



A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Working Paper Series: No. 49

Jointly Published by

GLOBALBAROMETER™

Political Discontent in South Korea

Chong-Min Park

Korea University

Issued by

International Political Science Association

2009 Chile

Asian Barometer
A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

Working Paper Series

Jointly Published by
Globalbarometer

The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied research program on public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance around the region. The regional network encompasses research teams from twelve East Asian political systems (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, and Indonesia), and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). Together, this regional survey network covers virtually all major political systems in the region, systems that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

The ABS Working Paper Series is intended to make research result within the ABS network available to the academic community and other interested readers in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Scholars in the ABS network also devote their work to the Series with the hope that a timely dissemination of the findings of their surveys to the general public as well as the policy makers would help illuminate the public discourse on democratic reform and good governance. The topics covered in the Series range from country-specific assessment of values change and democratic development, region-wide comparative analysis of citizen participation, popular orientation toward democracy and evaluation of quality of governance, and discussion of survey methodology and data analysis strategies.

The ABS Working Paper Series supercedes the existing East Asia Barometer Working Paper Series as the network is expanding to cover more countries in East and South Asia. Maintaining the same high standard of research methodology, the new series both incorporates the existing papers in the old series and offers newly written papers with a broader scope and more penetrating analyses.

The ABS Working Paper Series is issued by the Asian Barometer Project Office, which is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science of National Taiwan University and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. At present, papers are issued only in electronic version.

Contact Information

Asian Barometer Project Office

Department of Political Science

National Taiwan University

21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan 100

Tel: 886 2-2357 0427

Fax: 886-2-2357 0420

E-mail: asianbarometer@ntu.edu.tw

Website: www.asianbarometer.org

Political Discontent in South Korea

Chong-Min Park
Department of Public Administration
Korea University
cmpark@korea.ac.kr

Prepared for the XXI International Political Science Association World Congress in Santiago, Chile
on July 12-16, 2009

South Korea (Korea hereafter) has been a democracy for more than two decades. Since the democratic transition in 1987, free and competitive elections haven been regularly held at all levels of government and there have been two transfers of power from one political party to another. There has been universal suffrage for all adults and access to public office has been open to all citizens. The limits of civil liberties and political rights have been extended. No one disputes that Korea establishes itself an electoral democracy. If democracy is characterized with universal adult suffrage, free and fair elections, multiparty competition and alternative sources of information (Dahl 1970; Coppedge and Reinicke 1990; Diamond 1999), the political regime in Korea meets these basic requirements of democracy. It is no wonder that Korea is regarded as one of the successful third-wave democracies in East Asia (Shin and Lee 2006; Chu, Diamond, Nathan and Shin 2008).

Correspondingly, Freedom House has rated Korea as “free” since the transition to democracy in 1987. For the first five years after the transition Korea received an average score of 2.5 on Freedom House’s seven-point political rights and civil liberties scales, which run from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). For the period between 1993 and 2004 it obtained an average score of 2.0. In every year since 2005 it received an average score of 1.5 (Freedom House 2008). The young democracy in Korea now ranks with the world’s old liberal democracies. Similarly, the World Bank Governance Indicators reveal that for the last decade Korea has received positive ratings in three dimensions associated with democratic governance: on each scale with scores ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, it received 0.50 in 1996, 0.61 in 2000, 0.75 in 2005 and 0.66 in 2007 for voice and accountability; 0.70 in 1996, 0.74 in 2000, 0.78 in 2005, 0.82 in 2007 for rule of law; 0.32 in 1996, 0.19 in 2000, 0.12 in 2005 and 0.36 in 2007 for control of corruption (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008). Despite some fluctuations, Korea has made steady progress in democratic strength and constitutionalism.

Yet, public support for democracy has weakened or slowed down for the last decade. For instance, preference of democracy over its alternatives declined from 65 percent in 1996, to 54 percent in 1998, to 45 percent in 2001, and to 43 percent in 2006. Levels of satisfaction with democracy in practice dropped from 55 percent in 1996 to 44 percent in 1998 and then rebounded to

47 percent in 2001 and to 48 percent in 2006. Public trust in representative institutions of democracy eroded sharply. Those trusting the parliament fell from 49 percent in 1996, to 15 percent in 2003, and to 7 percent in 2006. Those trusting political parties declined from 39 percent in 1996, to 15 percent in 2003 and to 9 percent in 2006. Noteworthy is that despite growing public discontent with the democratic process, however, those desiring democracy remained little changed for the last decade: 92 percent in 1996, 89 percent in 1998, 90 percent in 2001, 95 percent in 2003 and 94 percent in 2006.

These and other opinion surveys indicate that Korean people have lost their confidence in the National Assembly and political parties, and remained dissatisfied with democratic performance and have become more skeptical of democracy. Yet, they continue to desire their country to be democratic. Despite growing institutional disaffection, public aspiration for democracy has not subsided but unqualified commitment to democracy has weakened.

Some theorists and researchers of democracy similarly indicated the emergence of ‘dissatisfied democrats’ or ‘critical citizens’ in established democracies. For instance, Klingemann (1999) paid attention to “dissatisfied democrats” “who put a high rating on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of government but at the same time place a low rating on the performance of their democratic regime.” Similarly, Norris (1999) took note of “critical citizens” “who value democracy as an ideal yet who remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political system, and particularly the core institutions of representative government.” The emergence of critical citizens or dissatisfied democrats is not a phenomenon exclusive to established democracies. As illustrated above, these kinds of citizens can be found in new democracies like Korea.

In this paper we examine the nature and sources of political discontent in Korea. We assume that political discontent (or negative political support) is multi-dimensional and sources and consequences of political discontent vary depending upon its objects. Specifically, we examine whether ordinary Koreans distinguish between different objects of political discontent and why they are dissatisfied with the democratic process and skeptical of representative institutions of democracy. We find out who are “critical citizens” among the Korean people, and determine how they differ from “allegiant citizens” or other kinds of citizens in their political attitudes and behavior. These and other related

questions are primarily explored in the context of the 2006 East Asian Barometer (EAB hereafter) survey in Korea. A series of Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB hereafter) surveys conducted between 1996 and 2001 as well as the 2003 EAB survey in Korea are also utilized for describing trends in support for democracy.¹

Prior Theory and Research

Theorists and researchers on public attitudes toward democracy agree that political support for democracy is a multidimensional phenomenon. It is widely accepted that different aspects of democracy as attitude objects need to be distinguished. We likewise assume the multi-dimensional conceptualization of political support. It is Easton (1975) who systematically examines the concept. He defines political support as an attitude by which a person orients oneself to a political system positively or negatively. Hence, political support can be positive or negative. Positive support refers to political allegiance while negative support, political discontent. Easton (1965) theoretically distinguishes between three objects of political support, namely the political community, the political regime and the political authorities. The political community refers to ‘a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor,’ the political regime refers to the authority structure and its justifications, and the political authorities refer to the present incumbents of authority roles. Support for democracy is primarily directed to the political regime. According to Easton’s classifications, the regime further breaks down into two components: structural and ideological. The structural component refers to the formal structures of authority, while the ideological component deals with their principles and justifications. Therefore, support for democratic regime means support for democratic institutions and principles.

