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A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Working Paper Series: No. 111

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Exit and Voice:
Political Participation in East Asia

Chin-En Wu
Associate Research Fellow,
Institute of Political Science,
Academia Sinica, Taiwan

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Contact Information

Asian Barometer Project Office

Department of Political Science

National Taiwan University

*No.1, Sec.4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei,
10617, Taiwan, R.O.C.*

Tel: 886 2-3366 8456

Fax: 886-2-2365 7179

E-mail: asianbarometer@ntu.edu.tw

Website: www.asianbarometer.org

Exit and Voice: Political Participation in East Asia

Chin-en Wu

Associate research fellow

Academia Sinica

Email: chinen@gate.sinica.edu.tw

*Paper prepared for the Fourth Wave Asian Barometer Workshop, August 9-10,
Taipei.*

In the classical work of *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Hirschman (1970) elucidates how people respond to the deterioration in the quality of an organization. They can either leave the organization or remain there but voice their discontent. The popularity of one response tends to reduce the usage of the other one. Hirschman's insightful observation has inspired many subsequent works that applied the same logic in various social dimensions. In the context of emigration, Hirschman's argument implies that people who are not satisfied with the existing political, economic, or social system, is more likely to choose to emigrate to another country. The question we raise in this article is whether the motivation to live in another country affects people's choice of political participation.

Political participation includes the conventional and the non-conventional form of participation. The former include voting and campaign participation while the latter include signing petition, protest, and violent use of forces.¹ When and why they choose different form of activities is an important question that scholars begin to ask (Harris and Gillion 2010). In this article, we argue that emigration preference is associated with political participation choices. At first glance, a straightforward hypothesis would be that emigration preference would reduce people's incentive to participate. In other words, exit and voice implies a trade-off relationship, suggesting by Hirschman. This relationship, we argue, is only partly true. Once we consider the cost of different type of political activities, one may propose a different hypothesis.

Since the cost and effect of the conventional and nonconventional activities are rather different, the emigration-minded people may choose to engage more in activities that are more effective in relatively shorter time period. In this regard, the conventional and nonconventional forms of political activities are quite different. In this article, we will examine the relationship between people's preference to live

¹ Although violent actions are unlawfully, they may convey political messages (Lamprianou 2013).

oversee and their political participation incentives, both voting and contentious forms in the region of East Asia. The existing literature has explored this issue about emigration preference and political participation. We will use the fourth wave Asian Barometer survey to test the hypothesis.

Theory

Political participation

Anan Marsh (1974) extended the definition of political activities from the conventional politics to the unconventional activities. The latter can include petition, demonstration, boycotts, strikes, and violent activities. Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) also classify four general types of political activities: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and directly contacting officials. Scholars also argue that with the rise of post-materialism accompany the decline in electoral participation and the increase in non-electoral form of participation (Inglehart 1997, Dalton 2009a). This type of activities includes community activity, contentious and political participation such as petition, demonstration, boycott, strikes, and rally. Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) and Dalton (2014) indicated that the unconventional form of participation has increased in many democracies in recent years.²

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) posit that three factors shape people's propensity to participate: capacity, motivation, and network of recruitment. People

² Over years, thanks to the rising education and the growth of mass media, American witnesses an increasing level of political sophistication and political interests. This trend, however, do not translate into higher voting turnout rates (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). One explanation for this gap focuses on the relative position theory. The effect of education level on political participation depends on the location in the sociopolitical hierarchy, so the overall increase in educational level will have only a modest impact on participation (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Another explanation focuses on the rising popularity of other form of political participation. Scholars observe an increase in citizen-initiated communal and single-issue activities in the Western democracies (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2014). Rising political sophistication and political interests reduce the participation of voting and spur the increase in non-electoral participation. Those activities are usually citizen-initiated and bypass the political parties and link directly to the government.

who are affiliated with social groups tend to participate in politics more because they are more likely to be asked to participate. People who have high political interests, political efficacy, or group consciousness are more likely to participate in politics. Since political participation requires time, money, and skills, it is assumed that better educated and high-income individuals are more likely to participate in political activities. In addition, people who face financial pinch are less active in the participatory system. Social class is often considered the most important factor deciding the needed resources and skills. It is assumed that better educated and high-income individuals are more likely to have the time, income, skills, and information to participate in political activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Nie et al. 1996). Empirically, scholars demonstrate that better educated individuals (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and high-income earners (Endersby, Petrocik, and Shaw 2006) are more likely to vote. The situation is most clear in the United States where the reported voting participating rate between the highest and the lowest income quintiles can reach 35% (Mahler 2008). In Europe, the participation rate gap between income strata is significantly smaller. Because of the high union membership rate, voting date and registration requirement, left-wing political parties and labor unions mobilize the working class to vote. In addition, the compulsory voting system in some countries also helps (Beeghley 1986, Mahler 2008). Moreover, higher educated citizens are also more likely to participate in campaign activity and communal activity (Dalton 2014).

