



A Comparative Survey of


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Influence of Social Capital on Political Participation in  
Asian Cultural Context

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# Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

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# **Influence of Social Capital on Political Participation in Asian Cultural Context**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Since the publication of Putnam's much-celebrated book (Putnam 1993), social capital has become one of the key concepts that have underpinned many analyses of contemporary democracies. While this concept connotes many interrelated things including interpersonal/institutional trust, civic engagement, and the liveliness of horizontal groups, we now know, at least generally, that the affluence of social capital contributes to high performance of democratic practice such as governmental efficiency and high political participation. Yet, due to its multifaceted nature, the concept of social capital remains somewhat ambiguous, especially at its operational level, and the relationships among various dimensions of social capital are certainly under-investigated. Also under-studied in the current literature is a likely interaction between social capital and cultural/social-psychological factors which enable stable and consistent inter-relationships. An exploration into the relevance of these factors would require a cross-country/cross-regional comparison; for example, without a systematic comparative research, one cannot assess how relevant is the compatibility between social and cultural values to the democratic functioning.

The data collected by East Asia Barometer provides an excellent opportunity to conduct such a comparative investigation in the Asian context. The data set contains, across 8 nations, a set of variables that enable us to construct reasonable measures of various aspects of social capital, as well as political participation and attitudinal/behavioral attributes. Utilizing this data, we hope to elucidate the varying patterns with which different assets of social capital contribute to the working of democracy. As part of the ongoing collaborative research project, our immediate task in this paper is to summarize the necessary theoretical background and to report the procedures for transforming the original data into operational variables for comparative purposes. We then proceed to propose our own hypotheses and models, and present our tentative findings regarding the interaction between social capital, cultural values, and political participation.

## **SOCIAL CAPITAL**

The conceptual exploration of social capital began in the latter part of the twentieth century, perhaps originally with a thought-provoking discussion by a sociologist, James Coleman. According to Coleman (1988), “human capital is created by changes in persons that brings about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways.” He then goes on to argue: “social capital comes about through changes in relations among persons that facilitate action.” Hence, social capital is regarded as something that promotes activities in a society. For instance, more productive activities can be created by trustful personal relationships, than without them. Trust, therefore, is a form of social capital which works as a precondition for further socially important activities, such as economic transactions.

For political scientists, the book that widely publicized the importance of social capital is Robert Putnam’s. In his book on local politics in contemporary Italy, Putnam (1993) argued and demonstrated that the differences in the level of performance between northern and southern Italian local governments are the results of the differences in civic communities, not the results of different level of economic development. He emphasized “associational life” which is the heart of activities in civic communities. According to Putnam, Participation in a variety of associations, even such as sport clubs, cultivates one’s cooperative skills as well as a shared sense of responsibility for collective endeavors.

The importance of trust and associational life was also highlighted by contemporary experts in experimental psychology. A group of researchers in collaboration with Toshio Yamagishi have proposed a concept of social trust (e.g., Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), which should be distinguished from undifferentiated blind trust to everyone. Social trust is a developed sense of trust, because by combining the findings by Yamagishi and Putnam’s arguments, associational life matures people’s judgment on who to trust and with whom to cooperate, and enables them to evaluate the competence of others in order to pursue their social goals. Yamagishi also argued that this social trust allows social system to be less sanction-based and, as a result, helps to reduce the cost of surveillance (Yamagishi, 1990). This positive impact of having in-depth discussions, coordinating voluntary organizations, and cultivating one’s management capacity can be pervasive and be applicable to many social contexts. It could be argued that the citizen’s cost of surveillance can also be cut down when the trust is “institutionalized”. Institutional trust motivates the workers in the organization of the institution, influences the citizens to grant higher evaluation on the institutions, and thus creates a positive feedback loop.

It is now generally accepted that these various components of social capital, i.e. the high level of activities and interactions in voluntary associations, reduction of social cost, and social effectiveness derived from the trust upon people and institutions, are all-powerful contributors towards the functioning and deepening of democracy. On the one hand, this line of research clearly represents a revival of “Civic Culture” tradition (Almond and Verba 1963) of democratic research in political science. Arguably, on the other hand, the recent insights into the importance of social capital can also be embraced in the utilitarian, rational-choice approach to the study of democracy, which recently has increasingly focused on the need of rational actors to coordinate their strategies and intentions in bringing out mutually beneficial outcomes (e.g. Weingast 1997).

Despite the expansion and enrichment of the research associated with the concept of social capital, many avenues seem still left open for further inquiries. On the relationship between trust and participation, for example, the evidence presented so far remains far from conclusive. Even if we include social participation as well as political participation in the dependent variable side, the evidence on the impact of trust is mixed at best. Newton (1999), for

example, pointed out that social trust is only weakly (positively) related to social participation and even less so with political participation in Europe. In the same book, Norris (1999), by using WVS data from 44 nations, showed party activism (a type of political participation) is only weakly determined by social trust as well as institutional confidence (trust). Also Newton and Norris (2000) found some indication that a weak positive relationship exists between social trust and social participation (they use the term “voluntary activism”). Japanese data showed no indication that social trust or institutional trust has any positive relationship with political participation (Ikeda 2002). These ambiguous and inconsistent results need to be clarified with further accumulation of empirical findings

The existing literature is unclear especially about the relationships between social participation and political participation. Putnam himself is not clear about the relationship between voluntary civic-organizational activities and political participation. In his original rendering on ‘bowling alone’ (Putnam, 1995a), he implied that the relationship between participation in voluntary organizations and political participation could be empirically demonstrated. In Putnam’s own words: ‘Participation in civic organization inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours.... These effects, it is worth noting, do not require that the manifest purpose of the association be political. Taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration’ (Putnam, 1993). Likewise, he argues elsewhere: ‘Political participation refers to our relations with political institutions. Social capital refers to our relations with one another. Sending a check to a PAC is an act of political participation, but it does not embody or create social capital. Bowling in a league or having coffee with a friend embodies and creates social capital, though these are not acts of political participation’ (Putnam, 1995b). Nevertheless, in his book-length treatment on the subject (Putnam, 2000), Putnam fails to pursue his inquiry fully and never fills the link between social and political participation. He simply juxtaposed two chapters (chapters 2 and 3), treating as if the relationship between social and political participation were a matter of common sense.

One of the few studies focusing on the relationship between voluntary organizational activities and political participation is done by Ikeda (2002a). By using JEDS2000 survey data from a representative sample of Japan, Ikeda demonstrated that activities in horizontal voluntary associations are positively correlated with political participation even after controlling relevant variables. While meaningful and significant, other empirical analyses must be built upon this finding to see whether such a positive correlation exists between political participation and other forms of social participation. Also warranted is a comparative research to see whether the observed relationship holds for other countries under different cultural contexts. Fortunately, the data from the East Asia Barometer project allows us to pursue precisely such a task.

## **CULTURE**

Although the importance of social capital for democracy has been widely recognized, its importance may vary across countries with different cultural backgrounds. How do cultural factors affect the impact of social capital? Or, does the salience of social capital override cultural differences in contributing to the working and deepening of democracy? In what follows, we discuss two particular factors of democratic culture: 1) values and 2) ideas about political leadership and authority.

### 1) Values

One of the cultural factors that may interact with social capital and political participation variables is basic societal values. In the analysis of East Asian democratic experiences, the well-known contrast between collectivism and individualism might be of particular rele-

vance. Collectivism, it is argued, is a psychological tendency to emphasize on group goals (over individual goals) and thus to put preference on group achievement, conformity, or social harmony (over individual achievement, judgment, and well-being). Many observers on Japanese industrial development, for example, pointed out that collectivism was one of the strongest contributing factors for Japan's success after World War II (see Aoki, 1990 for a review of this claim). A more comparative study is provided by Hofstede (1991), in his book on the analysis of IBM workers in over 50 countries in the East and the West, which emphasizes that collectivism is typical in the East and it characterizes political ideas and behavior in Asian societies (see also Triandis 1989, 1995).