In analyzing critical citizens or dissatisfied democrats in established democracies, Norris (1999), Klingemann (1999) and Dalton (1999) distinguish between three objects of regime support - principles, performance and institutions. Regime principles are their first object of regime support.

¹ The Korean Gallup conducted the KDB surveys in January 1996 (N=1,000), May 1997 (N=1,117), October 1998 (N=1,010), November 1999 (N=1,007), and March/April 2001 (N=1,007) and the EAB Korea survey in September 2006 (N=1,212). The Garam pollster conducted the EAB Korea survey (N=1,500) in February 2003. The 2006 EAB Korea survey sampled members of the population 19 years and older and the other surveys 20 years old by multistage sampling based on the principle of probability proportionate to size.

They represent the values of the political system. In the case of democracy they include such values and principles as freedom, participation, tolerance and the rule of law. Yet, in public opinion surveys, support for democratic regime principles is often measured by agreement that democracy is the best form of government or the most preferred political system. This measure blurs the distinction between the ideological and the structural component and tends to capture support for democracy as a whole. As Rose, Shin and Munro (1999) term, this measure reflects ‘idealist’ notions of democracy.

Regime performance is the second object of regime support. Support for regime performance pertains to public evaluation of the functioning of political regimes in practice. In surveys, support for regime performance is most often measured by ‘satisfaction with the performance of democracy’ or “how democracy functions in practice as opposed to the ideal.” It is less often measured through comparing the current regime against the previous regime. Regardless of how it is measured, public evaluation of democratic performance is oriented toward democracy as a reality and thus should be distinguished from support for democracy as an idea.

Regime institutions are the third object of regime support. By referring the formal structures of authority, not the occupants of authority roles, this dimension of regime support pertains to orientations to political institutions, not particular political actors. In surveys, support for regime institutions is often measured by public confidence or trust in specific public institutions such as executives, parliaments, courts, political parties, the military and the police. Referring to existing institutions, this measure reflects ‘realist’ views of democracy.

By using the multi-dimensional conceptualization of regime support, recent research on established democracies shows that an increasing number of citizens are supportive of democratic principles but at the same time dissatisfied with democratic performance and skeptical of political institutions (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Norris 1999; Torcal and Moreno 2006; Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 1995). These people are named “critical citizens” or “dissatisfied democrats” (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999), and democracies full of them are called “disaffected democracies” (Pharr and Putnam 2000). They all argue that since dissatisfied or critical citizens remain committed to democratic principles, their existence does not necessarily constitute a crisis in democracy. Their

presence may prove to be rather healthy for democracy because they exert pressures for democratic reforms.

The growing presence of critical citizens makes it necessary to distinguish between various dimensions of regime support. In analyzing political malaise in contemporary democracies, for instance, Gunther and Montero (2006) distinguish between democratic support, political discontent and political disaffection. They argue that these three dimensions are conceptually and empirically separable and that they have different behavioral consequences. First, democratic support refers to positive attitudes toward democratic principles and values. It is measured by approval of democracy as an ideal or preference of democracy over its alternatives. It is similar to the first type of regime support. Second, political discontent refers to negative attitudes toward the operation of democratic institutions and processes. It is primarily measured by satisfaction with democracy and evaluation of political condition. It is similar to the second type of regime support. Lastly, political disaffection refers to institutional disaffection and political disengagement. Especially, institutional disaffection, as measured by distrust in institutions, is similar to the third type of regime support. On the basis of this conceptualization, Torcal and Montero (2006) found “disaffected democrats,” who display supportive attitudes toward democracy yet disaffected with democratic institutions and processes.

In new democracies like Korea there may be growing discrepancy between support for democratic principles and support for political institutions. Therefore, the multi-dimensional conceptualization of political support proves to be useful in unraveling the dynamics of political discontent. By disaggregating targets of regime support into three components - principles, performance and institutions, we may be able to understand better the nature and sources of political discontent.

Conceptualization and Measurement

Following prior theory and research we analytically distinguish three dimensions of regime support, namely regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions (Dalton 1999; 2004; Shin 2007). Support for democracy consists of cognitive and affective orientations to democracy. We do not distinguish between affective and cognitive orientations because the data do not allow us to do

so empirically. Yet, our indicators of support for democracy largely reflect evaluative beliefs rather than feelings and emotions (for survey questions see Appendix).

First, support for regime principles pertains to attitudes toward democracy as the best or preferred form of government. A pair of questions is used to measure support for democratic principles. One asked respondents whether democracy is always preferable, an authoritarian government can be preferable under certain circumstances or it does not matter whether it is democratic or nondemocratic. The other asked respondents to indicate how democratic they personally want their country to be on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (full dictatorship) to 10 (full democracy).

Second, support for regime performance concerns attitudes toward the functioning of democracy. A pair of questions is used to measure support for democratic performance. One asked respondents whether they are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. The other asked respondents how much of a democracy their country is - a full democracy, a democracy with minor problems, a democracy with major problems, or not a democracy.

Third, support for regime institutions reflects attitudes toward existing political institutions. A pair of questions is used to measure support for political institutions. One asked respondents how much trust they have in the National Assembly and the other in political parties. Four response categories are provided – a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, and none at all.

Table 1 demonstrates the multi-dimensionality of regime support. The patterns of factor loadings point to three distinct dimensions: regime institutions (Factor I), regime performance (Factor II), and regime principles (Factor III). Ordinary Koreans turn out to be able to distinguish between three objects of regime support, particularly between democracy in principle and democracy in practice. This would make it possible to ascertain “critical citizens” who are dissatisfied with democratic performance or skeptical of political institutions but at the same time remain supportive of democratic principles (Gunther and Montero 2006).

(Table 1 about here)

As shown in Table 2, at the individual level three dimensions of attitudes toward democracy are related, albeit weakly, to each other. Support for democratic principles is related to satisfaction with democratic performance ($r=0.11$) and trust in political institutions (0.08), meaning that those satisfied with democratic performance or placing trust in political institutions are more likely to be supportive of democratic principles. In this regard, as Klingemann (1999) rightly notes, performance of democratic institutions and processes cannot be ignored. Noteworthy is that satisfaction with democratic performance and trust in political institutions are more strongly related to each other ($r=0.16$), suggesting that both reflect attitudes toward democracy in practice.

As also shown in Table 2, support for democratic principles is positively related to rejection of authoritarian rule ($r=0.15$), indicating that those supportive of democratic principles are more likely to reject authoritarian rule. Notable is that satisfaction with democratic performance is unrelated to rejection of authoritarian rule, suggesting that dissatisfaction with democratic performance may not weaken opposition to authoritarian rule. More notable is that trust in institutions is negatively related to rejection of authoritarian rule, meaning that those skeptical of political institutions are more likely to reject authoritarian rule. These findings suggest that dissatisfaction with democratic performance and institutional disaffection may lower acceptance for democratic rule but hardly weaken rejection of authoritarian rule. Public discontent with democratic processes and institutions may slow down democratic consolidation but hardly instigate authoritarian regress.

