Why East Asians React Differently to democratic Regime
Chang: Discerning Their Routes to Becoming Authentic Democrats

Doh Chull Shin
University of Missouri

Issued by
Asian Barometer Project Office
National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica
2007 Taipei
The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied research program on public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance around the region. The regional network encompasses research teams from twelve East Asian political systems (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, and Indonesia), and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). Together, this regional survey network covers virtually all major political systems in the region, systems that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

The ABS Working Paper Series is intended to make research result within the ABS network available to the academic community and other interested readers in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Scholars in the ABS network also devote their work to the Series with the hope that a timely dissemination of the findings of their surveys to the general public as well as the policy makers would help illuminate the public discourse on democratic reform and good governance. The topics covered in the Series range from country-specific assessment of values change and democratic development, region-wide comparative analysis of citizen participation, popular orientation toward democracy and evaluation of quality of governance, and discussion of survey methodology and data analysis strategies.

The ABS Working Paper Series supercedes the existing East Asia Barometer Working Paper Series as the network is expanding to cover more countries in East and South Asia. Maintaining the same high standard of research methodology, the new series both incorporates the existing papers in the old series and offers newly written papers with a broader scope and more penetrating analyses.

The ABS Working Paper Series is issued by the Asian Barometer Project Office, which is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science of National Taiwan University and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. At present, papers are issued only in electronic version.

Contact Information
Asian Barometer Project Office
Department of Political Science
National Taiwan University
21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan 100
Tel: 886-2-2357 0427
Fax: 886-2-2357 0420
E-mail: asianbarometer@ntu.edu.tw
Website: www.asianbarometer.org
Why East Asians React Differently to Democratic Regime Change: Discerning their Routes to Becoming Authentic Democrats

Abstract

Citizens of third-wave democracies lived most or all of their lives under authoritarian rule prior to the initiation of democratic regime change. Their long exposure to authoritarian life has made it difficult for many of these citizens to reject authoritarianism fully or to accept democracy fully. Consequently, their reactions to regime change often vary more in kind than in magnitude. Yet survey-based studies of democratization to date have been concerned exclusively with levels or magnitude of democratic support and authoritarian opposition among ordinary citizens, without taking into account the various ways citizens simultaneously orient themselves toward their past and present regimes. Unlike these studies, our research examines the distinct ways in which East Asians react to democratic regime change and compares powerful influences on each of these orientations.

The analysis of the East Asia Barometer surveys reveals that citizen reactions form four distinct orientation types: hybrids, anti-authoritarians, proto-democrats, and authentic democrats. It also reveals that although combinations of different factors significantly affect these four types, democratic regime experience and adherence to Confucian values are the most pervasive and powerful forces determining which orientation a citizen has. On the basis of this finding, we conclude that citizen reactions to democratic regime change are as much an outcome as a cause of democratic practice. We also conclude that Confucianism matters a great deal in the process of subjective democratization in East Asia.
Why East Asians React Differently to Democratic Regime Change: Discerning their Routes to Becoming Authentic Democrats

“human beings individually and collectively do not react to an ‘objective’ situation in the same way as one chemical reacts to another when they are put together in a test tube.”

Barrington Moore, Jr., 1966, 485

The current wave of democratization began spreading from Southern Europe more than three decades ago. Since then, this wave has washed the shores of every region around the globe, and more than eighty countries have made significant progress toward democracy by holding free and competitive elections and by expanding political competition among multiple political parties (Freedom House 2006; Marshall and Gurr 2005; Shin 2007; UNDP 2002). These changes alone, however, do not constitute a fully functioning democratic political system. As Rose and his associates (1998, 8) aptly point out, these institutions constitute only “the hardware” of representative democracy.

To operate this institutional hardware, a democratic political system requires congruent “software” (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton and Shin 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Both the scholarly community and policy circles widely recognize that what ordinary citizens think about democracy and its institutions is a key component of such software. Many scholars and policymakers, therefore, increasingly recognize that the consolidation of nascent democratic rule cannot be achieved unless an overwhelming majority of the mass citizenry embraces it as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996; see also Diamond 1999; Rose and Shin 2001).
Despite such growing recognition that ordinary citizens play a crucial role in the process of democratization, how they react to this process and what forces determine their reactions still remain a subject of considerable uncertainty. In what different ways do citizens orient themselves toward democratization, once the process gets underway? Why, after a substantial period of democratic rule, do some citizens commit themselves to democracy unconditionally, while many more citizens remain superficially attached to it without being dissociated from authoritarianism? What motivates citizens to remain committed or uncommitted to the process of consolidating nascent democratic rule? Does the improved quality of regime performance or some other set of concerns shape their reactions to the process?

Our study attempts to address these questions in the context of East Asia, a region where Confucian values are often viewed as a powerful deterrent to democratization because they are not compatible with the values and norms of liberal democracy (Zakaria 1984; see also Huntington 1991; Hu 1997; Pye 1985). East Asia is also the region that has resisted the powerful wave of global democratization despite three decades of rapid and sustained economic growth and social modernization (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Dalton and Shin 2007). Of the more than two-dozen independent states and autonomous territories in the region, only six countries are currently called electoral democracies and only five meet Freedom House’s criteria for a liberal democracy. There is little doubt that East Asia is a laggard in the third wave of global democratization, which is still in progress.