The study of unconventional political participation, however, largely falls into the domain of Sociology. Traditionally, political scientists focus their attention mainly on the conventional participation--voting, contacting officials, and campaign activity (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Harris and Gillion 2010). The study of contentious forms of politics, such as demonstration, boycott, and signing petition,

mainly focuses on the motivations of participants, for example Tarrow (1998); Ekiert and Kubik (1997), rather a general treatment of the citizens' choices to participate in various forms of politics. Several works do touch the unconventional form but they tend to focus only on one act of the activities (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 1995; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005; Harris and Gillion 2010). As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Harris and Gillion (2010) nicely indicated that citizens use a set of tools that fit their demands and the resource available. Thus, although scholars have pointed out several important factors that explain people's incentives to participate in the conventional activities, few have treated the conventional and unconventional participation together (Barnes and Kasase 1979; Harris and Gillion 2010).

The effort and the cooperation required are rather different across modes of activities (Verbam, Nie, and Kim 1978, Dalton 2014). Voting in general required less effort and cooperation than contacting officials, communal activity, and protest. Despite the relative low cost associated with casting votes, scholars demonstrate that better educated individuals (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996) and high-income earners (Endersby 2006) are more likely to vote, especially in the case of United States (Lijphart 1997; Dalton 2014). Campaign activity such as contacting the voters and making contribution requires even more time and energy than voting. Other activities such as communal activity involve substantial individual initiatives and skills, so the better educated are more likely to take part in voluntary activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). As for the non-conventional form of participation, the resource theory contended that this type of collective activities also require organizing skills and resources. Studies using survey data also confirmed that the better educated and the high income people are more likely to take part in the time-based acts such as campaign work, contacting officials, protest, local community, and social

organizations (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Dalton 2014).³

In contrast to the resource theory, the alternative theory argues that people who have less access to decision-makers or have unaccepted claims are more likely to see the contentious collective action as the only viable option.⁴ The marginal are more likely to face such difficult situation (Tarrow 1998; Harris and Gillion 2010). In contrast, the privileged actors have greater access to decision-makers via the conventional form of participation, so they are less likely to opt for the contentious form of activity. This line of theory predicts that those who are lower in the hierarchy of social status are more likely to engage in protest.⁵ Overall, the existing literature assumes that citizens are all prone to stay in the same country. Does the same consideration about political participation apply to people who have the incentive to go and live in another country? What other factor will these people consider to choose the political activities to engage in? This is what we will turn to below.

³ Few existing studies explore the incentives behind conventional and non-conventional participation at the same time. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) examine an array of participating modes but do not single out the more contentious form of activities. The participating gap depends on the resources involved in different activities. Although the high income people are more likely to vote, the cost of participating in vote is relatively low

⁴ From the existing literature we know that the reasons behind contentious acts may be related to either personal grievances or social issues. People's stake in the cause of the contentious activities is rather different. The disadvantaged people are more likely to be dissatisfied with material conditions they face, such as pollution damage, pensions lose, forced tearing down, and layoff. Those issues usually cannot be effectively and timely addressed in the existing political system. The immediate damages induce the disadvantaged to opt for the more confrontational method of acts such as demonstration, rally, march, sit-in, or even the use of force. The more confrontational form of activities usually involves more costs such as property damage, physical injury or even freedom loses. In addition, such threats also induce and allow them to use more confrontational mean to grab public attention. The society may be sympathetic to their suffering even their actions cause social unrests. In contrast, the higher socioeconomic groups are more likely to concern the post-material issues such as environment protection, gender equality, and freedom of choice. These issues does not pose an immediate threats to their economic well-being, they are more likely to opt for the moderate form of protest such as petition or other form of protest activities that do not disrupt social orders. Also because of this reason it is not legitimate for them to choose the more confrontational means.

⁵ Rising inequality reduce people's efficacy and resource available in affecting politics, reducing civic participation among the poor. High income inequality also reduces the trust in general and between income groups in particular. This trend significantly hinders civic engagement (Usalner and Brown 2005). The rise of class-based society in America in recent years also makes it less possible for people of different class to work together in voluntary associations (Putnam 2009).