(Table 2 about here)

Trends in Support for Democracy

Support for democratic principles

The KDB and the EAB surveys asked ordinary Koreans whether democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government or an authoritarian government (or a dictatorship) is preferable under certain circumstances. As shown in Figure 1, support for democracy as the best form of government has lowered considerably for the last decade. Those saying that democracy is always preferable declined from 65 percent in 1996 to 54 percent in 1998, to 45 percent in 2001, and to 43 percent in 2006. A downward trend is unmistakable. After democratization of two decades only less than half

expressed unqualified commitment to democracy. Notable is a rapid growth of disbelief in democracy. Those saying that under certain circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable rose gradually from 17 percent in 1996, to 31 percent in 1998, to 37 percent in 2001, and to 36 percent in 2006. An upward trend is unequivocal. In times of crisis these halfhearted citizens may not be mobilized to defend democratic institutions and processes.

(Figure 1 about here)

Despite the apparent erosion of democratic legitimacy, public aspiration for democracy has little changed for the last decade. The KDB and the EAB surveys asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they want their country to be democratic on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (complete dictatorship) to 10 (complete democracy). As shown in Figure 2, those placing themselves in the top half (6 or above on the scale) were 92 percent in 1996, 89 percent in 1998, 90 percent in 2001, 95 percent in 2003 and 94 percent in 2006.² Even the economic crisis in 1997 did not abate public aspiration for democracy. It is extraordinary given that support for democracy as the best form of government has declined during the same period. To understand the discrepancy, we need to note a large number of halfhearted supporters. They believe that under certain circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, yet want the country to be democratic perhaps because they do not regard the present time as constituting those “certain circumstances” justifying authoritarian rule.

(Figure 2 about here)

To ascertain support for democracy as an idea the KDB and the EAB surveys also asked ordinary Koreans to indicate the extent to which democracy is suitable for their country on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (completely unsuitable) to 10 (completely suitable). As shown in Figure 2, those placing themselves in the top half (6 or above on the scale) declined from 70 percent in 1996 to 62 percent in 1998 and then rebounded to 72 percent in 2001 and to 84 percent in 2003 and then dropped to 79 percent in 2006. The Korean public’s belief in the suitability of democracy was badly shaken in

² Several KDB surveys contain another measure of support for democracy. They asked respondents how much they were for or against the idea of democracy. Those choosing “very much for” or “somewhat for” was 91 percent in 1997, 87 percent in 1998, 91 percent in 1999 and 85 percent in 2001. This trajectory seems similar to that of aspiration for democracy.

the wake of the 1997 economic crisis but steadily reestablished as the economy began to recover.

Overall, analysis provides a mixed picture of support for democratic principles among the Korean population. A large majority wants the country to be democratic and considers democracy suitable for the country. This piece of evidence suggests that there exists wide public support for democracy. Yet, there is another piece of evidence which cautions us against excessive optimism about public support for democracy. The number of unqualified supporters of democracy has steadily decreased while that of lukewarm supporters increased. A reservoir of democratic legitimacy has been lowered for the last decade.

Support for democratic performance

To ascertain public evaluations of democratic performance, the KDB surveys asked respondents to indicate on a 10-point scale their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy. A score of 1 on the scale means ‘completely dissatisfied’ while a score of 10 indicates ‘completely satisfied.’ In contrast, the 2003 and 2006 EAB surveys tapped citizen satisfaction with democracy by using a four-point verbal scale, the values of which range from 1 (‘very satisfied’) and 4 (‘very dissatisfied’).

Figure 3 shows the percentage indicating some degree of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Those satisfied with democratic performance was 55 percent in 1996. It sharply dropped to 36 percent in 1997 in the wake of corruption scandals involving the president’s son and his close associates. Since then, the trajectory of democratic satisfaction has gradually risen. Those satisfied with democratic performance have risen to 44 percent in 1998, to 47 percent in 2001 and to 61 percent in 2003 right after 2002 presidential election, and then fell sharply to 48 percent in 2006. Notable is that except for a sudden increase in 2003 those satisfied with democratic performance remained not more than 50 percent for nearly a decade.

(Figure 3 about here)

To determine public evaluation of the supply of democracy, the KDB and the EAB surveys asked respondents how democratic they think the country’s political system is at the time of the surveys on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 (full dictatorship) to 10 (full democracy). To the extent that it measures

evaluation of how the country is governed, this indicator may be used as an overall assessment of democratic reality (Rose, Shin and Monro 1999). As shown in Figure 3, the trajectory of public evaluation of the political regime for the last decade is a U-curve shape. Those placing themselves in the top half (6 or above on the scale) declined from 79 percent in 1996, to 70 percent in 1997, and to 65 percent in 1998 and 1999. It then began to rebound to 68 percent in 2001 and to 82 percent in 2003 and then declined to 79 percent in 2006. Positive evaluations of democratic reality declined sharply in the wake of corruption scandals and economic disaster in 1997 and greatly increased just after the 2002 presidential election. Hardly surprising is that those considering democracy supplied far outnumbered those satisfied with the working of democracy.

The 2006 EAB survey contains another indicator which reflects more evaluative beliefs about democratic reality. The question similarly asked how much of a democracy the country is, but provided four responses categories with explicit evaluative terms such as “democracy with minor problems” or “democracy with major problems.” Only a tiny minority (5%) says a full democracy, a large majority (56%) a democracy with minor problems. A large minority (34%) replies a democracy with major problems and only a few (2%) not a democracy. Almost every Korean believes that the country has a democracy but perceived quality of democratic reality differently. Only three-fifths (61%) see Korean democracy either perfect or somewhat flawed. One in three Koreans see their democracy seriously flawed.

Overall, analysis yields mixed results. A large majority of the Korean public considered the political regime democratic and viewed democracy supplied. Yet, a large minority viewed the democracy seriously flawed and expressed uncertainty as to democratic reality. Furthermore, nearly half displayed no satisfaction with democracy. More people consider democracy supplied, yet more people consider the supply of democracy dissatisfying.

Support for political institutions

Public confidence in specific political institutions is widely used as an indicator of support for democracy at the regime level (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Miller and Listhaug 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Public institutions as attitude objects include the armed forces, the legal system, the

police, the parliament, political parties, and the civil service. The 1996 and 1997 KDB surveys and the 2003 and 2006 EAB surveys asked respondents how much trust they have a set of public and private institutions including parliament and political parties. As Figure 4 shows, those expressing some degree of trust in each of these institutions have declined sharply during the last decade. Public confidence in the National Assembly, the legislative branch in Korea, fell from 49 percent in 1996, to 22 percent in 1997, to 15 percent in 2003 and to 7 percent in 2006. It declined on average more than 4 percent annually. Public confidence in political parties similarly dropped from 40 percent in 1996, to 20 percent in 1997, to 15 percent in 2003 and to 9 percent in 2006. It declined an average of 3 percent annually. Those who trust both public institutions plummeted from 35 percent in 1996 to 18 percent in 1997 to 8 percent in 2003 and to 4 percent in 2006. Nearly no one turns out to have confidence in core institutions of representative democracy. This finding suggests that institutional disaffection is widespread in this young democracy.