Of course, such a stereotypical generalization faces recurrent criticisms. With regard to Japanese collectivism, for example, some have advanced a persuasive argument that such a societal value was not a product of persistent psychological tendencies but it simply reflected a (time bound) institutional pressure on the societal members to conform in the aftermath of war. (Takano & Osaka, 1999). A general and theoretical reevaluation of the concepts of collectivism and individualism is also under way, which casts a serious doubt on the merits of differentiating along the East and West division (Oyserman et al., 2002).

In light of continuing debate, we believe that the matter has to be settled empirically. That is, the significance of societal values must be identified with solid empirical evidence, and it is for this reason that this variable should be taken into account in assessing the relationship between social capital and political participation.

## 2) Ideas about political leadership and authority

The second cultural factor, whose interactive effect with social capital variables may be of consequence, is the ideas that people hold for political leadership and authority. This cultural dimension is important for our analysis of Asian democratic experiences, because it is said that cultures of the East and the West diverge quite substantially on the idea of authority and in ideals about political leaders. Most typically, Eastern political culture is associated with moralistic, paternalistic and harmony-oriented leader, not a bureaucratic official often found in the Western prototype. In the East, emphasis is on the personality and morally upright characters of the leader, instead of on the development of institutions for leadership (Chu, 1998; cf. Hofstede, 1991, Chap7). Moreover, paternalistic leadership is regarded as important in the East in order to coordinate and control the conditions for people with different interests. This sometimes means to suppress dissent in the name of societal harmony. In contrast, in the West, dissent is encouraged in public debate, and the process of negotiations under democratic institutions reflects mutual dissenting.

Due to the varying preference for different styles of leadership, the expected role of political leaders can differ between the East and the West. Hofstede (1991), for example, shows, with his Power Distance Index that, the preference for authoritarian leadership, reflected in people's expressions of dissent and acceptance to their superiors, is high in the Philippines (PDI score 94), Hong Kong (68), Thailand (64) Korea (60), Taiwan (58), Japan (54) whereas it is particularly low in the United States (40) and England (35). Hence, it is arguable that Authoritarian type of leadership is traditionally emphasized in the East, and if so this may well affect the functions of social capital variables. By de-emphasizing social participatory values and suppressing possible dissent, Eastern culture may be seen as emphasizing trust in existing institutions, which are perceived as given conditions of the society and therefore deserve to be trusted. In the West, on the other hand, the emphasis is put on freedom of choice and on non-authoritarian leadership style especially in voluntary associations.

## **DATA AND VARIABLES**

The East Asia Barometer project supplies a survey data which includes a number of important variables for the analysis of interaction between social capital, cultural factors and political participation. Before presenting our models and hypotheses, we must report some technical procedures with which we transformed original data into operation-friendly variables for comparative purposes. We must note at the outset that at this preliminary stage, the composite variables in this paper are not necessarily constructed without preparatory analysis on their measurement reliability.

## 1) Political participation

Our ultimate dependent variable is political participation. Though the classic civic culture study by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) distinguished four types of political participation, (i) vote, (ii) campaign participation, (iii) local activity participation, and (iv) personal contacts with officials, we divided them into two groups (combining (i) and (ii), (iii) and (iv) respectively). There are some justifications for this category simplification. First, in some countries, the distribution is so skewed to the point where categories themselves turn out to be meaningless (in Thai, for example, the percentage of those who voted was as high as 97%). Second, with the wording of questionnaire related to above (iv), it is impossible to distinguish those who contacted officials for public problems or for personal reasons. Third, we believe our collapsed category has justifiable theoretical meanings in that one mode of our political participation is election related participation, while the other represents an active involvement with government officials, politicians and other politically relevant organizations as well as more direct protest movements.

More precisely, the measurement of election participation was the count of the following questions; “Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [the latest year]?” (adopted “yes” answer; Q027), “Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?” (Q029), and “Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?” (Q030).

For active political participation, the following participation experiences are summed up with weighted by frequencies (Q073-Q080); “Contacted government (administrative) official”, “Contacted officials at higher level”, “Contacted elected legislative representatives at any level”, “Contacted political parties or other political organizations”, “Contacted non-government/civil society organizations (farmers’ associations, trade unions, religious groups, human rights groups, interests groups)”, “Contacted media (letter to newspapers, call-in to radio, TV, etc)”, “Demonstration, strike, sit-in”, and “Other people you have contacted”.

## 2) Social participation

One of the main components of social capital is participation in various social activities. According to Tsujinaka (2002) who conducted surveys on intermediate organizations in the United States, Germany, China, Korea and Japan, associations are configurable on two dimensions; social-resource dimension and nation-institutional dimension. On this plane, several types of associations are classifiable. We will follow this typology;

Local-community related associations such as residential association or PTA (q019s2 and q019s3; dummy variable name g\_comm).

Religious associational sector (q019s11; g\_reli)

Advocacy-political associational sector such as volunteer associations, social and civic movement organizations, or candidate support associations (q019s9, q019s10, q019s13; g\_adv)

Producer associational sector such as trade associations, agricultural associations, or  
producer cooperative (q019s4, q019s5, q019s7; g\_prod)  
Labor union related sector (q019s6; g\_labor)  
Social service related sector such as consumer cooperative (q019s8; g\_soc)

In the spirit of Putnam's and others' conceptualization of social capital, we perhaps want to add, to the above list, the following two types of groups both of which are identified in the Asian Barometer data:

Friendship associations such as hobby club, and sports club (q019s12, q019s15;  
g\_hobspo)  
Political party (q019s14; g\_party)

We will use these group typologies as well as the next two summary measurements;

Number of voluntary organization affiliation (variable name; Fgnum)  
Number of informal group affiliation (variable name; Pgnum)

With regard to the former, obviously, the more affiliated, the more social capital respondents are expected to have. We suppose multiple affiliations, which necessarily means access to larger and more heterogeneous information, is a positive function of social capital. The latter, we believe, is an indication of another type of social association which could ferment social capital (cf. Ikeda, 2002); Circle of colleagues who interact out of work, group at community schools or other place of learning, circle of friends who share common hobbies or favourite past times, circle of friends who do business (or investment) together or help out each other in money matters, circle of friends who exchange information and points of view, and informal credit/loan association.

### 3) Trust

Another important aspect of social capital is trust. In light of the theoretical discussion in the previous section, however, we need to develop a nuanced sub-categorization of this concept.

#### 3-1) social trust (generalized trust)

The East Asia Barometer survey contains a question which asks the respondent to express which of the two were closest to his/her opinion by using a four-point scale (Q024), between "One can't be too careful in dealing with them" and "Most people can be trusted." Since this scale is widely used in longitudinal studies such as World Value Survey, we would adopt it also as a reasonable measurement of social trust (variable Gene\_trs).

#### 3-2) Institutional trust

As for institutional trust, the question asked the respondent was: "How much trust you have in each of the institutions listed below?" using four-point scales from "None at all" to "A great deal of trust" (Q007-Q018). The list of institutions included court, national government, political parties, parliament, civil service, military, police, local government, newspapers, television, and election commission. We summated all the answers with giving 4 point to the "great deal of trust", 3 to "quite a lot of trust", 2 "not very much trust" and 1 "none at all". As some of the countries had missing data on a few items, we will use the average values as the measurement, by dividing the sum by the number of answers the respondents' country questionnaire provided (variable Inst\_trs). Throughout the 8 countries, principal component analyses showed that the 1<sup>st</sup> component has the large explanation power on the data variance (Japan

30%, Hong Kong 35%, Korea 39%, China 39%, Mongolia 24%, Philippines 45%, Taiwan 29%, and Thailand 35%), suggesting the measurement construction is valid.

#### 4) Other variables related to trust

In addition to political and social participation and trust, we take into consideration the following variables contained in the East Asia Barometer survey.

##### 4-1) perceived corruption

This variable is related to institutional trust but from the reverse point of view. Although not well established empirically, some have argued that the level of political participation is affected by a widely-publicized misconduct of officials and the consequential pervasive political distrust (e.g. Pharr 2000). Perception of corruption may closely be related to institutional trust. The two questions in the survey (Q114 & Q115) ask the respondent his/her perception of corruption: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?” and “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital city]?” The alternatives to answer were both 1 “hardly anyone is involved”, 2 “not a lot of officials are corrupt”, 3 “most officials are corrupt”, and 4 “almost everyone is corrupt”. We thus created a new variable by summing them up (variable Corrupt).

