A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

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Social and Institutional Trust in East and Southeast Asia

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Asian Barometer
A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

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Social and Institutional Trust in East and Southeast Asia

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In this study, we explore the structures of social and institutional trust found in East and Southeast Asian political culture. For this purpose, we utilize the Asian Barometer 3 dataset, which currently comprises 11 countries and regions in this part of the world. The primary focus of the analysis is whether so-called Asian cultural values bring about a different structure of social/institutional trust to that found in more developed Western countries. This concerns not only the relationship between trust and culture, but also the cultural effects of the relationship between trust and political participation, which is a major social consequence of social/institutional trust. We employ hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) for the analysis, a method well suited to cross-country comparative analysis, even though the small number of countries/regions in our study may not be strictly sufficient.

More than a decade has passed since the serious downtrend in institutional trust in advanced countries was first given academic attention (Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004; Catterberg & Alejandro, 2005). However, little of this empirical attention concerns the determinants and impacts of the erosion of trust, the only argument given being that the erosion of trust may negatively affect the legitimacy of political institutions. In contrast, there is no clear empirical evidence of a consistent long-term downward trend in the level of social trust. Although Putnam (2003) strongly argued that in the US context there was a significant decline in social trust between 1960 and 2000, Newton (1999) found this was not the case in Europe over the period 1976–93. In Japan, the trend in social trust is similar to that found in Europe based on trends in the World Values Survey (WVS) between 1981 and 2010.

Consequently, it is not easy to highlight the common and parallel chronological changes in institutional and social trust, and it is therefore difficult to justify that both types of trust reflect the same causal factor(s). For instance, Newton (2001) argued that interpersonal experience largely influences social trust, whereas political institutional trust derives from more indirect media experience. Therefore, there may not be any covariance between the levels of institutional and social trust. Accordingly, in this paper, we focus on political participation as an important indicator of the social consequences of institutional and social trust, especially in relation to political culture, and then elucidate upon the configurations of both types of trust.
1. Multiple routes from institutional trust to political participation

The motivation for this study is the intuition that there is more than one possible way in which institutional trust leads to political participation. For example, Ikeda, Kobayashi, & Richey (2012) revealed no evidence of a positive relationship between institutional trust and political participation in East Asia when using eight countries/regions and the East Asian Barometer (EAB) dataset (or ABS1), conjecturing that the existence of different routes/logics blurs or even cancels out the relationship between institutional trust and political participation. It is then strategically meaningful to disentangle these alternative routes as a means of better deciphering the meaning of institutional trust.

The first possible route (logic) is that under a high level of institutional trust and through active political participation—including voting, attending rallies, joining demonstrations, signing petitions, and contacting politicians—citizens believe that they are able to establish a highly trustworthy governing body. This is consistent with the logic developed by social capital theory, especially in Putnam (1993, 2000), that social networks and beliefs in reciprocity, social trust, and institutional trust, lead to active political participation. Norris (1999) provided empirical support for this particular route by analyzing datasets from 44 countries in the WVS in the 1990s.

However, this is not the sole route/logic linking institutional trust and political participation. The second route/logic posits that through participation the citizenry can overthrow the current government in order to reestablish trustable (better) government. This logic asserts that while supporting the idea of democratic institutions at the systemic level, citizens will participate more politically when they become more distrustful of the current government. In actuality, systemic support for democracy is widespread in East and Southeast Asia, with at most 5.3% of respondents in Mainland China and 6.2% of respondents in The Philippines of the opinion that their own country/region was not a democracy. Indeed, this kind of protest-prone participation invites more radical participation, including changing the current government, taking part in demonstrations, etc., than entailed in the first route.

However, even the more “normal” type of governmental participation could arise through the same motivation (the second route), as the theory of postmaterialistic “critical citizens” suggests (Dalton, 2004; Stolle & Hooghe, 2004). Similarly, Norris (1999) revealed that “protest potential” activities, as part of governmental participation, and institutional trust are negatively related. Note also the arguments about “critical democrats” (Chu & Huang, 2010). In particular, we cannot ignore this type of democrat in that they are widely found throughout Eastern and Southeastern Asia, representing about three of every ten citizens in Japan, Singapore, and The Philippines, four of every ten citizens in Taiwan and Korea, and one of every ten citizens in Mainland China. In related work, Qi and Shin (2011) used data on 43 countries/regions in the 2000 WVS to show that critical democrats exhibit higher political participation, even after omitting Japan and other developed countries from their sample.

These alternative logics on political participation have a common feature in that they include systemic-level institutional trust (i.e. belief in the desirability of the democratic system). However, they differ in the direction of the causal link between trust and participation. We posit that there is yet another logic (or absence of logic) concerning political participation. Many citizens believe that their daily life has nothing to do with trust in the government, or think that governmental activities are irrelevant to their own life. In political science, researchers tend to conceptualize these thoughts as mere political alienation. However, the idea of “private-life orientation” attempts to conceptualize this in a more positive way, i.e. instead of lacking something political, citizens are conceptualized to be intentionally nonpolitical. That is, there are potentially two ways of thinking for citizens. The first is that “you can rely on your government, you only need to focus on your own life, and that is
enough for your life." The second is that even if you are distrustful of politics, it will not change your life and values, and then it is useless to be a political "joiner." In either stream of thought, the distance to political participation is remote.

In explaining "private-life orientation," the concept of postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1977) is a good point to start. This posits that as the society grows and becomes more affluent, citizens will begin to pursue their own self-actualization, and that in order to realize this goal, they must become involved in politics. We are of the opinion that what actually happened in postmodern society is not that simple. That is, in pursuing self-actualization, there is more than one route through which it may be realized, and not just in the public domain with a political target. For example, it is also possible for citizens to merge this into the domain of their private life by targeting either an economically prosperous life (e.g. self-actualization of one's consumer life or cultural activities) or an occupational life (by targeting professional self-actualization through attaining one's professional goals).

Of course, it is also possible that through these nonpolitical self-actualization processes, one also becomes aware that unless politics is changed a life target will not be realized, and this then involves moving into the political domain (Ikeda, 2007). In reality, such a route to political participation is not common; while everyone understands self-actualization, it is possible that politics remains absent from the citizen's mindset in the process of self-actualization. Although this is indeed the case in Japan, we would not be surprised if the same did not also exist in other regions of East and Southeast Asia where economic development has been especially rapid in the past two decades. We therefore argue that private-life orientations do not just represent "uninvolvement" in politics through alienation and a lack of political interest, rather reflect more meaningful choices about individual lifestyles and maintaining distance from politics.

As shown in Table 1, we are able to categorize four patterns of institutional trust and political participation. In these patterns, the routes from institutional trust to political participation differ depending on the levels of trust and political involvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional trust</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Distrust</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politically involved</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically uninvolved</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With politically involved citizens (cases 1A and 1B), the first case (1A) exhibits that institutional trust leads to governmental political participation, and this is consistent with the logic of social capital theory. However, even distrustful citizens would take part in politics through protest-type political participation or by voting behavior aimed at ousting/attacking the existing government (1B).