Our research seeks to identify the distinct ways in which East Asians orient themselves to democracy and its alternative regimes, and to ascertain the forces that most
powerfully shape each of these orientations. To explore these orientations and their sources, this paper uses data culled from the first round of the East Asia Barometer (EAB) survey project. These multi-national public opinion data, gathered between 2001 and 2003, consist of responses collected through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected voters in Japan (N=1,418), South Korea (N=1,500), Mongolia (N=1,096), the Philippines (N=1,200), Taiwan (N=1,415), and Thailand (N=1,546) (more information about the EAB surveys is available from its website: http://www.asianbarometer.org/)

We present our study in eight parts. In the section that follows immediately, we offer a critical review of public opinion research on third-wave democracies. Based on this review, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding how and why citizens orient themselves to democratization. The second section explicates the notion of citizen orientations to democratic regime change, one form of subjective democratization, and also ascertains four types of their orientations. The third section discusses seven theoretical models, each of which constitutes an alternative explanation of these orientations. The fourth section discusses how we determined the four types of citizen orientations to democratic regime change and measured the key variables underlying each of the seven theoretical models that are chosen as independent variables. The fifth and sixth sections highlight, respectively, national and demographic differences in the ways in which East Asians orient themselves to democratic regime change. The seventh section examines the factors that contribute most to each of these orientation types and compares these factors across the types. The final, eighth section summarizes key findings and discusses their implications for further democratization in East Asia.
Prior Research

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there has been a significant growth in public opinion research on popular support for democracy in new democracies. Among the best-known projects are the New Democracies Barometer, the New Europe Barometer, the Latinobarometer, and the Afrobarometer (for a review of these studies, see Diamond 2001; Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005; Norris 2004). These barometers and many other national and international surveys have generated a great deal of valuable information about the various roles the citizenry plays in the process of democratic transition and consolidation. Undoubtedly, we now know a lot more than before about citizen support for democracy and its sources and dynamics across countries, regions, and even continents (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Diamond 2001; Rose 1999; Shin 2007). Yet the existing body of survey-based studies suffers from a number of serious deficiencies that leave our specific inquiries unanswered.

Geographically, most of these studies are based on the national and cross-national surveys conducted in the regions outside East Asia. Consequently, many key survey findings from democratizing countries in Africa, Europe, and Latin America are yet to be confirmed in the context of East Asia, which is different from any other region in terms of cultural values and socio-economic modernization. Imbued with Confucian cultural values and “blessed” with economic prosperity under authoritarian rule, East Asians are not likely to react to the process of democratization in the same way as their peers do in other regions. How differently or similarly East Asians react to this process has yet to be the subject of a systematic investigation (Chang, Chu, and Huang 2006; Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Shin and Wells 2005).
Conceptually, previous research endeavors have often failed to consider together the ways in which citizens react to democracy and its alternatives. Some of these endeavors have focused merely on their reactions to democracy, to the exclusion of non-democratic regimes. Even in ascertaining their democratic reactions, others have focused on the ideals of democracy and excluded its practices (Gibson 2006; Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992). Having failed to consider anti-authoritarian and/or practical democratic orientations, many previous survey-based studies offer only partial or segmented accounts of the multi-dimensional process of subjective democratization that takes place in the minds of ordinary citizens.

In examining citizens’ reactions to democracy-in-practice, moreover, some studies uncritically assumed that all citizens recognize the existing regime as a democracy (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). In the real world of democratizing countries, however, a substantial minority refuses to recognize their current regime as a democracy. Their favorable or unfavorable reactions to the current regime should not be considered indicative of their support for or opposition to democracy. Thus a serious substantive error undermines these studies that equate orientations toward the existing regime with those toward democracy itself.

Analytically, previous studies with few exceptions (McDonough, Barnes, and Lopez Pina 1998; Shin and Wells 2005) focus exclusively on the level or quantity of pro-democratic or anti-authoritarian regime orientations. Computing the percentages accepting of democracy and opposed to its alternatives and comparing those percentages on a separate basis have been one popular mode of analysis. Another equally popular mode is to construct a composite index of democratic support or authoritarian opposition
and to compare its mean scores across time and space (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). With these percentages and means alone, we are not able to ascertain the qualitatively different ways in which people orient themselves to democratic regime change. In other words, those statistics are not suitable for unraveling how democratic orientations interact with authoritarian orientations in the minds of ordinary citizens. Failing to capture the categories of these interactions, previous research tends to provide a static rather than dynamic account of subjective democratization taking place among individual citizens.

Theoretically, the extant survey-based studies as a whole tend to offer less than a full account of why citizens react to democratization in the way they do. Over the past two decades, an increasing number of theoretical models have been advanced to determine the powerful forces shaping mass political orientations (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Newton 2005; Mishler and Rose 2005). In analyzing the etiology of citizen reactions to democratic change, however, much of the previous research has tested these models on a highly selective basis. As a result, the existing literature as a whole offers a far from complete account of citizen reactions.

In an attempt to overcome these deficiencies in the literature, this study analyzes both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian regime orientations and identifies four distinct orientation types among the mass publics of East Asia. It also examines how the proportion of citizens falling into those categories varies across different demographic groups. Finally, it determines which theoretical models offer the fullest accounts of each type and compares those models across the four types.
Conceptualization

The central concept of our inquiry is citizen reactions to the democratization of authoritarian rule. This is a compound concept referring to the change taking place at the micro-level of individual citizens in the wake of a transformation at the macro-level of a political system and its institutions. To explicate this concept, we first need to identify what each of the two dynamic phenomena refers to and then to specify the exact nature of their interaction.