##### 4-2) perceived social connections

Having effective personal network to powerful position in the society could be an alternative way of accessing social resources instead of collective civic engagement; A mechanism implied in social capital arguments was that high trusters are able to discern who could be trustful and then able to increase social capital by associating with others who are trustful, which collectively enhances social resources. On the other hand, having connections to powerful others enables them to bypass the trust-social capital route by directly extracting social resources from those who have power sometimes unfairly and un-democratically. Then having social connections could be negatively related with political participation which is in essence more open to every citizen. In the Asian Barometer survey, Q025 can be utilized to measure such an effect: “I have enough friends and connections so that I can get help if I need it” (variable Connect). (Another possible variable on this measurement was from Q026, but the data was not available in some countries).

#### 5) Cultural factors

As discussed in the previous section, our goal is to reveal the varying patterns with which social capital promotes democracy under different cultural contexts. To explore the importance of cultural factors, we focus particularly on the following two variables.

##### 5-1) values:

Collectivism, often identified as the key societal value in East Asia, can be measured by summing the following two questions (Q068, Q069); “A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him”, and “For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second”. We summated the answers by giving 4 point to “strongly agree”, 3 to “somewhat agree”, 2 “somewhat disagree”, and 1 “strongly disagree” (variable Collect). Both variables are correlated significantly positively except Mainland China.

##### 5-2) ideas about political leadership

Ideas about political leadership or ideas of governance can possibly vary from the East to the West, as well as across individual countries, according to several dimensions. We pursue four such dimensions which are reflected in the East Asia Barometer survey data.

The first dimension concerns with the morality of politicians. In our data, this can be measured by four-point scale questions to the statement: “You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right”(Q131); and “If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything” (Q138)(variable Moral).

Second, the support for political paternalism was can be measured by four-point scale questions to the statement: “Government leaders are like the head of a family. We should all follow their decisions” (Q133); and “The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society” (Q134) (variable Paternal).

Third, tendency to suppress dissent was measured by the statements; “We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things” (Q121), and “No opposition party should be allowed to compete for power” (Q122) (variable Nodissnt).

Finally, the preference for harmony-oriented politics was questioned by the statements: “Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups” (Q135), and “If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic” (Q139) (variable Harmony).

Principal component analyses on these 8 items showed various patterns of components across countries; Roughly speaking, the morality and paternalism go together mostly; dissent suppression and harmony orientation are separate. Despite these variations, we will go ahead to use the above four measurements for our analysis.

#### 6) Control variables

Some factors exogenous to social capital or cultural variables can be associated with dependent variables, and should therefore be controlled statistically. Such factors are: perceived economic situation of the nation as a whole (summation of Q001-Q003; variable Macroeco), perceived economic situation of the individual him/herself(summation of Q004-Q006; variable Personeco), perceived political efficacy (summation of variables; Q128 and Q129; variable Efficacy), and demographic variables such as. country, gender, age, education, and perceived social status in relative term.

### **MODELS AND HYPOTHESES**

Our main target of analysis is two-fold. First, we want to identify the role of social participation (civic engagement) as well as trust on political participation. Second, at the same time, we want to reveal the patterns according to which cultural differences interact with social capital in contributing to the functioning and deepening of democracy. Thus, the basic model consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the processes in which social capital (social participation and trust) affects political participation. The second part attempts to uncover the possible cultural factors intervention.

#### 1) Models

The model for the first part of our inquiry is straightforward, whereas modeling for the culture-social capital interaction can be much more complex. As for the latter part of our analysis, we have three basic causal models in mind;

- (1) Direct effect model; Even if we control for social capital variables, cultural factors will be directly associated with political participation.
- (2) Mediated effect model; Culture affects the whole relationship between social capital and political participation. In this case, various specific scenario are theoretically possible;

- a) Social trust may not be associated with political participation where collectivism is high, whereas the association may become positive where collectivism is low. In high collectivistic mind-set collectivism affects participation in collective way such as conformity pressure to vote, where there is no room for individual level of social trust to have some effect.
  - b) As stated in *Analects* 8-9 (of Confucius), Asian paternalistic values is consistent with the thought “People should be dependent, not to be informed”, i.e. people should be trustful of the governors without being informed as assumed under deliberate public conception. Then, we may assume that under high paternalistic mind-set, social trust will not be related with political participation.
  - c) Institutional trust could be negatively related with political participation, because dependable people let governors do their own politics, i.e. institutional trust goes with a blind trust on the establishment including political system, meaning decrease in political participation. On the other hand, under non-paternalistic mind-set, the positive relationship between social capital and political culture emerges, i.e. institutional trust could be positively related with political participation.
  - d) As concerning the effect of social participation on political participation, it is possible that in both of collectivistic and non-collectivistic mind-sets the relationship would be positive due to pseudo correlation in the former, and due to social capital effect in the latter (in the former collectivism is related positively both with group affiliation and political participation, causing pseudo correlation).
- (3) Aggregate model; The previous mediated effect model assumed the causal relationship is on individual psychological mechanism. However, the causal chain could be a more cultural level phenomenon, i.e. individual behaves collectivistically, not because he/she is collectivist in mind-set but because of the culture in which he/she lives. Then depending on collectivistic nature of culture [measured in the country aggregate level of high collectivism (where respondents’ average collectivism is high)] we predict the same way as in the mediated effect model.

[This time, we are not able to test this aggregate model due to time shortage.]

## 2) Hypotheses

Based on the arguments above, we propose the following hypotheses.

- 1a-1. Social trust is positively related with political participation.
- 1a-2. Institutional trust is positively related with political participation.
- 1b. Social participation is positively related with political participation.
- 2a. (Direct effect model of culture) Cultural factors directly positively related with political participation.
- 2b. (Mediated effect model of culture) Culture affects the whole relationship between social capital and political participation at the individual level.
- 2c. (Aggregate effect model of culture) Culture affects the whole relationship between social capital and political participation at the aggregate level.

At present stage, we will not be able to test 2c.

## 3) Procedure of analysis

We will test our hypotheses one by one. In each of the tests, we will firstly conduct a combined analysis on the whole country data with country dummy variables (comparison country is Japan), and then move onto analyses on each country. It should be noted that the

analyses on Mainland China was not possible because of the lack of the dependent variables (political participation).

#### 4) Results

##### 4-1) Test of H 1a-1: Social trust is positively related with political participation.

Table 1 shows the results of our ordered logit analyses. Ordered logit analysis is recommended when the dependent variable is ordered and still has limited values (Long, 1997). Here for consistency we used this method throughout the paper.

The dependent variables were election related participation as well as active participation. The leftmost column lists the independent variables and control variables. Country dummy variables are put into the equations when all the country data (combined country data) are used, which is shown in the second leftmost column. From the third leftmost column to the rightmost, we show the results from each country data analysis.

The results reveal that social trust is positively correlated with both of the election related participation and the active participation for the combined country analyses. Country specific analyses show that the former results are more consistent than the latter; social trust is positively associated with the election participation in Japan, Korea (marginally) and Thailand (with the Philippines as an exception which shows negative correlation). When the active participation was chosen as the dependent variable, it was significant only in Thailand in individual country analyses (though note that Japanese data was  $p=.103$ ).

Overall, then, although the effect was not large, we have nevertheless a general support for the hypothesis 1a-1.

Having personal connection with powerful others was one of the alternative way to access social resources instead of having high social trust, and we predicted the variable could be negatively related with political participation. The result shows the reverse; The variable is also generally positively correlated with political participation variables, which forces us to guess that there are two routes of political participation; one is general way of trusting others, and the other way is to have more short cut route, which connotes voting may be a reward for those who are powerful (as a return for service utilized through the connection).

##### 4-2) Test of H 1a-2: Institutional trust is positively related with political participation.

According to Table 1, institutional trust variable does not seem to be related with political participation overall taking either the election participation or the active participation as the dependent variable. In individual country data analyses there is even a negative relationship in Taiwan for election participation. The negative impact of institutional trust can also be found for Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand when active participation variable is chosen as the dependent variable.

