



**An Asian Barometer Conference on  
The State of Democratic Governance in Asia**

**Session VII. Synthetic Analysis**

**Political Values and Regime Evaluation in East Asia**

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\*Paper prepared for delivery at an Asian Barometer Conference on “The State of Democracy Governance in Asia?” Organized by *Asian Barometer Survey*, National Taiwan University, June 20-21, 2008, Taipei, Taiwan.

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## **Introduction**

Since the 1980s, new or restored democracies mostly can survive. In terms of the ‘quantity of democracy’, the third wave of democratization has dramatic improvement. Nevertheless, in terms of the ‘quality of democracy’, these unfledged democracies perform different political outcomes. Democratization, indeed, installs regular elections, establishes democratic procedures such as the rule of law and check and balance, and successfully restrains the restoration of dictatorship and military government. Nevertheless, considering the extent to which government replies citizens’ requests, accountability, and democratic governance, new or restored democracies have diverse achievements. On the one hand, some countries not only obey the rule of law and democratic principles, but also perform high quality governance. On the other hand, other democracies violate human rights, engage in egregious political corruption, perform declining quality of governance, and might result in setbacks of democracy and democratic erosion and deterioration. The questions stated above make scholars attach importance to the performance of democratic regimes (Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Baker, 1999; Berg-Schlosser, 2004; Cullell, 2004; Foweraker and Krznaric, 2001; Hagopian, 2005; Larry and Morlino, 2004; Morlino, 2004; Kaufmann, et al., 2005).

In fact, not only new or restored democracies, developed democracies also face the problem of enhancing the quality of governance. According to the statistics of public opinion polls, more and more citizens concerns the quality of governance and feel disaffected and unsatisfied with the performance of democratic governments. These problems concerns scholars and worry them about the legitimacy and fundamental support for democracy (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999; Pharr et al., 2000). Nevertheless, measuring the quality of governance is a tough task. Powell(1982) and Lijphart (1999) used to apply macro level indicators as the criteria to investigate the performance of democracy. Since the 1990s, international non-government organizations such as International

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and Freedom House, have recruited experts to evaluate the performance of democracy. In contrast with conventional studies relying on political experts and the supply side, Shin and Chu (2004) assert that citizens under the governance are more capable of subjectively evaluating the performance and quality of democracy from the demand side.

It is widely recognized that so-called East Asian economic miracles are created by “the developmental states” in post-war period. However, the East Asian developmental states were hand in hand with authoritarianism, except for Japan, though which was also under a one-party dominant democracy for several decades (Pempel, 1990). So a crucial question is to what extent the authoritarian legacies impacts citizens’ evaluation of democratic performance. In this paper, we aim to accomplish a three-fold analytical task. First, we review the recent efforts to conceptualize and measure quality of democracy by introducing a comprehensive battery for measuring some essential properties of liberal democracy. This battery was designed and employed by Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Next, we present an empirical assessment of the quality of East Asian third-wave democracies based on the data clued from the latest wave of ABS. We examine to what extent East Asian citizens think their current regimes have embodied the essential properties of liberal democracy. Third, we explore the complex relationship among various aspects of quality of democracy and belief in liberal democratic values. Through a multivariate analysis, we found that people holding democratic values are more inclined to approve democratic regime performances.

## **Defining the Quality of Democracy**

The concept of democracy varies along with the criteria and indicators researchers apply. Early studies on the quality of democracy focused more on the institutional outcomes of

democracy instead of democratic procedures and substantive performance. In addition, the studies mostly investigated the change in the quality of democracy in a country or an area (Putnam 1993). Recently, scholars try to proceed with systematical and cross-national comparative studies. Lijphart (1999) applied general principles of democracy such as representation, equality, electoral participation, the proximity between government and the electorate, the degree of satisfaction with government, accountability, and the majority rule, and systematically compare the quality democracy in 36 democracies. He concludes that in general, consensual democracy performs better than majoritarian democracy. Based on Dahl's concept of polyarchy, Altman and Perez-Linan (2002) studies the democratization of Latin America countries and derive three crucial dimensions: civil rights, political participation, and competition. Nevertheless, they admit that the three dimensions can only draw a rough draft for democratic life and they encourage future studies on evaluating the quality of democracy.