What constitutes the democratization of an authoritarian political system and its institutions? Institutionally, it involves a transition from authoritarian rule to a political system that allows ordinary citizens to participate and compete on a regular basis in the election of political leaders. Substantively, it also involves a process in which electoral and other institutions of representative democracy consolidate and become increasingly responsive to the preferences of the citizenry. Of these two types of democratic change—institutional and substantive—our study focuses on the former dealing exclusively with democratic regime change.

How do people react to the transformation of an authoritarian regime into a democracy? They react both behaviorally and psychologically. Behaviorally they can take part, either actively or passively, in the anti-authoritarian movement to dismiss authoritarian leaders and to end authoritarian rule. They can also participate in the pro-democratic movement to formulate a new democratic constitution and hold founding elections. Psychologically, they can react to such democratic regime change by accepting or rejecting it in varying degrees. Because all of the countries in our investigation have already completed the process of democratic regime change, our study focuses on
psychological reactions, which are still unfolding. In our study, therefore, citizen reactions to democratic regime change refer to a mental contest in which democratic and non-democratic regimes compete against each other for the position of preferred regime. These reactions, therefore, constitute the subjective dimension of democratization among individual citizens.

How do democracies and its alternatives interact with each other in the subjective world of democratization? Does the acceptance of one necessarily lead to the rejection of the other? To address this question systematically, we assume that citizens of emerging democracies have little experience and theoretical knowledge about democratic politics and thus find neither democracy nor dictatorship to be a fully satisfying solution to the many problems facing their societies. Under such uncertainty, many of these democratic novices embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently (Rose and Mishler 1994; Rose, Mishler, and Haepfer 1998; Shin 1999). A growth in their pro-democratic orientations, moreover, does not necessarily bring about a corresponding decline in their anti-authoritarian orientations or vice versa.

As a result, citizen orientations toward democracy and authoritarian rule can take four types: (1) neither the full embrace of democracy nor the full rejection of authoritarian rule; (2) the full rejection of authoritarianism without the full embrace of democracy; (3) the full embrace of democracy without the full rejection of authoritarianism; and (4) the full embrace of democracy along with the full rejection of authoritarian rule. Of these four reaction types, the fourth represents unconditional commitment to democratic regime change. The larger the proportion of these democrats,
the broader and deeper is the scope of subjective democratization among the mass citizenry.

**Theories of Subjective Democratization**

Why do citizens react differently to democratization? Why do some citizens remain hybrids while others become authentic democrats? What motivates citizens to become proto-democrats rather than anti-authoritarians? The extant literature does not provide a satisfactory answer to any of these questions. To date, most of the scholarly efforts have focused primarily on the question of why some people support democracy and oppose authoritarianism more or less than other people do. As a result, relatively little is known about why many citizens of emerging democracies remain attached to authoritarian rule more than a decade after its demise. Much less is known about the different ways citizens orient themselves toward democracy and authoritarianism. What factors determine whether an individual citizen will accept both forms of government, reject both, or prefer one over the other? The literature provides a number of complementary theoretical perspectives regarding this question.

**Socialization and Cultural Values**

Why do so many citizens of third-wave democracies remain attached to the political values and practices of the authoritarian past even after a substantial period of democratic rule? The socialization and cultural values theories emphasize the cumulative effect of decades of socialization to non-democratic values, including the Communist, Confucian, and Islamic values of collectivism, egalitarianism, elitism, and hierachism (Dahrendorf 1990; Eckstein et al. 1998; Hahn, 1991; Jowitt 1992; Sztompka, 1991). Adherence to such pre-democratic values, these theories claim, makes it difficult
for citizens to reorient themselves toward democratic values, especially toward the values of liberalism and pluralism that figure significantly in democratic political order. If citizens of former Communist states, for example, feel that the principles and norms of their new democratic regime run counter to the pre-democratic values in which they were socialized for all or most of their lives, they might be reluctant to commit themselves to democracy. The more strongly people adhere to the collectivistic or hierarchical values of the pre-democratic period, the more cautious they are likely to be about embracing democracy as the preferred form of government.

**Democratic Political Learning**

The *democratic political learning theory*, often called the *learning model*, emphasizes a different side of human nature than does the socialization theory. While the latter emphasizes the difficulty people have changing their political attitudes and values, the former emphasizes their propensity to change when subjected long enough to a new environment. Specifically, the learning model emphasizes "an informal process by which individuals acquire their beliefs through interactions with their political environments" (McClosky and Zaller 1984, 12). Through repeated, long-term involvement in the political process, people become familiar with and integrated into changes in the political system in which they live. Familiarity with the new democratic process, therefore, breeds contentment or satisfaction with it and encourages citizens to endorse the view that democracy is superior to its alternatives. Proponents of this political learning and re-socialization attribute upward shifts in democratic support to longer or positive experiences with the functioning of democratic institutions (Converse 1969; Dahl 1989; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Weil 1994).
Modernization and Cognitive Competence

The modernization or neo-modernization theory offers an explanation for why certain segments of the mass citizenry are more likely to appreciate the virtues of a new democratic regime and to become involved in the new democratic political process. This theory emphasizes the role of socioeconomic development in generating democratic political orientations, which Inglehart and Welzel (2005) characterize as “self-expression values.” Economic development enables an increasing number of people to satisfy their basic needs and thus to acquire new knowledge and skills through formal education. Through this process of socioeconomic development, they also become exposed to the new values of post-materialism and the virtues of democracy. Thus socioeconomic development encourages appreciation for democratic values. However, not everyone exposed to these values embraces new democratic political ideas and demands the democratization of authoritarian rule. In fact, only a minority does so initially. Thus the modernization theory is often paired with the cognitive competence theory, which emphasizes the cognitive capacity of citizens to deal with the complexity of political life and influence its process.