Perceived corruption variable could be a negative indicator of institutional trust. This variable does not show any overall effect either on the two dependent variables. Also noticeable are some anomalies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mongolia, indicating positive relationship with election participation (Taiwan data also revealed positive correlation for active participation).

Obviously, these counterintuitive results regarding the effect of institutional trust warrant some further investigations.

##### 4-3) Test of H 1b: Social participation is positively related with political participation.

Both the associational participation and informal group participation counted by members of affiliations are good predictors on election participation as well as on active participation (Table 1). Especially the former variable is significant again in country specific analyses with the only exception of the Korean case where the results did not reach significant when

the dependent was active participation. Informal group participation variable is less powerful; Mongolia and Philippine data does not reveal significant relationship with both of the dependent variables. Overall, the findings support hypothesis 1b.

A small reservation on this support should be noted. A few of social participation items counted in the index of voluntary organizational affiliation (Fgnum) is tightly connected with political activities, especially in the cases of candidate support organization or political party membership. Those affiliated with those groups are fairly small in number except for Mongolian political party membership, but ideally these should be removed from the social participation list for constructing the index, because they may not be appropriate for “social participation” items. However, the results of the analyses by removing these items did not change the conclusion. Only a part of Mongolian results changed (insignificant in social participation to political participation). Time pressure prevents us to change the tables in this paper. [Apparently further analyses should be conducted having this "contamination" in mind.]

Table 2 shows more detailed analyses on the effects of associational affiliation types. The effects apparently vary from country to country and from one associational type to another. It should be noticed that all the signs are positive in the overall analyses and the case is true for most of the signs in individual country analyses as well. Also if we exclude politics-related associational type such as political party affiliation type and advocacy group type (like candidate support organization), we still see many types of organizations are positively related with political participation.

#### 4-4) Exploring H 2a (Direct effect model)

In order to test the direct effect model of culture, we added cultural variables into the equations in Table 1. The results are shown in Table 3. It is apparent the newly added independent variables did not change the whole landscape of the effects of social capital related variables (social participation and social/institutional trust). The only cultural variable which affected participation consistently was collectivism variable, the more collectivist, the more participatory. While this may reflect a collectivistic nature of participation in Asian cultures, one should note that the relationship is weak and individual country data analyses did not show any significance for this variable.

Other culture related variables worth noticing are paternalism and harmony orientation. Paternalism is negatively correlated with election participation in Hong Kong and Thailand, and with active participation in Korea. These results suggest that entrusting tendency leads to decrease in political participation.

Overall, we must conclude that effects of cultural variables, as seen from this direct effect model, are not very strong.

#### 4-5) Exploring H 2b (Mediated effect model)

We have three ways of examining this hypothesis. The first way is to divide the sample into two by the medians to check the differences of effects in both samples. The second way is to include an interaction variable approach. The third approach would be to use path analytic method. We choose the first in this paper, because we have a large sample and the approach is quite simple to see the differing effects. Table 4 and 5 show the summary results; for each of cultural variables we split the sample at the median.

The results in Table 4 show very clear picture for the effect of social trust for collectivism as well as political cultural factors, supporting our inference. When collectivism is low in respondents' mind-set, social trust is effective to promote election participation. On the other hand when collectivism is high, that effect disappears. The same is true for political cultural variables; for instance when the support for paternalistic attitude is low, social trust is powerful, but when it is high trust the effect goes away.

Note, however, that the relationship is different when active participation is chosen as dependent variable (Table 5); the effect by collectivism is the reverse, and the effect of political culture is not always consistent with our original inference.

Finally, as predicted, the effect of social participation variables is consistently positive with the political participation variables both under and above the medians of cultural related variables.

All in all, the analyses and findings here point to the validity of the mediation model of culture, especially the interplays between social trust and culture related variables.

## **DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE TASKS**

In this paper, we have examined the salience of various aspects of social capital and cultural effects in facilitating political participation, using the 8 country survey data from the East Asia Barometer project. While still preliminary, our analyses brought out several intriguing findings. Social trust as well as civic engagement in terms of social participation generally significantly affect political participation, especially election related behavior in the East Asian countries. Moreover, when we introduced cultural variables, the analyses reveal different aspects of the Asian mind; the more collectivistic, or the more embedded in “traditional” Asian political ideals, people follow less to the Putnamian patterns in election related participation. This does not mean that we herald the uniqueness of Asian values, but it does imply that Putnamian logic of democracy could have some limit of applicability under a different cultural settings. In this final section, we point to some remaining problems to be solved as well as future task on this theme for discussion.

### 1) Problems to be solved

As was pointed out in the previous section, our measurement of social participation is somewhat contaminated by politically colored group affiliation; Of course many social organizations could have “political color” when they try to attain their own goals; for instance, community organization ask local politicians to help them to solve the problems in their community. Thus sometimes it is difficult to distinguish social participation and political participation. However, still there are differences of gradation of political color in different levels of civic engagement.

Another issue to be discussed is on social trust. There are two problems; one relates to the fact that the measurement is a single item and the other concern with the fact that we have not conducted an analysis of an aggregate level effect of social trust. For the latter problem, it can be argued social trust is effective only if others around us reciprocate trust in turn. In that sense, social trust is collective in nature. Thus, although we saw significant effects of social trust in the previous analyses, we need more refinement. For example, we need more social trust items in order to avoid large measurement error (in Japanese data, we have several more items, analyzing those items would provide more persuasive evidence in this point). Further, aggregate analysis on social trust is needed possibly at the national level comparison, local level comparison (each sampling area could be units of analyses), or more micro aggregate level (we need new items such that “do you think your friend/ neighbor/ others in daily contacts will trust you?”)

Another problem is the treatment of daily social interaction. As shown by Huckfeldt or Ikeda (Huckfeldt and La due Lake, 1998; Ikeda, 2002b), daily social interaction is a resource of social capital for political participation. Unfortunately, however, in this East Asian Barometer we do not have relevant variables. It would be fruitful to investigate the interaction effect of daily social interaction and Asian or more general values on political participation.

Yet another factor of importance, not taken into consideration in this paper, is political tolerance. In the idea of liberal democracy, full political participation means to accept full political participation of others without any reservation, which is an essence of political tolerance. Although we do not have relevant variables at hand, future survey will need a set of tolerance related items.

Finally, for further analysis, we have yet to examine the aggregate-level effects. To do so, more complex modelings are to be tested, using, for example, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM: see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM might answer our following questions: Are the effects of social capital on democratic outcome variables the same for all countries? And if not, how they vary? It will also help us distinguish individual- and aggregate-level effects.

## 2) Effect of mobilization

For a fair evaluation of the evidence presented, we would also like to point out the limits of survey based research, which are relevant to our analyses as well. Generally, the survey is geared toward analyzing the mass-level attitude and behavior, setting aside the elite-side of the story in democratic practices. Hence, the findings we have reported on political participation could be partly attributed to mobilization process caused by political activists on the side of candidates or political parties. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) pointed out that the decline of American political participation is not attributable to distrust in politics or government, but more attributable to the demand side of participation, i.e. decline of mobilization by campaign, social movement etc.

In order to show that the findings reported earlier stand significant even when Rosenstone style explanation is taken into consideration, we have added a mobilization variable as a control variable to the equations in Table 1. The mobilization variable is a weighted summation of Q032 to Q042; The question was “During the last national election in [year], did any of the following personally ask you to vote for a particular candidate?” ; The alternatives are “family members/relative”, “seniors in a clan or extended family”, “neighbour/friend”, “community leaders”, “superior at work/school”, “owners of the firm/unit that you work for”, “member/official of organization that you belong to”, “government official whom you know personally”, “government official whom you don’t know”, “candidate/party activist whom you know personally”, “candidate/party activist whom you don’t know”. For the cases where the data was available (Japan, Mongolia, Philippines, and Thailand), the results clearly revealed in Table 6 that effects of social capital related variables did not change very much, although the mobilization variable is highly significant. We take this as further endorsement for our arguments and findings.