(Figure 4 about here)

Democratic support, democratic dissatisfaction and institutional disaffection

Scholars of disaffected democracy or critical citizens argue that despite declining confidence in political institutions and growing negative evaluation of regime performance, citizens are found strongly committed to democracy as an idea. Although they are disaffected with political institutions and skeptical of political leaders, they prove to be unequivocally supportive of democratic values and principles. So, they maintain that established democracies in the West may face challenges to strengthen democracy, hardly a crisis in democracy.

The present analysis illustrates that Korean young democracy is no exception. For the last decade trust in representative institutions has sharply declined. Satisfaction with democratic performance has remained low. More importantly, unqualified support for democracy has declined. In contrast, public aspiration for democracy has remained high and public evaluation of suitability of democracy has stayed fairly positive. The picture of Korean politics is that citizens are skeptical of political institutions and disappointed with the working of democracy. Yet, they still want the country to be

democratic and consider democracy suitable for the country.³ However, they are less committed to democracy as an idea. Unlike established democracies in the West, the young democracy in Korea faces not only high levels of political disaffection but also mixed levels of democratic legitimacy.

Sources of Support for Democracy

Prior theory and research emphasize a variety of determinants of attitudes toward democracy (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Booth and Seligson 2009). Researchers on disaffected democracies propose a model for explaining declining public trust (Pharr and Putnam 2000). They argue the “Public satisfaction with representative institutions is a function of the information to which citizens are exposed, the criteria by which the public evaluates government and politics, and the actual performance of those institutions.” They further assert that actual performance of institutions is affected by “the capacity of political agents to act on citizens’ interest and desires,” “the fidelity with which political agents act on citizens’ interests and desires,” and social capital and social trust. While their model mainly deals with confidence in democratic institutions or satisfaction with democratic performance, not support for democracy as an idea, we draw some individual-level implications from their model and develop a framework for analyzing support for various aspects of democracy. In this paper we primarily focus on individual-level variables associated with economic conditions, quality of governance, and social capital. By using the 2006 EAB survey data, we examine sources of support for democratic principles, satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions, respectively.⁴

Performance theorists of democracy argue that people display support for democracy when they consider it delivering expected outcomes. Yet, the outcomes they expect and the priorities they place

³ The principle of electoral democracy is generally unchallenged. The KDB surveys and the 2003 EAB Korea survey asked ordinary Koreans whether they agree or disagree with the statement that “The best way of choosing our government is an election that gives every voter a choice of candidates and parties.” Those agreeing with the statement were 79 percent in 1997, 81 percent in 1998, 87 percent in 1999, 79 percent in 2001 and 87 percent in 2003. Although the trajectory of support for electoral democracy reflects election cycles, it is evident that electoral democracy is ‘the only game in town’ in the eyes of ordinary Koreans.

⁴ Three indices of support for democracy were constructed as follows: for democratic principles the variable ‘preference of democracy’ (recoded 1=3; 2=1.5; 3=0) and the variable ‘desire of democracy’ (recoded 1-3=0; 4-5=1; 6-7=2; 8-10=3) are added to form a seven-point index; for democratic performance the variable ‘satisfaction with democracy’ (recoded 1=3; 2=2; 3=1; 4=0) and the variable ‘level of democracy’ (recoded 1=3; 2=2; 3=1; 4=0) are added form a seven-point index; for political institutions the variable ‘trust in the National Assembly’ (recoded 1=3; 2=2; 3=1; 4=0) and the variable ‘trust in political parties’ (recoded 1=3; 2=2; 3=1; 4=0) are added to form a seven-point index. The scores of each index range from 0 (low) to 6 (high).

on them are likely to differ (McDonough, Barnes and Lopez Pina 1986). The criteria or standards of evaluation by which people evaluate democracy may vary across time and place. Some regard economic performance as having the greatest impact on people's judgments (Lipset 1959). Others claim that political goods are more important than economic ones (Rose and Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Weatherford 1987; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Shin and McDonough 1999). Considering prior research on support for democracy, we focus on two broad categories of performance variables: economic performance and political performance (Diamond 1999). To assess the impact of economic performance on support for democracy, we use a set of six standard questions to measure current, retrospective and prospective evaluations of national as well as household economies. To ascertain the effects of political performance on support for democracy, we use six pairs of questions to measure various aspects of quality of governance - control of corruption, electoral competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, freedom, and equality.⁵ To determine the role of social capital in shaping support for democracy, we use one standard dichotomous measure of social trust and a measure of associational membership.

Bivariate analysis

As presented in Table 3, support for democratic principles is largely unrelated to assessments of economic conditions. It is weakly related to prospective assessment of household economy only. This indicates that support for democracy in principle may not be contingent on economic performance. In contrast, support for democracy in practice is largely related to assessments of economic conditions. Support for democratic performance is more strongly related to current economic assessments. It is interesting that trust in political institutions is more strongly related to prospective assessments of national economy, suggesting that confidence in the future of national economy would increase confidence in political institutions. Notable is that national economic assessments tend to be more strongly related to trust in institutions than satisfaction with democracy, indicating that the former reflects more concrete and specific support than the latter. Overall, good economic performance may not strengthen support for democracy as an idea, but it surely enhances satisfaction with democracy

⁵ A seven-point index of each quality of governance is constructed by combining responses to its pair of questions. The scores of each index range from 0 (low) to 6 (high).

and confidence in institutions.

(Table 3 about here)

As presented in Table 3, support for democratic principles is related to assessments of some aspects of politics. Of six dimensions of political performance only three - control of corruption, horizontal accountability, and equality - are related to support for democracy in principle. Those considering official corruption uncommon, institutional checks and balances effective or legal and political equality secure are more likely to be committed to democracy as an idea. In contrast, support for democratic performance is related to all dimensions of political performance. Especially, it is more strongly related to electoral competition, control of corruption and horizontal accountability. When people experience free and competitive elections, little official corruption and effective institutional checks and balances, they are likely to be satisfied with the supply of democracy. Likewise, trust in political institutions is also related to all dimensions of political performance. Especially, it is more strongly related to control of corruption, indicating that those considering official corruption unusual are more likely to place trust in the National Assembly and political parties.