Regime Performance

The regime performance theory emphasizes the performance of the democratic regime under which citizens currently live (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Klingeman and Hoefferbert 1998; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Shin and McDonough 1999). Specifically, it contends that citizens increase their support for democratic regime change in proportion to the benefits they see such change bringing to their prioritized interests (Gastil 1992; see also Schwartz 1987). If they feel that democratization promotes their
goals, citizens become more supportive of the process; if they feel that it hinders their
goals, they become less supportive.

In the empirical literature, there is general agreement that subjective evaluations
of political performance matter more than subjective evaluations of economic
performance. In their research on post-Communist countries, Rose, Mishler, and
Haerpfer (1998), for example, found that people are more supportive of the current
democratic regime when they are satisfied with its political performance than when they
are satisfied with its economic performance. In a similar study on post-Communist
Europe, Evans and Whitefield (1995) also found that political performance is more
important than economic performance in generating democratic support among its mass
citizenry. In Africa as well, the government’s capacity at delivering political goods
rather than economic benefits was found to be more important for approval of democracy
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Rose, Mishler, and
Haerpfer 1998).

Social Capital

Alexis de Tocqueville and his followers have long argued that a viable democracy
requires a vibrant and robust civil society. Specifically, they have emphasized the
importance of citizen involvement in the social networks of associations and groups in
fostering the norms of reciprocity and trust among the mass public life (Diamond 1999;
example, citizens active in civic affairs and trusting of other fellow citizens embrace the
virtues of democracy in general and also support the current democratic system, which
allows them to pursue freely what they value for themselves and their community. In the
literature on civil society, therefore, associational activism and interpersonal trust are generally viewed as contributing to the allegiance of citizens to democracy-in-practice and their commitment to democracy-in-principle (Dalton 2006; Putnam 2000; Seligson 1999).

These seven theoretical models offer alternative explanations of why citizens of new democracies remain attached to democracy or detached from non-democratic regimes. Only when we consider all of these models together, therefore, can we offer a comprehensive account of why citizens react differently to democratic regime change. With rare exceptions (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998), however, previous studies have failed to do this. In none of the previous studies to date, have patterns of subjective democratization been ascertained and explained in terms of all seven of these theoretical models found in the literature on democratization. Consequently, we know a lot about why people become more or less strongly attached to democracy or detached from authoritarianism, but we know very little about why citizens vary so greatly in the routes they take to becoming authentic democrats. We want to find out why some citizens remain attached to both democracy and authoritarianism while others reject both and still others favor one over the other.

Measurement

As discussed above, citizen reactions to democratic regime change are conceptualized as categorical variables whose values vary in quality, rather than quantity. These variables are measured by considering responses to two sets of three separate items. The three items in the first set tap the extent to which respondents endorse the desirability, suitability, and preferability of democracy as a political system. The three items in the
second set tap the extent to which respondents were detached from the virtues of authoritarian regimes, including those of military, civilian, and one-party dictatorship. Considering citizens’ responses to the items in both sets, we determined whether they were fully attached to democracy and fully detached from authoritarianism. Then considering together the status of such democratic attachment and authoritarian detachment, we identified four types of subjective democratization.

The first type called hybrids refers to those who are neither fully detached from authoritarianism nor fully attached to democracy. The second type called anti-authoritarians refers to those who are fully detached from authoritarianism but have yet to endorse democracy fully. The third type called proto-democrats refers to those who have not yet detached fully from authoritarianism but who endorse democracy fully. The fourth type called authentic or committed democrats refers to those who are both fully detached from authoritarianism and fully attached to democracy.

Why does any particular East Asian experiencing democratization belong to one of these four distinct types? We have identified seven theoretical models that can serve as alternative explanations. The first two models concern socialization to practices of the authoritarian past and adherence to the values of Confucianism. We measured adherence to Confucian values with two pairs of items: one pair taps deference to authority, and the other taps opposition to pluralism. Another pair of items involving the characteristics of gender and age also measures socialization to the authoritarian way of life. In Confucian societies, females must often submit to their male counterparts at home as well as in public. Age matters because it determines how long a person lived under authoritarian rule prior to the democratic transition.
The next two models deal with modernization. On one level, modernization occurs when citizens experience economic wellbeing and thus can expand their knowledge and skills. On a deeper, psychological level, modernization occurs when citizens are exposed to the ideas of democratic politics and become competent in understanding the democratic process. We measure the first dimension of modernization with levels of family income and educational attainment and with community type, whether urban or rural. We measure the cognitive or psychological dimension of modernization in terms of exposure and mobilization into the world of politics, the capacity to define democracy in one’s own words, and the perceived ability to understand the complexity of politics.