With politically uninvolved citizens (2A and 2B), citizens of type 2A rely on the government and leave politics to those who govern; here, the level of satisfaction in politics is relatively high but the participation level is relatively low. We surmise that in empirical tests, the 1A case would potentially contaminate the 2A case, so it would be empirically difficult to discern the exact effect of trust on participation. Conversely, in the 2B case, citizens are in a sense separated from politics in their mindsets and focus instead on their private life, i.e. they display a distrust of politics without protestation. We speculate that the 2B case often intermingles with the 1B case when empirically tested, again resulting in a blurring of the impact of distrust in politics.
For the final argument in this section, we call attention to the well-known idea of political efficacy, a concept thought to accelerate political participation. This concept has two dimensions: internal political efficacy, in which citizens feel efficacious when they believe they have a say about the political body in question, and external political efficacy, in which citizens believe they are responded to by the political body in question. Both are conceptually independent from institutional trust. However, we can categorize the efficacy concept as an ability factor in a broader trust concept (Yamagishi, 1998). Nonetheless, trust in one’s competence is somewhat different from believing that the government can be trusted because it follows our expectations. In this sense, the latter refers to the intention of government. Moreover, efficacy shares much with competence in that external political efficacy relates to beliefs about the competence of those who are trusted (i.e. political institutions), and internal political efficacy concerning the competence of citizens (those who trust political institutions). (Note 1)

2. Conceptual multiplicity of social trust and the route to political participation

2.1. Typology and structure
When we discuss social trust, it is inevitable to begin with its conceptual distinctions and the range of debates concerning its conceptualization. In this paper, we posit that social trust, in other words, trust in other human beings, differs depending on (1) the terms on which we suppose trust, and (2) the social conditions that trust imposes. (Note 2)

First, we have two arguments concerning the target of trust.

(1) The trustworthiness of others differs depending on whether they are those whom you know or those whom you categorically trust. Based on the distinction in Yamagishi’s (1998) trust notion, trust in others you already know is “personal trust,” which is an accumulated belief in the context of past interaction with the given others of the trust relationship. In contrast, “categorical trust” is trust in a category that one knows is trustworthy in general, such as medical doctors or police officers, etc., and is dependent on the cultural/social context. In contrast, when one judges an unknown other (upon first contact) as trustworthy, this decision is much influenced by one’s sense of generalized (or general) trust or the probabilistic expectation that the unknown other is trustworthy, as discussed below.

(2) Another differentiation is on the interpersonal “radius” of the interaction (relationship) with others, as emphasized by Fukuyama (2000). Those with a large radius, meaning they have large friendship/close social ties, are likely to have diverse others with whom to interact, and then are likely to develop more generalized expectations of others, even within the radius, i.e. similarly to generalized others. Likewise, those who have many others on whom they expect to receive social support are likely to have expectations of others in a more generous way, leading to generalized positive expectations.

Second, the social conditions that are in place when people interact with each other make a difference, i.e. the conditions determining whether they can control the interests/benefits of others. Regardless of whether the given others are acquaintances or not, if one has social control, the relationship with others is that of an “assurance” relationship (Yamagishi, 1998). That is, one is able to depend on these others because one is able to punish or reward them according to their behavior toward oneself. In contrast, “trust” is where, despite the lack of assurance relationship, one judges others as trustworthy. The especially important case is where even if one is not acquainted with the given other, one judges the other to be trustworthy. When this expectation is highly estimated, we say that the level of general trust of this person is high. This notion is important as it changes the possibility of cooperation.
with unknown others in the lack of assurance conditions. In other words, it opens up more opportunities for diverse interactions with new people.

There are two streams of theories concerning the determinants of the level of general trust (Nannestad, 2008). The first assumes that general trust is a product of rational judgment: even when one encounters unknown others, one is able to judge them trustworthy or not. The idea of “social intelligence” in Yamagishi (1998) is that when one has high social intelligence, one can reduce the risk of erroneously interacting with unknown others who have bad intentions or wish to harm one. In turn, this intelligence is likely to develop better in social environments where one has a high probability of encountering unknown others and has the opportunity of developing social skills to discern the social cues for trustworthiness. In addition to the argument by Yamagishi (1998), we also surmise that if one has a relatively large radius of social ties, these ties are likely to be more diverse, as least when compared with a smaller radius of social ties. This too will nurture greater social intelligence. A second theory assumes that general trust is a belief that is norm driven and not empirically based. As Uslaner (2002) argued, trusting others is a normative and ethical belief that “people should be trustful of others and will behave accordingly.” In this case, the level of general trust is not a function of the social environment or rational judgment.

2.2. Social trust and political participation

We assume there are four possible paths from social trust to political participation. The arguments given here focus only on general trust, as it is one of the focuses of social capital theory.

(1) From the logic underpinning social capital theory, social trust, through mutual reliable social interactions with positive feedback loops, mutually conditions others to behave trustfully. This accelerates several aspects of civic engagement, including political participation.

(2) The same high social capital condition may lead one to free ride the benefit of civic engagement, i.e. the collective social dilemma overrides the benefit. In such a case, those who free ride will reduce their cost of political participation, and the general tendency will be that the higher the social trust, the lower the level of political participation.

(3) In social conditions where the social trust level of citizens is low, such that one suspects that less trusted others will benefit from engaging politically, it is strategic for one to take part in rivalry, and therefore one is more likely to participate politically.

(4) Where one is politically disengaged (a low level of involvement), the level of political participation will be low, irrespective of the level of social trust.

Past research has focused on some of these possibilities. For example, in his analysis of social capital, Putnam (2000) mainly focused on the first case, while Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) discussed the distinction between the second and the third cases. When focusing on the third case, scholars argue about the level of homogeneity or heterogeneity found among citizens. For instance, Arneil (2006) suggests that cultural homogeneity makes trust more cooperative, thereby resulting in greater participation. There are many counterobservations that competing (heterogeneous) groups rival each other when participating in major social change. As for the fourth case, the same argument holds as for the case of low institutional trust making for low political involvement. (Note 3)

3. Role of Asian values

The question is what kind of logical interactions for the above arguments are possible when we consider Asian values.
3.1. Asian values
To start with, we will adopt the concept of Asian values as developed in the Asian Barometer Studies (ABS; [http://www.asianbarometer.org/](http://www.asianbarometer.org/)), and introduce the idea in the following two stages for our analysis. In the first stage, ABS assumes two contrastive values: namely, liberal democratic values (LDV) and traditional social values (TSV). As the social desirability of liberal democratic ideas is high in this region, the LDV scale is an inverse measure of positive attitudes toward nondemocratic practices/ideas. This serves to act against the inflation of the score toward support for democracy (Chu & Huang, 2011); the items used include paternalism in the political world, anti-checks and balances, and Confucian ethical leader. As for the TSV score, the ABS employs an improved measure originally developed in Taiwan (by Fu Hu), as verified in the ABS2 dataset (Chu & Huang, 2011). This measure reflects “social values” in daily social settings and positive attitudes toward paternalism, harmony orientation, and collectivism. In ABS3, the survey project also includes an item measuring long-term orientation, pointed out by Hofstede (1991) as being another type of Asian value. We tentatively define these TSV as Asian values. (Note 4)

In the second stage, we focus on the subscales of TSV, especially paternalism and harmony orientation, both of which were consistently extracted over the countries/regions in the ABS2 dataset analyses (Ikeda, Nathan, & Kobayashi, 2011) and also pointed out as affecting Asian political behavior (Ikeda & Richey, 2011). Paternalism is the tendency to accept that a social superior behaves autocratically and protectively in a hierarchical relationship with a social inferior. Further, paternalism is often the superior acting against the will of the inferior as a form of “dominance by good intention” (Hatakeyama, 1989). Harmony orientation is the tendency to behave as if people involved in some specific situation do not have any conflict and have consensus by suppressing dissent. Both paternalism and harmony orientation are widely observable in the East and Southeast Asian regions. By targeting these TSV subscales, we will be able to differentiate which are more influential in determining political participation in the Asian context. (Note 5) Based on the above arguments, let us now examine how Asian values could influence the relationships between institutional and social trust and political participation.

