

International Conference

The Transformation of Citizen Politics and Civic
Attitudes in Three Chinese Societies

Panel Six

Title of paper

**Disaggregating Political Culture:
Regionalism in Television viewing Choice In 22
Provinces, 2002**

Presenter

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**Disaggregating Political Culture:
Regionalism in Television Viewing Choice
In 22 Chinese Provinces, 2003**

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**Presented at the International Conference on
The Transformation of Citizen Politics and Political Culture
in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong**

**November 19-20, 2004,
Institute of Political Science
Academia Sinica, Taipei**

I. Introduction

Regional identities under gird political cleavages, define political communities, delineate political boundaries, and constitute the basis of political representation. Together with class, gender, religion, and age, they often inform the political culture and differentiate the political orientation of the national population. As political cleavage, they threaten the national unity of some old European states (Belgium, Spain),¹ young Asian countries (India, Malaysia, South Korea),² and almost all post-Communist regimes.³ They persist in the electoral behavior of even mature democracies like the

¹ Britt Cartrite, "Contemporary ethnopolitical identity and the future of the Belgian state" *Nationalism and ethnic politics* 8/3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 43-71; Kris Deschouwer, "Falling apart together: the changing nature of Belgian consociationalism, 1961-2001" *Acta Politica* 37/1 (Spring-Summer, 2002), pp. 68-85; William Heller, "Regional parties and national politics in Europe: Spain's estado de las autonomias, 1993 to 2000" *Comparative Political Studies* 35/6 (August 2002), pp. 657-85; Resina Ramon, "Post-national Spain? Post Spain Spain?" *Nation and Nationalism* 8/3 (July 2002), pp. 377-396.

² Hochul Sonn, "Regional cleavage in South Korean politics and elections" *Korea Journal* 43/2 (Summer, 2003), pp. 32-54; Jungug Choi, "Ethnic and regional politics after the Asian economic crisis: a comparison of Malaysia and South Korea" *Democratization* 10/1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 121-34.

³ Farkhod Tolipov, "Nationalism as a geopolitical phenomenon: the Central Asian case" *Central Asian Survey* 20/2 (June, 2001), pp. 183-94; Michael Libal, "Ethnic conflict in the Balkans and in the Caucasus: some general considerations," *Journal of Southeastern European and Black Sea Studies* 2/2 (May, 2002), pp. 1-20; Luiza Bialasiewicz, "Upper Silesia: rebirth of regional identity in Poland," *Regional and Federal Studies* 12/2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 111-32; Robert Koulis, "Opportunity Lost? The social (dis)integration of Roma minority rights in post-transition Hungary" *Nationalism and ethnic politics* 8/1 (Spring 2002), pp. 81-104; Alexandra Bitusikova, "Slovakia: an anthropological perspective on identity and regional reform," *Regional and federal studies* 12/2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 41-64; David Smith, "Narva region within the Estonian republic: from autonomism to accommodation?" *Regional and federal studies* 12/2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 89-110; Spyros Sofos, "Macedonia at the crossroads" *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 3/2 (November 2001), pp. 145-51.

United States, Canada, France, Sweden and Switzerland.⁴ When reinforced with ethnic and religious strife or dominant subordinate structures, they lead to demands for secession and independence as in Quebec in Canada, Kosovo in Yugoslavia, Punjab in India, Chechnya in Russia, Biafra in Nigeria, and East Timor in Indonesia. With similar ethnic-linguistic or religious groups across the border, they feed the irredentism of Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basque in Spain, Muslims in the Philippines, Armenians in Turkey, and Kurds in Iraq. In the darkest hours of human history, they combine with other social forces and political developments to trigger genocide of Armenians in Turkey, Tutsis in Rwanda, Darfur in Sudan. The violence potential of regional identities, and the role they play in the course of national political development is thus no less important than that of class, race, and religion.

⁴ David L. Weakliem and Robert Biggert, "Region and Political Opinion in the Contemporary United States," *Social Forces*, 77/3 (March, 1999), pp. 863-886; Robert Speel, "The persistence of regional divisions in American Electoral Politics" *Regional and Federal Studies*, 9/3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 157-79; Jean-Francois Godbout and Eric Belanger, "La deminsion regionale due vote economique Canadian aux elections federales de 1988 a 2000" (The regional dimension of Canadian economic voting in federal elections) *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35/3 (September 2002), pp. 567-88; Martino Mazzoleni "I sistemi partitici regionali in Italia dalla prima alla seconda repubblica (Italy's regional party systems from the First to the Second Republic) *Revista Italiana di Scienza politica* 32/3 (December 2002), pp. 459-491; Jan Olsson and Joachim Astrom, "Why regionalism in Sweden?" *Regional and Federal Studies* 13/3 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 66-89; Jorgen Gren, "New regionalism and West Sweden: change in the regionalism paradigm" *Regional and Federal Studies* 12/3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 79-101; Barbara Loyer, "Langues nationales et regionales: une relation geopolitique (National and regional languages in France: a geopolitical relationship" *Herodote* 105 (2002), pp. 15-37; Jurg Steiner, "Consociational theory and Switzerland, revisited" *Acta Politica* 37/1 (Spring-Summer, 2002), pp. 104-120; Frederick Solt, "Civic or structure? Revisiting the origins of democratic equality in the Italian regions" *British Journal of Political Science* 34/1 (2004), pp. 123-35; Stephane Boisseaux and Jean-Philippe Leresche, "Dynamiques regionales et glaobalisation: le cas de la politique des AOC-IGP en Suisse (Regional dynamics and glaobalization: the case of PDO-PGI policy in Switzerland) *Schweizeische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft* 8/3-4 (Winter, 2002), pp. 35-60;.

In the case of China, the presence and magnitude of regional identities remains enigmatic for both the pre-modern and contemporary periods, as both centrifugal and centripetal forces act to consolidate or replace these primordial attachments. Founded by military conquest, the Chinese empire since the time of its first unifier Qinshihuangti was an amalgam of diverse language, ethnic, and religious groups, often segregated by mountain ranges, river systems, and other natural barriers. Even among the majority Han race in the core region in China proper, the persistence of vernacular dialects and language groups, regional cuisine, local operas, distinct marriage and burial customs, local folk religions and regional holidays both testify to and reinforce regional identities.⁵ At the same time, the relative weakness of class, language, race, and religion undermines competing sources of group identity and accentuates regional identity in traditional Chinese society. While a plethora of local dialects exists, the presence of a common written script for over two millennia, and the popularization of Mandarin through the public education system create the dominant unifying Metropolitan language culture and erode regional language barriers.⁶ Unlike caste and slave-owning societies, the class structure in late Imperial China was relatively permeable, as sons of peasants and craftsmen could ascend officialdom through the civil examination.⁷ Unlike Christianity or Islam, the three official religions in traditional China (Buddhism, Daoism,

⁵ For a recent survey of regional cultures in Contemporary China, see Ni Jianzhong, ed., *Renmin Zhongguo: Zhongguo di nanbei qingmou yu renmin jingshen* [The north and south profile in China and its human spirit] Beijing: zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1996.