Exit and Political Choices

Hirschman (1970) in his classical work indicates that when facing the deterioration in the quality of an organization, individuals have two response choices. They can either leave the organization or remain there and voice their discontent. The popularity of one response tends to reduce the usage of the other one. Hirschman's insightful observation has inspired many subsequent works that applied the same in many social phenomena. The applications include, to name a few, identity (Laitin 1998), democratization (Gehlbach 2006), trade protection (Aggarwal et al. 1987), labor organization (Freeman and Medoff 1984), parties (Kato 1998; Schlesinger 1975), globalization (Schoppa 2006), and revolution (Hirschman 1993; Pfaff and Kim 2003). Despite the rich application of Hirschman's theory, the existing literature has only sparsely considered the possible correlation between emigration, a form of exit, and political participation, a form of voice.

The existing discussion of this relationship is mainly about the subject of democratic transition. Pfaff and Kim (2003) argue that in the case of East Germany on the eve of democratization protest and emigration are positively correlated at the early stage of authoritarian regime fall. Exit sends a signal either that the authoritarian regime is less willing to crack down or many people are discontent with the incumbent regime. Exit and voice tend to move in the same direction. It is until the stage that so many people exit voice ceases to become an attractive option to express discontents. Gehlbach (2006) also demonstrates the possibility of positive correlation between exit and voice. He argues that when the emigration of citizens is costly to the authoritarian rulers, exit can increase the bargaining power of the people. This situation result in more social protests.

What about the relationship between emigration and participation under a relative stable regime? To see this, we will need to explore the incentives of the likely

emigrants. The emigration-minded people have a shorter and sometimes facing uncertain time period to remain in the country. They tend to have a shorter time span to consider and hence may choose to engage more in activities that are more effective in relatively shorter time period. They may have the same or even higher motivation to influence politics. Since voting is a slow mean to influence government policy-making, people who want to live in another country are likely to be less interested in exercising the rights to vote. In fact, in many cases, the ineffectiveness of the conventional political input in the past is the sources influencing people's emigration preference. Thus, the emigration-inclined people are likely to vote less than the emigration-declined people. However, when it comes to the non-conventional mean of participation, the story is likely to be different. The emigration-inclined people may consider the contentious form of participation a comparatively effective and timely way to address the issue they concern. As the emigration-inclined people tend to be discontented with the existing political and economic system, they have the motivation to affect the political system. Thus, they are more likely to engage in the contentious form of political participation than the emigration-declined people.

Note that the participation frequencies of the conventional and non-conventional activities are rather different. Across countries, the conventional participation, especially voting, still has a much higher participating rate than the non-conventional participations, even for the emigration-inclined people. Thus, it is not that these emigration-inclined people will discard the conventional participation and embrace the non-conventional form of participation. They still participate more in voting than in protest. But they are more likely to participate less in the conventional form of activities than the emigration-declined participants. At the same time, they are more likely to participate more in the non-conventional form of activities than the emigration-inclined voters.

Emigration preference and Participation


Emigration preference

Emigrations become an attractive option for many people who are not satisfied with the existing system. Scholars posit that those who perceive that their life's opportunities, either individual or collective, are circumscribed by existing political, economic, or social system, are more likely to favor emigration (Agadjanian et al. 2008, p.626).⁶ In many countries, more than 40% of respondents reply that they are willing to leave their country of residence. People in Korea, Hong Kong, Philippine, Singapore, Vietnam, and Cambodia express a strong interest to move to another country if they got the chance. Next, in general people in more populous countries are less willing to live in another country. For example, Japan, China, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia all have a population close to or above 70 millions. People in those countries have more opportunities to find opportunities domestically. Philippine, with a population of near a hundred million, however, is an outlier. Filipino has a long tradition of working overseas and remit their earnings back home. Unlike China, Vietnam, and Thailand, and Malaysia, Philippine has yet developed the export-driven manufacturing industries which could absorb surplus laborers from the rural areas.⁷

⁶ Across East Asia the young people, compared with the older generations, are much more willing to go and live in another country. As reported in Figure 3, the generation differences are quite dramatic. In many countries, the percentage of the young adult who has the intention to emigrate is 15% higher than the other groups.

⁷ One may also hypothesize that people under authoritarian regime are more willing to go and live in another country. Empirically, however, compared with democracies, people in authoritarian regimes do not have higher propensity to move to another country.