3.2. Asian values, institutional trust, social trust and political participation

3.2.1. Institutional trust
We first assume that as Asian values maintain confidence in governmental institutions as a normative practice, the values will enhance the possibility of increasing the level of institutional trust. The logic of rulers, which emphasizes paternalism and harmony, demand trust and dependence on them as well as the suppression of disobedience, represent normative demands. In contrast, in the context of Polish politics, Sztompka (1999) argued that paternalism is a functional substitute for trust in civic societies, and will necessarily invite suspicion and supervision instead of obedience. In the Asian authoritarian state context, we sometimes empirically observe a similar tendency. In addition, Wong, Wan, and Hsiao (2011) found, using an eight-country/region dataset for East Asia, that traditionalism had only a weak impact on a political trust scale comprising trust in administrative, judicial, and legislative institutions. These arguments and related empirical studies show that we require a more rigorous empirical test. The hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis below examines this relationship. Using the technical terminology for HLM, we specify institutional trust (the trust in one’s government) as the dependent variable, and the aggregate-level Asian values (Level 2) as determinants of the Level 1 intercept for the dependent variable.
Whether Asian values directly affect political participation (i.e. technically, participation is the dependent variable, with its Level 1 intercept a function of its Level 2 Asian values), will be dependent on the contexts of paternalism or harmony orientation. Looking back at the Japanese experience after WWII, some empirical studies have found that the paternalistic mobilization of voters in the election process was widely observed (Richardson, 1991), whereas when paternalism demands "carte blanche" dependence on leaders, it will decelerate participation, as typically observed for leadership cases in union democracy in many organizations (Ishida, 1970). In addition, as harmony orientation demands a conforming attitude, the orientation will interlock in the direction of paternalism. We also assume that when paternalism or harmony does not function well, leading to the suppression of conflict or the coercion of harmony, the opportunity for protest/objection will arise. In other words, the carte blanche strategy with paternalism works well as far as the superior satisfies the inferiors. See the analyses using ABS2 by Ishida (1970, pp. 144–135), Pharr (1984) and Ikeda (2012). Finally, although the above arguments assume the cultural values are set as a normative standard (Level 2 aggregate variables), the same could be true for these values as individual values, i.e. Level 1 values. There is no reason to suppose otherwise while we internalize these cultural values.

3.2.2. The relationships between Asian values and social trust

When comparing liberal democratic values and traditional social values, the former will not much relate to social trust, i.e. it has more formal and public aspects. On the other hand, we generally expect that traditional social values are relevant and function as constraining on social relationships, resulting in the reinforcing of social trust throughout the existing limited range of interpersonal interactions, i.e. these values are anti-expansive on social network development. Let us consider what this means when allowing for more specific subvalues.

To start with, we focus on the case where the dependent variable is general social trust (Note 6). One aspect of paternalism is the hierarchical control of social relationships, and this naturally leads to an orientation toward more closed social relationships (in this sense, paternalism is assurance oriented). That is, opportunities for nurturing general trust that assume more open social relationships will be limited. Technically, this predicts that the intercept of Level 1 when setting general trust as the dependent variable will be a negative function of paternalism at Level 2. We expect that paternalism at Level 1 will function in a similar fashion. As for the effect of harmony orientation, we expect that motivations to maintain harmonious social relationships work against forming a heterogeneous and open social network. This is more likely to enclose one’s personal ties in a safer in-group. Thus, this orientation again, deprives the opportunities for a growing general trust, i.e. this orientation is a negative function of general trust.

Next, consider the radius of social trust. The basic idea is that the difference between the innermost and outermost radii reflects the difference in the level of social trust. In Asia, this radius divides the level of trust, and family-centrism, for instance, will enclose trust inside (Fukuyama, 1995). However, in contemporary changing Asian contexts, we surmise that this trust radius is more fluid than it was twenty years ago, and people now have a greater opportunity for contact with outsiders outside their own radius or to expand their own radius. In this light, we expect that the larger the radius one has, the greater the opportunity to encounter heterogeneous others, and this increases the likelihood of having higher general trust. In relation to this line of reasoning, by comparing four East Asian and four Scandinavian countries, Helgesen (2006) posited that in the latter countries social trust in personal relationships spills over to unknown others, while in the former it would appear social trust is confined to the range of family and friends. However, this may be changing. For example, Yosano and Hayashi (2005), using a survey of the Japanese population,
showed that a route exists to form general trust via the generalization of one’s existing personal relationship to social networks outside one’s existing relationship radius.

Finally, we consider the effect on political participation from social trust in relation to Asian values. We posit that under high personal trust (rather than general trust), paternalism may decelerate political participation when it promotes carte-blanche-type free riding. However, this could also accelerate participation if it functions as a political mobilization engine. As mentioned, paternalism functions well under existing social relationships rather than with abstract and unknown others and it functions better under personal trust than in general trust cases. This is possibly a route from social trust to political participation not expected from the logic of social capital. As for the route via general trust, we consider that the constraining role of paternalism will decelerate the positive relationship between general trust and political participation. Lastly, as for the effect of harmony orientation, we expect the same direction suggested by paternalism.

4. Data and method
To explore empirically the validity of the above argument, we use the Third Wave of the Asian Barometer dataset, which includes eleven countries/regions from East Asia (Japan, Korea, Mainland China, Taiwan, Mongolia) and Southeast Asia (The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam). HLM is the chosen method of analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Nezlek, 2011) that is appropriate for this type of dataset, although the number of Level 2 units (in this case, country aggregate level) is not statistically sufficient for the analysis and so we should be cautious about overestimating the statistical power (Maas & Hox, 2005; Sherbaum & Ferreret, 2008). (Notes 7 and 8)

4.1. Variable specification
- Political participation: Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) distinguished between two types of political participation: governmental and electoral. As electoral political participation differs in its meaning across Asia, in this paper we focus on governmental political participation. We subclassify governmental political participation into two categories following a precedent set long ago by Sidney Verba (1988). The first of these is contact-type political participation, which indicates contacting people with politically public roles, such as politicians, high status officials, or other influential persons (use q64–q68 from ABS3; variable name is contactpar). The second is potential protest-type political participation, which includes activities such as signing petitions, gathering together to resolve local problems, and demonstrations (q69–q72; variable name is actpar). Each question item is drawn from the respondent response to the question about whether they have ever committed an individual item of participation: the choices allowed for each answer are “once” (1), “more than once” (2), and “never” (0) during a three-year period. The final scales are the weighted summation of these items (the weights are the values in parentheses).

- Trust in the central government as the measurement of institutional trust: We measured this item along with trust in other institutions using a four-point scale. Considering the purpose of this study, we focus on this single item.

- Internal/external political efficacy: We employed standardized variables for these variables. For internal efficacy, we summed the responses to the following two four-point scale items (variable name is effic): “I think I have the ability to participate in politics” (q133), and “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what is going on” (reversed, q134). For external efficacy, we used a
For the variables related to social trust, we constructed the following four measures.

- General trust (generalized trust): Here we used a little-known item for the trust-versus-caution question, “Generally speaking, would you say that ‘most people can be trusted’ or ‘that you must be very careful in dealing with people’?” (WVS-like question \(wvstrust1\)). We see that this WVS-type question is problematic as emphasized by Miller and Mitamura (2003) (also see Simpson and Tucker, 2008). Miller and Mitamura wrote, “The question under investigation does not ask respondents to choose between trust and distrust. (...) Rather, respondents choose between trust and caution. Yet there is reason to believe that trust and caution are not opposites; certainly it is possible for a person to believe most people can be trusted, and at the same time believe that it is prudent to be cautious. It is reasonable, for example, to believe that the overwhelming majority of people will never try to burglarize one’s house, but still to choose to lock one’s door.” (Miller & Mitamura, 2003, p. 63). Instead of using this question, we measured general trust using a four-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” by asking a single simple question, “Are most people trustworthy?” (q49 as \(gtrust\)). Actually, our Japanese pilot study (via a web survey) showed that the \(gtrust\) measurement performed better than the WVS type. However, we also use the WVS-type question to prove it is not useful in this analysis. The correlation between \(gtrust\) and \(wvstrust1\) is 0.347.