⁶ Glen Dudbridge, "China's Vernacular Cultures", an inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on June, 1, 1995. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

⁷ Ping-ti Ho, *The Ladder of Social Success in Imperial China: Aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*. New York: Science Editions, 1964.

Confucianism) do not have organizational hierarchies, formal membership, and induction rites. With the exception of the brief Republican period in the Mainland, religions in China have always been subordinate to the state, which claims and exercises the right to register and set quotas for temples and monasteries, Buddhist ordinations, and examine candidates for priesthood. Together with the relatively stunted development of craft guilds and merchant associations, the absence of independent religions did not usher in the epiphany of civil society in China, until centuries after it has blossomed and borne fruit in Europe and America. In contrast to the multiple racial stocks in the Indian, Persian, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires, the racial taxonomy in China is much more homogeneous, at least within China proper. Together with sanguinity, as manifested through family lineages and clan organizations, locality constitutes the dual foundations of social organization in traditional China that are based on the ascriptive principle of birth, and not secondary institutions based on occupational and religious choice.

Inadvertently, state policies also reinforced regionalism in Imperial China. The restriction of local travel in Ming, where sojourn outside one's county required the justification and application of an official passport, and granted generally for official business, tied many Chinese to the place of their birth. As argued by Ho Ping-ti, the official use of ancestral birthplace (jiguan) rather than one's own birthplace (chushengdi) for identification in legal documents, the prevalent practice of returning the remains of deceased itinerants for burial in the ancestral home-town, and the legal requirement for officials to repatriate to their original domicile to mourn the bereavement of either parent

for 27 months reinforced the dominance of region as a principle of personal identity and collective community. The organization of the education and civil examination system, through a rigid hierarchical system where school space, candidacy size, and number of degrees for different administrative levels were allocated by strict geographic quotas accentuated the importance of regional identities. The salience of locality and region can be further seen in early Qing legislations prohibiting nativism identity fraud to penalize locals who enrolled in schools or sat in civil service exams on the quotas of other counties, prefectures, and provinces. It is also evident in the credential checking procedures of questionable candidates in the highest imperial court examination, where an imperial prefect would ensure that the candidate could speak the local dialect of the alleged domicile, or require him to show proof of nativity in the given domicile by land deeds and house titles of his parents.⁸

Yet while the amphi-dexterous state strengthened regionalism with its right hand, it also weakened it with its left. By the Third Century B.C. if not earlier, Qinshihuang abrogated the autonomy of the local feudal aristocracy and institutionalized the centralized bureaucratic state. In comparison, the corresponding battle in Europe was only successfully concluded by Louis XIV, Frederick I and Peter the Great who crushed the powers of local lords, clergy, and city-states in the Age of Absolutism a millennium later. Once the centralized state was inaugurated, the imperial heirs of Qinshihuang instituted elaborate conflict of interest rules to prevent the resurgence of regionalism. In Han, officials could not be administrators of their native counties, prefectures, and

⁸ Ping-ti Ho, *Zhongguo huiguanshi lun* [A Historical Survey of Landsmannschaften in China] Taipei: Xuesheng shudian, 1966, pp. 7-8.

provinces. The rule was extended to exclude trading favors through mutual surveillance, where administrative units could not have surveillance officials from each other's unit.⁹ It was subsequently developed into a transitive rule that outlawed local connections among surveillance officials of three administrative units.¹⁰ To prevent officials from developing local attachments, the subsequent Sui Dynasty introduced systematic rotation by prohibiting administrative terms of over three years in the same locality. In the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the rules of local avoidance were further extended to require central officials in the Revenue and Justice Ministries to reclude themselves from ruling on cases involving their native provinces.¹¹

In the Contemporary period, both the Nationalist and Communist regimes have pursued centralization programs to build a developmental state and promote a national political culture. In the Mainland, the command economy allocated all factors of production (land, labor, capital) based on central planning of local need. The centralized fiscal administration system took from the rich coastal provinces and redistributed it to the impoverished interior provinces. The Nomenklatura system centralized appointments of top state and party officials in the Politburo rather than local party committees. Rules of local avoidance were reinstated to prevent nepotism and inordinate local attachments. Mandarin has been mandated as the official language in courts, government agencies, and

⁹ The law is known as prohibition of mutual surveillance [duixiang jianlin fa]. If the surveillance official of County A was a native of County B, then the surveillance of County B could not be a native of County A, Ho (1966), p. 3.

¹⁰ If the Surveillance Official of County A was native of County B, and that of County B was a native of County C, then natives of County C could not be Surveillance Officials of County A or B, see Ho (1966), p. 3.

¹¹ Ho (1966), pp. 5-6.

the medium of instruction in all levels of public education. On the mainland, and also in the pre-liberalization period in Taiwan, the monopoly of all print and electronic media further enables the regime to promote not only the national language but also the single and unifying ideology. At least since 1957, when the wilting of the Hundred Flowers led to a single bloom of propaganda de jour, air and brain waves were further homogenized to promote the national rather than local culture. As recently as 2000 in China, new regulations were promulgated to ensure that only speakers of standard Mandarin can be hired to be radio and television announcers.¹²

But one should not overstate the unifying capacity of traditional Chinese culture or the centralizing power of the authoritarian state. The dominant power of local potentates in Eastern Han, and its periodic resurgence in the North and South Dynasties, the rebellion of the fiefs in mid Tang, the reliance of the Qing regime on local armies to defend the empire from rampaging Taipings, as well as warlordism in the Republican period, testify to the resilient and adhesive strength of regionalism. In the Contemporary era, the unprecedented development of the market economy has also fostered regional identities. Fiscal decentralization has led local officials to adopt protectionist policies and to erect trade barriers to levy taxes on goods from outside the region. Liberalization of media control gives rise to resurgence of local culture, as exemplified by the proliferation of regional opera, *xiangsheng*, and variety shows where the local vernacular is the medium that massages the viewers. Market developments also resurrected an affluent class of entrepreneurs who revived the traditional practice of contribution to clan

¹² *Zhongguo zhongyang dianshitai nianjian, 2001* [China Central Television Yearbook, 2001] Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 2001, pp. 227-8.

halls, ancestral shrines, and locality based associations. The proliferation of interprovincial contests in sports, culture, varsity debates, beauty pageants, compounded by the multiplying effects of mass media, has mobilized local community groups to organize and sponsor competitions, and in the process, engendering interprovincial competition, regional identities, and local pride.