## 3) General values

Worldwide value studies point to two important dimensions in general values: modernization and postmodernization values (Inglehart, 1997). Especially, postmodernization values are crucial to democracy since they emphasize participation as well as tolerance on dissent (freedom of speech) (Inglehart, 1990; Clark, 1998). On the other hand, modernization values emphasize more basic societal stability, i.e. healthy economic development and maintenance of social order. Concerning social capital, people who are inclined toward postmodernization values are expected to be more supportive of participation and tolerance on dissent, compared to those who prefer modernization values. In the context of Asian culture, then, it is important to find how these general values go together with traditional Asian values.

Unfortunately, we have not measured Inglehart value items in all the countries. However, we have two possibilities of analyses by our present data; one is that Q119 provides a choice between democracy and economy; this variable will possibly be used as the choice be-

tween modernization value and postmodernization value. The other possible analysis is to use Japanese data because in Japanese survey, we obtained Inglehart value items.

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Table 1-1. Test of Hypotheses 1a-1, 1a-2, & 1b(1)

election	election related participation	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand
fgnum	associational social participat	0.29 ***	0.71 ***	0.50 ***	0.27 ***	0.28 ***	0.30 ***	0.33 ***
pgnum	informal group social participat	0.08 **	0.16	0.25 ***	-0.03	0.01	0.28 ***	0.22 *
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.01	0.00	0.24 +	-0.03	0.07	-0.40 *	0.13
gene_trs	social trust	0.16 **	0.05	0.20 +	0.25	-0.39 *	-0.02	0.34 **
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.02	0.19 *	-0.09 +	0.09 *	-0.05	0.13 **	-0.04
connect	have personal connection	0.27 ***	0.15	0.44 ***	0.20 **	0.37 ***	0.10	0.23 ***
macroeco	macro economy	-0.02 +	-0.08	-0.08 *	-0.11 ***	-0.01	-0.02	0.11 ***
persoeco	personal economy	0.02	-0.01	0.11 **	0.02	0.01	0.09 **	-0.05
efficacy	efficacy	0.07 ***	0.13	-0.02	0.17 ***	0.03	0.07	0.07 *
se002	gender	-0.09 *	0.05	0.11	-0.18 +	-0.10	0.01	-0.13
se003	age group	0.14 ***	0.13 ***	0.27 ***	0.10 ***	0.14 ***	0.12 ***	0.02
se005a	education(year)	0.03 ***	0.03	0.06 **	0.02	0.04 **	0.02	-0.01
se017	social stratification	-0.05 +	-0.19 *	-0.09	0.01	0.02	-0.09	0.02
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	-0.67 ***						
kor	Korea	1.08 ***						
mon	Mongolia	2.46 ***						
phl	Philippines	1.42 ***						
twn	Taiwan	1.35 ***						
tha	Thai	2.79 ***						
_cut1		1.75	2.09	2.57	-0.96	0.56	-0.97	-1.40
_cut2		4.65	4.85	5.90	1.17	2.85	2.58	1.86
_cut3		6.37	6.84	8.30	2.95	4.08	4.22	3.75
n		9007	809	1500	1135	1200	1407	1538
LR chi		2784.61	61.38	215.15	119.12	126.65	105.45	115.88
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.1271	0.0872	0.0719	0.0413	0.0422	0.0377	0.0326

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 1-2. Test of Hypotheses 1a-1, 1a-2, & 1b(1)

active	active participation	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand
fgnum	associational social participat	0.39 ***	0.55 ***	0.21	0.28 ***	0.41 ***	0.63 ***	0.31 ***
pgnum	informal group social participa	0.22 ***	0.26 *	0.30 ***	0.09	0.07	0.33 ***	0.27 *
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.00	-0.36	0.85 ***	0.26	-0.07	-0.48 *	-0.33 *
gene_trs	social trust	0.16 **	-0.11	0.06	0.18	0.32	0.01	0.49 ***
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.02	0.16	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.11 *	-0.05
connect	have personal connection	0.18 ***	0.46 **	-0.02	-0.07	0.48 ***	0.24 *	0.13 *
macroeco	macro economy	0.02	0.06	-0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.05	0.11 **
persoecon	personal economy	0.00	-0.03	-0.06 +	0.09 +	-0.06	-0.01	0.02
efficacy	efficacy	0.05 **	0.01	-0.06	0.02	-0.08 +	0.11 +	0.15 ***
se002	gender	-0.30 ***	-0.56 ***	0.02	-0.13	-0.38 **	-0.50 ***	-0.32 **
se003	age group	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.02
se005a	education(year)	0.05 ***	0.07 **	0.08 ***	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.04 **
se017	social stratification	0.09 **	0.13	0.01	0.32 ***	0.08	-0.07	0.14 *
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	1.70 **						
kor	Korea	1.88 **						
mon	Mongolia	0.67 ***						
phl	Philippines	1.48 ***						
tw	Taiwan	1.13 ***						
tha	Thai	2.48 ***						
_cut1		4.33	1.87	2.56	5.32	2.48	0.67	2.41
_cut2		4.83	2.47	3.18	5.88	3.10	1.20	2.73
_cut3		5.74	3.25	4.73	6.30	3.85	1.90	3.65
_cut4		6.08	3.61	5.29	6.58	4.31	2.26	3.91
_cut5		6.61	4.27	6.02	6.83	4.79	2.83	4.48
_cut6		6.87	4.61	6.40	7.20	5.01	3.11	4.67
_cut7		7.29	5.04	6.92	7.32	5.53	3.68	5.15
_cut8		8.02	6.33	7.80	7.62	6.05	5.16	5.98
n		9007	809	1500	1135	1200	1407	1538
LR chi		972.35	80.91	89.87	51.06	110.12	159.17	143.97
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.053	0.0494	0.0266	0.0257	0.049	0.0663	0.033

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 2-1. Test of Hypotheses 1a-1, 1a-2, & 1b(2)

election	election related participation	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand
g_comm	community organization affiliation	0.43 ***	0.38 ***	0.20	0.17	0.34	0.61 *	0.54 ***
g_reli	religious organization affiliation	0.12	0.56 *	-0.40	-0.36	0.10	0.23	-0.52 +
g_adv	advocacy organization affiliation	0.43 ***	0.91 ***	0.75 *	-0.01	0.77 ***	0.56 *	0.45 +
g_prod	producer organization affiliation	0.27 ***	0.11	0.80 +	0.52 **	0.51	0.12	0.34 *
g_socs	social service organization affiliat	0.14	-0.05	--	0.46 +	2.84 ***	--	-2.58
g_hobspo	hobby_sports organization affiliati	0.03	-0.01	0.80 **	-0.50 **	1.29 *	0.45	-0.39
g_party	political party organization affiliati	0.88 ***	2.55 ***	--	0.99 ***	-0.06	0.93 **	0.59
pgnum	informal group social participat	0.08 **	0.00	0.17 +	-0.03	0.04	0.29 ***	0.30 **
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.00	-0.09	-0.02	-0.15	0.06	-0.39 *	0.12
gene_trs	social trust	0.16 ***	0.44 ***	0.20 +	0.21	-0.38 *	-0.01	0.35 **
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.02	0.02	0.18 *	0.08 *	-0.04	0.13 **	-0.04
connect	have personal connection	0.29 ***	0.22 **	0.14	0.43 ***	0.39 ***	0.10	0.23 ***
macroeco	macro economy	-0.02 +	0.00	-0.08 *	-0.12 ***	-0.02	-0.02	0.11 ***
persoecon	personal economy	0.02	-0.04	-0.01	0.11 **	0.02	0.10 **	-0.06
efficacy	efficacy	0.07 ***	0.09 *	0.16 +	0.19 ***	0.03	0.07	0.06 *
se002	gender	-0.09 *	-0.13	0.05	-0.18	-0.09	0.03	-0.14
se003	age group	0.14 ***	0.25 *	0.13 ***	0.10 ***	0.14 ***	0.12 ***	0.02
se005a	education(year)	0.03 ***	0.07 **	0.03	0.06 **	0.04 **	0.02	-0.01
se017	social stratification	-0.05 +	-0.19 *	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	0.03
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	-0.68 ***						
kor	Korea	1.05 ***						
mon	Mongolia	2.33 ***						
phl	Philippines	1.46 ***						
tw	Taiwan	1.35 ***						
tha	Thai	2.75 ***						
_cut1		1.80	2.06	2.10	-1.31	0.62	-0.88	-1.52
_cut2		4.68	5.30	4.84	0.87	2.92	2.68	1.75
_cut3		6.41	6.86	6.83	2.71	4.16	4.34	3.65
n		9007	1418	809	1135	1200	1407	1538
LR chi		2809.54	289.63	54.94	174.34	143.2	112.04	128.65
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.1282	0.0978	0.0383	0.0604	0.0477	0.0401	0.0362