The third wave of democratization spreads toward Africa. Baker applies democratic cultivation as the criterion for auditing the quality of democracy. He examines the extent to which a regime has been democratized instead of whether it is democratic. To secure a complete and consistent measurement, Baker designs 4 dimensions, including 30 criteria as follows:

1. Examining the electoral procedure: including whether the procedure is open to the public, is fraud, or is intervened by political parties or government; whether the franchise is granted to all citizens; whether voters share fair information over candidates, parties, and polices; the degree to which the legislative branch reflects public opinions; the chance of being a candidate, the level of political participation, and the degree to which voters accept political turnover.
2. Examining the open and accountability of government: including whether government polices fulfill the incumbent party's promises in electoral campaign, the extent to which government consult with citizens about public policies, the accessibility of government information, the

degree to which legislature can supervise bureaucratic administration, whether the legislative branch is capable of controlling public expenditure, whether legislators concern public interests, whether the judiciary enjoys autonomy and independence, the accessibility of courts, and the autonomy of local government.

3. Examining civil and political rights : including equality, freedom, and the right of education...etc.
4. Examining democratic society : including national ideology, social tolerance, the activities of economic institutions, the diversification of arts and media, and public trust on political institutions.

Foweraker and Krznaric investigate the quality of democracy based on its liberal democratic performance. They set up minimum requirements for democracy and exclude countries and areas that do not satisfy the requirements. Foweraker and Krznaric view the quality of democracy as the degree to which a country follows the principles of liberal democracy. They classify the quality of democracy along two aspects: The first aspect is legal values, including civil rights, the right of property, political rights, and the rights of minorities. These are endorsement for personal freedom. The second is institutional values, including accountability, representation, the check and balance, and participation. These institutions make government accountable to citizens ( Foweraker and Krznaric , 2000 ; 2001 ) . Based on the criteria above, they further compare the performance of Western democracies, and find that they perform diversely on each dimension ( Foweraker and Krznaric , 2003 ) .

O'Donnell (2004) provides a broader meaning for democracy, and measures the quality of democracy along four aspects:

- 1 、 Civil attitude toward democracy: This aspect firstly concerns the equality and institutionalization of elections, including citizens, electoral systems, and party systems. In

addition, it assesses the elected government, including the functions of the executive and legislative branches, and other institutes.

- 2、The democracy of government organizations and the judicial system: This aspect not only focuses on the democracy of regimes, but also the judicial system, other government organizations and institutes.
- 3、Social networks : the basic requirements of democracy and the characteristics of social networks are highly correlated with the quality of democracy.
- 4、The development of human beings and human rights: this dimension can be deliberated from two viewpoints: First, it concerns the development of human being, including the rights of health, basic living standard, literacy, and employment. In addition, it also takes care of the human rights, including social security and the human rights of foreigners.

O'Donnell's theory is noteworthy because he concerns the development of human beings as well as the basic human rights. Unlike basic civil rights, positive human rights refer to the rights of survive and development and are much more general. Thus, Cullell applies O'Donnell's theory to evaluate the quality of Costa Rica's democracy. Cullell defines the quality of democracy as the coincidence between the political life and institutional performance and citizens' democratic aspiration. Thus, he asserts that studies of the quality of democracy are to measure the distance between the normative regulations and the empirical execution of democracy. The distance can be measured along ten dimensions: the efficient rule of law, democratic decision-making processes, electoral systems, government organizations, local government, intra-party politics, civil society, political participation in the decision-making processes, public opinions, and civil culture. (Cullell, 2004).

Besides political scientists, non-government organizations also contribute a great deal of efforts on evaluating the quality of democracy. Recently, International Institute for Democracy

and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) launches a cross-national project about estimating the quality of democracy. The project starts from investigating how civil rights are protected by institutions, legislatures, and government organizations and how the civil society contributes to political participation, and ends up with the international aspect of democracy. The structure of IDEA's analysis contains four parts and 14 indicators ( Beetham 2004 ) :

1. citizen rights : the independence of the state, and civil rights, the rule of law and judicial justice, citizens and political rights, and social and economic rights.
2. Representative and accountable government : free and fair elections, the democratic roles of political parties, the efficiency and accountability of government, civil control over the military and police, and the control of political corruption.
3. Civil society and popular participation: media, political participation, the responsiveness of government, and the autonomy of local government.
4. Democracy beyond the state: the international aspect of democracy.