As seen in Table 3, associational membership is unrelated to any types of support for democracy. Joiners are no more likely than non-joiners to be supportive of democratic principles, satisfied with democracy and confident in representative institutions. This may call into question the causal relationship between network of civic associations and performance of institutions. In contrast, social trust is related to all types of support for democracy. Trusting people are more likely to be supportive of democratic principles, satisfied with democratic performance and confident in political institutions. As Donatella della Porta (2000) suggests, social trust may contribute to better institutional performance, which in turn leads to more confidence in political institutions.

Overall, simple correlation analysis evidently demonstrates that official corruption, ineffective institutional checks and balances and partial application of laws may erode support for democracy at the regime level. In the basket of political goods control of corruption matters most. As Susan Pharr (2000) shows in her analysis of public confidence in Japan, misconduct in office rather than policy performance may play a prominent role in shaping political discontent in this young democracy in

Korea.

Multivariate Analysis

We used regression analysis to estimate the relative importance of various economic, political and social variables on each type of support for democracy after controlling for socio-demographic variables. Table 4 reports results generated by the OLS procedures. The results show that four sets of predictors account for 11 percent of the variance in support for democratic principles, 14 percent of the variance in support for democratic performance, and 9 percent of the variance in support for political institutions.

We first examine the extent to which the four sets of independent variables predict support for democratic principles. The effects of the political performance variables remain significant even after controlling for economic performance variables. The effects of control of corruption, institutional checks and balances, and legal and political equality are statistically significant and their coefficients are in the expected, positive direction. Associations may be no schools for inculcating democratic principles, but social trust boosts support for democracy in principle. Current economic assessments have significant effects. Yet the direction is in the unexpected direction. Positive economic assessments discourage rather than encourage support for democratic principles. This finding shows that support for democracy in principle may not be subject to economic performance. Finally, two socio-demographic control variables - gender and education - have significant effects. Women and the more educated are more likely to favor democracy in principle than men and the less educated.

Next we turn to evaluation of democratic performance. Of the four sets of predictors listed in Table 4, some political performance variables matter in shaping satisfaction with democratic performance. Electoral competition, political equality and control of corruption lead to more positive evaluations of democratic performance. In contrast, economic assessments have no significant effects, suggesting that perceived democratic performance is not subject to national and personal economic well-being. Social trust and associational membership have no effects. Of four socio-demographic control variables only age has significant, albeit weak, effects. The old are less critical of the working of democracy than the young. It remains uncertain whether this difference reflects life-cycles or

generational effects. Overall, support for regime performance largely depends on the delivery of some political goods. In the basket of political goods, free and fair elections matter most. In contrast, economic goods play little role in increasing public satisfaction with democracy.

We finally turn to predictors of support for political institutions. Notable is that four of six economic assessments have significant influence. In contrast, only two of six political goods have significant effects. Positive retrospective and prospective assessments of national economy as well as positive current assessments of household economy encourage higher trust in political institutions. Oddly, positive retrospective assessments of household economy encourage less trust in political institutions. Both control of corruption and electoral competition have significant influence, suggesting that free and fair elections and official law-abidingness are key predictors of trust in representative institutions. Neither civil society variables nor social-demographic control variables have significant effects. Overall, institutional trust is more subject to economic performance than political performance.

(Table 4 about here)

Analysis evidently shows that sources of support for democracy vary depending on its attitude objects. First, ineffective legislative oversights and judicial reviews, unequal application of laws and official corruption undermine support for democracy in principle. Lower social trust also weakens commitment to democracy as an idea. Second, limited electoral competition, official corruption and unfair application of laws undercut support for democratic performance. Lastly, poor economic performance as well as limited electoral competition and official corruption lower confidence in political institutions.

Critical Citizens

As discussed earlier, scholars and researchers point out the emergence of “critical citizens” or “dissatisfied democrats” in established democracies (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006). These citizens are dissatisfied with the political process and skeptical of political institutions yet remain committed to democracy in principle. How many critical citizens do we find among the Korean people? Who are they and how they differ from other kinds of

citizens? In this section we address these questions.

We constructed two typologies to create a set of categories of citizens (see Table 5). The first typology is constructed by combining responses to democratic principles and democratic performance. The four categories produced are (1) satisfied democrats, who are satisfied with democratic performance and supportive of democratic principles; (2) dissatisfied democrats, who are dissatisfied with democratic performance yet remain supportive of democratic principles; (3) satisfied non-democrats, who are satisfied with democratic performance but unsupportive of democratic principles; and (4) dissatisfied non-democrats, who are dissatisfied with democratic performance and unsupportive of democratic principles.

The second typology is constructed by combining responses to democratic principles and political institutions. The four categories produced are (1) trusting democrats, who trust political institutions and are supportive of democratic principles; (2) distrusting democrats, who distrust political institutions yet remain supportive of democratic principles; (3) trusting non-democrats, who trust political institutions but remain unsupportive of democratic principles; and (4) distrusting non-democrats, who distrust political institutions and remain unsupportive of democratic principles.

As shown in the first panel of Table 5, when using the first typology less than a third (30%) of the Korean public proves to be satisfied democrats, who are satisfied with democracy and supportive of democracy. In contrast, only a tiny minority (8%) turns out to be dissatisfied democrats, who are dissatisfied with democracy yet remain supportive of democracy. Satisfied democrats outnumbered dissatisfied democrats by 12 percentage points. Judging from their numbers, dissatisfied democrats as critical citizens are hardly a significant presence in the political landscape in Korea. More notable, however, is that a sizable minority (30%) proves to be skeptical of democracy even if they are satisfied with democratic performance. This category of citizens may prove to be obstacles to democratic consolidation. The most critics of democracy, dissatisfied non-democrats, constitute the third largest category (14%), larger than dissatisfied democrats as critical citizens.

As shown in the second panel of Table 5, when using the second typology one-third (35%) are distrusting democrats, who distrust political institutions yet remain supportive of democracy. These

critical citizens constitute the second largest category. Only a tiny minority (5%) turns out to be trusting democrats, who trust political institutions and are supportive of democracy. Another tiny minority (5%) is trusting non-democrats, who trust political institutions yet remain unsupportive of democracy. It is disturbing that distrusting non-democrats, who are cynical of political institutions and unsupportive of democracy, constitute the largest category (40%).

When using institutional disaffection, distrusting democrats as critical citizens constitute significant forces in the political process. In contrast, when using democratic dissatisfaction, dissatisfied democrats as critical citizens hardly constitute meaningful presence. What is more notable is that satisfied non-democrats or distrusting non-democrats constitute large minorities, whose existence may hamper Korea's progress toward a mature democracy.

(Table 5 about here)

Table 6 provides the socio-demographic profiles of these categories of citizens. First, regardless of gender, age, education and income, satisfied democrats and satisfied non-democrats constitute major categories of citizens. Even dissatisfied non-democrats outnumber dissatisfied democrats among every segment of the population. Satisfied democrats are more often found among people with a college education and middle or high-income people while least found among highest-income people. In contrast, satisfied non-democrats are least found among people with a college education while more often found among highest-income people, older people, and the less educated.