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 2-2. Test of Hypotheses 1a-1, 1a-2, & 1b(2)

active	active participation	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand
g_comm	community organization affiliation	0.38 ***	0.87	0.28	0.43 *	0.85 **	0.74 *	0.17
g_reli	religious organization affiliation	0.33 **	0.56	-0.70	-0.58	0.24	0.63 **	0.08
g_adv	advocacy organization affiliation	0.60 ***	1.05 ***	0.55	0.21	0.79 **	0.90 ***	0.51 +
g_prod	producer organization affiliation	0.53 ***	0.83 ***	1.34 **	0.55 **	0.95 *	0.94 ***	0.33 *
g_socs	social service organization affiliat	0.43 *	--	--	0.28	0.48	--	1.64
g_hobspo	hobby_sports organization affiliati	0.11	-0.22	-0.40	0.25	0.58	0.97 **	-0.11
g_party	political party organization affiliati	0.42 **	--	--	0.33 +	2.04	0.30	0.99 **
pgnum	informal group social participat	0.24 ***	0.25 *	0.30 ***	0.10	0.07	0.35 ***	0.34 **
inst_trs	institutional trust	-0.01	-0.33	0.87 ***	0.23	-0.08	0.48 *	-0.32 *
gene_trs	social trust	0.17 **	-0.11	0.05	0.19	0.33	0.03	0.55 ***
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.02	0.15	-0.03	0.06	0.06	0.12 *	-0.05
connect	have personal connection	0.18 ***	0.47 **	-0.03	-0.03	0.50 ***	0.24 *	0.13 *
macroeco	macro economy	0.02	0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.11 **
persoeo	personal economy	0.00	-0.03	-0.07 +	0.09 +	-0.05	0.01	0.01
efficacy	efficacy	0.05 ***	0.13 *	-0.05	0.03	-0.08 *	0.12 +	0.15 ***
se002	gender	-0.30 ***	-0.64 ***	0.00	-0.11	-0.39 **	0.48 ***	-0.32 **
se003	age group	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.02
se005a	education(year)	0.05 ***	0.07 ***	0.08 ***	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.04 **
se017	social stratification	0.08 *	0.12	0.01	0.32 **	0.08	0.07	0.14 *
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	1.63 ***						
kor	Korea	1.79 ***						
mon	Mongolia	0.60 ***						
phi	Philippines	1.50 ***						
tw	Taiwan	1.06 ***						
tha	Thai	2.40 ***						
_cut1		4.32	2.06	2.53	5.27	2.52	0.84	2.47
_cut2		4.81	2.66	3.15	5.84	3.14	1.37	2.79
_cut3		5.72	3.43	4.71	6.26	3.89	2.08	3.71
_cut4		6.06	3.79	5.27	6.54	4.35	2.43	3.98
_cut5		6.59	4.45	6.01	6.79	4.84	3.00	4.54
_cut6		6.85	4.79	6.39	7.16	5.07	3.29	4.74
_cut7		7.28	5.22	6.90	7.29	5.60	3.86	5.22
_cut8		8.01	6.50	7.79	7.58	6.12	5.36	6.05
n		9007	809	1500	1135	1200	1407	1538
LR chi		949.23	75.22	100.6	57.78	108.9	159.73	145.44
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.0517	0.046	0.0297	0.029	0.0484	0.0665	0.0334

+ : .05 < p ≤ .10, \* : .01 < p ≤ .05, \*\* : .001 < p ≤ .01, \*\*\* : p ≤ .001

Table 3-1. Test of Hypothesis 2A

election	election related participation	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand
fgnum	associational social participat	0.29 ***	0.69 ***	0.50 ***	0.27 ***	0.29 ***	0.30 ***	0.32 ***
pgnum	informal group social participa	0.08 **	0.13	0.25 **	-0.03	0.01	0.28 ***	0.21 *
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.01	0.17	0.23 +	-0.01	0.03	-0.39 *	0.10
gene_trs	generalized trust	0.16 **	0.04	0.20 +	0.28	-0.38 *	-0.03	0.34 **
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.02	0.19 *	-0.09 +	0.10 *	-0.05	0.13 **	-0.03
connect	have personal connection	0.27 ***	0.16	0.44 ***	0.22 **	0.35 ***	0.11	0.22 ***
collect	collectivism	0.04 *	0.06	-0.02	0.05	0.04	-0.10	0.03
moral	morally upright leader preferenc	0.03	-0.07	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.05	0.13 ***
paternal	paternalism	-0.03 +	-0.29 **	0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.04	-0.08 *
nodissnt	suppress dissent orientation	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	-0.05	0.03	-0.14 *	0.04
harmony	harmony orientation	-0.01	0.10	0.05	-0.01	-0.02	0.08	-0.07 *
macroeco	macro economy	-0.02 +	-0.06	-0.08 *	-0.10 **	-0.01	-0.01	0.11 ***
persoeco	personal economy	0.02	-0.02	0.11 **	0.01	0.01	0.09 **	-0.05
efficacy	efficacy	0.07 ***	0.14	-0.02	0.16 ***	0.04	0.07	0.06 *
se002	gender	-0.09 *	0.05	0.11	-0.18 +	-0.10	0.02	-0.12
se003	age group	0.14 **	0.13 ***	0.26 ***	0.10 ***	0.14 ***	0.12 ***	0.02
se005a	education(year)	0.03 ***	0.06 *	0.07 **	0.01	0.04 **	0.01	-0.01
se017	social stratification	-0.05 +	-0.18 *	-0.09	0.01	0.02	-0.08	0.03
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	-0.67 ***	-0.66 ***					
kor	Korea	1.08 ***	1.08 ***					
mon	Mongolia	2.46 ***	2.49 ***					
phl	Philippines	1.42 ***	1.42 ***					
twn	Taiwan	1.35 ***	1.37 ***					
tha	Thai	2.79 ***	2.77 ***					
_cut1		1.75	1.87	2.78	-1.16	1.08	-1.56	-1.15
_cut2		4.65	4.77	6.12	0.97	3.38	2.01	2.12
_cut3		6.37	6.49	8.52	2.76	4.61	3.67	4.03
n		9007	9007	1500	1135	1200	1407	1538
LR chi		2784.61	2796.88	217.43	125.28	131.31	114.93	132.81
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.1271	0.1276	0.0726	0.0434	0.0437	0.0411	0.0374