The Freedom House also applies three indicators to judge the degree of freedom in a country: the judicial environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. Although the Freedom House does not directly appraise the quality of democracy, but its studies help us understand the degree of freedom, which relates to the quality of democracy in worldwide countries.

In the project "Institute Governance & Anti-Corruption" funded by the World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi consistently evaluate the institution governance of 209 countries from 1996 to 2004. They construct six aspects to measure the governance: The first and second aspects investigate how government and authority are chosen, monitored, and replaced, including voice and accountability, political stability, and absence of violence. The third and

fourth aspects analyze government's capability of making and enforcing policies, including government effectiveness and regulatory quality. The last two aspects focus on the interactions between citizens and government, including the rule of law, and control of corruption ( Kaufmann et al. 2005 ) ◦

In this paper, we apply Morlino and Diamond's approach. Morlino firstly emphasizes the procedure and asserts that a qualified product is produced via a well-designed procedure. Second, he stresses the content and claims that the quality is the characteristic of a product, and could be referred to the design, material, or functions of the product. Finally, he accents customers' satisfaction with the product and their reconsumption on the same product or service. Namely, according to Morlino, political outcomes are also one of the targets for measuring the quality of democracy. Based on the configuration above, Morlino considers qualified democracy as an institutional structure that can fulfill personal freedom and equality via the legitimacy of the institute. He claims that a qualified democracy must be a legitimate regime that can satisfy demands and acquire support from the public. If the institute is backed up by the civil society, it can pursue its democratic values. Otherwise, if the institute has to postpone its goals and to make its efforts on maintaining its legitimacy, then satisfying the minimum requirements of democracy becomes the most important goal. In Morlino's opinion, a qualified democracy should provide appropriate freedom and equality to its citizens, associations, and communities. Citizens have the rights to evaluate whether their government abides by law and pursue the goal of freedom and equality.

Diamond and Morlino provide a more detailed criteria to evaluate the quality of democracy : the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness and these criteria are intertwined with each other( Diamond and Morlino , 2004 ) . Thus, we assert that investigating the quality of democracy should not only

examine whether it satisfies the minimum requirements of democracy, but whether it performs qualified governance.

## **The Impact of Authoritarian Legacies**

In the past 30-40 years, a lot of developing countries took import-substituting industrialization (ISI) or command economy as a means to accelerate industrialization but failed, while the developmental state pattern adopted by East Asian countries, on the contrary, was successful. Under the Cold War, the East Asian leaders in new industrializing countries, on the one hand, felt threatened and tried to maintain their authority. On the other hand, they wanted to achieve the goal of establishing a strong and rich country in a short period, and thus such special socio-economic structure established under the goal of nationalism (Woo-Cumings 1999).

Generally speaking, the developmental states have three characteristics. First, there is a set of unique institutional arrangement within bureaucratic machine and between the public and private sectors. Peter Evans (1995) called this kind of institutional arrangement as “embedded autonomy”. In addition, states have the capacity to regulate and to execute the policies that benefit economic development, for instance, getting some prices wrong instead of getting them right. The policies also include supporting strategic industry, supplying special loans for competitive industry and getting rid of sunset industry, and through subsidies, cutting tax and special benefits to encourage investment (Amsden, 1989; Onis, 1991; Wade, 1990). Third, political elites and citizens strongly believe developmentalism (Weiss and Hobson, 1995). Since the developmentalism is less discussed in the literature and very pertinent to our analysis of public opinion, we need to elaborate it. Schneider (1999: 93) defined developmentalism as “an ideology or world view that accords industrialization a higher priority than other goals and gives the state the leading role to promote it.” Hirschman summarized it best: “if we were to think in

terms of a “binding agent” for development are we simply not saying that development depends on the ability and determination of a nation and its citizens to organize for development ?” (Hirschman, 1958: 8). Indeed, as Johnson has proposed in his classic study of Japan, “a state’s first priority will define its essence....For more than 50 years the Japanese state has given its first priority to economic development.” (p.305). And it is the nationalism and the exigencies of national survival that made these countries took economic development as its main purpose (Johnson, 1999; Doner et al., 2005).

The dramatic change of global socio-economic structure in the 90s—the breakdown of the cold-war structure, the wide-spread of ideology in liberalization, the consensus built in among core countries, such as emphasizing macroeconomics (reducing financial deficits in particular), reducing the government’s role in economy, and opening up the domestic market—have made liberal economic thinking gain the victory worldwide through policy-imitating, spread of new ideas and pressure from financial institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) (Biersteker, 1995).