- Personal trust that targets known others: We created the variable for trust in specific others using a compound measure of the first principal component for the following three items: trust in “your relatives”, “your neighbors”, and “other people you interact with” (q25, q26, and q27 into \(pertrust\)). These are well interrelated and had a moderate level of correlations with each other (0.541 between q25 and q26, 0.337 between q25 and q27, and 0.473 between q26 and q27), and form a single dimension in every country and region.

- Radius of trust: For this variable, we used two variables, i.e. one’s social network size (\(netw\text{_}size\)) and social support size (\(sup\text{_}size\)). (Note 9)

- Political uninvolve: Based on a preparatory analysis, and to answer two sets of questions (interest in politics and political conversation) as indicators of uninvolve in politics, we adopted the frequencies of talking politics with one’s family members or friends (three-point scale, q46 into \(pdiscuss\); correlation with interest in politics was 0.451).

- Interaction terms between the three trust-related variables (trust in government, general trust, and personal trust) and the frequency of political discussion (\(govt\text{_}disp, gtrs\text{_}disp, ptrs\text{_}disp\)): As discussed, we specified these interaction terms to check whether the effect of trust differs depending upon the level of political involvement.

- Cultural factors: As discussed, we used two primary cultural measures as well as three subscales.

  - The first major measure is liberal democratic values (\(LDVSCO\)) from the reverse summation of the following variables: “Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions” (q141), “The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society” (q142), “Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups” (q143), “If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it
cannot possibly accomplish great things” (q145), and “If people have too many
different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic” (q147).
- Traditional social values (TSVSCO) related with daily social life Asian values: This
variable is the summation of the following variables: “Even if parents’ demands are
unreasonable, children still should do what they ask” (q55), “Being a student, one
should not question the authority of one’s teacher” (q57), “In a group, we should avoid
open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group” (q58), “Even if there is some
disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict” (q59), “A person should not
insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him” (q60), “For the sake
of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second” (q50), and “For the
sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed” (q52).
- LDVSCO and TSVSCO in each country/region are not very highly negatively
correlated, ranging from as low as –.461 in Mainland China, with the next strongest
of –.307 in Korea, –.298 in Taiwan, and –.249 in Japan. Indonesia was only –.222,
and Malaysia was –.258.
- Subscales of TSV: We developed two scales based on the analysis of the ABS2
cultural values (Ikeda, Kobayashi, & Nathan, 2011). Using factor analysis for each
country, we found that two factors were consistently extracted, namely, paternalism
and harmony orientation. The third factor, collectivism, fluctuated in its appearance,
sometimes combined with paternalism, other times with harmony or independence.
Because of this, we only employ paternalism and harmony orientation (named patern,
harmon, respectively). The correlation between these variables is 0.303.
- The Asian Barometer 3 project also introduced long- vs. short-orientation variables.
This was suggested as another Asian value dimension by Hofstede (1991), and the
project was initially devised to measure this notion: “When dealing with others,
developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one’s immediate
interest” (q53), and “When dealing with others, one should not only focus on
immediate interest but also plan for the future” (q54). We summed the responses to
both questions, and created longtrm for initial analyses to observe the relevance of
the variable. The correlations between this variable and the variables specified earlier
are 0.371 for the TSV score, 0.110 for paternalism, and 0.384 for harmony orientation.

- We employ the type of political regime as control variables in Level 2 (at the aggregate
level).

1. Liberal Democracy (LDC): Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
2. Electoral Democracy (EDC): Mongolia, The Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand
3. Electoral Authoritarian Regime (EAR): Malaysia and Singapore (and Hong Kong in
the near future)
4. One-Party Authoritarian Regime (OPC): Mainland China, Vietnam (and including
Cambodia)

We specify these regimes with dummy variables for the first three regime types and
specify the final regime type (OPC) as the base or reference category.

- Where appropriate, we use three variables indicating the different dimensions of social
diversity in each country/region, comprising Gini coefficients for vertical economic,
ethnolinguistic and religious diversity (Alesina et al., 2003) (the variables are gini, eth_lang,
and religion).

- Finally, we include several demographic variables as controls, including gender (se2), age
(se3a), education (se5), and subjective income level (se13a, reversed).
model used and the subscales of traditional social values are shown below.

As other variables at Level 1, we include the frequencies of political discussion, participation, but with a different order (Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam). Japan scored fourth highest. The lowest were Singapore and China, and the second lowest were Taiwan and Korea. As shown in Figure 2A, trust in the national government clearly shows that Vietnam and China score highly. While this is consistent with other studies in this area, it is argued this merely reflects "demand characteristic answers" in both countries, but this is not the case (see Wang, Dalton, & Shin, 2006). Singapore and Malaysia score next, with Japan and then Korea having the lowest scores for trust in national government.

The general trust score (Figure 2B) revealed that there is little diversity between the countries/regions, with the highest being Vietnam. However, the personal trust score (Figure 2C) is lowest in Vietnam, and again the variability across countries/regions is not very large. With the cultural factors, the LDV scores depicted in Figure 3A indicate that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are the highest scoring, followed by Indonesia, Singapore, China, The Philippines, and Thailand as a group. The lowest scores are for Vietnam and Malaysia. For the TSV score (Figure 3B), Vietnam is first, then Indonesia. The third-highest scoring group comprises Mongolia, Thailand, Malaysia, and The Philippines. The lowest scoring group includes Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China. With the subvalues of TSV (Figure 4), we can see paternalism is high in Indonesia, then Vietnam and Malaysia, but low in Japan and Taiwan. As for harmony orientation, the highest scoring is again Indonesia, then Malaysia and Vietnam, with Japan and Taiwan again the lowest. Finally, long-term orientation is high in Mongolia and Vietnam, with Thailand and Malaysia trailing far behind, with the lowest scoring group comprising The Philippines, China, and Japan.

6. Determinants of trust in the national government

We now examine trust in the national government, as measured on a four-point scale. For this, we employ a HLM model with an ordinal dependent variable. We include cultural variables at the aggregate as well as the individual level (Level 2 and Level 1, respectively). As other variables at Level 1, we include the frequencies of political discussion, internal/external political efficacy, and demographic variables. At Level 2 for the effect of the intercept on Level 1, we include political regime dummies as well as cultural values. The model used and the subscales of traditional social values are shown below.