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 3-2. Test of Hypothesis 2A

active	active participation	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand
fgnum	associational social participat	0.39 ***	0.51 ***	0.25 +	0.29 ***	0.41 ***	0.62 ***	0.30 ***
pgnum	informal group social participat	0.22 ***	0.33 ***	0.31 ***	0.09	0.06	0.33 ***	0.27 *
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.00	-0.69 **	0.86 ***	0.31	-0.17	-0.46 *	-0.38 **
gene_trs	generalized trust	0.16 **	0.29	0.10	0.20	0.32	0.00	0.48 ***
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.02	-0.08	-0.01	0.07	0.05	0.11 *	-0.05
connect	have personal connection	0.18 ***	0.04	-0.01	-0.03	0.44 ***	0.24 *	0.12 *
collect	collectivism	0.07 ***	0.15	0.15 **	0.05	0.07	-0.02	0.05
moral	morally upright leader preferenc	0.03	-0.11	-0.05	-0.03	0.12 *	0.00	0.02
paternal	paternalism	-0.02	-0.08	-0.12 *	-0.06	0.07	0.03	0.04
nodissnt	suppress dissent orientation	0.00	-0.03	0.17 ***	-0.06	0.03	-0.07	-0.01
harmony	harmony orientation	-0.05 *	0.00	-0.16 ***	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.01
macroeco	macro economy	0.02	0.06	-0.06	0.05	0.06	-0.05	0.11 **
persoeoco	personal economy	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	0.08	-0.06	-0.01	0.01
efficacy	efficacy	0.05 **	0.11 +	-0.09 *	-0.01	-0.05	0.10	0.15 ***
se002	gender	-0.30 ***	-0.65 ***	-0.01	-0.13	-0.38 **	-0.49 ***	-0.31 **
se003	age group	0.01	0.16 ***	0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.02
se005a	education(year)	0.05 ***	0.06	0.08 ***	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.04 **
se017	social stratification	0.09 **	0.20	0.04	0.32 **	0.08	-0.07	0.15 *
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	1.70 **	1.69 ***					
kor	Korea	1.88 **	1.86 ***					
mon	Mongolia	0.67 ***	0.70 ***					
phl	Philippines	1.48 ***	1.45 ***					
twn	Taiwan	1.13 ***	1.14 ***					
tha	Thai	2.48 ***	2.47 ***					
_cut1		4.33	4.50	5.08	2.38	3.73	-0.01	2.84
_cut2		4.83	4.99	5.52	2.98	4.35	0.53	3.17
_cut3		5.74	5.90	6.74	3.76	5.11	1.24	4.09
_cut4		6.08	6.24	7.01	4.13	5.57	1.59	4.35
_cut5		6.61	6.77	7.78	4.79	6.05	2.16	4.92
_cut6		6.87	7.03	7.98	5.14	6.28	2.44	5.11
_cut7		7.29	7.46	8.56	5.57	6.80	3.01	5.59
_cut8		8.02	8.19	9.55	6.86	7.32	4.49	6.42
n		9007	9007	1418	809	1200	1407	1538
LR chi		972.35	993.26	166.08	86.15	125.3	161.21	147.59
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.053	0.0541	0.1021	0.0367	0.0557	0.0671	0.0339

+ : .05<p≤.10, \* : .01<p≤.05, \*\* : .001<p≤.01, \*\*\* : p≤.001

Table 4. Test of Hypothesis 2b(1)

		collectivism (under median)	moralistic leader(under median)	paternalism(under median)	non- dissentism(under median)	harmony orientation(under median)
<b>election</b>	<b>election related participation</b>					
fgnum	associational social participat	0.30 ***	0.30 ***	0.33 ***	0.27 ***	0.28 ***
pgnum	informal group social participa	0.07 +	0.11 ***	0.07 +	0.10 **	0.07 *
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.05
gene_trs	social trust	0.20 **	0.22 ***	0.21 **	0.14 *	0.21 **
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
connect	have personal connection	0.29 ***	0.26 ***	0.24 ***	0.30 ***	0.23 ***
macroeco	macro economy	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03 +
persoeco	personal economy	0.04 *	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.02
efficacy	efficacy	0.08 ***	0.05 **	0.06 ***	0.09 ***	0.07 ***
se002	gender	-0.06	-0.08	-0.05	-0.09	-0.06
se003	age group	0.13 ***	0.15 ***	0.13 ***	0.13 ***	0.12 ***
se005a	education(year)	0.02 *	0.02 *	0.02 *	0.02 **	0.03 **
se017	social stratification	-0.08 *	-0.07 +	0.01	-0.03	-0.02
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	-0.61 ***	-0.52 ***	-0.57 ***	-0.53 ***	-0.68 ***
kor	Korea	1.11 ***	1.11 ***	0.96 ***	0.97 ***	0.92 ***
mon	Mongolia	2.37 ***	2.56 ***	2.54 ***	2.52 ***	2.35 ***
phl	Philippines	1.26 ***	1.42 ***	1.27 ***	1.37 ***	1.32 ***
tw	Taiwan	1.40 ***	1.43 ***	1.40 ***	1.29 ***	1.15 ***
tha	Thai	2.70 ***	2.76 ***	2.76 ***	2.78 ***	2.76 ***
_cut1		1.92	1.60	1.85	1.57	1.66
_cut2		4.78	4.50	4.66	4.36	4.49
_cut3		6.43	6.17	6.28	6.09	6.12
	n	4671	5256	4404	4789	4621
	LR chi	1470.86	1492.95	1303.62	1476.3	1358.53
	P	0	0	0	0	0
	Pseudo R2	0.1281	0.1179	0.1203	0.1247	0.1197

		collectivism (over median)	moralistic leader(over median)	paternalism(over median)	non-dissentism(over median)	harmony orientation(over median)
<b>election</b>	<b>election related participation</b>					
fgnum	associational social participat	0.28 ***	0.29 ***	0.26 ***	0.33 ***	0.30 ***
pgnum	informal group social participa	0.10 **	0.04	0.09 *	0.06	0.09 *
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	-0.02
gene_trs	generalized trust	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.17 *	0.10
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.04	0.08 ***	0.06 *	0.03	0.05 *
connect	have personal connection	0.26 ***	0.28 ***	0.30 ***	0.24 ***	0.32 ***
macroeco	macro economy	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
persoeco	personal economy	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.05 **	0.01
efficacy	efficacy	0.07 ***	0.10 ***	0.07 ***	0.04 +	0.07 ***
se002	gender	-0.12 +	-0.08	-0.12 *	-0.08	-0.12 +
se003	age group	0.15 ***	0.13 ***	0.16 ***	0.15 ***	0.16 ***
se005a	education(year)	0.03 ***	0.03 **	0.03 **	0.03 **	0.02 *
se017	social stratification	-0.02	-0.02	-0.11 **	-0.07 +	-0.08 *
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	-0.76 ***	-0.82 ***	-0.77 ***	-0.86 ***	-0.71 ***
kor	Korea	1.03 ***	1.05 ***	1.20 ***	1.22 ***	1.22 ***
mon	Mongolia	2.61 ***	2.35 ***	2.46 ***	2.40 ***	2.58 ***
phl	Philippines	1.53 ***	1.44 ***	1.62 ***	1.53 ***	1.51 ***
tw	Taiwan	1.30 ***	1.29 ***	1.33 ***	1.43 ***	1.56 ***
tha	Thai	2.96 ***	2.83 ***	2.81 ***	2.81 ***	2.80 ***
_cut1		1.608461	1.955078	1.653604	1.929704	1.859663
_cut2		4.546755	4.870584	4.646531	4.946323	4.830963
_cut3		6.349952	6.670668	6.47472	6.658019	6.656477
	n	4336	3751	4603	4218	4386
	LR chi	1337.37	1329.11	1525.78	1321.07	1448.13
	P	0	0	0	0	0
	Pseudo R2	0.1282	0.1438	0.1379	0.1314	0.1371

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 5. Test of Hypothesis 2b(2)

		collectivism (under median)	leader(under median)	paternalism(under median)	non- dissentism(under median)	harmony orientation(under median)
<b>active</b>	<b>active participation</b>					
fgnum	associational social participat	0.33 ***	0.41 ***	0.42 ***	0.36 ***	0.37 ***
pgnum	informal group social participa	0.23 ***	0.20 ***	0.26 ***	0.19 ***	0.24 ***
inst_trs	institutional trust	-0.05	0.04	-0.10	0.08	-0.12
gene_trs	social trust	0.06	0.15 *	0.14 +	0.19 *	0.16 *
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.01
connect	have personal connection	0.19 ***	0.16 ***	0.16 ***	0.19 ***	0.23 ***
macroeco	macro economy	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03
persoeco	personal economy	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.02
efficacy	efficacy	0.02	0.05 *	0.06 *	0.05 *	0.05 +
se002	gender	-0.32 ***	-0.28 ***	-0.30 ***	-0.36 ***	-0.34 ***
se003	age group	0.01	0.01	0.03 *	0.02	0.01
se005a	education(year)	0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.05 ***
se017	social stratification	0.12 *	0.05	0.10 *	0.04	0.09 +
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	1.74 ***	1.83 ***	1.76 ***	1.67 ***	1.75 ***
kor	Korea	1.84 ***	1.88 ***	2.04 ***	1.68 ***	2.00 ***
mon	Mongolia	0.69 ***	0.73 ***	0.77 ***	0.85 ***	0.72 ***
phl	Philippines	1.42 ***	1.38 ***	1.32 ***	1.30 ***	1.41 ***
twn	Taiwan	1.20 ***	1.25 ***	1.28 ***	0.98 ***	1.08 ***
tha	Thai	2.44 ***	2.40 ***	2.46 ***	2.38 ***	2.47 ***
_cut1		4.05	4.23	4.24	4.05	4.30
_cut2		4.30	4.12	4.11	4.34	4.03
_cut3		3.32	3.02	3.04	3.41	3.13
_cut4		3.00	3.39	3.31	3.10	3.03
_cut5		0.34	0.43	0.41	0.29	0.31
_cut6		0.00	0.13	0.02	0.33	0.10
_cut7		1.03	1.11	1.14	1.04	1.11
_cut8		1.01	1.00	1.01	1.00	1.03
n		4671	5256	4404	4789	4621
LR chi		468.97	518.14	509.42	507.98	517.45
P		0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.0508	0.048	0.0548	0.05	0.0526