Second, regardless of gender, age, education and income, both distrusting democrats and distrusting non-democrats constitute major categories of citizens. Yet, the former was outnumbered by the latter among most segments of the population. Distrusting democrats are more often found among people with a college education and younger people while least found among highest-income people. In contrast, distrusting non-democrats are more often found among people with high-income people while less often among people with a college education.

Overall, our critical citizens, especially distrusting democrats, are more likely to be younger people and the more educated. The fact that the more educated prove to be more critical citizens than the less uneducated indicates the role of education in shaping attitudes toward democracy. Perhaps

through education people may develop the cognitive capacity to evaluate political objects and possess more information about the political process.

(Table 6 about here)

How do our critical citizens differ from other kinds of citizens in their levels of political engagement?⁶ Do they display lower levels of political engagement? As shown in the first panel of Table 7, dissatisfied democrats are less likely to vote than satisfied democrats. Yet, the former are more likely than the latter to participate in unconventional political activities such as protest. Apart from these forms of political engagement, there is no notable difference between them in political interest, political efficacy, and participation in campaign and contact activities. Overall, dissatisfied democrats as critical citizens are no less likely than satisfied democrats as allegiant citizens to be involved in the political process except elections.

As shown in the second panel of Table 7, distrusting democrats are less likely than trusting democrats to vote in elections and to get involved in contact activity. Except for these forms of political engagement, there is no significant difference between them in political interest, political efficacy, and participation in campaign and even protest activity. Overall, distrusting democrats as critical citizens are no more likely to withdraw from politics than trusting democrats as allegiant citizens.

Notable is that satisfied non-democrats and dissatisfied non-democrats are no more than dissatisfied democrats (our first type of critical citizens) to disengage themselves from the political process. Moreover, trusting non-democrats and distrusting non-democrats are no more than distrusting democrats (our second type of critical citizens) to disengage themselves from the political process. All the findings suggest that our critical citizens are not distinguishable from allegiant citizens or even “disloyal” citizens (satisfied or distrusting non-democrats) in their levels of political engagement.

(Table 7 about here)

A further analysis of the relationship between each type of support for democracy and each form of political engagement shows that dissatisfaction with democratic performance does not promote less

⁶ For survey questions concerning various forms of political engagement, see Appendix.

political interest, less political efficacy, and more withdrawal from political processes.⁷ Similarly, distrust in political institutions does not result in political disinterest, political inefficacy and political disengagement. Yet, those dissatisfied with democratic performance or skeptical of political institutions are more likely to participate in protest activity. Overall, political discontent and disaffection hardly discourages ordinary people to disengage themselves from politics.

Summary and Conclusions

South Korea, a country known as one of the most successful third-wave democracies, has recently become a nation of political discontent (Chang, Chu and Park 2007). Public confidence in representative institutions of democracy plummeted and satisfaction with democratic performance halted to grow. In contrast, public desire for democracy remained strong and approval of democracy as a suitable form of governance stayed relatively strong. Yet, unqualified commitment to democracy continued to decline. Overall, public evaluations of democracy in practice are largely negative while public support for democracy in principle mixed.

In this paper we seek to examine why so many ordinary Koreans remain discontented with many aspects of their democratic rule while remain supportive of democracy as an idea. We conceptually and empirically distinguish between three dimensions of support for democracy. On the basis of such conceptualization, we first examine sources of support for democracy and then ascertain who are “critical citizens” and how they differ from other types of citizens.

It is found that ordinary Koreans are able to separate democracy in principle from democracy in practice. They also tend to distinguish between regime performance and regime institutions. Nonetheless, analysis shows that three dimensions of support for democracy are positively, albeit weakly, related to each other, suggesting that dissatisfaction with the democratic process or distrust in

⁷ Simple correlation analysis shows that support for democratic principles is unrelated to most forms of political activism except campaign activity. Those skeptical of democracy are no less likely to be interested in politics, to feel politically competent, and to get involved in contact and protest activities. Yet, they are more likely to participate in campaign activity. Second, support for democratic performance and support for political institutions are unrelated to most forms of political activism except unconventional participation. Those dissatisfied with democratic performance and those distrusting political institutions are no less likely to be interested in politics, to feel politically competent, and to get involved in campaign and contact activities. Yet, both are more likely to participate in protest activity. Political discontent and cynicism do not encourage political disengagement. They appear to encourage direct political action.

political institutions may erode support for democracy as an idea.

As expected, support for democratic principles is found positively related to rejection of authoritarian rule. Notable is that dissatisfaction of democratic performance does not weaken opposition to authoritarian rule. More noteworthy is that distrust in political institutions encourage rather than discourage rejection of authoritarian rule. Political discontent does not result in more acceptance of civilian and military dictatorship.

Analysis indicates different sources of support for democracy. Support for democracy in principle hardly depends upon macroeconomic conditions and personal financial situations. Provision of some political goods such as equality, control of corruption and horizontal accountability proved to be important. Social trust encourages support for democratic principles while associational membership does not. Higher education also increase support for democratic principles, suggesting that not associations but schools play a role in promoting the idea of democracy.

The story is somewhat different in the case of support for democracy in practice. Neither economic assessments nor social capital affect evaluation of democratic performance. Only provision of some political goods determines support for democratic performance. Especially, electoral competition and control of corruption are important predictors of satisfaction with democracy. In contrast, trust in political institutions largely depends on national and personal economic well-being.

It is discovered that government corruption is likely to erode support for democratic principles, satisfaction with the democratic process and trust in political institutions. Support for democracy proves to be contingent on official misconduct than policy outcomes (Pharr 2000). Corruption and other ethical standards violations of government are likely to increase public discontent with democracy (della Porta 2000). Moreover, less fair and free elections are expected to decrease satisfaction with democracy and trust in the parliament and political parties. Uneven application of laws is likely to undermine support for democratic principles.

Separating satisfaction with democratic performance from trust in political institutions, we constructed two typologies to identify critical citizens, namely “dissatisfied democrats” and “distrusting democrats.” It is found that dissatisfied democrats as critical citizens constitutes only a

tiny minority of the Korean electorate. Two largest categories are “satisfied democrats” and “satisfied non-democrats.” If the former are allegiant citizens, the latter may be regarded as “disloyal” citizens.” It is also found that distrusting democrats as critical citizens constitutes a large minority of the Korean public. Another large minority is distrusting non-democrats, who may be regarded as “disloyal” citizens. Both are two largest categories of citizens. Distrusting democrats are more often found among the better educated while less often found among the rich and the poorly educated.

It is found that two types of critical citizens, dissatisfied democrats or distrusting democrats, do not disengage themselves from the political process. They are no more likely to express political disinterest, political inefficacy and political disengagement. Our critical citizens are not distinguishable from “allegiant” citizens or even “disloyal” non-democrats in their levels of political engagement. Regardless of whether they are critical, allegiant or “disloyal” citizen, ordinary Koreans are skeptical of democracy and critical of political institutions.