In the magnetic field of conflicting forces, the present strength of regional identities in China, as well as the direction and magnitude of its evolution, remains obscure. In studying political culture, concepts and methods of political sociology also need to be informed by the tools of political geography. It would thus be useful for survey research to be cognizant of the presence of regionalism and incorporate questions in their protocol to chart its evolution overtime and map the contours of its distribution in space. Before such costly tasks are undertaken, the recent publication of provincial and city level television program ratings provides a preliminary glimpse and surrogate measure for a systematic examination of the extent and depth of regional identities in Contemporary China.¹³

Using the 2004 survey on preferences for television viewing, this paper analyzes the market share of provincial television station vs. the national channels (China Central Television, hereafter CCTV, and the China Education Television, hereafter CETV) in 2003. To measure the strength of regional preference for local productions, three sets of analyses will be performed. First, the relative market shares of national vs. provincial

¹³ *Zhongguo dianshi shoushi nianjian 2004* [China Television Rating Yearbook, 2004] Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2004, hereafter *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*.

television stations in the top 15 most popular television stations on the national level, and the top 30 most watched programs for each province will be analyzed. Second, to measure the degree of deviations from the national mean, the convergence of the top 30 television programs in each province with the national list will be examined. Third, an additional measure of national-provincial convergence will be computed for the top 20 programs in each province for 4 types of television programs, viz, variety shows, news, television drama series, and special programs. Following this set of descriptive tasks, explanatory analyses will be undertaken to correlate the strength of preference for provincial television programs with different measures of provincial demographic profile, socio-economic development, education attainment, and communications capacity. To discern future developments, this paper will end with analyses of temporal variations of preferences for regional programs, as well as their breakdown by education and income levels.

Readers should be cautioned that there are both selection bias and validity problems with the television viewing survey. The survey was conducted for the television industry, and includes only the 22 largest provincial markets, including 4 metropolis (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing) with provincial level authority. Some smaller television markets in the north (Shanxi), the south (Fujian, Hainan), and much of the northwest region (Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Inner Mongolia) are not included in the survey. The data analysis efforts are thus handicapped by this exclusion. In addition, only viewership of national vs. provincial channels will be analyzed in the present paper, leaving from the study those of city and county stations, and those outside the Mainland

(Hong Kong, Taiwan), both of which have extensive viewers in some local television markets. Just as important, preference for provincial television production may not be simply motivated by regional identity, but may well be intervened by the technical difficulty of receiving airwaves for national channels, possible superior quality of provincial productions, prime-time scheduling, and promotion by local corporate advertisers through awards of cash or kind. We will attempt to resolve some of these methodological issues in a later section, but more systematic efforts have to be attempted in future investigations.

II. Charting Regional Preferences in Television Viewing

In this section, we will analyze 1) the relative shares of national vs. provincial stations in the national television market; 2) the degree of convergence between the most popular television programs in each province with the national most-watched list; and 3) national-provincial convergence in 4 types of television programs. Viewership shares in the following tables refer to the percentage in each group (urban/rural, income and education category) viewing the national, provincial, and other stations and programs. In 2003, China has 358 television stations operating in 879 frequencies (including those relayed from Hong Kong).¹⁴ As noted earlier, national stations refer to CCTV and CETV. Provincial stations refer to those owned and managed by the provinces. “Other” refers to non-state and non-provincial owned stations, most of which are operated by cities and counties. The data are collected by Sofres/CSM, a joint venture by the French media market research company and CCTV, which since 1996, has built two systems of

¹⁴ *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, pp. 3, 679-87.

electronic television viewing analysis network. The nationwide system is based on 1,100 urban households and 900 rural households in 19 provincial units. A supplementary system is based on a similar network of 15,1000 urban and rural households in 86 cities and counties. Our data are drawn from their tabulation of rating surveys that include those of 19 provincial units plus three metropolitan cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai).¹⁵

Dominance of the National Channels

Table-1 lists the top 15 television channels by market shares in China in 2003. As shown, the national channel still enjoys a predominant position among the viewers in 2003. Six channels of CCTV (I, VI, VIII, V, III, IV) occupy the top six of fifteen most popular channels in China's television market, with relative shares ranging from 2.5% to 30.6%. Together with CCTV-II, seven of its nine channels of the national television station were among the top 15 most popular channels in that year. After the CCTV, eight provincial channels made it to the top 15 top watched television channels in China, with Hunan Satellite (5th), Anhui-I (8th), Shandong Satellite (9th), Beijing Satellite (10th), Jiangxi-I (12th), Liaoning-I (13th), Shanghai Eastern Satellite (14th), and Henan-I (15th). As a group, CCTV and its companion station CETV garnered 67% of the market share in national television viewership, with the remaining 33% shared by the provincial television stations.¹⁶

Table-1 about here

¹⁵ Chongqing is included in the 19 provincial units.

¹⁶ *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, Table 1.4.1, p. 17.

Localism in Television Viewership

While the national channels occupy the predominant positions among national viewers, it is still possible that within each province, local channels are more popular than the national channels. If CCTV channels are the third or fourth channels of choice in each province, they could still be the most popular channels nationwide, if none of the provincial channels commands a leading position in viewership in provinces outside its own. To put this in another way, if CCTV channels enjoy only a 30% minority market share in all the provinces, with each of the provincial channels taking the lead within its own province but none outside it, then the national station would still be the leading stations nationwide, but not the top station within each province. If the foregoing phenomenon is true, the implications for our analysis of regional identities is that the pre-eminence of CCTV in national television viewership does not preclude the predominance of the provincial television station in local media markets. Local viewers can still prefer local channels and productions over those of the national station.

To examine the relative preference for local vs. national television programs within each province, two sets of analyses will be performed. First, the top 30 most popular television programs in each of the 22 provinces will be compared with the 30 leading television programs nationwide, to measure the extent of convergence between the local and national viewership. Second, a similar set of computation will be performed on the top 10 provincial programs in four different types of programs (News, television drama,

specials, and variety shows) with the top 20 national programs in these categories, to determine whether or not localism in television programming pertains to all or specific types of broadcast genres. The choice of the top 10 provincial with the top 20 national programs, rather than the top 30 list in the second set of analysis, is dictated by the data source.