Learning democratic politics can also take a variety of forms. Normatively, citizens can internalize freedom, equality, tolerance, and other values and norms of democracy. In practice, they can become familiar with the way democracy operates and satisfied with its workings. We focus on the practical dimension and chose the awareness of the current regime as a democracy and the positive assessment of its overall performance as two dichotomous indicators of democratic political learning. We considered these two dichotomous indicators together and formulated four ways citizens learn to view their new democracy. Those four ways include as an unsatisfactory authoritarian regime, a satisfactory authoritarian regime, an unsatisfactory democracy, and a satisfactory democracy. In addition to this variable of regime perception, we employed participation in the electoral process—voting and attending campaign rallies—as an indicator of democratic political learning.
Regime performance is divided into two categories, one on political performance and the other on economic performance. For the political performance category, we considered the extent to which respondents rated political parties and the parliament as trustworthy and the degree to which they perceived national and local governments as corrupt. For the economic performance category, we combined negative, neutral, and positive assessments of the national and household economies together into a 5-point index.

In the literature on civil society, social capital is widely viewed as a two-dimensional phenomenon. Structurally, it refers to the extent to which people are connected with each other through the networks of voluntary associations and groups. Culturally, it refers to the extent to which they trust their fellow citizens. We considered associational membership and interpersonal trust as two separate indicators of social capital.

**National Differences in Citizen Orientations to Regime Change**

To ascertain the patterns of regime orientations in East Asia, we first measured levels of attachment to democracy and detachment from authoritarianism. We define full attachment to democracy as the presence of democratic desire, the endorsement of the suitability of democracy, and preference for democracy. We define full detachment from authoritarianism as the rejection of military, civilian, and one-party rule. We use these measures of democratic and authoritarian regime orientations to create our dependent variable comprising four types of regime orientations. This section compares the mean levels of democratic support and authoritarian opposition across the six new East Asian democracies in our study.
To measure democratic support, we selected three questions from the EAB surveys, which tapped, separately, desirability of democracy, suitability of democracy, and preference for democracy. The first question asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they want to live in a democracy on a 10-point numeric scale in which scores of 1 and 10 indicate, respectively, “complete dictatorship” and “complete democracy.” The second question asked them to rate the suitability of democracy on a 10-point scale. A score of 1 means that democracy is “completely unsuitable,” and a 10 means “completely suitable.” Scores of 6 and above on these two 10-point scales were considered pro-democratic responses. The third question asked whether respondents always prefer democracy to any other kind of government. Affirmative responses to this question were considered pro-democratic. To estimate the overall level of citizens’ attachment to democracy, we counted their pro-democratic responses, which could range from 0 to 3. A score of 0 indicates a complete lack of support for democracy, and a score of 3 indicates full attachment to democracy.

[Table 1 here]

For each country, the top panel of Table 1 reports the percentages affirming the desirability, suitability, and preferability of democracy separately and together. In all six countries, large majorities of three-quarters or more expressed the desire to live in a democracy. In all these countries, substantial majorities of more than three-fifths judged democracy as suitable for their country. In always preferring it to any other form of government, however, the respondents were divided into two groups. In Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand, majorities expressed unqualified preference for democratic rule. In Korea and Taiwan, however, less than half the population expressed such
democratic support. When all these pro-democratic responses are considered together, majorities were fully supportive of democracy in three countries—Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the other three countries, minorities, ranging from 30 percent in Taiwan to 47 percent in Mongolia, were fully supportive. When all six East Asian countries are considered together, the pooled sample shows that full supporters of democracy constitute a minority of 48 percent. This indicates that about half the mass citizenry in democratic East Asia has yet to embrace democracy fully even after more than a decade of democratic rule.

To measure the levels of detachment from authoritarianism, we selected three questions from the EAB surveys, each of which asked respondents whether they would agree or disagree with the regimes of the authoritarian past, including military rule, civilian dictatorship, and one-party dictatorship. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the percentages rejecting each and all of these three non-democracies. We counted the number of those anti-authoritarian responses and estimated the overall level of detachment from authoritarianism. Scores on this index range from a low of 0 to a high of 3. The table shows that in every East Asian democracy, large majorities reject each non-democratic alternative. When responses to all three non-democratic regimes are considered, however, the fully detached constitute minorities in three of the six countries—Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand. It’s noteworthy that two of the countries, the Philippines and Thailand, also appeared on the list of countries in which majorities rather than minorities expressed full support for democracy. Clearly, accepting democracy fully is one thing and rejecting its alternatives fully is another matter.
On the basis of whether respondents fully accept democracy and fully reject authoritarianism, we next classified them into the four types of regime orientations: hybrids, anti-authoritarians, proto-democrats, and authentic democrats. *Hybrids* neither embrace democracy nor reject authoritarianism. *Anti-authoritarians* are not fully supportive of democracy but are fully detached from authoritarianism. *Proto-democrats* accept democracy fully but do not reject authoritarianism to the same extent. *Authentic democrats* fully embrace democracy and fully reject authoritarianism. Table 2 presents the distribution of these four types of regime orientations for each of the six countries.

The table reveals considerable differences in the patterns of subjective democratization for the six countries. In terms of the most and least popular orientation types, for example, the six countries are divided into four groups. In two countries—Mongolia and the Philippines—hybrids are the most popular and anti-authoritarians are the least popular. In Korea and Taiwan, anti-authoritarians are the most popular and proto-democrats are the least popular. In Thailand, on the other hand, proto-democrats are the most popular and anti-authoritarians are the least popular. Only in Japan, which represents the oldest East Asian democracy, are authentic democrats, the most ardent supporters of democracy, the most popular, and even here, proto-democrats, not hybrids, are the least popular. Why regime orientations vary so much in East Asia remains a mystery.