The young democracy in Korea is in trouble, if not a crisis. It appears to face challenges somewhat different from those faced by disaffected Western democracies. Korean democracy has a large number of “critical citizens” who are cynical of political institutions yet remain supportive of democracy. Korean democracy also has a large number of “disloyal” citizens who are satisfied with democratic performance yet remain skeptical of democracy or who are cynical of political institutions and skeptical of democracy. They are not the kinds of “critical citizens” often found in disaffected democracies in the West. The young democracy in Korea has to deal with political discontent of critical citizens as well as “disloyal” citizens suspicious of democracy as a form of government.

References

- Bratton, Michael, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chang Yu-tzung, Yun-han Chu and Chong-Min Park. 2007. "Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia," *Journal of Democracy* 18(3): 66-80.
- Chu, Yun-han, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan and Doh Chull Shin. 2008. *How East Asians View Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang Reinicke. 1990. "Measuring Polyarchy." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25: 51-72.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1999, 'Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies,' in P. Norris, ed. *Critical Citizens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
- della Porta, Donatella. 2000. "Social Capital, beliefs in Government and Political Corruption," in S. Pharr and R. Putnam, eds. *Disaffected Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Easton, David. 1975. "A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 9: 431-448.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 485-514.
- Freedom House. 2008. *Freedom in the World*. Available online at: www.freedomhouse.org.
- Fuchs, Dieter, Giovanna Guidorossi and Palle Svensson. 1995. "Support for the Democratic System," in H. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, ed. *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gunther, Richard P. and Jose Ramon Montero. 2006. "The Multidimensionality of Political Support for New Democracies: Conceptual Redefinition and Empirical Refinement," in M. Torcal and J. Montero, eds. *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aarrt Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007, *Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006*.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in P.

- Norris, ed. *Critical Citizens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter and Dieter Fuchs, eds. 1995. *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105.
- Listhaug, Ola and Matti Wiberg. 1995. 'Confidence in Political and Private Institutions,' in H. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, eds. *Citizens and the State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McDonough, Peter, Samuel H. Barnes and Antonio Lopez Pina. 1986. "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain." *American Political Science Review* 80: 735-760.
- Miller, Authur and Ola Listhug. 1999. "Political Performance and Institutional Trust," in P. Norris, ed. *Critical Citizens*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1999. "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?" in P. Norris, ed. *Critical Citizens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, Chong-Min and Doh Chull Shin. 2006. "Popular Support for Democracy and its Institutions in Korea: The Dynamics and Sources of Regime Support and Institutional Trust," *International Review of Sociology* 16(3): 665-681.
- Pharr, Susan J. 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies," in S. Pharr and R. Putnam, eds. *Disaffected Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Pharr, Susan J. and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerper. 1998. *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rose, Richard, Doh C. Shin and Neil Munro. 1999. 'Tensions between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: South Korea,' in P. Norris, ed. *Critical Citizens*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Shin, Doh Chull. 2007. "Democratization: Perspective from Global Citizenries," in R. Dalton and H. Klingemann, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Shin, Doh Chull and Jaechul Lee. 2006. "The Korea Democracy Barometer Surveys: Unraveling the Cultural and Institutional Dynamics of Democratization, 1997-2004." *Korea Observer* 37(2): 237-275.
- Shin, Doh Chull and Peter McDonough. 1999. "The Dynamics of Popular Reactions to Democratization in Korea," *Journal of Public Policy* 19:1-32.
- Torcal, Mariano and Jose Ramon Montero. 2006. "Political Disaffection in Comparative Perspective," in M. Torcal and J. Montero, eds. *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Weather, M. Stephen. 1987. "How Does Government Performance Influence Political Support?"

Political Behavior 9: 5-28.

Appendix Survey Questions

A. Support for democracy

Democratic principles

1. Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? (1) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government, (2) under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, (3) for people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime.
2. Here is a scale: 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now?

Support for democratic performance

1. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Korea? Are you (1) very satisfied, (2) fairly satisfied, (3) not very satisfied or (4) not at all satisfied?
2. In your opinion how much of a democracy is Korea? (1) A full democracy, (2) a democracy, but with minor problems, (3) a democracy, with major problems or (4) not a democracy

Support for political institutions

How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions (1) A great deal of trust, (2) quite a lot of trust, (3) not very much trust, or (4) none at all?

1. National Assembly
2. Political parties

B. Rejection of authoritarian rule

There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? For each statement, would you say you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove?

1. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.
2. The army (military) should come in to govern the country.

C. Political assessments

Control of corruption

1. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government? Would you say (1) hardly anyone is involved, (2) not a lot of officials are corrupt, (3) most officials are corrupt, or (4) almost everyone is corrupt?
2. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?

Electoral competition

1. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement "Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period."
2. On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election? Was it (1) completely free and fair, (2) free and fair, but with minor problems, (3) free and fair, with major problems or (4) not free or fair?

Vertical accountability

Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements.

1. People have the power to change a government they don't like.
2. Between elections the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions.

Horizontal accountability

1. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement "When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do."
2. To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check? (1) Very capable, (2)

capable, (3) not capable, or (4) not at all capable

Freedom

Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements.

1. People are free to speak what they think without fear.
2. People are free to join any organization they like without fear.

Equality

Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements.

1. Everyone is treated equally by the government.
2. Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.

D. Economic assessments

National economy

1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? Is it (1) very good, (2) good, (3) not good nor bad, (4) bad, or (5) very bad?
2. How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Is it (1) much better, (2) a little better, (3) about the same, (4) a little worse, or (5) much worse?
3. How do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now? Will it be (1) much better, (2) a little better, (3) about the same, (4) a little worse, or (5) much worse?

Household economy

1. As for your own family, how would you rate your economic situation today? Is it (1) very good, (2) good, (3) not good nor bad, (4) bad, or (5) very bad?
2. How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago? Is it (1) much better now, (2) a little better now, (3) about the same, (4) a little worse now, or (5) much worse now?
3. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now? Will it be (1) much better, (2) a little better, (3) about the same, (4) a little worse, or (5) much worse?

E. Social capital

Associational membership

Are you a member of any organization or formal groups?

Social trust

Generally speaking, would you say that "Most people can be trusted" or "that you must be very careful in dealing with people?"

F. Political engagement

Political interest

1. How interested would you say you are in politics? (1) Very interested, (2) somewhat interested, (3) not very interested or (4) not at all interested
2. How often do you follow news about politics and government? (1) Everyday, (2) several times a week, (3) one or twice a week, (4) not even once a week, or (5) practically never

Political efficacy

For each statement, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

1. I think I have the ability to participate in politics.
2. Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on.

Campaign activity

1. Thinking about the last national election, did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?
2. Did you persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?

Contact activity

In the past three years, have you never, once, or more than once done the following because of

personal, family or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies?

1. Contacted government (administrative) officials.
2. Contacted elected officials or legislative representatives at any level.
3. Contacted officials of political parties or other political organizations.
4. Contacted representative of non-government/civil society organizations.

Protest activity

Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have never, once, or more than once done any of these things during the past three years?