Besides the change of international socio-economic environment, the prime examples of authoritarianism state in East Asia, had experienced democratic transition since the mid 1980s. In the past, “[state] effectiveness is therefore a function of the degree of insulation (or ‘autonomy’) from the surrounding social structure” (Wade, 1990: 375).<sup>1</sup> (Also see in Johnson and Haggard, 1990). Thus, we should expect democratization would have great impact on the authoritarianism state. Scholars usually paid attention to the impact of democratization on the developmental states. That is how democratization opened the political space for more interest groups to influence policy-making, to seek rents, and thus to undermine bureaucratic autonomy (Chu, 1994; Kang, 2002). In short, the state was weakened by the imposition of the democratic process. As Chu

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<sup>1</sup> Note that the empirical association between authoritarianism and developmental state does not mean the former is the necessary of the latter.

(2003) described, “the coherence and autonomy of the economic bureaucracy suffered as the resourceful business elite has capitalized on the electoral opening and the strengthening of representative institutions to pursue influence buying at strategic junctures in policy-making process.” However, several scholars such as Wong (2004a, b), Chu(2002), Wade(2003), Weiss(2003), Weiss and Thurbon (2004), have also shown that some developmental state has been undergone adaptive changes in its state capacity or actively involved in industrial restructuring.

Many empirical studies have shown that the gap between the reality and promise of democracy has been widening and there are widespread perceptions that democratically elected governments and officials are corrupt, incompetent and unresponsive and untrustworthy. In a bulk of third-wave countries without concerted efforts to improve democratic quality it is unlikely that democracy can achieve a broad and durable legitimacy. If deepening democratic reform is an imperative for all emerging democracies, it is even more so for young democracies in East Asia. In this region democracy not only faces gathering problem of growing popular dissatisfaction or even disillusion but some fierce competitors. Democracy has to compete not only with its predecessor that still lingers on in people’s memory (sometimes in a nostalgic way) but also with its efficacious authoritarian and semi-authoritarian neighbors. In this context, the democratic future of East Asia depends very much on the emerging characteristics as well as the performance of the region’s existing democracies. If the perceived quality of democracy fails to live up to people’s expectation, democracy will not be able to win over the heart of the people in the long run. Also, if democracy does not shine in the eyes of the people of East Asia, its demonstration effect will be very limited and the region’s further democratization will be cast in doubt.

However the relationship between democratic values or detachment from authoritarianism and quality of democracy is a complex one. The conventional wisdom holds that popular

commitment to democratic values will gain strength if the characteristics as well as the performance of the democratic regime are perceived to be superior to the old regime on some important indicators of good governance, such as political liberty, equality, rule of law, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. On the other hand, symptoms of bad governance, such as rampant corruption, electoral fraud and protracted gridlock, corrode people's trust in democratic institution. To answer these questions, this paper aims to focus on the public opinion. Because few research that posit the causal relation between legacies of authoritarianism and evaluating democratic regime performances.

## **Model Interpretation**

Following the previous intellectual advancement, Asian Barometer Survey developed and employed a full array of indicators that correspond to the eight dimensions mentioned above in its latest wave of region-wide comparative survey. In addition, we specifically allow measurement of political corruption to be a separate dimension, rather than just a component of rule of law, to capture its extraordinary impact in shaping people's orientation toward democracy. All together ABS employed the following eighteen items to cover the nine dimensions:

### **A. Rule of Law**

- 1) Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.
- 2) How often do national government officials abide by the law?

### **B. Corruption**

- 1) How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?
- 2) In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?

### **C. Competition**

- 1) Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.
- 2) How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?
- 3) On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?

#### **D. Participation**

- 1) In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?
- 2) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?
- 3) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?

#### **E. Vertical Accountability**

- 1) People have the power to change a government they don't like.

#### **F. Horizontal Accountability**

- 1) When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.
- 2) To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?

#### **G. Freedom**

- 1) People are free to speak what they think without fear.
- 2) People can join any organization they like without fear.

## **H. Equality**

- 1) Everyone is treated equally by the government.
- 2) People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.


## **I. Responsiveness**

- 1) How well do you think the government responds to what people want?