Convergence of the top 30 national with the top 30 provincial television programs

To measure the degree of convergence between viewer preference for given provinces with that of the nation, we undertook a pair-wise comparison of the most highly rated 30 television programs nationwide, with those in each of the 22 provinces. For both lists, national, international and provincial productions are eligible for inclusion, and they comprise the five leading types of television programming in China – Sports, Variety Shows, Special productions, Television Drama, and News.

Table-2 about here

As shown in Table-2, among the top 30 television programs nationwide in 2003, all except one were aired by CCTV-I, and the other by CCTV-III. When convergence with the leading 30 programs in the nation is examined, there is substantial variations among the 22 provinces. As shown in the first data column on Table-3, 8 of the 22 provinces had 4 or fewer of its top 30 most popular television programs also on the national list. Shandong had 4, Hunan and Zhejiang each had two, Shanghai and Anhui each had 1,

while Guangdong, Guangxi, and Jiangxi had none. In contrast, eight provinces found 10 or more of its top 30 most popular programs also in the top 30 national most watched list – Chongqing (10), Hebei (10), Guizhou (11), Jilin (13), Tianjin (13), Henan (18), Heilongjiang (19), and Jiangsu (22).

Table-3 about here

Provincial-National Convergence by Four Types of Top Programs

In this analysis, we compute the degree of convergence between the top 20 national programs with that of each of the 22 provinces for four different types of programming – variety shows, television drama series, news programs and special productions. Together with sports, these programs constitute the basic four categories of television programming that are the official typology used by the broadcast industry, government regulators and media analysts. Sports programs are not included in this set of analyses since many of the top 10 sports programs in the 22 provinces in 2003 are international events, where inferences cannot be drawn on the choice of national vs. regional identities. Indeed, alone among the 5 types of programs, sports events do not correlate significantly with any other programming in regional preferences, while all other correlate highly at the 0.01 level of significance (Table-4)

Among the four types of programs, *variety shows* (10 in top 30) are musical and cultural soirees, usually produced to celebrate a major national holiday (New Year, Mid-

Autumn) or historic event (Return of Hong Kong, China's successful bid of the 2008 Olympic Games). The popularity of these programs has spawned productions at special sites (Yunnan, Three Gorges Dam), by government agencies (Central Disciplinary Commission, Ministry of Public Security), and trade groups (fashion designers). Year after year, the Lunar New Year Soiree has been by far the most watched television program in China at least for the past decade. The extravaganza is a marathon of variety entertainments, presented as two to three separate shows of three-to-four hour multi-media performances of popular songs and dance, local and ethnic operas, comic dialogue (xiangsheng), interspersed with game shows, magic and acrobatic performances.

Second, national and provincial news programs constitute a separate type of programming in the official classification. As the most watched news programs in China, the half-hour National Network News [xinwen lianbo] is one of six news programs aired by CCTV's Channel I on a daily basis,¹⁷ broadcast in prime-time beginning at 19:00.¹⁸ After the National Network News, the "30-minute News" [xinwen sansifen] program, broadcast daily at noon; the short 5 minute news break aired daily at 6 p.m.; the 20 minute 'Broadcast Now' [xianzai bobao], a nightly news aired at 9 p.m.; the 15 minute "International News" [shijie baodao] broadcast daily at 10 p.m., and the 12 minute

¹⁷ The other five are 1) "Morning News Program", aired daily at 6:00-6:15, 7:00-7:20 and 8:20 a.m.; 2) "Rolling News" [Gundong xinwen], five-minute newsbreaks broadcast at 10:00, 14:00, 16:00, 18:00, and midnight; 3) "News Half-hour" [Xinwen sansifen], aired daily at noon; 4) "Evening News" [wanjian xinwen], a 10-minute program broadcast beginning at 21:19; and 5) "Current Affairs in Breadth and Depth" [shishi zhongheng], a 10-minute news program aired Sundays, divided into important news, interviews, development and prospects, and current event calendar; *2000 CCTV Yearbook*, pp. 57-59.

¹⁸ *2000 CCTV Yearbook*, p. 58.

“Evening News” [wanjian xinwen] that follows back-to-back, also made the top 20 news program national chart.¹⁹ Third, special programs [zhuanti] are less time-sensitive production on current events, focused on personages. They include historic figures (Mao, Marshal Chen Geng), top scientists, distinguished women, leading physicians and epidemiologists in the SARS campaign, and judges, prosecutors, and law-enforcement agents, news-making persons, and a daily, five minute short on “Science and Technology Survey” [Keji bolan]. Fourth, multi-series television drama [dianshiju] make up a separate type of programming, where 173,110 episodes in 1,601 such sets of series were aired in China in 2003.²⁰ Consisting of 2 to 40 episodes of 48 minutes each, the first-runs of these series are usually aired on prime-time, with each of the top 20 series attracting 40 to over 100 million viewers nationwide.²¹ All the top 20 variety shows, news programs, special productions and television drama series in 2003 were produced by CCTV.²²

Intra-measure Correlation

There is high positive correlation among four of the five measures of regional preference in television viewing. As shown in the first two data columns of Table-3, the

¹⁹ *2001 CCTV Yearbook*, p. 116; *2000 CCTV Yearbook*, pp. 57-59; 106-7, 123. On Saturdays and Sundays, the “Broadcast Now” program is aired only 10 minutes, not the 20 minutes as in weekdays.

²⁰ *China TV Rating Yearbook 2004*, p. 51.

²¹ *China TV Rating Yearbook 2003*, pp. 182-83; *2002 CCTV Yearbook*, pp. 138-42; 393-94.

²² *China TV Rating Yearbook 2004*, pp. 248-54.

four provinces that are most divergent with the national preference in the top 30 television program (Jiangxi, Anhui, Guangxi, Shandong) do not overlap at all with the top national 20 television drama list, while the four most convergent provinces (Tianjin, Beijing, Jiangsu, Henan) also record the highest level of overlap with the national list. The degree of correspondence with the top 20 national variety shows (5th data column) is also high, with three of the most convergent provinces (Tianjin, Jiangsu, Henan) and three of the most divergent provinces (Anhui, Guangxi, Shandong) in the top 30 national TV programs list reappearing in the same category. To a less extent, Tianjin, Jiangsu, and Henan were also the most convergent provinces in the top 20 national special programs (4th data column), while Guangxi and Shandong also made the least convergent provinces in the same list.