Despite such national differences, the six countries are, by and large, alike in two important respects. In none of the countries do authentic democrats constitute a majority. Even in Japan, East Asia’s oldest democracy, less than two out of five people fully accept
democracy while rejecting its alternatives fully. In all six countries, moreover, majorities do not fall into any of the four regime orientation types. Generally, only relatively small pluralities of less than one-third fall into each type. In none of these countries do pluralities of more than two-fifths adhere to any type. In four countries, moreover, nearly one-fifth or more belongs to each orientation type. Such divisions may be one of the reasons why these new East Asian democracies have been struggling to become fully consolidated (Chang, Chu, and Park 2007; Cheng 2003; Croissant 2004).

**Demographic Differences in Patterns of Regime Orientations**

We now examine how the patterns of subjective democratization vary across different segments of the East Asian mass publics. Table 3 presents the relationship between the four types of regime orientation and the five demographic variables of gender, age, education, household income, and type of community.

[Table 3 here]

Regarding gender, females are most likely to be either hybrids or authentic democrats, while males are most likely to be authentic democrats. Compared to males, females are more reluctant to reject authoritarianism and to accept democracy to the fullest extent. Concerning age, the youngest group splits fairly evenly between hybrids, antiauthoritarians and authentic democrats but have significantly fewer proto-democrats in their ranks. The 30- to 39-year-olds are also significantly less likely to be a proto-democrat than any other type, but unlike their younger counterparts, they are most likely to be authentic democrats. Members of the next two groups, which covers 40- to 59-year-olds, are also most likely to be authentic democrats than any other type, but members of
the 60 and older group are slightly more likely to be hybrids than they are to be authentic democrats. Clearly, age does not have a linear relationship with orientation type.

Higher levels of education are associated with consistently lower proportions of hybrids and a nearly opposite relationship with authentic democrats. As a result, hybrids are most numerous among the illiterate, while authentic democrats are most numerous among those with a college education. Looking at income, members of the lowest group are significantly more likely to be hybrids than any other orientation type and the lowest income group also has significantly more hybrids than does any other group. Members of every other income group are more likely to be authentic democrats than any other orientation type, though their breakdown among those other types varies widely. Regarding community, both urban respondents and rural respondents are most likely to be authentic democrats, but urban respondents are much more likely than their rural counterparts to be anti-authoritarians, while rural respondents are much more likely to be proto-democratic.

Considering all five of these demographic characteristics together shows that the proportions of hybrids are higher among females, older people, the least educated, and the lowest income group. Those of anti-authoritarians are higher among young people, the college-educated, middle-income people, and rural residents. The proportions of proto-democrats are higher among older people, the college-educated, and urban residents, and those of authentic democrats are higher among males, the middle-aged, the college-educated, and the upper middle income group.
Sources of Subjective Democratization

To discover why citizens vary so greatly in the routes they take to becoming authentic democrats, we make use of seven theoretical models, each of which constitutes an alternative explanation of regime orientations. These models are socialization, culture, modernization, cognitive awareness, political learning, institutional performance, and social capital. Of these seven models, which ones offer the most and least powerful explanations of each regime orientation type? To address this question, we performed a Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) on the pooled sample of six EAB surveys.

MCA is known as the equivalent to a multiple regression analysis using dummy variables. Unlike ordinary least-square and other statistical techniques, the MCA does not require the normal distribution of units. Nor does it require that all predictors are measured on interval scales or that the relationships be linear. It is, therefore, capable of handling predictors measured on nominal and any other scales and interrelationships of any form among the predictor variables and between a predictor and dependent variable. It is also capable of handling a dichotomous dependent variable with frequencies that are not extremely unequal (Andrews, Morgan, and Sonquist 1973). This technique is, therefore, more pertinent in the analysis of public opinion data than others, although it is not as popular as some.

We employed MCA to analyze the four types of subjective democratization, each of which is measured as a dichotomy. In analyzing each type, we considered a total of fifteen variables as predictors. Fourteen of these variables are independent variables representing the seven theoretical clusters known in the literature to influence citizen orientations to democratic and other regimes. In addition, the six countries studied here
are in the MCA as a single control variable in order to estimate accurately the extent to which each independent variable affects each type of subjective democratization independent of others. Table 4 reports the \( \text{eta} \) and \( \text{beta} \) coefficients for each predictor. Being equivalent to standardized regression coefficients, the \( \text{beta} \) coefficients allow us to determine the relative importance of each independent variable as an influence on the dependent variable.

[Table 4 here]

Of the 14 independent variables listed in the table, seven variables—gender, age, community type, participation in the electoral process, memberships in voluntary associations, interpersonal trust, and assessments of the national economy and household finances—have no significantly independent effect on any of the four orientation types. The first two of these four variables are indicators of socialization to authoritarian politics, while the third one indicates exposure to modernization. Electoral participation is an indicator of learning about electoral politics, while assessments of the national and household economies indicate institutional performance.

Contrary to what is expected from the literature on socialization and modernization, varying levels of exposure to authoritarian politics and modern life do not have any significant independent effect on the way East Asians react to the democratic regime change taking place in their country. Such exposure appears to affect their reactions only indirectly through the particular types of values they have acquired from the socialization and modernization processes. Likewise, participation in the most fundamental democratic process of electing their political leaders appears to shape their regime reactions indirectly through the cultivation of cognitive capacity. Contrary to the
claims of social capital literature, neither joining in formal associations nor trusting other fellow citizens contributes to the democratization of authoritarian regime orientations. Finally, as shown in earlier research conducted in other regions, assessments of the national economy and personal financial situations matter little to such subjective democratization among East Asians.