Level 1 Model

\[
\text{Prob}[R_i \leq 1] = \phi_{1i} = \phi_{0i}
\]
\[
\text{Prob}[R_i \leq 2] = \phi_{2i} = \phi_{1i} + \phi_{2i}
\]
\[
\text{Prob}[R_i \leq 3] = \phi_{3i} = \phi_{2i} + \phi_{3i}
\]
\[
\text{Prob}[R_i \leq 4] = 1.0
\]
\[
\phi_{1i} = \text{Prob}[(\text{GOVTRUST}(1) = 1)|\beta_i]
\]
\[
\phi_{2i} = \text{Prob}[(\text{GOVTRUST}(2) = 1)|\beta_i]
\]
\[
\phi_{3i} = \text{Prob}[(\text{GOVTRUST}(3) = 1)|\beta_i]
\]
\[
\log[\phi_{1i}/(1-\phi_{1i})] = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{PATEREN}) + \beta_2(\text{HARMON}) + \beta_3(\text{LONGTRM}) + \beta_4(\text{PDICUSS}) + \beta_5(\text{SE1}) + \beta_6(\text{SE2}) + \beta_7(\text{SE3}) + \beta_8(\text{SE5}) + \beta_9(\text{SE13})
\]
\[
\log[\phi_{2i}/(1-\phi_{2i})] = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{EFFIC1}) + \beta_2(\text{PATEREN}) + \beta_3(\text{HARMON}) + \beta_4(\text{LONGTRM}) + \beta_5(\text{PDICUSS}) + \beta_6(\text{SE2}) + \beta_7(\text{SE3}) + \beta_8(\text{SE5}) + \beta_9(\text{SE13}) + \delta_2
\]
\[
\log[\phi_{3i}/(1-\phi_{3i})] = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{EFFIC2}) + \beta_2(\text{PATEREN}) + \beta_3(\text{HARMON}) + \beta_4(\text{LONGTRM}) + \beta_5(\text{PDICUSS}) + \beta_6(\text{SE2}) + \beta_7(\text{SE3}) + \beta_8(\text{SE5}) + \beta_9(\text{SE13}) + \delta_3
\]
Level 2 Model
\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \cdot \text{PATERN}_j + \gamma_{02} \cdot \text{HARMON}_j + \gamma_{03} \cdot \text{LONGTRM}_j + \gamma_{04} \cdot \text{LDC}_j + \gamma_{05} \cdot \text{EDC}_j + \gamma_{06} \cdot \text{EAR}_j + u_{0j} \]
\[ \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + u_{1j} \]
\[ \beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + u_{2j} \]
\[ \beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + u_{3j} \]
\[ \beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40} + u_{4j} \]
\[ \beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50} + u_{5j} \]
\[ \beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60} + u_{6j} \]
\[ \beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70} \]
\[ \beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} \]
\[ \beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90} \]
\[ \beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100} \]

Note that the directions of the signs lie opposite in their meaning; i.e. minus values indicate the direction of higher institutional trust. As shown in Table 2, Model 1 at Level 1 shows that liberal democratic values lower trust in the government, whereas traditional social values increase trust. Model 2 further explores the impact of the subscales of traditional values, and it is evident that paternalism is the major factor determining trust. These results are ironic in at least two regards. On the one hand, those who believe in liberal democracy are likely to disbelieve the government, which is typical for “critical democrats.” On the other hand, traditional values, especially paternalism, which are often the target of attack as “undemocratic practice,” contribute to trust in the government (even if it is a democratic government).

Let us now check the effects of the other variables. Political discussion makes governmental trust decrease, while internal efficacy and (more strongly) external efficacy also enhance trust. It is interesting to note that while involvement in politics (in terms of talking about politics) fails to support governmental trust, external efficacy is very effective in this regard. “Responsiveness” of political leaders is a normative expectation in Confucian cultures (typical in the Asian context), and external efficacy is psychologically relevant to this expectation. This is also consistent with the finding that paternalism had a positive effect at Level 1. That is, in a vertical social structure with Confucian paternalism, there is realization of the perception of the normative assumption. The argument of authoritarian deliberation (He & Warren, 2011) or minben (民本) (Shi & Lu, 2010) seems to be in accord with the finding here. Put differently, leaders leniently treat any political discontent and this increases the perception of external efficacy on the part of the governed. As for the demographic variables, we find that the higher the level of education and the higher the subjective status, the less the trust in government.

Now consider the Level 2 effect. In Model 1, there is no clear effect of LDV and TSV. However, in Model 2, the subscales of TSV have some effects that in countries/regions with high harmony orientation, the level of trust is high, while in countries/regions with a low long-term orientation there is a higher level of institutional trust. Overall, by including the findings at Level 1 we can see that individual value patterns of paternalism and harmony orientation have the effect of increasing trust. However, this does not reach a normative level at the country/region level (at Level 2), i.e. internalized Asian values have a positive impact on institutional trust, even after controlling for fluctuations in aggregate level of these values. Finally, the effect of the political regime at Level 2 is clear, showing that trust is especially high in one-party authoritarian regimes.

7. Determinants of general trust

We examine the determinants of general trust on a four-point scale with ordinal dependent-variable models. These models are slightly different from the models of
institutional trust in that as independent variables at Level 1, we specify instead of the efficacy variables three types of interpersonal trust variables, i.e. personal trust, social network size, and support network size. Table 3 provides the estimated results where the direction of general trust is reverse ordered (negative values indicate the direction of greater trust).

Consider first the Level 1 effect. While the LDV variable performed poorly, the TSV variable positively relates with general trust (Model 1). Moreover, the subscales of the traditional social values also have positive relationships (Model 2). These are quite contrary to the expectation that paternalism and harmony orientation negatively correlate with general trust. Turning to Models 3 and 4, we can see that WVS-type trust does not relate closely to the cultural variables. As to the effect of the personal network variables, one clear result is that personal trust leads to general trust, i.e. the generalization of the expectation of personal trust in one’s social network toward trust in others. This finding supports the conclusion by Yosano and Hayashi (2005) that the accumulation of personal trust positively affects the level of general trust, while countering the claim by Uslaner (2002) that general trust is a belief independent of one’s own experience.

The other clear result is the positive effect of support size. That is, the more one expects social support from others (a larger support network), the higher the general trust; i.e. the larger radius of trust stimulates higher general trust. This supports the argument in Fukuyama (2000). The effects of the demographic variables, however, are not very consistent. The Level 2 effects are also not very clear for the cultural variables, i.e. the aggregate variables, such as norms of LDV or TSV, do not have a positive impact on individual general trust; i.e. the effects are not significant on the Level 1 intercept of general trust. On the other hand, the political regime effects are obvious. In particular, the one-party authoritarian regime performs well. This is difficult to interpret, and we conjecture that other unknown factors relate to this regime type.

8. Determinants of governmental political participation

To explore the determinants of governmental political participation, we use several independent variables at Level 1. That is, in addition to the value variables, we include the institutional trust variable as well as the personal and general trust variables in the estimated equations. The same is true for the efficacy and control variables. In addition, we create interaction models using the three interaction terms, i.e. the three trust variables multiplied by the political discussion variable. The Level 2 variables are the same as for the trust models detailed above. Additionally, we specified other statistical models where the Level 2 value variables affect the Level 1 trust variables. In other words, the Level 2 value variables are a function of the slopes of Level 1 trust variables.

The HLM model shown below is typical of the interaction-term models used for the analysis of governmental political participation. For the dependent variable, we assume an overdispersed Poisson distribution for both contact-type and protest potential political participation.

**Level 1 Model**

\[
E(\text{CONTACTP}_{ij}|\beta) = \lambda_{ij}
\]

\[
\log(\lambda_{ij}) = \eta_{ij}
\]

\[
\eta_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{PATERN}_{ij}) + \beta_{2j}(\text{HARMON}_{ij}) + \beta_{3j}(\text{LONGTRM}_{ij}) + \beta_{4j}(\text{GOVTRUST}_{ij}) + \beta_{5j}(\text{GTRUST}_{ij}) + \beta_{6j}(\text{PERTRUST}_{ij}) + \beta_{7j}(\text{PDISCUSS}_{ij}) + \beta_{8j}(\text{GOVT\_DIS}_{ij}) + \beta_{9j}(\text{GTRS\_DIS}_{ij}) + \beta_{10j}(\text{PTRS\_DIS}_{ij}) + \beta_{11j}(\text{EFFIC1}_{ij}) + \beta_{12j}(\text{EFFIC2}_{ij}) + \beta_{13j}(\text{SE2}_{ij}) + \beta_{14j}(\text{SE3A}_{ij}) + \beta_{15j}(\text{SE5}_{ij}) + \beta_{16j}(\text{SE13A}_{ij})
\]
Level 2 Model

\[ \beta_0 = \gamma_{00} \]

\[ \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \epsilon_{1j} \]

\[ \beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \epsilon_{2j} \]

\[ \beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30} + \epsilon_{3j} \]

\[ \beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40} + \epsilon_{4j} \]

\[ \beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50} + \epsilon_{5j} \]

\[ \beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60} + \epsilon_{6j} \]

\[ \beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70} + \epsilon_{7j} \]

\[ \beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} \]

\[ \beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90} \]

\[ \beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100} \]

\[ \beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110} + \epsilon_{11j} \]

\[ \beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120} + \epsilon_{12j} \]

\[ \beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130} \]

\[ \beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140} \]

\[ \beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150} + \epsilon_{15j} \]

\[ \beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160} \]

For the Level 1 variables, all variables except the controls and interactions are group centered. The variables GOVT_DIS, GTRS_DIS, PTRS_DIS are the interaction terms between the three trust variables and the political discussion variable.