Figure 1 Intention to Live Abroad



Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Political system performance could also affect young people's willingness to move to another country. We identify three important dimensions of regime performance: satisfaction with the way democracy work, democratic quality, and the economic performance. The former is associated with the general performance of the political regime, while the latter is mainly about economic outputs. Facing the degradation of the quality of service, people can either voice their needs, via vote or protest, or vote with their feet. Emigration is essentially to vote with their feet. Figure 2 presents data on the relationship between young people's satisfaction with the way democracy work and their preference for emigration. As seen, people who are less satisfied with the performance of democracy have a stronger preference to migrate to another country. For example, 34% of unsatisfied Malaysian, compared with 24% of satisfied Malaysian, expresses a desire to move abroad if they have the opportunities.

Figure 2 Democratic Satisfaction and Inclination to Immigrate



Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Next, in general we find that people who perceive that the current economic condition bad are more willing to consider moving to another country. In addition, a bleak assessment of future economic condition is associated with greater motivation to move to another country. Comparing the effect of societal and family economic assessments, we find that that latter play a great role in the young people's motivation to move to another country. The economic voting literature in general finds that societal economic condition exerts greater impact than family condition. However, when it comes to in emigration decisions, it is the opposite. Since economic voting is about holding the government responsible for the economic performance of a country, societal economic performance matter more. The intention to emigrate has more to do with the individual conditions, so family economic assessment plays a bigger role.

Exit and voice across countries

In democracies, voting is normally considered as a right but also an obligation. People

who want to live in another country are likely to be less interested in exercising the rights and fulfilling the obligation. Thus, we examine the relationship between people's preference to work overseas and their political participation, both voting and contentious forms. Figure 1 shows the plot of emigration preference and voting participation. It's a scatter plot of the country mean of the two variables. It shows that across East Asian countries higher preference to emigrate is associated with lower voting participation. Figure 1 does not include Myanmar because it held elections only until very recently. Figure 2 shows the plot of emigration preference and protest participation. It's also a scatter plot of the country mean of the two variables. It shows that across East Asian countries greater incentive to emigrate is associated with greater protest participation. As seen, it has a positive slope. The slope is not that large, suggesting that the relationship is not that strong across countries. We can then examine the within country patterns.




Figure 3 Emigration Preference and Voting Participation





Figure 4 Emigration Preference and Protest Participation

Individual-level pattern


Figure 5 compare the incentive to live abroad between the regularly voting and non-regularly voting groups. As seen, across East Asia, citizens who express the intention to leave one's country for a new one tend to vote less often. The greater the incentive one has to go and live in another country, the more likely one is less interested in the conventional form of political participation. When it comes to the solving local problems, on average, the emigrant inclined group participates less than the non-emigrant-inclined group. The pattern is less clear across countries.

Figure 5 Intention to Live Abroad and Voting Participation



Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Figure 6 Intention to Live Abroad and Solving Local Problems




Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

On the other hand, we find a positive association between emigration motivation and contentious political participation, as reported in Figure 7 to 9. It suggests that


people who accept emigration also participate more in signing petition (Figure 7), protests (Figure 8), and use of force and violence (Figure 9). People who are discontent with the political and economic system are more likely to favor emigration and choose to participate in the contentious political activities. Such grievances usually cannot be appropriately addressed in the political system through the conventional form of participation, so people stage social protests against the governments or enterprises. Comparing the two figures, the signs of the two correlations are different. Those who are more willing to live abroad are less interested in electoral participation but are more willing to participate in contentious political activities.

Figure 7 Intention to Live Abroad and Signing Petitions




Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Figure 8 Intention to Live Abroad and Protest Participation



Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Figure 9 Intention to Live Abroad and Used force or violence



Unit: percentage; Data Source: Asian Barometer Wave 3

Research Design

We use the fourth wave Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) data to test our hypotheses.

ABS collected data from 14 East Asian countries/regimes from 2014 to 2016.

In terms of democratic development, our cases include matured democracy (Japan), stable third-wave democracies (Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia), unstable third-waved democracies (Philippines and Thailand), electoral authoritarian countries/regime (Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Myanmar and Hong Kong) and one-party communist state with limited election (Vietnam). Since they are heterogeneous in this dimension, we will need to control democratic levels.

The dependent variables are a set of participation variables. The question about the conventional participation include how often do you vote ever since you became eligible for voting and got together with others to try to resolve local problems. The questions about the non-conventional form of participation include got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition, attended a demonstration or protest march, and used force or violence for a political cause. The key independent variable is people's incentive to migrate to another country.