The correlation among the four measures is highly significant. As shown in Table-4, the top national program list correlates significantly with the top 10 national lists in television drama series (.860), special programs (.873), and variety shows (.949), at the 0.01 level of confidence. The three series also correlate highly among themselves.

Table-4 about here

To facilitate analysis with explanatory variables, an additive measure of regional preference in television viewing is created by summing the number of provincial programs that are convergent with the top national lists in the 1) most popular 30 television programs, 2) top 20 television drama series; 3) top 20 special programs, 4) top

20 news programs and 5) top 20 variety shows. The composite measure has a theoretical range of 0 (when there is no convergence between the provincial with the national list in all the four categories) to 70 (when the convergence is perfect). As shown in the last data column in Table-3, the empirical range is from 0 to 61, with Guangdong (0), Shanghai (4), and Guangxi (9) as the most divergent provinces, while Jiangsu (61), Henan (35), and Heilongjiang (48) as the most convergent.

Testing for Extraneous Factors

The above findings could result from two factors that are extraneous to preference for local television programs. That viewers in Guangxi, Guangdong and Shanghai watch CCTV channels less often could simply be due to local technical difficulties with receiving CCTV frequencies. Second, viewers in these provinces may also prefer to watch local television programs because the latter has a higher quality or entertainment value than those of CCTV. To test for these two possible explanations, we first correlate regional viewing preference with the number of television frequencies received in each province, to determine the relative ease with which local viewers receive outside television channels. As shown in Table-5, there is no clear pattern that provinces with high preference for provincial productions receive fewer frequencies.

Table-5 about here

Provincial Productions aired in other Local Stations

To control for the effects of quality and entertainment value of local productions, we analyze the extent to which local productions received high viewer ratings in other provinces. If viewers in Shanghai, Guangxi and Guangdong prefer to watch local productions rather than those of CCTV, it may well be the case that their provincial programs are better than those of the national stations. To eliminate this possibility, we analyze productions of provinces with high regional preferences that receive top ratings in other provinces, including the top 30 television programs in China, and the top 30 programs in any of the 21 other provinces. In addition, we also count the number of productions in each province aired in the other 21 provinces for each of the five types of programming, in particular, 1) the top 10 news programs; 2) top 10 special programs; 3) top 10 Television dramas; 4) top 10 sports programs, and 5) top 10 Variety shows. As shown in Table-6, among the top three provinces with the highest level of preference for local productions, none of the productions of Shanghai, 1 of Guangdong (sports), and three of Guangxi (1 each in sports, variety show, and special production) made the top rated lists of the top national and provincial programs in any of the 7 categories. If the analysis is extended to the next 9 provinces with the highest regional preferences, one each from Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Anhui made it to these lists. Shandong productions, however, were well received by one to two other provinces in News (2), TV Drama (2), Sports (2), and News (1). It should thus be clear that the high ratings of Shanghai, Guangxi, and Guangdong provincial productions in their native provinces are not shared by viewers in other markets.

Table-6 about here

III. Explaining Regional Preferences

To search for variables that may explain variations in regional preferences of television viewing among provinces, we collect and analyze data for the 22 provinces for two sets of socio-economic variables. Taking the theoretical literature as our guide, we first collected and analyzed data on socio-economic modernization, reasoning with Inkeles (1983) that affluence, urbanization, and education would erode regional identities and shift political orientations from the local and periphery to the national and central authority.²³ Towards that end, we collected and analyzed provincial data on 1) total population; 2) rural population; 3) urban population, and 4) percentage of television viewers in rural areas. To search for variations in education attainment among provinces, we used 5) number of enrolled junior and high school students; and 6) number of enrolled college students. To measure variations in provincial economic development, we analyzed: 7) per capita disposable income for urban population; 8) per capita actual expenditure for urban population; 9) per capita income for rural population; and 10) mean expenditure for peasant households.

Second, we also collected and analyzed data on the extent of communications, on the premise that increasing contact with and information about the outside world would reduce regional identity and strengthen orientation towards national centers of political

²³ Alex Inkeles, *Exploring Individual Modernity*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 229.

and economic power. As empirical measures for the degree of geographical mobility, we use 11) the percentage of provincial population residing in their original domicile since birth as the indicator, drawing the inference that higher percentages of such population groups suggests the lack of mobility and limited outside contact. In addition, we also correlate regionalism in television viewing with the following measures of traditional mode of communication: 12) total mail deliveries; 13) special mail deliveries; and 14) total passenger rail traffic originating from province. Lastly, we also analyzed provincial data on electronic communications, using the number of: 15) desk phones; 16) mobile phones; 17) internet subscribers; and 18) long-distance calls placed. The data sources are the *2003 China Statistical Yearbook*, the *2003 China Yearbook of Transport and Communications*, and the *2001 China Demographic Statistical Yearbook*.

As shown in Table-7, there is no correlation between regional preference for local television programs with almost all measures of socio-economic development. Total provincial population, urban and rural population, and percentage of rural television viewers in the province is not correlated with regional preference. Likewise, there is also no significant correlation with the measures of education attainment, whether they be 1) total enrolled high school students; 2) total enrolled college students; or per capita enrolled high school and college students. Consistent with this trend, we also found no significant correlation between regional preference with three measures of economic affluence (per capita urban disposable income, per capita rural income; per rural household total expenditure). Other per capita measures of the above variables also yield no significant correlation coefficients. We did find a moderate, significant correlation

between regional preference with per capita urban expenditure (-.461), at the .031 level of significance. In parallel with the above results, we also found no significant correlation between regional preference with measures of both traditional and electronic communication. In general, provinces that view their own productions more often than CCTV are not necessarily those that have higher levels of regular and special mail deliveries, total passenger rail traffic originating from province, desk and mobile phones, the number of internet subscribers and the number of long-distance calls placed.

Table-7 about here

IV. Future Trends of Regionalism in China

The lack of positive correlation with explanatory variables on the provincial level maybe the result of spurious ecological effects, where aggregation at a higher ecological level masks relationships on lower levels. To sort out these effects, and to identify future trends of regional identities, two sets of analyses will be attempted. The first focuses on national trends on viewing national vs. local programs, including: 1) temporal span (1999-2003); 2) by education attainment, and 3) income levels. To disaggregate national trends, the second set breaks down view choice by different education and income strata, and rural-urban residence of province.