Of the seven remaining independent variables, whose beta coefficients are .05 or higher, five have a significant effect only on one or two of the four types identified here. For example, education and income have such an effect on one type apiece, while cognitive competence, institutional trust, and governmental corruption have a significant effect on two apiece. Higher education discourages East Asians from becoming hybrids, while large incomes encourage them to become authentic democrats. Neither of these two modernization indicators significantly affects adherence to any other orientation type. This finding suggests that in East Asia, direct consequences of socioeconomic development for democratization among the mass citizenry are quite limited in scope. This may help explain why East Asia has become a region of laggards in the current wave of democratization despite decades of rapid and sustained socioeconomic development.

Cognitive competence significantly affects the two extreme regime orientation types. Increases in exposure to politics and the ability to understand democracy and politics in general make East Asians less likely to be hybrids and more likely to be authentic democrats. Trust in the democratic institutions of political parties and Parliament makes citizens less likely to be anti-authoritarians and more likely to be proto-democrats. Perceptions of corruption in the national and local government, on the other
hand, makes citizens more likely to be anti-authoritarians and less likely to be authentic democrats. Clearly, these variables as sources of subjective democratization have much stronger affects on some orientation types than on others.

Unlike all other theoretical variables considered in our study, Confucian values and democratic regime experience have significant effects on all four orientation types. As the adjusted percentage figures reported in Figure 1 show, Confucian values, which stress deference to authority and uniformity in mode of thinking, discourage East Asians from becoming anti-authoritarians or authentic democrats, while encouraging them to become hybrids or proto-democrats. In striking contrast, the experience of a well-functioning democratic regime discourages them to become hybrids or anti-authoritarians, while encouraging them to become proto-democrats or authentic democrats (see Figure 2). Even when the effects of all other variables are statistically removed, those unattached to Confucian values are nearly twice more likely to become authentic democrats than those highly attached to those values (41% vs. 22%). Those who embrace the current regime as a well-functioning democracy are also nearly twice more likely to become authentic democrats than those who dismiss it as a malfunctioning authoritarian regime (36% vs. 19%). Moreover, for all four types of regime orientations, these two independent variables register the two highest beta coefficients for all or most patterns. There is no doubt that Confucian values and regime experience are not only the most pervasive but also the most powerful influences on subjective democratization among East Asians.

[Figures 1 and 2 here]
We now compare the three variables that influence each regime orientation type to the greatest extent. For the two extreme categories, hybrids and authentic democrats, the most influential variables are cognitive sophistication, Confucian cultural values, and positive democratic learning. Of these three variables, cognitive competence and regime assessments significantly weaken adherence to the hybrid orientation while strengthening adherence to the authentic democratic orientation. Confucian values, on the other hand, strengthen the former while weakening the latter. According to the magnitude of the beta coefficients reported in Table 4, positive democratic regime experience is the most powerful force affecting the hybrid orientation. On the other hand, Confucian values shape the authentic democratic orientation most powerfully.

The two intermediate categories of anti-authoritarian and proto-democratic orientations are, by and large, shaped by Confucian cultures, positive democratic experience, and trust in democratic institutions. All three of these variables affect the two categories in exactly the same fashion. They significantly discourage East Asians to become anti-authoritarians and encourage them to become proto-democrats. They appear to serve as forces transforming anti-authoritarians into proto-democrats.

Finally, we compare the number of all the variables that significantly affect each category of regime orientation to determine how different combinations of independent variables shape the category. Table 4 shows that these combinations involve between three and five of the fourteen variables. Of the fourteen theoretical variables considered, only four—Confucian values, education, cognitive competence, and democratic regime experience—are significant influences on the hybrid orientation. Regarding the antiauthoritarian orientation, the significant influences are Confucian values, democratic
regime experience, institutional trust and perception of governmental corruption. The same values, minus perception of governmental corruption, have significant influence on the proto-democratic orientation. In the case of the authentic democratic orientation, which involves the full acceptance of democracy and the full rejection of authoritarianism, five variables have significant influence: Confucian values, income, cognitive competence, democratic regime experience and perception of government corruption. Although the number of significant factors varies from one category of regime orientation to another, the significant factors vary little in kind. In East Asia, it appears that different combinations of the same five variable clusters—culture, modernization, cognitive competence, democratic political learning, and institutional performance—determine the contours and dynamics of subjective democratization. Of these five variable clusters, Confucian culture and democratic learning are the two most powerful and pervasive promoters of democracy.

**Summary and Conclusions**

In the scholarly community and policy circles there is a growing consensus that the democratization of authoritarian rule requires more than the inauguration of competitive elections and a multiparty system. These electoral processes become effective only when a large majority of the citizens fully accepts the new democratic regime while fully rejecting its alternatives. Without such a majority of fully committed democrats, countries in democratic transition will likely struggle to become complete or consolidate democracies. They are more likely to hobble along as “broken-back” democracies (Rose and Shin 2001).
To understand the process of democratic consolidation from the perspective of the mass citizenry, an increasing number of international and national public opinion surveys have been conducted throughout global regions. So far, studies based on these surveys have been concerned exclusively with the levels or magnitude of democratic support and/or authoritarian opposition among ordinary citizens whose political systems were transformed into a democracy after decades of authoritarian rule. Consequently, we know a lot about why people become more or less strongly attached to democracy or detached from authoritarianism, but we know very little about why citizens vary greatly in the routes they take to becoming authentic democrats, i.e. why some citizens remain attached to both democracy and authoritarianism while others reject both and still others favor one over the other. Our study has attempted to fill this gap in survey-based studies of democratization by examining the dynamic patterns and sources of subjective democratization among the mass citizenries of six East Asian democracies.