In addition to the key variables, we include several control variables. We use this question, "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country", to estimate people's evaluation of democratic performance. The specific question is "All citizens from different ethnic communities in your country are treated equally by the government". In addition, superior government performance is likely to boost confidence in a democratic system. Next, we include economic evaluation, since superior current economic conditions are likely to induce respondents to think that governments are responsive to peoples' needs. Specifically, the EAB asked the respondents to rate the overall present economic conditions, both at the national and family level. Since democratic and government performance evaluation and economic evaluations are correlated with emigration preference, adding these variables into the empirical model will take away part of the explanatory power of emigration. Finally,

the control variables also include a set of demographic variables: gender, age, and levels of education.

For the measure of income dispersion in a country, we use Gini Coefficient to proxy income distribution. It is an aggregate indicator gauging the distribution of income in a country. The Gini Coefficient is an extensively used index of income inequality, but its scores vary significantly in different sources. In addition to different survey years, divergent house-income survey methods may contribute to the differences. Whether the coefficients investigate gross income or net income after taxes, personal income or household income, income or expenditure, all tend to make differences (Deininger and Squire 1996). For example, the Gini Coefficients of East Asian countries reported in the World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency 2006), the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005), and Key Indicators: Inequality in Asia (Asian Development Bank 2007) all vary to some extent. We use Asian Development Bank's Key Indicators as our main indicator for the Gini Coefficient. However, if we use the Gini Coefficients from the other two sources, the estimated results of the whole model are quite similar.⁸

All pooled country regressions using multi-level regression. We first include individual-level variables only and then include both individual-level variables and country-level variables. We then run regression for each country to see if the predicted relationships exist.

⁸ To avoid the inherent problems of the Gini index, this paper use another measure of income inequality to double check the validity. The kurtosis of household income as a measure of income inequality, derived directly from the EAB, suffers less from different investigating methods. The kurtosis of reported household income is a measure of the heaviness of the tails of a distribution. Heavy tailed distributions will have kurtosis greater than 3 and light tailed distributions will have kurtosis less than 3. Greater kurtosis means that more cases are located at the two ends. In the context of income distribution, the distribution of reported income is skewed toward the left, i.e. a majority replies that they belong to the lower or middle classes. Higher kurtosis, therefore, denotes a higher portion of respondents falling in the bottom two groups and fewer respondents belonging in the highest two groups, suggesting greater income inequality. For the individual assessment of income inequality, the EAB does not directly ask respondents whether the gap between the rich and the poor has narrowed. Instead, the EAB asks if they agree that people in their countries have basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter.

Empirical Results

First, we pool cases from East Asian countries to run regression. The first two models in Table 1 show that emigration preference is negatively associated with voting participation and with solving local problems. The remaining models demonstrate that emigration preference is positively associated with voting signing petition, participating in protest, and using force.

Table 1 Emigration Preference and Political Participation (baseline model)

	Voting	Local	Petition	Protest	Force
Education	-0.010 (0.012)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.005)	-0.004* (0.002)
Age	0.355*** (0.014)	0.100*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.008)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)
Gender	-0.048*** (0.014)	-0.156*** (0.011)	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.003)
Income	0.005 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.001)
Economy (society)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Economy (individual)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.002)
Emigration Incentives	-0.071*** (0.009)	-0.018*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.002)
Constant	3.173*** (0.193)	1.627*** (0.067)	1.136*** (0.044)	1.002*** (0.027)	1.012*** (0.011)
<i>N</i>	15981	16457	16328	15227	12466

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Next, we also include satisfaction with the performance democracy and the government. These two variables capture people's discontent with the existing political and economic systems; therefore, they are significantly correlated with the emigration motivation. As reported in Table 2, the estimated result for the emigration variable is largely the same. Including the two variables taken away some of the measure of people's discontent with the system. Table 1 and 2 do not include country-level variables. We can include the aggregate level variable. We include the Freedom House scores and Gini coefficient to capture level of democratic development and income distribution. The result for the emigrations variable is largely intact.