8.1. Contact-type political participation

Table 4 provides the results for contact-type political participation. Let us first focus on Models 1 and 3 to examine the Level 1 effects. As shown, the effects of the demographic variables are consistent in that males, older persons, and the highly educated are more likely to engage in contact-type political participation. However, the political efficacies differ somewhat from the analysis of institutional trust in that we consistently find that internal political efficacy, unlike external efficacy, encourages citizens to engage in contact-type political participation. Our interpretation of this is that in considering political participation as the intentional actions of citizens, the awareness of one’s subjective feeling of power (internal efficacy) positively affects one’s will to realize (their actions), while the expectation of reactions from the side of the governing body (external efficacy) are more indirect, resulting in a weaker effect. Conversely, whether citizens are able to trust draws on the reactions of the governing body, leading external efficacy to be more influential than in the results in Section 6.

With regard to the effects of the values at Level 1 (the individual level), it is difficult to discern any direct effects. In fact, it is only in the long-term orientation that we find any positive effect on participation. The effects of the trust variables are also difficult to identify. However, the effect of political discussion as the political involvement factor exhibits a positive correlation with participation. By checking the interactions in Models 2 and 4, clearer results emerge in that the effect of political discussion is largely absorbed into these interaction effects. Put differently, higher institutional trust with more talking about politics stimulates contact-type participation. Even with lower institutional trust, the negative effect of a low level of trust is reduced if citizens talk about politics (high political involvement), and they are then stimulated to engage in greater participation (see Figure 5 for post hoc simulation results based on Model 4). The same is true for the effect of general trust, with the negative effect of low general trust strengthened by talking a lot about politics.

We now summarize the results in relation to the arguments given on the four possible routes from social trust to political participation given in Section 2.2. First, the effects of trust...
(Models 2 and 4 with interaction terms) reveal that the logic of social capital remains (the first route). Second, the interaction effects between trust and political involvement (talking about politics) show that high-level trusters override the negative effect of free riders even when the slope of trust is less steep, as in the case of low-level trusters when talking about politics (negation of the second route). Third, low-level trusters generally participate much less and low-level trusters with low political involvement participate even less (support for the fourth route). With higher political involvement, this helps push up participation to some extent (as for the third route, see Section 7.2, we find the route is not plausible).

The Level 2 effects indicate some impact of culture and political regimes. Model 2 reveals the additive effects of LDV and TSV in that countries/regions with high scores for both cultural values exhibit the highest contact-type participation. As shown in Figure 6, the political regime effect, as shown by the values for EDC and EAR, have a decreasing effect on participation. For the subcultural effect, although the level of statistical significance does not exceed 5%, paternalism is likely to some extent to accelerate mobilization to participate at the aggregate level (Model 4). Furthermore, based on the discussion in Section 3.2.2, we checked the aggregate cultural effects (Level 2) on the slope for trust (Table 5 Model 1). None showed any significant effect. That is to say, the aggregate level effects of paternalism/harmony orientation via trust did not change contact-type participation.

8.2. Protest-type political participation

Table 6 provides the results for the models of potential protest-type political participation. Most of the results are similar to those already found for contact-type political participation. Two intriguing results emerge. First, although the results for the interaction terms are much the same as before, the difference between high and low in institutional trust is not very large compared with those for contact-type participation (Figure 7A), possibly because distrust sometimes stimulates protest (clearer results on this point were found in the ABS2 dataset analysis (Ikeda, 2012)). In contrast, the effect of personal trust is the reverse. As shown in Figure 7C using the post hoc simulation of Model 4, higher personal trust leads to lower protest-type participation, likely because the narrow path toward participation from personal networks stimulates direct actions via protest-type participation.

Second, the Level 2 effects on the political regime and cultural norms reveal (as shown in Figure 8), that lower protest-type participation is observed in EDC and OPC (reference) countries/regions. This suggests that high traditional social value norms affect protest-type participation more. Interestingly, in the case of the latter, participation is enhanced rather than suppressed. However, Models 3 and 4 show no subculture-specific effect, suggesting the need for more investigation. In an additional analysis, we included the Level 2 cultural variables as a function of the slope of Level 1 trust, but obtained no clear result, as was the case for contact-type participation (Table 5 Model 2).

Finally, we performed additional analysis concerning the third possible route for political participation as discussed in Section 2.2 by adding diversity scales as Level 2 variables to the intercepts of the Level 1 trust variables, as shown in Table 7. We obtained no significant result for either type of participation, with the Gini coefficients for economic, ethnic/linguistic, and religious diversities having no significant impact on any of the three types of trust. We conclude that diversity or heterogeneity at the level of the country/region has no effect on the level of political participation via the level of trust.

9. Discussion and conclusion

Our results for our models specifying trust as a dependent variable indicate a few new findings. First, both institutional and general trust are affected by the type of political regime;
even after controlling for other relevant factors, the OPC regime will increase the levels of both types of trust. As for cultural effects, there exists a consistent pattern at the individual level (Level 1) in that the stronger the commitment to traditional social values, the stronger the level of paternalism and harmony orientation, and the more trustful people are of government and generalized others. We especially did not expect the latter.

The results for political participation also brought about some interesting findings concerning political regimes. In East and Southeast Asia, we generally found that institutional trust leads to governmental political participation, and in this sense, it is difficult to point out any negative aspects of Asian cultural values (i.e. paternalism and harmony orientation) on political participation, while we detected no trace of the psychological route from liberal democratic value support to political participation. These findings are not very consistent with those found in the ABS2 analyses of thirteen Asian countries/regions by Ikeda (2012). In this case, although we also find cultural effects, low trusters with higher political involvement are highly likely to participate politically, which leads to our observation of an overall pattern of a negative correlation between trust and participation. Our next investigation should focus on these kinds of empirical inconsistencies.

What then is the effect of Asian values? We often observed the effects of traditional social values and their subscales, especially the effects of paternalism and harmony orientation. In general, the aggregate level of traditional cultural norm positively affected contact-type and protest-type political participation, even after controlling for any political regime effects. However, the norm effects blurred somewhat when we focused on the subscales of political involvement. This is somewhat different from the findings using the ABS2, where citizens with high political involvement and high governmental trust were found to participate more (even in protest-type participation) in strong paternalistic norm countries/regions. One possibility is that in the ABS2 findings, protest-like participation was possibly stimulated because citizens appear to protest against the impression that the “ideal of paternalism” is not realized in the sense that the superior takes care of the inferior. We do not find this same effect in the ABS3. Accordingly, we need to elaborate upon this inconsistency in relation to the notion of “critical democrats” (Chu & Huang, 2010) to gain greater insight into the impact of Asian culture on political participation.

Finally, what remains unexplored is that although we have examined institutional trust and social trust side by side, we have not focused on their interrelationship. In fact, this is a demanding task to undertake, as there have been a variety of discussions already on the direction of influence between the two trust concepts. On the one hand, some studies emphasize the route from political institutional trust to social trust; on the other hand, other studies argue that social trust is the basic starting point for institutional trust. Let us discuss this further.