As shown in Table-8, the five year trend from 1999-2003 shows a slight increase in the number of viewers who choose to watch the leading national station, from 30.5% in

1999 to 32.2% in 2003. If viewers for the national education station are included, then the viewership for the two national television stations has increased two percentage points in the recent five year period, from 30.6% in 1999 to 32.6% in 2003. The national stations' gain was at the expense of the provincial stations, which lost a fraction of one percentage point, and other (city and county) stations, which shed 1.7% in the national viewer market. Year-to-year changes are small, and not in the same direction.

Clearer trends can be seen in viewer channel choice by education strata. As shown in the same table, there is a steady increase of viewers for CCTV, from 26.8% in the lowest education stratum (no formal education), to 43.8% in the highest (college and above). The trend is monotonic, with a spread of 17% points. Viewer shares for the provincial stations show a corresponding, general downward trend, dropping from 17.6% for those without formal education, to 13.3% for those with college or higher education. Viewership trends for different income strata display a clear, monotonic downward trend, with viewers for provincial stations declining from 17.1% for the lowest income group (600 yuan or less per month), to 12.6% for the highest (2,601 yuan or more). Viewers for CCTV shows a unimodal trend along different income strata, increasing from 29.6% in the lowest income group to 39.2% in the middle income group (1,200-1,700 yuan), then dropping for the next two strata to 30.1% for those earning 2,601 yuan or more per month.

Table-8 about here

Provincial Viewership Trends

Provincial viewership trends mirror national trends. A clear shift from provincial towards national stations is observed in viewer choices when education attainment strata are controlled, shown in Table-9. Each of the 22 provinces displays four clear and consistent trends. First, focusing on the lower education column with junior high or below formal schooling, viewers watching provincial stations outnumber those of the national station, sometimes by over five times (Jiangxi, Shanghai, Guangdong) or as much as more than seven (Guangxi). Second, viewer preference shift in the higher education group (senior high school or above), where those watching the national stations outnumber those of provincial stations for most provinces (except Hunan, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Guangdong, and the four metropolises of Chongqing, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin). Third, comparing across the two education strata, percentage of viewers for provincial stations drops from the lower education group to the higher education group for most provinces (except Henan). Fourth, the clearest trend, and one without exception in the 22 provinces, is the corresponding surge in percentage of viewers watching national stations, as we move from the lower to higher education group, with magnitude of increase as much as three times (Anhui, Guangxi, Jiangxi).

Table-9 about here

Similar shifts in viewer trends are also observed across income strata in the 22 provinces. As shown in Table-10, 1) in the lower income group, viewers for provincial stations outnumber those of national stations for most provinces (except Jiangsu and

Yunnan), and sometimes as much as over four (Shanghai, Guangdong) or five times (Guangxi); 2) the trend is flipped for the higher income bracket, where viewers for national stations generally outnumber those of provincial stations (except Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and metropolitan Chongqing, Shanghai, Beijing); 3) percentage of viewers for provincial stations drops for most provinces for the higher income group for most provinces (except Chongqing, Henan); and 4) percentage of viewers for national stations increases from the lower to the higher income brackets (except Chongqing), in one case as much as close to five fold (Guangdong).

Viewer preference for regional programs are less clear across rural and urban areas. For most provinces, it is still the case that viewers in rural areas prefer to watch provincial rather than national stations (except Henan, Jiangsu, Yunnan). It is also the case that as we compare across rural and urban viewerships, urbanites watch provincial stations proportionately less than rural dwellers (except Chongqing, Henan, Jilin, Jiangsu), and those watching national stations outnumber those in rural areas (except Chongqing, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu). But when viewers for the provincial vs. national channels are compared within urbanites, 9 of the 22 provinces registered the contrary trend where their viewers prefer to watch provincial stations.

Table-10 about here

Summary and Conclusion

Using a 2003 survey of viewer market shares in 22 provinces in China, this paper analyzes viewer choice of national vs. provincial television channels and programs, chart the extent and level of regional identities. On the national level, we find that the national station (CCTV) occupying a predominant position among viewers, enjoying around two-thirds of the national television viewership, with the remaining third shared by the provincial stations. At the subnational level, we find substantial variations among the 22 provinces. When compared with the top 30 national programs, only slightly more than a third (8 of 22) of the provinces had 4 or fewer of its top 30 most popular programs also on the national list.

Analyzing provincial ratings of 5 types of programming, we find viewer preferences for national vs. provincial programs to be generic and not program specific. There was high correlation among such viewer preferences in news programs, specials, variety shows, and television drama series (but not in sports programs) indicating that viewers who prefer national over provincial productions in one set of programs would show the same preference over other programs. Combining preferences in 5 sets of television programming by province in a single additive regionalism scale, we also find great variations in viewer preferences among the 22 provinces, with the most divergent province (Guangxi) sharing only 3 programs, while the most convergent (Jiangsu) sharing 39 out of a possible 70 programs in five sets of most watched programs in the national list.

To explain variations in preferences for regional programs, our analysis with demographic profile, socio-economic development, educational attainment, and communication capacity in the 22 provinces does not result in any significant correlation with the provincial regionalism score. While the national level analyses have resulted in null findings, clear and consistent trends emerge in the subnational level of analysis, where higher education and income levels are strongly associated with preference for viewing national over provincial television channels and programs.

While the last finding suggests that progress in education and affluence would lead to further development of a national cultural identity in China, it would be premature to pronounce the demise of regionalism in the nation. Our data suggest that the development of a national political culture is not necessarily linear, where the more cosmopolitan coastal provinces and the more urbane metropolis are the pace-setters. Indeed, our foregoing analysis shows that cosmopolitan Shanghai was one of the top scorers in the regionalism preference scale. And in some measures, the other three metropolis (Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing) also deviate from the national pattern where urban residents prefer to watch national channels over provincial ones. Outside China, we can also not take comfort from the persistence of regional identities in more mature democracies that are supposed to be in a more advanced stage of political development.