Table 2 Emigration Preference and Political Participation (Full model)

	Voting	Local	Petition	Protest	Force
Education	-0.044*** (0.016)	-0.049*** (0.012)	0.029*** (0.009)	0.018*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.003)
Age	0.252*** (0.018)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.055*** (0.010)	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.003 (0.003)
Gender	0.003 (0.020)	-0.169*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.012)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.004)
Income	-0.011 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.006* (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)
LDV	-0.135*** (0.024)	-0.096*** (0.019)	0.039*** (0.014)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.013*** (0.004)
Economy (society)	0.015 (0.011)	0.016* (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.002)

Economy (individual)	0.032*** (0.012)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.006 (0.007)	0.009* (0.005)	0.004** (0.002)
Democratic Quality	-0.119*** (0.042)	0.059* (0.033)	0.067*** (0.025)	0.028 (0.018)	0.005 (0.008)
Emigration Incentives	-0.039*** (0.011)	-0.064*** (0.008)	0.014** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.011*** (0.002)
Satisfaction (democracy)	0.053*** (0.016)	-0.049*** (0.012)	0.007 (0.009)	0.004 (0.007)	0.001 (0.003)
Satisfaction (democracy)	0.055*** (0.014)	0.028*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.056*** (0.006)	0.002 (0.003)
Constant	2.893*** (0.145)	2.151*** (0.113)	1.184*** (0.085)	1.246*** (0.063)	1.038*** (0.027)
<i>N</i>	8838	9227	9195	9194	8722

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Next, we perform regression analysis in each country. The result is summarized in Table 3. To save space, we only report the estimates of the key variables. For the association between emigration preference and voting participation, the estimated result is basically similar to the aggregate models. However, the hypotheses are confirmed in most countries but not every country. The trend in engaging in solving local issues model is less clear. More countries have the opposite sign or are not significant. It makes sense since getting together with others to try to resolve local problems is an activity that goes between the conventional and non-conventional activities. It is a traditional form of political participation but it also needs a great deal of civil initiative.

For the contentious activities, protest participation and the use of force or

violence have similar pattern. It is significant in most countries. However, in some countries such as China and Vietnam, the question of use of force or violence is not asked, so we are less certain about the application of the theoretical prediction to the more authoritarian form of states. Petition participation exhibits a less clear pattern than the other two contentious activities. This makes sense since petition signing is more about the general issues such as environment protection and human rights. These issues, unlike unemployment and pollution, do not pose an immediate threat or cause a tangible damage to the participant. People will not consider petition as an effective method to timely address their grievances or discontents.

Thailand is a model case, where all the five types of participation fit the result. The political charged society over the past decade there may contribute to this trend. Note that the two authoritarian-leaning countries of China and Vietnam, despite limited space for political participation, are also to a large extent fit the general picture. If we focus only on voting and protest, the two main participation activities, the two authoritarian countries fit the hypothesis pretty well. For some of the countries that are not supported by the data, Hong Kong stands out as a unique case. Those who are willing to emigrate tend to vote more. It is likely because that those discontent Kong Kongese worry about the dominance of Chinese influence in the assembly and eager to participate. Philippine is also a unique case. It has a long emigration tradition. The propensity of emigration is so high that the association between emigration preference and political participation choices disappear. South Korea has a tradition of social protest even dated back to the authoritarian rule. In recent years, the contentious form of political participation is increasing become more popular in Taiwan, partly due to the rise of post-materialism and partly due to the inability of the political system to deal with the stagnant economy. This is probably the reason the contentious part of the story does not apply to these two countries. Myanmar is a country that just begins to

left the closed military rule. Despite the newly inaugurated election, political participation is considerably limited. This factor contributes to the insignificant relationship we found here.

Conclusion

We find that emigration preference is associated with political participation choices. First, emigration preference is negatively associated with voting participation and with solving local problems. Second, emigration preference is positively associated with voting signing petition, participating in protest, and using force.

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Table 3 Emigration Preference and Political Participation, by country

	Japan	Hong Kong	Republic of Korea	Mainland China	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	Vietnam	Cambodia	Malaysia	Myanmar
Voting	No	(+)***	(-)**	(-)**	No	No	(-)**	(-)**	(-)**	No	(-)**	No	(-)*	(-)**
Local	No	(+)***	(-)**	No	No	(+)**	(-)**	(-)**	No	No	(-)**	No	No	No
Petition	No	(+)***	No	No	(+)***	(+)*	No	(+)***	No	(+)***	No	No	No	No
Protest	(+)**	(+)***	No	(+)**	(+)***	No	No	(+)***	No	(+)**	n/a	(+)**	(+)**	No
Force	(+)**	(+)***	No	n/a	(+)***	No	No	(+)***	(+)**	n/a	n/a	No	(+)***	No

Report emigration preference only. No denotes no significant relationship. n/a denotes data not available.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