First, the view that institutional trust increases social trust assumes that the stable social structure institutions bring about is the basic starting point upon which social trust depends (i.e. like an argument on “assurance”). For instance, Ostrom and Ahn (2003) consider social institutions as a set of rules, such that given these rules, citizens commit to rule-driven behavior, which enables citizens to trust each other more easily. This is a “field theory” that social trust is a function of institutional incentive structure (i.e. an assurance structure). Empirical examples of this line of argument include the comparative study of Switzerland and Japan by Freitag (2003).

Second, based on social capital theory, another line of research assumes the reverse causal direction, i.e. higher social trust contributes to greater political institutional trust. As a part of social capital, social trust positively affects the increase in social capital, such that as
a collective outcome for society, social capital supports greater institutional trust. In this case, the independent variable is noninstitutional expectations placed on others, i.e. trust among citizens. Here the trust in institutions is somewhat a byproduct of democratically affluent society constructed by trustful citizens. Empirical studies along this line of thought include Cattenberg and Alejandro (2005), Rahn and Rudolph (2005), and Zmerli and Newton (2008). Overall, both forms of causal direction are theoretically plausible. Our initial analysis of the ABS3 dataset suggests that both assumptions have at least some empirical support. This presents an interesting opportunity for further exploration.

Notes
1 “Responsiveness” as a form of external efficacy functions well only if the other side (the government) listens. In this sense, some elements of trust in the government are hidden (i.e. the belief the government will listen).
2 In this paper, “trust” means the social relational aspect of trust (expectations of the intentions of others) in a broader sense, and defines the ability aspect of trust differently (Yamagishi, 1998; Earle, 2010). The ability aspect is a kind of insight into others’ capabilities. However, this is somewhat peripheral to the focus of this study, and is not discussed here.
3 Homogeneity and heterogeneity in one’s social network bring about different complexities compared with the argument in this paper. If citizens have heterogeneous others in their social network, this may be likely to trigger interpersonal conflict, resulting in suppressing political participation (Mutz, 2006) or likely to trigger political interest, resulting in stimulating participation (Scheufele et al., 2004; Ikeda & Boase, 2011). However, some other studies showed no empirically statistically significant result (Ikeda, 2002; Nir, 2005; Park & Shin, 2005). Social capital theories in general emphasize the positive impact of heterogeneous social relationships, but as is shown here, the empirical basis remains weak.
4 What we mean by “Asian” in this paper is that the traditional social values detailed here are widely supported in the East/Southeast Asian area. It does not deny that the same value configuration has support in other areas of the world.
5 Note that because we doubt collectivism is a common Asian characteristic value, we will not use this value as a subscale; see the discussion in Ikeda and Richey (2011). Conversely, Hofstede (1991) pointed out “long-term orientation” and this will be included in our analysis.
6 Because of time constraints, we do not investigate the role of personal trust variables as dependent variables.
7 In this paper, we initially assume cultural values are an average of the responses in each country/region as a normative standard. If we wanted to investigate this point more rigorously, we would need to use the variance score of the same value to indicate the strength of the cultural values, i.e. the larger the variance, the weaker the cultural norm.
8 If we focus only on individual behavior across the countries/regions, we can adopt robust regression models by setting the countries/regions as clusters. However, as shown in the tables in this paper, many random effects are highly statistically significant, i.e. country-/regional-level variance cannot be ignored (Tsutsui & Fuwa, 2008), and thus HLM analysis is more useful.
9 As it was not the intention of the ABS3 questionnaire to measure the contrast between trust and assurance or the roots of general trust, we are unable to elaborate upon this point in more detail.

References
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Freitag, Markus (2003). Social capital in (dis)similar democracies: The development of generalized trust in Japan and Switzerland. Comparative Political Studies, 36, 936-967.


Figure 1. Governmental participation

1A. Contact-type participation

1B. Protest-type participation

Figure 2. Levels of trust

2A. Trust in the national government

2B. General trust

2C. Personal trust
Figure 5 Post-hoc simulation on the interaction of political discussion and trust on contact-type participation

Figure 6 Post-hoc simulation on the political discussion and contact-type participation in different regimes
Figure 7: Posthoc simulation on the interaction of political discussion and governmental trust on protest-type participation.

Figure 8: Post-hoc simulation on the political discussion and protest-type participation in different regimes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. HLM models for trust in the national government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dependent variable: Trust in the National Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For HLM 1 slope, $b_1$</td>
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<tr>
<td>For LDV/SCO slope, $b_2$</td>
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<tr>
<td>For POLICIES slope, $b_5$</td>
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<td>For LDV/SCO slope, $b_2$</td>
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<tr>
<td>For RITCHD2 slope, $b_{12}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>For RITCHD33 slope, $b_{13}$</td>
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**Final estimation of variance components**

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<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Variance $\sigma^2$</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Variance $\sigma^2$</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.31</td>
<td>802.59 ***</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1190.63 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDV/SCO slope $b_2$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>21.87 *</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.98 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMONI slope $b_3$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>58.18 ***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>40.70 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONGTERM slope $b_4$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.98 *</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>12.85 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE24 slope $b_5$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2.68 ***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2.17 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFRC1 slope $b_6$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.98 *</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>17.94 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFRC2 slope $b_7$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>102.69 ***</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>108.48 ***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. HLM models for general trust

| Dependent | General Trust | Model 1 | | | | Model 2 | | | | | | Model 3 | | | | | | Model 4 | | | | |
|------------|---------------|--------|--------|-----------------|--------|----------------|--------|----------------|--------|----------------|--------|----------------|--------|----------------|--------|
| Level 1    |               |        |        |                  |        |                |        |                  |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | Intercept        | -4.02  | -16.60 ***     | -4.12  | -16.60 ***     | 1.07   | 2.73 *          | 0.16   | 0.11           |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | LD/SCC, v        | -0.00  | -0.40           | 0.20   | 0.82           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | T/S, v           | 0.23   | 1.52            | 0.04   | 0.14           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | PATERN, v        | 0.48   | 1.81            | 0.09   | 1.33           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | HARMON, v        | 0.17   | 0.68            | -1.59  | -2.44          |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | LOI x LSF, v     | 0.35   | 1.32            | 0.70   | 0.32           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | LDC, v           | 0.59   | 2.12*           | 0.66   | 1.88*          | -2.29  | -3.87 *         | -1.39  | 0.91*          |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | ECC, v           | 0.70   | 3.17*           | 0.92   | 2.93*          | -2.55  | -3.56 *         | -0.93  | 1.42           |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | EUP, v           | 1.43   | 7.01 ***         | 1.55   | 7.96 ***        | -3.27  | -7.46 ***        | -5.31  | -8.11          |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | OPC, v           | One-Part, authoritarian |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
| Level 2    |               |        |        | Intercept        | 0.00   | 0.65            | 0.00   | 0.67           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | LD/SCC, v        | 0.00   | -0.13           | -0.17  | -0.88 **        | -2.78  | -0.32          |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | T/S, v           | 0.00   | -0.13           | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | PATERN, v        | 0.00   | 0.66            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | HARMON, v        | 0.00   | 0.60            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | LOI x LSF, v     | 0.00   | 0.60            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | LDC, v           | 0.00   | 0.60            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | ECC, v           | 0.00   | 0.60            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | EUP, v           | 0.00   | 0.60            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |
|            |               |        |        | OPC, v           | 0.00   | 0.60            | 0.00   | 0.47           |        |                |        |                |        |                |        |