		collectivism (over median)	moralistic leader(over median)	paternalism(over median)	non-dissentism(over median)	harmony orientation(over median)
<b>active</b>	<b>active participation</b>					
fgnum	associational social participat	0.45 ***	0.36 ***	0.36 ***	0.44 ***	0.42 ***
pgnum	informal group social participa	0.21 ***	0.25 ***	0.18 ***	0.28 ***	0.20 ***
inst_trs	institutional trust	0.02	-0.09	0.12	-0.12	0.14
gene_trs	generalized trust	0.26 **	0.15 +	0.17 *	0.12	0.16 +
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.02
connect	have personal connection	0.15 **	0.18 ***	0.19 ***	0.16 **	0.11 *
macroeco	macro economy	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04 *	0.01
persoeco	personal economy	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.02
efficacy	efficacy	0.09 ***	0.06 *	0.03	0.05 +	0.05 *
se002	gender	-0.27 ***	-0.33 ***	-0.30 ***	-0.25 ***	-0.26 ***
se003	age group	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
se005a	education(year)	0.05 ***	0.05 ***	0.05 ***	0.06 ***	0.05 ***
se017	social stratification	0.06	0.14 **	0.07	0.14 **	0.09 +
hkg	dummy Hong Kong	1.71 ***	1.55 ***	1.65 ***	1.74 ***	1.61 ***
kor	Korea	1.97 ***	1.91 ***	1.79 ***	2.18 ***	1.81 ***
mon	Mongolia	0.75 ***	0.59 **	0.62 ***	0.39	0.60 **
phl	Philippines	1.52 ***	1.63 ***	1.68 ***	1.78 ***	1.58 ***
twn	Taiwan	1.07 ***	0.98 ***	0.97 ***	1.31 ***	1.17 ***
tha	Thai	2.59 ***	2.57 ***	2.50 ***	2.64 ***	2.47 ***
_cut1		4.56	4.40	4.49	4.56	4.33
_cut2		5.06	4.90	5.01	5.07	4.83
_cut3		5.96	5.83	5.90	5.95	5.78
_cut4		6.29	6.18	6.25	6.36	6.14
_cut5		6.87	6.76	6.88	6.89	6.77
_cut6		7.14	6.99	7.22	7.16	7.02
_cut7		7.54	7.40	7.52	7.49	7.51
_cut8		8.39	8.18	8.25	8.19	8.32
n		4336	3751	4603	4218	4386
LR chi		535.84	475.41	493.15	493.5	465.99
P		0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2		0.0588	0.0629	0.0546	0.0604	0.0548

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 6-1. Alternative possibility on H1

election	election related participation	Japan			Mongolia			Philippine			Thailand		
askedvot	election mobilization	0.26 ***	0.39 ***	0.13 ***	0.26 ***	0.15 *	0.36 ***	0.24 ***					
fgnum	associational social participat	0.29 ***	0.19 ***	0.26 ***	0.26 ***	0.15 *	0.36 ***	0.28 ***					
pgnum	informal group social participa	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.11	-0.11	0.19 +					
inst_tr	institutional trust	0.03	-0.16	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.16					
gene_tr	social trust	0.20 **	0.47 ***	0.20	0.20	-0.31	-0.31	0.21					
corrupt	perceived corruption	0.00	0.02	0.09 *	0.09 *	-0.05	-0.05	-0.04					
connect	have personal connection	0.27 ***	0.24 ***	0.22 **	0.22 **	0.26 ***	0.26 ***	0.21 ***					
macroeco	macro economy	0.00	0.02	-0.11 **	-0.11 **	-0.01	-0.01	0.11 ***					
persoeco	personal economy	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.05					
efficacy	efficacy	0.08 ***	0.08 *	0.16 ***	0.16 ***	0.03	0.03	0.07 *					
se002	gender	-0.14 **	-0.19 +	-0.18 +	-0.18 +	0.01	0.01	-0.24 *					
se003	age group	0.13 ***	0.27 ***	0.10 ***	0.10 ***	0.14 ***	0.14 ***	0.03					
se005a	education(year)	0.02 *	0.06 *	0.02	0.02	0.04 *	0.04 *	0.00					
seu17	social stratification	-0.03	-0.21 **	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.11					
mon	Mongolia	2.34 ***	2.35 ***										
phl	Philippines	1.29 ***	1.00 ***										
tha	Thai	2.56 ***	2.23 ***										
_cut1		1.52	1.66	-0.73	-0.73	0.66	0.66	-0.98					
_cut2		4.15	4.38	1.42	1.42	3.17	3.17	2.37					
_cut3		5.82	6.16	3.22	3.22	4.56	4.56	4.42					
n		5291	5291	1135	1135	1200	1200	1538					
LR chi		1405.86	1795.25	136.18	136.18	307.07	307.07	266.22					
P		0	0	0	0	0	0	0					
Pseudo R2		0.1045	0.1334	0.0472	0.0472	0.1023	0.1023	0.0749					

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001

Table 6-2. Alternative possibility on H1

active	active participation				Thailand
	Japan	Mongolia	Philippine	Thailand	
askedvot	0.24 ***	0.38 ***	0.27 ***	0.22 ***	0.22 ***
fgnum	0.35 ***	0.48 ***	0.30 ***	0.27 ***	0.26 ***
pgnum	0.17 ***	0.28 ***	0.17 ***	0.09	0.25 *
inst_trs	-0.18 *	-0.75 ***	-0.17 *	0.30	-0.30 *
gene_trs	0.32 ***	0.33 +	0.27 **	0.11	0.36 **
corrupt	-0.01	-0.07	-0.01	0.05	-0.04
connect	0.19 ***	0.08	0.16 ***	-0.02	0.10 +
macroeco	0.07 ***	0.01	0.07 ***	0.04	0.11 **
persoeco	0.01	0.12 *	0.01	0.08	0.02
efficacy	0.07 ***	0.11 +	0.07 ***	0.01	0.14 ***
se002	-0.34 ***	-0.71 ***	-0.38 ***	-0.14	-0.44 ***
se003	0.02 +	0.17 ***	0.03 *	0.01	0.00
seu05a	0.04 ***	0.06 +	0.05 ***	0.06	0.05 ***
seu17	0.16 ***	0.19 ***	0.19 ***	0.36 ***	0.20 **
mon	0.57 ***	0.52 ***	0.52 ***		
phl	1.26 ***	0.90 ***	0.90 ***		
tha	2.24 ***	1.86 ***	1.86 ***		
_cut1	4.73	5.32	4.89	5.79	3.03
_cut2	5.17	5.77	5.35	6.36	3.38
_cut3	5.98	7.05	6.21	6.79	4.36
_cut4	6.28	7.33	6.53	7.09	4.64
_cut5	6.77	8.11	7.05	7.34	5.24
_cut6	7.01	8.31	7.30	7.73	5.44
_cut7	7.41	8.89	7.72	7.86	5.94
_cut8	8.03	9.88	8.36	8.16	6.80
n	5291	1418	5291	1135	1538
LR chi	698.9	198.47	976.85	81.81	268.52
P	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.0653	0.0913	0.0913	0.0411	0.0616

+: .05<p≤.10, \*: .01<p≤.05, \*\*: .001<p≤.01, \*\*\*: p≤.001