The implications for the study of political culture are both substantive and technical. Conceptually, region should be accorded its proper role in the analysis of political orientation and behavior. Along with class, education, gender, religion and race, it is a

basic agent of political socialization. Southern Democrats in the U.S. are a different political breed than its northern counterparts. The electorate in the bicoastal states has distinct party affiliation from that of the American heartland. In the study of Chinese political culture then, it is not sufficient to delineate the differences between rural-urban residents, college-educated with pre-collegiate respondents, women from men. Care should also be taken to map the regional contours of political topography. With our present limited understanding of regional political culture, survey research should establish the basic coordinates, behavioral isotherm, peaks and troughs of political geography in China. This calls for establishing the empirical base-line, at the provincial or city level, of regional variations in political knowledge, interest and efficacy, conservatism and liberalism, trust and cynicism towards authority, electoral and non-electoral participation. In the research process, this suggests an explicit effort to incorporate region in the sampling design, taking care not to exclude some provinces with distinct political orientations, and giving due proportional weight to populations in regions with salient characteristics. It also suggests that the protocol needs to include questions that tap variations in strength and type of group identities, be they class, gender, ethnicity, religion, occupation, nation or region. All politics may not be local in China, but the study of Chinese political culture and behavior need to include regional variations.

Table 1: Market Share of Top 15 Television Channels in China, 2003

Rank	Channel	Market Share (%)
1	CCTV -I	30.6
2	CCTV-VI	7.5
3	CCTV-VIII	7.2
4	CCTV-V	4.8
5	Hunan Station Satellite Channel	4.6
6	CCTV-III	4.3
7	CCTV-IV	4.0
8	Anhui-I	3.0
9	Shandong Satellite Station	2.9
10	Beijing Satellite Station	2.7
11	CCTV-II	2.5
12	Jiangxi – I	1.6
13	Liaoning – I	1.4
14	Shanghai Eastern Satellite	1.4
15	Henan Satellite - I	1.3

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, p. 18.

Table 2: Top 30 Television Programs in China, 2003

Rank	Program	Type	Station	Reception Rate	Market Share
1	Lunar New Year Soiree	V	CCTV-I	37.6	68.5
2	Network News	N	CCTV-I	18.0	41.7
3	2003 Yuanxiao Soiree	V	CCTV-I	16.2	30.1
4	Focused Interview	N	CCTV-I	13.4	28.8
5	Ganwen Kongchang	S	CCTV-I	12.9	26.6
6	2002 National Science and Technology Award	S	CCTV-I	12.8	25.0
7	Hu Jintao APEC Press Conference	S	CCTV-I	12.4	27.2
8	Rongyu	D	CCTV-I	10.8	22.5
9	Junge Liaoliang	D	CCTV-I	10.0	21.2
10	Liu Laogen	D	CCTV-I	9.7	18.2
11	Public Security Chief II	D	CCTV-I	9.5	19.6
12	National TV Xiangsheng Contest	V	CCTV-III	9.5	20.6
13	Da yanfang	D	CCTV-I	9.4	19.8
14	Towards Strengthening the State through the educated elite	S	CCTV-I	9.2	18.6
15	Science Survey	S	CCTV-I	9.1	17.8
16	NPPCC Special Report	N	CCTV-I	9.0	17.2
17	CCTV Arts Troup touring Xingxia	V	CCTV-I	8.5	17.7
18	NPC Session	N	CCTV-I	8.0	15.4
19	Premier Wen meeting journalists	N	CCTV-I	7.9	15.3
20	Zhigao liyi	D	CCTV-I	7.6	15.6
21	CCTV Art troupe touring Three Gorges	V	CCTV-I	7.5	15.5
22	Mid-Autum Festival Soiree	V	CCTV-I	7.5	15.0
23	Xiaowo dun zhongsheng	D	CCTV-I	7.5	15.9
24	TV Nightly soiree	V	CCTV-I	7.2	14.7
25	Guitu ru hong	D	CCTV-I	7.1	15.2
26	Hengzhang meigui	D	CCTV-I	7.1	14.3
27	Min. of Public Security Soiree	V	CCTV-I	7.1	15.2
28	Approaching Mao Zedong	S	CCTV-I	6.5	14.6
29	Min. of Culture soiree	V	CCTV-I	6.4	16.2
30	Fashion Designer Model Contest	V	CCTV-I	6.4	13.3

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, p. 248. V=variety shows, N=news, D=drama series, S=special production.

Table 3: Convergence of Provincial and National Top TV Programs, 2003

Province	Top 30 Local w/ top 30 National Programs	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 National TV Drama series	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. News Programs	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. Special Productions	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. Variety Shows	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. Sports Programs	Total Convergence (excluding sports)
Anhui	1	0	3	5	4	5	13
Chongqing	10	2	9	7	10	5	38
Guangxi	0	1	4	2	2	1	9
Henan	18	9	9	9	8	7	53
Heilongjiang	19	6	8	8	7	6	48
Hubei	10	0	9	9	8	5	36
Hunan	2	0	5	4	1	3	12
Jilin	13	4	10	10	7	6	44
Jiangsu	22	10	9	10	10	2	61
Jiangxi	0	0	5	5	2	4	12
Liaoning	7	1	6	6	3	8	23
Shandong	4	0	4	3	2	2	13
Shaanxi	9	1	7	9	5	6	31
Sichuan	9	1	8	3	5	1	26
Zhejiang	2	0	7	7	7	6	24
Beijing	6	3	4	5	5	9	23
Shanghai	1	0	1	0	2	5	4
Tianjin	13	1	6	9	10	6	39
Guangdong	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Guizhou	11	2	8	5	7	2	33
Hebei	5	1	7	4	5	6	22
Yunnan	6	7	8	7	7	5	35

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, pp. 248-425.

Table 4: Pearson Correlation of National Program Market Share among 5 TV Program Series, 2003

VAR	Regionalism Score (1)	Top 30 Local w/ top 30 National Programs (2)	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 National TV Drama series (3)	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. News Programs (4)	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. Special Productions (5)	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. Variety Shows (6)	Top 10 Local w/ top 20 Nat. Sports Programs (7)
(1)	1.00	.792**	.860**	.875**	.873**	.949**	.155
(2)	.792**	1.00	.541**	.553**	.546**	.768**	.095
(3)	.860**	.541**	1.00	.804**	.782**	.734**	.017
(4)	.875**	.553**	.804**	1.00	.801**	.748**	.327
(5)	.873**	.546**	.782**	.801**	1.00	.754**	.179
(6)	.949**	.768**	.734**	.748**	.754**	1.00	.099
(7)	.155**	.095	.017	.327	.179	.099	1.00

n = 22, ** = correlation is significant (2-tailed) at 0.01 level of confidence.

Table 5: No. of TV Frequencies receivable by 22 Provinces, 2003

Province	Frequencies Received	Mean Frequencies received by average household
Anhui	64	6
Chongqing	69	11
Guangxi	66	8
Henan	67	5
Heilongjiang	65	14
Hubei	67	9
Hunan	68	19
Jilin	66	9
Jiangsu	65	9
Jiangxi	65	6
Liaoning	66	15
Shandong	67	9
Shaanxi	67	8
Sichuan	68	13
Zhejiang	67	18
Beijing	-	-
Shanghai	-	-
Tianjin	-	-
Guangdong	79	21
Guizhou	66	11
Hebei	65	9
Yunnan	65	10

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, p. 228.