Final estimation of variance components

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<tr>
<th>Pseudo-effect</th>
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<th>Variance ( \sigma^2 )</th>
<th>Variance ( \sigma^2 )</th>
<th>Variance ( \sigma^2 )</th>
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<td>Component</td>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Component</td>
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<td>LD/SCC, v</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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<td>HARMON, v</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>LOI x LSF, v</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>OPC, v</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
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*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
### Table 4. HLM models for contact-type political participation

#### Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>dependent</th>
<th>Contact type political participation</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Level1</td>
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<td>Coef.</td>
<td>t-ratio</td>
<td>Coef.</td>
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<td>NTRCP12, y1</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.23</td>
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<td>0.79</td>
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<td>2.18 +</td>
<td>0.62</td>
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<td>HARMON, y1</td>
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<td>EAR, y1</td>
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<td>0.93</td>
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<td>For LDVSCO slope, b1</td>
<td>NTRCP12, y1</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.45</td>
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<td>NTRCP12, y1</td>
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<td>LDC, y1</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>EDC, y1</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>EAR, y1</td>
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#### Final estimation of variance components

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<th>Component</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Variance</th>
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<td>1.221**</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.337**</td>
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<td>15.99</td>
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<td>TSVSCO slope, a</td>
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<td>32.49 **</td>
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<td>PATERN, a</td>
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<td>34.58**</td>
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<td>HARMON, a</td>
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<td>15.68</td>
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<tr>
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<td>GOVTRUST, a</td>
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<td>15.97 +</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>17.80 +</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>15.70 +</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>2.77 +</td>
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**p<0.001, *p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p>0.1
Table 5. HLM models for political participation (cultural values as intercept for trust variables)

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<th>Contact type political participation</th>
<th>Protest type political participation</th>
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<td>dependent</td>
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<td>t-ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level1</td>
<td>Level2</td>
<td>var name</td>
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<tr>
<td>For INTRCPT1, y β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>PATERN, y</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMON, y</td>
<td>Harmony orientation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONGTRM, y</td>
<td>Longterm orientation</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GOVTRUST slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Trust in the national gov. intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATERN, y</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMON, y</td>
<td>Harmony orientation</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GTRUST slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>General trust intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATERN, y</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMON, y</td>
<td>Harmony orientation intercept</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For PERTRUST slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Personal trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATERN, y</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMON, y</td>
<td>Harmony orientation</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For PDISCUSs slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Political discussion freq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GOVT_DIS slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Government trust discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GTRUS_DIS slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>General trust discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>For PTRS_DIS slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Personal trust discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GOVTRUS_PAT slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Government trust paternalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>For GTRUS_PAT slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>General trust paternalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>For PTRS_PAT slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Personal trust paternalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>For GOVT_HAR slope, β</td>
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<td>Government trust harmony</td>
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<tr>
<td>For GTRUS_HAR slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>General trust harmony</td>
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<tr>
<td>For PTRS_HAR slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Personal trust harmony</td>
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<td>For EFFC1 slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
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<td>For EFFC2 slope, β</td>
<td>INTRCPT2, y</td>
<td>External efficacy</td>
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**Final estimation of variance**

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<th>Variance σ²</th>
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Table 6. HLM models for potentially protest-type political participation

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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For LDV score slope, $\beta_1$, Intercept: 0.04, 0.16; TSV score: 0.00, 0.00; PATERN: 0.06, 0.50; Harmonic orientation: -0.01, 0.06; Liberal Democracy: -0.01, 0.01; Electoral Democracy: 0.04, 0.00; Electoral Authoritarian: 0.06, 0.00; Longterm orientation: 0.06, 0.03; Government trust/discussion: -0.03, 0.00; General trust/discussion: -0.03, 0.00; Personal trust/discussion: 0.02, 0.00; Internal efficacy: 0.15, 0.01; External efficacy: 0.01, 0.00; Gender: 0.21, 0.06; Age: 0.01, 0.01; Education: 0.01, 0.01; Subjective income level (R): 0.01, 0.00.

Final estimation of variance components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Variance $\sigma^2$ Component</th>
<th>Variance $\tau^2$ Component</th>
<th>Variance $\tau^2$ Component</th>
<th>Variance $\tau^2$ Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTERCEPT, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.30 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDV score, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSV score, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATERN, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harmonic orientation, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Longterm orientation, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVT trust/discussion, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTRUST/discussion, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal trust/discussion, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy, $a_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, ++p<0.005, +p<0.1
Table 7. HLM models for political participation (diversity as intercept for trust variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>var name</th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For INTTRCPT1, β₁</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y00</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>4.51 **</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For PATERN slope, β₂</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y10</td>
<td>Paternalism</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For HARMON slope, β₃</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y20</td>
<td>Harmony orientation</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For LONGTRM slope, β₄</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y30</td>
<td>Longterm orientation</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2.75 *</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>2.01 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GOVTRUST slope, β₅</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y40</td>
<td>Trust in the national govt.</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For RELIGION, y42</td>
<td>GINI, y41</td>
<td>GINI coefficient</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For ETH_LANG, y43</td>
<td>ETH_LANG, y53</td>
<td>Ethnic/language diversity</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GTRUST slope, β₆</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y50</td>
<td>General trust intercept</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>3.37 **</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.22 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For RELIGION, y52</td>
<td>GINI, y51</td>
<td>GINI coefficient</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For ETH_LANG, y53</td>
<td>ETH_LANG, y63</td>
<td>Ethnic/language diversity</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For PERTRUST slope, β₇</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y60</td>
<td>Personal trust intercept</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GTRUST slope, β₈</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y70</td>
<td>Political discussion freq</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>3.63 **</td>
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<tr>
<td>For GOVTRUST slope, β₉</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y80</td>
<td>Government trust discussion</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-2.25 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For GTRUST slope, β₁₀</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y90</td>
<td>General trust discussion</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-4.15 ***</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-2.63 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For PERS_DIS slope, β₁₁</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y100</td>
<td>Personal trust discussion</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.60 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For EFFIC1 slope, β₁₂</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y110</td>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>5.02 ***</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>5.61 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>For EFFIC2 slope, β₁₃</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y120</td>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>For SEX3 slope, β₁₄</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y130</td>
<td>gender (1=m,2=f)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-3.22 ***</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-6.13 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For SEX4 slope, β₁₅</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y140</td>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.39 ***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>5.64 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For EDUC slope, β₁₆</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y150</td>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5.13 ***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For SEX13A slope, β₁₇</td>
<td>INTTRCPT2, y160</td>
<td>subjective income level(rev)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Final estimation of variance components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Random Effect</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component</td>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTTRCPT1, u₁</td>
<td>0.35 1433.29 ***</td>
<td>0.30 1163.66 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATERN slope, u₂</td>
<td>0.00 29.45 ***</td>
<td>0.00 23.61 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARMON slope, u₃</td>
<td>0.00 29.45 ***</td>
<td>0.00 23.61 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONGTRM slope, u₄</td>
<td>0.00 29.45 ***</td>
<td>0.00 23.61 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVTRUST slope, u₅</td>
<td>0.01 13.28 ***</td>
<td>0.01 15.56 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTRUST slope, u₆</td>
<td>0.01 15.56 ***</td>
<td>0.01 15.56 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERTRUST slope, u₇</td>
<td>0.01 32.58 ***</td>
<td>0.00 10.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICUSS slope, u₈</td>
<td>0.02 49.58 ***</td>
<td>0.01 19.21 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFIC1 slope, u₉</td>
<td>0.00 33.11 ***</td>
<td>0.00 28.92 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFIC2 slope, u₁₀</td>
<td>0.00 16.31 **</td>
<td>0.01 14.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level 1/7 2.77 1.97

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, = p<.1