Our analysis of the EAB surveys conducted a few years ago in the countries reveals that in all East Asian democracies, majorities of the publics do not endorse democracy as “the only game in town” even after more than a decade of democratic rule. With the exception of Japan, those fully endorsing democracy do not even constitute pluralities in any of the countries. Instead, the majorities of their citizens remain hybrids, anti-authoritarians, and proto-democrats by refusing to accept democracy fully or to reject authoritarianism fully. A lack of broad authentic democratic support and a high degree of fragmentation into all four distinct categories of regime orientations constitute notable characteristics of subjective democratization in East Asia.
Theoretically we found that decades of socialization into the authoritarian mode of life and greater involvement in civic life have no significant impact on the way East Asians react to the regimes of different natures. Of the five other clusters of theoretical variables, the clusters of Confucian values and democratic learning significantly affect all four orientation types. In addition, cognitive competence and modernization significantly affects the two extreme orientation types (hybrids and authentic democrats), and institutional performance significantly affects every orientation type but hybrids. In short, the number of significant influences and the most pervasive influences on regime orientations vary considerably across orientation categories. This can be considered another notable characteristic of subjective democratization in East Asia.

The more notable of our findings concerns Confucianism. According to the data presented in Table 4, it affects two types, proto-democrats and authentic democrats, more powerfully than democratic regime experience or any other theoretical variable considered. This finding, that Confucianism is the most powerful influence promoting the full embrace of democracy, runs counter to findings of previous research, which shows that Confucian values have little or inconsistent effects on different aspects of democratic support (Chang, Chu, and Tsai 2005; Dalton and Ong 2006; Park and Shin 2006). In addition, our finding reveals that Confucianism, which is widely believed to be incompatible with the values of democracy, does more than undermine subjective democratization among East Asians. As expected from the Asian values debate (Bell 2006; de Barry 1998; Fox 1997; Zakaria 1984, 2003), adherence to the Confucian values of hierarchism and anti-pluralism undermines democratization by discouraging citizens to become anti-authoritarians or authentic democrats while encouraging them to become
hybrids. What is unexpected is the finding that these values encourage some East Asians to become proto-democrats, who fully embrace democracy. The more strongly they uphold those values, the more they are likely to embrace democracy without rejecting its alternatives fully. Since the full embrace of democracy is one important dimension of subjective democratization, we wonder whether Confucianism plays multidirectional roles of detracting from and contributing to the process at the same time (Fukuyama 1995; Hahm 2005). This is the question future research should examine more rigorously with multidimensional measures of Confucianism.

Finally, our findings call into question the notion that regime orientations, either democratic or authoritarian, are a reflection of diffuse commitment reflecting deep-seated values. Contrary to what Easton (1975) and others (Di Palma 1993; Inglehart 2002; Kornberg and Clarke 1983) have suggested in the past, these orientations are not impervious to change; instead they grow and decline in response to a variety of forces, including regime experience and institutional performance. Our results are an important piece of evidence that the divergent ways citizens react to democratic regime change are as much an outcome as a cause of democratic practice (Mueller and Seligson 1994; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mishler and Rose 2002; Newton 2005).
References


Table 1 National Differences in Democratic Support and Authoritarian Opposition
(in percent)

A. Democratic Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Pooled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desirability</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitability</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferability</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all of the above)</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Authoritarian Opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Pooled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military rule</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian dictatorship</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party dictatorship</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all of the above)</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. National Differences in Patterns of Subjective Democratization
(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Mongolia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Pooled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hybrids</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiauthoritarians</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proto-democrats</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic democrats</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3 Demographic Differences in Patterns of Subjective Democratization
(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Hybrids</th>
<th>Antiauthoritarians</th>
<th>Proto-democrats</th>
<th>Authentic democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 &amp; older</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterates</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary ed.</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary ed.</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary ed.</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4  The Relative Effects of Independent and Control variables on Four Patterns of Subjective Democratization (MCA estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Hybrids</th>
<th>Antiauthoritarians</th>
<th>Proto-democrats</th>
<th>Authentic democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eta</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Eta</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucian values</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Competence</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Learning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral participation</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental corruption</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic performance</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ass. Membership</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Country)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(R²) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)

Beta coefficients of .05 and higher are statistically significant at the .01 level.
Figure 1. Confucianism and Patterns of Regime Orientations

% of Population

Levels of Confucian Attachment

- ■ Hybrids
- ○ Antiauthoritarians
- ▲ Proto-democrats
- ▼ Authentic democrats
Figure 2. Democratic Regime Experience and Patterns of Regime Orientation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


36. Wang Zhengxu, and Tan Ern Ser. 2007. Are Younger People in Asia more Pro-democratic: Lifecycle Effects or Generational Changes?


38. Chong-min Park, and Jaechul Lee. 2007. Are Associations the Schools of Democracy across Asia?


Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

For more information, please visit our website: www.asianbarometer.org