Figure 1 represents the structural equation model we apply to analyze how Asians evaluate the quality of democracy. We assert that citizens have general perception of the quality of democracy. The general perception of the quality of democracy is a latent and unobservable concept, but can be indirectly investigated along 9 dimensions: the rule of law, corruption, competition, participation, horizontal accountability, vertical accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. Except vertical accountability and responsiveness, the other seven concepts are also latent variables and can be estimated by two or three questions.

What might affect respondents' general evaluation of the quality of democracy? We assert that evaluating the quality of democracy is not an easy task. Citizens' interests in and knowledge about the principles of liberal democracy are necessary, but not sufficient requirements for assessing the quality of democracy. For people with authoritarian tendency, they lack for interests in democracy and are less likely to evaluate the quality of democracy. Moreover, due to the shortage of the knowledge about liberal democracy, they are less capable of evaluating the quality of democracy. In contrast with people holding authoritarian values, people who embrace liberal democracy not only are more capable of, but also are more interested in evaluating the quality of democracy. Similarly, for those respondents preferring democracy to dictatorship and authoritarian, we assume that they are more likely to provide comments on the quality of democracy.

**Within**



Besides respondents' personal interests in liberal democracy, their experiences under democratic government also affect how they evaluate the quality of democracy. Studies of Asian values generally argue that Asians prioritize economic development and their satisfaction with material demands (Bell 2000; Harrison 1992; Neher 1994, 958; Smart 1997). Thus, we also incorporate respondents' economic perception as a dependent variable and claim that for those who have negative perception of economy, they are more likely to depreciate the quality of democracy. Contrarily, if people perceive that economy is developing, then they are more likely to appreciate the quality of democracy. Besides the theoretical hypotheses above, we also include several control variables, such as respondents' residence, education levels, and family income. The statistical result is demonstrated in Table 1.

Table 1 provides strong support for critical democrats. We find that people with liberal democratic value are tough customers for democracy. They not only enjoy the life under democratic governance, but play a critical role, set up a high standard for democracy, and expect high quality of governance. Thus, once the experience does not meet their expectation, these people are more easily disappointed at democracy. In contrast with people with liberal democratic values, people with authoritarian tendency tend to comply with authority and are less interested in politics. They tend to satisfy with the status quo and have low expectation on their government. These people are easily satisfied with their life, no matter whether they are under the governance of authoritarian or democracy.

Table 1 also shows that whether democracy is preferable to other alternatives positively associates with the assessment of the quality of democracy. Attentive readers might doubt that this finding seems against the previous one. To interpret this

finding, let us review the question ABS applies to measure the democratic preferability:

Q121. Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?

- (1) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one
- (2) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime
- (3) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government

To estimate preferability of democracy, this question measures the replaceability of democracy. For people who prefer democracy to any other alternatives and think democracy is irreplaceable, they tend to appreciate the quality of democracy. Contrarily, if people agree with that democracy is conditional and replaceable, they tend to claim that democratic procedures have no moral status and intrinsic value. For those people, “Good government is about results, not process”<sup>2</sup> and procedures are evaluated by their consequences (Arneson 1993, 125). The choice among various possible governance regimes is to be made by selecting the regime whose implementation would maximize the attainment of moral goals (Arneson 2003, 124). In short, they think that democracy is only one of all replaceable instruments and does not necessarily lead toward the best outcomes. Society should be capable of selecting a decision procedure that is likely to produce the greatest fulfillment of people’s significant moral rights over the long haul (Arneson 2003, 131). For those people, since the democratic regime is only one among all possible regimes, they are less likely to provide good comments on the quality of democracy.

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<sup>2</sup> By Lee Kuan Yew. See Bell 2000, 185.

We also find that respondents' economic perception positively associate with the assessment of the quality of democracy. This finding supports the hypothesis that the degree of economic development and the satisfaction at material demands mainly concerns East Asians and become the criteria they apply to evaluate the quality of governance. In addition, the statistics of control variables on Table 1 demonstrate that peoples who are more educated and wealth are less likely to provide positive evaluation to their government. In contrast with lower income people and people with lower education levels, these educated middle classes have high expectation on democracy, are hard to be pleased and satisfied with the performance of current government. Table 1 also shows that in contrast with people living in rural areas, urban citizens are more likely provide negative evaluation to their government.

[Table 1 Goes Here]

## **Conclusion and Discussion**

In this paper, first, we generally review diverse approaches of measuring the quality of democracy and the indicators they apply. Instead of consulting political experts, in this paper, we ask respondents to evaluate the quality of governance of their countries.

