.3	350 (32.8%)
	Not very responsive	0.5	18.3	55.2	15.9	10.1	611 (57.3%)
	Not responsive at all	0.0	4.1	37.0	45.2	13.7	73 (6.8%)
	DK/NA	0.0	3.6	21.4	7.1	67.9	28 (2.6%)
Total		14 (1.3%)	217 (20.3%)	557 (52.2%)	152 (14.2%)	127 (11.9%)	1067 (100%)
N=1067							
Notes:							

Figure 1: Summary of Quality Assessment: Japan in 2007



Note: Electoral Participation is a behavioral measure and may not be comparable to other indicators.

Table 12a: Quality of Democratic Governance and Regime Legitimacy

Correlation Analysis of Japan 2007 Survey

	Satisfaction with Democracy	Support for Democracy	Detachment from Authoritarianism	Diffuse Regime Support
Rule of Law	--	--	--	--
Law-abiding government	0.27**	0.10**	0.04	0.23**
Controlling corruption	0.21**	0.12**	0.03	0.21**
Competition	0.34**	0.08**	0.04	0.23**
Participation	--	--	--	--
Electoral participation	-0.07**	0.03	-0.04	0.01
Political Interest	0.04	0.26**	0.20**	-0.03
Political efficacy	0.01	0.19**	-0.01	-0.01
Vertical Accountability	0.16**	0.07*	0	0.12**
Horizontal Accountability	0.08*	-0.02	-0.01	0.10**
Freedom	0.24**	0.03	-0.01	0.19**
Equality	0.27**	-0.02	-0.08**	0.25**
Responsiveness	0.30**	0.07*	-0.03	0.29**
Country's Economic Condition	0.23**	0.15**	0.04	0.08**
Personal Economic Condition	0.24**	0.10**	0.03	0.05

N=1067

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 12b: Quality of Democratic Governance and Regime Legitimacy

Regression Analysis of Japan 2007 Survey

	Satisfaction with Democracy					Support for Democracy				
	B	std. err.	beta	prob.	VIF	B	std. err.	beta	prob.	VIF
Rule of Law										
Law-abiding government	0.170	0.079	0.070	0.032	1.428	0.132	0.109	0.041	0.229	1.428
Controlling corruption	0.061	0.082	0.023	0.461	1.313	0.251	0.114	0.073	0.028	1.313
Competition	0.578	0.099	0.187	0.000	1.380	0.124	0.137	0.031	0.366	1.380
Electoral participation	-0.099	0.069	-0.041	0.149	1.101	0.345	0.095	0.110	0.000	1.101
Political Interest	0.005	0.077	0.002	0.946	1.166	0.842	0.107	0.245	0.000	1.166
Political Efficacy	-0.066	0.066	-0.028	0.317	1.096	0.357	0.092	0.117	0.000	1.096
Vertical Accountability	-0.085	0.092	-0.029	0.356	1.309	-0.031	0.128	-0.008	0.809	1.309
Horizontal Accountability	-0.002	0.089	-0.001	0.982	1.075	-0.173	0.123	-0.042	0.161	1.075
Freedom	0.178	0.061	0.090	0.003	1.286	0.023	0.084	0.009	0.781	1.286
Equality	0.165	0.079	0.067	0.037	1.420	-0.292	0.110	-0.091	0.008	1.420
Responsiveness	0.381	0.091	0.134	0.000	1.405	0.079	0.126	0.021	0.529	1.405
Country's Economic Condition	0.124	0.038	0.097	0.001	1.207	0.155	0.053	0.093	0.003	1.207
Personal Economic Condition	0.225	0.046	0.143	0.000	1.179	0.119	0.064	0.058	0.064	1.179
constant	-0.984	0.150		0.000		1.952	0.208		0.000	
adjusted R-square	0.213					0.117				
std. err. of regression	1.005					1.391				
N	1067					1067				

	Detachment from Authoritarianism					Diffuse Regime Support				
	B	std. err.	beta	prob.	VIF	B	std. err.	beta	prob.	VIF
Rule of Law										
Law-abiding government	0.080	0.065	0.044	0.223	1.428	<i>0.185</i>	<i>0.084</i>	<i>0.075</i>	<i>0.027</i>	1.428
Controlling corruption	0.052	0.068	0.026	0.447	1.313	<i>0.196</i>	<i>0.087</i>	<i>0.073</i>	<i>0.025</i>	1.313
Competition	0.095	0.081	0.041	0.243	1.380	<i>0.233</i>	<i>0.104</i>	<i>0.075</i>	<i>0.026</i>	1.380
Electoral participation	0.017	0.057	0.009	0.769	1.101	0.048	0.073	0.020	0.510	1.101
Political Interest	<i>0.427</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.217</i>	<i>0.000</i>	1.166	-0.133	0.082	-0.050	0.103	1.166
Political Efficacy	<i>-0.115</i>	<i>0.055</i>	<i>-0.066</i>	<i>0.036</i>	1.096	-0.045	0.070	-0.019	0.524	1.096
Vertical Accountability	-0.014	0.076	-0.006	0.853	1.309	-0.093	0.098	-0.031	0.340	1.309
Horizontal Accountability	-0.056	0.073	-0.024	0.448	1.075	0.155	0.094	0.049	0.100	1.075
Freedom	0.002	0.050	0.002	0.962	1.286	<i>0.128</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.047</i>	1.286
Equality	<i>-0.209</i>	<i>0.065</i>	<i>-0.114</i>	<i>0.001</i>	1.420	<i>0.241</i>	<i>0.084</i>	<i>0.098</i>	<i>0.004</i>	1.420
Responsiveness	-0.063	0.075	-0.030	0.400	1.405	<i>0.518</i>	<i>0.097</i>	<i>0.181</i>	<i>0.000</i>	1.405
Country's Economic Condition	0.020	0.031	0.021	0.532	1.207	0.007	0.040	0.006	0.857	1.207
Personal Economic Condition	0.038	0.038	0.032	0.325	1.179	-0.024	0.049	-0.015	0.631	1.179
constant	2.076	0.124		<i>0.000</i>		-0.372	0.159		<i>0.020</i>	
adjusted R-square	0.049					0.131				
std. err. of regression	0.829					1.065				
N	1067					1067				
Notes: significant variables are written in Italic.										