1. Refused to pay taxes or fees to the government.
2. Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition.
3. Attended a demonstration or protest march.
4. Used force or violence for a political cause.

Table 1 Dimensions of support for democracy

	Factor I Regime institutions	Factor II Regime performance	Factor III Regime principles
Trust in National Assembly	.909	.049	.061
Trust in political parties	.906	.091	.003
The level of democracy	.042	.842	-.003
Satisfaction with democracy	.089	.820	.083
Preference of democracy	.028	-.038	.794
Aspiration for democracy	.028	.115	.765

The reported factor loadings were extracted from principal component analysis with varimax rotation.

Source: 2006 EAB survey


Table 2 Correlations between three types of support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian rule

	Democratic principles	Democratic performance	Political institution
Democratic performance	.111**	-	
Political institutions	.079*	.161**	-
Rejection of authoritarian rule	.152**	Ns	-.111**

Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. *p<.05 **p<.01


Source: 2006 EAB survey

Figure 1 Trends in public preference of democracy over its alternatives




Source: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 KDB surveys and 2003, 2006 EAB surveys

Figure 2 Trends in public acceptance of democracy as an idea




Source: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 KDB surveys and 2003, 2006 EAB surveys

Figure 3 Trends in public evaluation of democratic performance



Source: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 KDB surveys and 2003, 2006 EAB surveys

Figure 4 Trends in public trust in political institutions



Source: 1996, 1997 KDB surveys and 2003, 2006 EAB surveys

Table 3 Correlations between economic, political and social variables and three types of support for democracy

	Democratic principles	Democratic performance	Political institutions
<i>Economic</i>			
National economy - current	Ns	.141**	.151**
National economy-retrospective	Ns	.119**	.128**
National economy-prospective	Ns	.108**	.208**
Household economy-current	Ns	.134**	.132**
Household economy-retrospective	Ns	.099**	Ns
Household economy-prospective	.086**	Ns	.104**
<i>Political</i>			
Control of corruption	.171**	.244**	.192**
Electoral competition	Ns	.245**	.123*
Vertical accountability	Ns	.094**	.079*
Horizontal accountability	.142**	.214**	.120**
Freedom	Ns	.155**	.079**
Equality	.131**	.170**	.075**
<i>Social</i>			
Membership	Ns	Ns	Ns
Social trust	.120**	.137**	.131**

Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. *p<.05 **p<.01

Source: 2006 EAB survey

Table 4 Regression of economic, political and social variables on three types of support for democracy

	Democratic principles	Democratic performance	Political institutions
<i>Economic</i>			
National economy-current	-.162*	Ns	Ns
National economy-retrospective	Ns	Ns	.158*
National economy-prospective	Ns	Ns	.153**
Household economy-current	-.181*	Ns	.180*
Household economy-retrospective	Ns	Ns	-.169*
Household economy-prospective	Ns	Ns	Ns
<i>Political</i>			
Control of corruption	.146***	.103***	.104**
Electoral competition	Ns	.143***	.090*
Vertical accountability	Ns	Ns	Ns
Horizontal accountability	.143**	Ns	Ns
Freedom	Ns	Ns	Ns
Equality	.197***	.084**	Ns
<i>Social</i>			
Membership	Ns	Ns	Ns
Social trust	.369***	Ns	Ns
<i>Socio-demographic</i>			
Gender	.225*	Ns	Ns
Age	Ns	.073*	Ns
Education	.273***	Ns	Ns
Income	Ns	Ns	Ns
N	682	702	699
Adjusted R-sq	.107	.138	.087

Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Gender (male=1; female=2), age (19-29=1; 30-39=2; 40-49=3; 50-59=4; 60+=5), education (0-6=1; 7-9=2; 10-12=3; 13+=4), and income (lowest=1; highest=5).

Source: 2006 EAB survey

Table 5 Types of citizens

Typology	Democratic principles	Democratic performance	Political institutions	Types of citizens	Percent
I	Support	Satisfied		Satisfied democrats	30
	Support	Not satisfied		Dissatisfied democrats	8
	Not support	Satisfied		Satisfied non-democrats	30
	Not support	Not satisfied		Dissatisfied non-democrats	14
II	Support		Trust	Trusting democrats	5
	Support		Not trust	Distrusting democrats	35
	Not support		Trust	Trusting non-democrats	5
	Not support		Not trust	Distrusting non-democrats	40

The percentages of missing data (not classifiable) are not reported. N=1,212

Source: 2006 EAB survey

Table 6 Socio-demographic backgrounds of types of citizens

Typology I	Satisfied democrats	Dissatisfied democrats	Satisfied non-democrats	Dissatisfied non-democrats	(N)
Gender					
Men	36	8	39	17	(517)
Women	37	12	34	17	(491)
Age					
19-29	40	10	33	17	(203)
30-39	38	12	34	17	(236)
40-49	34	11	37	19	(241)
50-59	33	8	42	18	(151)
60+	37	9	40	14	(172)
Education					
<High school	32	9	40	20	(215)
High school	33	9	41	16	(406)
College	42	12	29	17	(382)
Income					
Lowest	37	12	37	15	(309)
Low	35	9	36	19	(265)
Middle	41	8	33	18	(201)
High	41	7	38	12	(81)
Highest	29	10	46	15	(68)
Typology II	Trusting democrats	Distrusting democrats	Trusting non-democrats	Distrusting non-democrats	(N)
Gender					
Men	6	39	5	50	(517)
Women	6	43	6	45	(516)
Age					
19-29	6	45	4	46	(213)
30-39	6	45	5	45	(242)
40-49	4	41	6	49	(249)
50-59	7	34	7	52	(154)
60+	8	38	7	47	(175)
Education					
<High school	7	34	8	51	(220)
High school	5	38	7	51	(424)
College	7	48	3	42	(389)
Income					
Lowest	7	41	7	45	(320)
Low	5	41	6	48	(279)
Middle	8	41	4	48	(202)
High	4	47	3	46	(78)
Highest	8	31	6	55	(67)

Source: 2006 EAB survey

Table 7 Types of citizens and levels of political engagement

	Satisfied democrats	Dissatisfied democrats	Satisfied non- democrats	Dissatisfied non-democrats
High level of political interest	40	43	42	47
High level of political efficacy	18	11	16	16
Voted	80	64	75	71
Have done any campaign activity	28	23	34	34
Have done any contact activity	36	41	35	38
Have done any protest activity	12	26	16	27
(N)	(337~362)	(91~102)	(339~364)	(156~169)
	Trusting democrats	Distrusting democrats	Trusting non- democrats	Distrusting non-democrats
High level of political interest	40	40	48	41
High level of political efficacy	21	15	17	16
Voted	86	75	87	72
Have done any campaign activity	30	25	38	33
Have done any contact activity	45	35	36	36
Have done any protest activity	15	16	18	20
(N)	(56~63)	(386~418)	(51~57)	(455~485)

Source: 2006 EAB survey