Our empirical analyses confirm our assumption that a respondent's evaluation of the quality of democracy not only relates to her personal background, but also her interests in and support for liberal democracy and her experience under democratic governance. We find that the perceived quality of democracy is shaped by what citizens expect out of and demand from their government. For those who hold democratic values and enthusiastically participate in politics, they are the best customers of evaluating the quality of democracy. Due to their high expectation on

democratic governance, these people tend to provide negative comments on governance to their democratic regimes. Similarly, the empirical analysis also shows that high education level, high family economic status, and living in urban areas also significantly influence respondents' expectation on governance and affect their evaluation of the quality of democracy. The personal advantages above enable the middle class to become critics of democracy. Contrarily, because people with authoritarian tendency are used to submit themselves to authority, they tend to comply with governance and are less likely to criticize their governments. In other words, for citizens with authoritarian tendency, they are more likely to provide positive comments to their government.

For consolidation of democracy, the criticism of governance is as important as the support for democracy. Support for liberal democracy, on the one hand, provides a consistent and stable foundation for democratic development. That is, citizens view democratic institutions as unconditional and irreplaceable by any other alternatives. The criticism of governance, on the other hand, provides supervision and incentives for government. It not only reminds government of its shortage and drawbacks, but also generates strong constraints on state officials.

In addition, the empirical analysis also shows that for East Asian citizens, of all of the properties people expect out of liberal democracy, nothing is more important than economic development. Economic development not only provides legitimacy to East Asian soft authoritarian, and justifies their limits on civil and political rights, but also is one of the most important criteria for evaluating the quality of governance.

In the future, we need more research on ways to improve democratic quality. Drawing on experiences of East Asia, one can identify at least three important set of factors that are significantly associated with the quality of democracy. First, political elites matter. Lack of strong commitment of a country's significant leaders of opinion,

culture, business, and social organizations, and all major leaders of government and politically significant parties to democratic norms and procedures is a sure recipe for cooking low quality of democracy. Second, mass political culture matters. If a majority of citizens firmly endorse the principle of freedom and rights protection, limited government, democratic accountability, and rule of law, state officials will feel compelled to follow the procedure of good democracy. State officials violating individual freedom and or engaging in illegal practices and corruption will definitely worry about being replaced through elections. Lastly, civil societies also play an important role in determining the quality of democracy. Based on the findings in this paper, the three dimensions above would be the core of our future research on the quality of democracy.

Table 1 Structural Equation Model for the Quality of Democracy

	Independent variables	Coefficients/(t-value)/Significance
	Quality of Democracy	
Main Model	Authoritarian Tendency	1.417 (3.064) ***
	Economic Perception	0.277 (9.873) ***
	Democratic Preferability	0.053 (3.864) ***
	Education Level	-0.011 (-3.575) ***
	Family Income	-0.018 (-2.485) **
	Rural / Urban	0.073 (2.504) **
		Quality of Democracy
Confirmatory Factor Analysis	Rule of Law	1 (-)
	Corruption	0.786 (20.560) ***
	Competition	0.831 (9.695) ***
	Participation	-0.016 (-2.593) ***
	Horizontal Accountability	-0.381 (-3.652) ***
	Vertical Accountability	0.365 (7.813) ***
	Freedom	0.922 (9.442) ***
	Equality	1.194 (16.028) ***
	Responsiveness	1 (-)
		Rule of Law
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Dependent Variables)	Rule of Law Q1	1 (-)
	Rule of Law Q2	0.927 (7.075) ***
	Corruption	
	Corruption Q1	1 (-)
	Corruption Q2	1.284 (19.353) ***
	Competition	
	Competition Q1	1 (-)
	Competition Q2	1.282 (10.571) ***
	Competition Q3	1.127 (7.118) ***
	Participation	
	Participation Q1	1 (-)
	Participation Q2	4.616 (6.168) ***
	Participation Q3	2.323 (6.538) ***
	Horizontal Accountability	
	Horizontal Accountability Q1	1 (-)
	Horizontal Accountability Q2	2.575 (3.489) ***
	Freedom	
	Freedom Q1	1 (-)
Freedom Q2	0.845 (17.401) ***	
Equality		
Equality Q1	1 (-)	
Equality Q2	0.640 (9.992) ***	

Table 1 cont.