Table 6: Provincial Productions Aired in other Provincial Stations, 2003

Province	Top National 30 Programs	Top 30 Provincial Programs	Top 10 News Programs	Top 10 Special Programs	Top 10 TV Drama	Top 10 Sports Programs	Top 10 Variety Shows
Guangdong	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Shanghai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guangxi	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Hunan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jiangxi	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Anhui	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Shandong	0	1	2	1	2	2	0
Hebei	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liaoning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beijing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zhejiang	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sichuan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, pp. 255-425.

Table 7: Pearson Correlations of Provincial Regional Viewing Preference with Explanatory Variables, 2003

VAR	Pearson Correlation w/ Regionalism Score	Significance (2- tailed)
Demography		
Total Population	-.023	.917
Rural Population	-.246	.271
Urban Population	.024	.915
% TV viewers in rural areas	.060	.796
Economic Development		
Per capita Urban disposable income	-.335	.127
Per capital urban actual expenditure	-.461*	.031
Per capita rural actual income	-.219	.328
Mean Rural Household expenditure	-.246	.271
Education		
Total junior and senior high school enrollment	.158	.437
Total college enrollment	.098	.666
Communication and Mobility		
% residing continuous at birthplace	.033	.884
Total mail delivery	-.352	.108
Total special mail delivery	-.257	.249
Total passenger rail traffic originating from province	.024	.915
No. of desk phones	-.146	.517
No. of mobile phones	-.297	.180
No. of long distance calls placed	-.277	.211
No. of internet subscribers	-.271	.223

* denotes Pearson correlation significant at 0.05 level of confidence (2-tailed).

Table 8: Viewer Market Share, by Education and Income, 1999-2003

	CCTV	CETV	Provincial Channels
By Annual Trend			
1999	30.5	0.1	16.3
2000	30.4	0.1	17.2
2001	32.5	0.2	15.2
2002	31.9	0.3	14.7
2003	32.2	0.4	16.0
By Education Level (2003)			
No Formal Education	26.8	0.5	17.6
Primary Education	26.9	0.4	18.1
Junior High School	30.0	0.3	16.6
Senior High School	33.7	0.5	15.1
College and above	43.8	0.4	13.3
By Income Level (2003)			
<600	29.6	0.3	17.1
601-1,200	36.8	0.4	14.6
1,201-1,700	39.2	0.4	13.6
1,701-2,600	35.6	0.6	13.6
>2,600	30.1	0.4	12.6

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, p. 243.

Table 9:
% Viewer Choice of National vs. Provincial Channels by Education Attainment

Province	Junior High or below		Senior High or above	
	Local	National	Local	National
Anhui	68.5	14.7	42.6	45.5
Chongqing	64.7	30.8	56.2	40.3
Guangxi	69.3	9.3	52.2	27.6
Henan	17.9	27.8	18.1	48.7
Heilongjiang	48.9	41.0	40.1	48.2
Hubei	37.8	24.4	28.7	48.7
Hunan	60.1	16.8	53.5	26.4
Jilin	38.4	24.6	36.8	47.7
Jiangsu	26.1	33.9	25.7	39.9
Jiangxi	73.4	13.8	48.8	40.3
Liaoning	48.8	30.4	39.1	46.2
Shandong	60.0	15.5	39.6	39.1
Shaanxi	55.9	24.0	35.5	46.3
Sichuan	45.4	22.6	30.1	49.1
Zhejiang	40.3	22.6	30.0	40.3
Beijing	62.3	33.5	57.9	37.9
Shanghai	80.9	15.4	74.5	21.3
Tianjin	56.9	41.0	49.2	48.6
Guangdong	62.3	11.7	55.8	21.3
Guizhou	65.2	33.6	29.2	50.7
Hebei	47.1	24.5	33.2	49.1
Yunnan	33.9	39.6	25.6	52.7

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, pp. 255-418.

**Table 10:
% Viewer Choice of National vs. Provincial Channels by Income Level and
Rural/Urban Residence**

Province	Monthly Income <600 yuan		Monthly Income >600 yuan		Rural		Urban	
	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National
Anhui	63.9	18.9	44.5	45.8	65.7	17.3	39	44.2
Chongqing	57.2	38.8	64.6	31.5	63.8	32.1	65.7	29.1
Guangxi	66.8	11.7	51.6	33.7	67.9	9.0	51.8	27.7
Henan	19.9	33.2	20.0	60.2	16.7	28.6	29.8	49.8
Heilongjiang	48.8	40.4	38.0	49.7	50.0	42.6	43.6	39.2
Hubei	36.5	28.7	29.6	50.1	39.2	24.3	25.6	44.6
Hunan	58.0	18.6	55.6	23.7	-	-	58.4	18.9
Jilin	38.7	29.3	34.0	48.6	37.7	20.7	40.1	44.9
Jiangsu	26.7	34.6	24.3	36.1	26.0	36.0	27.9	28.8
Jiangxi	69.1	18.5	52.7	34.8	72.6	15.7	51.8	31.8
Liaoning	44.5	33.6	37.6	46.3	50.8	29.6	40.7	40.2
Shandong	55.4	18.9	31.0	47.1	59.5	16.5	31.3	38.9
Shaanxi	50.8	27.1	34.9	48.7	54.8	23.6	37.4	42.6
Sichuan	43.2	29.3	29.6	53.3	45.9	24.0	30.0	49.4
Zhejiang	41.1	22.5	34.7	29.5	39.2	23.1	30.4	37.8
Beijing	60.6	35.7	57.8	37.8	-	-	60.4	35.5
Shanghai	78.8	18.2	62.0	23.8	-	-	78.0	18.0
Tianjin	51.6	46.3	46.2	51.1	-	-	52.4	45.3
Guangdong	60.3	13.8	40.9	67.1	-	-	60.6	14.8
Guizhou	54.6	35.0	39.8	51.2	63.2	32.0	40.4	41.5
Hebei	45.3	16.8	31.3	52.2	48.3	27.6	30.4	53.4
Yunnan	31.3	43.4	25.2	55.1	33.3	41.4	30.3	44.9

Source: *China TV Rating Yearbook, 2004*, pp. 255-418.