		Authoritarianism
	Authoritarian Q1	1 (-)
	Authoritarian Q2	3.413 (2.815) ***
	Authoritarian Q3	3.325 (2.653) ***
	Authoritarian Q4	3.469 (2.528) **
	Authoritarian Q5	3.762 (2.506) **
	Authoritarian Q6	3.325 (2.480) **
Confirmatory Factor	Authoritarian Q7	3.100 (2.322) **
Analysis	Authoritarian Q8	3.541 (2.352) **
(Independent Variables)	Authoritarian Q9	2.589 (2.544) **
		Economic Perception
	Economic Perception Q1	1 (-)
	Economic Perception Q2	1.039 (25.864) ***
	Economic Perception Q3	1.025 (13.037) ***
	Economic Perception Q4	0.890 (9.379) ***
	Economic Perception Q5	1.103 (12.993) ***
	Economic Perception Q6	0.962 (11.208) ***

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## **Appendix**

### **1. Rule of Law:**

Q1. Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.

- (1) Strongly Disagree
- (2) Somewhat Disagree
- (3) Somewhat Agree
- (4) Strongly Agree

Q2. How often do national government officials abide by the law?

- (1) Rarely
- (2) Sometimes
- (3) Most of the time
- (4) Always

### **2. Corruption:**

Q1. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?

- (1) Hardly anyone is involved
- (2) Not a lot of officials are corrupt
- (3) Most officials are corrupt
- (4) Almost everyone is corrupt

Q2. In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?

- (1) It is doing its best
- (2) It is doing something
- (3) It is not doing much
- (4) Doing nothing

### **3. Competition**

Q1. Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.

- (1) Strongly Disagree
- (2) Somewhat Disagree
- (3) Somewhat Agree

(4) Strongly Agree

Q2. How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates.

(1) Rarely

(2) Sometimes

(3) Most of the time

(4) Always

Q3. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [year]. Was it: (NEW)

(1) Not free or fair

(2) Free and fair, with major problems

(3) Free and fair, but with minor problems

(4) Completely free and fair

#### **4. Participation**

Q1. In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?

(1) No

(2) Yes

Q2. Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?

(1) No

(2) Yes

Q3. Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?

(1) No

(2) Yes

#### **5. Vertical Accountability**

Q1. People have the power to change a government they don't like.

(1) Strongly Disagree

(2) Somewhat Disagree

(3) Somewhat Agree

(4) Strongly Agree

## **6. Freedom**

Q1. People are free to speak what they think without fear.

- (1) Strongly Disagree
- (2) Somewhat Disagree
- (3) Somewhat Agree
- (4) Strongly Agree

Q2. People are free to speak what they think without fear.

- (1) Strongly Disagree
- (2) Somewhat Disagree
- (3) Somewhat Agree
- (4) Strongly Agree

## **7. Equality**

Q1. Everyone is treated equally by the government.

- (1) Strongly Disagree
- (2) Somewhat Disagree
- (3) Somewhat Agree
- (4) Strongly Agree

Q2. People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.

- (1) Strongly Disagree
- (2) Somewhat Disagree
- (3) Somewhat Agree
- (4) Strongly Agree

## **8. Responsiveness**

Q1. How well do you think the government responds to what people want?

- (1) Not responsive at all
- (2) Not very responsive
- (3) Largely responsive
- (4) Very responsive

## **9. Authoritarian Tendency**

Q1. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.

Q2. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.

Q3. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be

discussed in society.

Q4. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.

Q5. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

Q6. If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

Q7. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

Q8. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

Q9. When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.

(1) Strongly Disagree

(2) Somewhat Disagree

(3) Somewhat Agree

(4) Strongly Agree

## **10. Economic Perception**

Q1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? Is it...

(1) Vary bad

(2) Bad

(3) Good

(4) Very Good

Q2. How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Is it ...

(1) Much worse

(2) Worse

(3) Better

(4) Much Better

Q3. What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now? Will it be ...

(1) Much worse

(2) Worse

(3) Better

(4) Much Better

Q4. As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today? Is it..

(1) Vary bad

(2) Bad

- (3) Good
- (4) Very Good

Q5. How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago? Is it ...

- (1) Much worse
- (2) Worse
- (3) Better
- (4) Much Better

Q6. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now? Will it be...

- (1) Much worse
- (2) Worse
- (3) Better
- (4) Much Better