



A Comparative Survey of

*DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT*

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Partisanship and Institutional Trust:  
A Comparative Analysis of Emerging Democracies  
in East Asia

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## **Asian Barometer**

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

# **Working Paper Series**

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Partisanship and Institutional Trust:  
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## **Introduction**

Trust in political institutions has important political consequences, including a regime's legitimacy (Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane 2006, p. 883). What are the factors that affect citizens' trust in political institutions? Intuitively speaking, citizens trust political institutions when those institutions perform well (Lipset and Schneider 1987; Hetherington 1998; Putnam 1994). However, how do citizens acquire the information and use it to appraise political institutions? The media, as the main channel of public information, can of course affect institutional trust by its coverage of institutional performance and scandals (Orren 1997). In a more subtle and yet under-developed way, social capital theory argues that institutional trust is closely associated with vibrant social networking and social trust (Putnam 2001). These theories view institutional trust as the end product of good government performance and studies in this vein focus mainly on what factors uphold government performance and the flow of information.

This seemingly objective way of assessing political institutions has shortcomings. Firstly, trust is a psychological phenomenon. According to a classic definition, "An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed" (Deutsch 1958, p. 266; Warren 1999). Such risk-taking behavior involves not only an objective

assessment of whether the expected event actually occurs but also a subjective calculation on the part of the trusting person. Secondly, institutional trust is more complicated because political institutions were designed with different principles and purposes. In particular, some institutions function through partisan elections while others through more neutral processes. When assessing partisan institutions, identifiers of political parties are often confronted with information that conflicts with their partisan cognitions. In this paper, we argue that trust in partisan institutions, vis-à-vis trust in neutral institutions, is likely to be subject to cognitive dissonance, and citizens may rely their partisanship as a heuristic shortcut in evaluating the trustworthiness of partisan institutions. Without including partisanship as a subjective factor in the analysis of institutional trust, we are omitting a variable that may be as important as the objective factors underlying institutional performance.

Subjective factors of institutional trust are important in established democracies, but they should be even more important in emerging democracies. This is because political institutions in emerging democracies are not far removed from these countries' authoritarian past and are likely to invoke ambivalent emotions from citizens. Until these emotions completely die down, trust or suspicion in political institutions may depend on subjective factors in emerging democracies more than in established democracies.

In this paper, we investigate the effect of partisanship on institutional trust in six emerging democracies in East Asia. Using data from the third wave Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), we construct indicators of institutional trust and identify their determinants. We focus on partisanship as our key explanatory variable. Our research question concerns the asymmetric effect of party ID, i.e., whether identifiers of the opposition parties tend to have weaker institutional trust. But we also look into different types of political institutions to see if the asymmetric effect is more pronounced in partisan institutions than in neutral institutions. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings on the consolidation of democracy.

### **Institutional Trust and Its Sources**

According to social capital theory, trust in political institutions is the end product of vibrant social networking and generalized trust (Putnam 2001). Putnam (1993, 2001) reasons as social capital develops, it also helps build efficient and effective political institutions, which in turn boost people's trust in those institutions. The social capital theory, however, has raised some theoretical questions and lacked consistent empirical support. Theoretically, the working mechanism of how generalized trust and social networking helps improve government performance is unclear. To Putnam, it seems that social capital contributes to government

performance through two means. The first is civic responsibility as a response to social trust; and the second is civic engagement with public concerns in mind (1993). The two mechanisms, however, are based on different logics. While the first requires self-consciousness and honesty of politicians and officials to perform well, the later is actually a monitoring mechanism that keeps politicians/officials accountable. In other words, social capital is paradoxically begetting both trustworthy politicians and suspicious citizens at the same time. While this paradox may be inherent in the classic concept of trust, i.e., trust is essentially a risk-taking behavior and hence the trusting party must be wary of the trusted party, it does render dubious the causal effects of social capital on institutional trust.

Besides its theoretical ambiguity, social capital theory also faces mixed empirical support. Cross-national comparison of institutional trust shows that social trust is positively correlated with institutional trust in advanced democracies (Newton and Norris 2000). In the United States, earlier levels of social trust were found to contribute to institutional trust in the later time, but social networking only has a modest effect on institutional trust (Damico, Conway, and Damico 2000). In newly democratized countries, such as South Korea, it was found that civic engagement had no effect on institutional trust while social trust is negatively correlated with institutional trust (Kim 2005). How do we reconcile these heterogeneous findings? Some

scholars suggest that all political institutions are not the same because that they were designed with different principles and purposes. It is therefore necessary to distinguish different types of political institutions in investigating the causal relationship between social capital and institutional trust.

### **Institutional Trust and Types of Political Institutions**

When investigating institutional trust, researchers usually lump all political institutions together to form a single measure of institutional trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) criticized such a one-dimensional view. Firstly, some institutions, such as the executive office and the parliament, are supposed to operate along partisan lines. In democracies, these institutions are organized by elections in which political parties with different platforms compete for control. After an election, citizens expect these institutions to make policies consistent with the ideology of the party that wins the election. Under such a premise, confidence in these institutions is likely to vary among citizens according to whether or not they identify with the incumbent party. Thus, associating trust in these institutions with social trust only may be misleading if partisanship is not taken into account. Secondly, other political institutions, such as the courts, the military, and the police are supposed to operate in an impartial, non-partisan manner. These institutions are



crucial for maintaining the order and efficiency of governance. Hence, if trust is a risk-taking behavior, the performance of these institutions is pertinent with the development of social trust since they are the institutions that punish trust abusers in a society. Therefore, Rothstein and Stolle argue, it is specific to these neutral institutions that social trust and institutional trust are likely to be associated.

Based on data from the third wave of World Values Survey, Rothstein and Stolle found three dimensions underlying the indicators of institutional trust. They named the three factors partisan institutions (represented by parliament, political parties, and government etc.), neutral and order institutions (the military, the police, and legal institutions), and power checking institutions (TV and the press). Treating trust in different types of institutions as independent variables, Rothstein and Stolle (2008) found a positive relationship between institutional trust and generalized trust. They, however, did not investigate the effects of partisanship on trust in different types of institutions at individual level.

For the U.S. case, Lipset and Schneider (1983) conducted factor analysis in an attempt to discover the underlying structure of institutional trust. They were generally satisfied with a one-factor solution, although their results hint that the media might be different from all other political institutions. Cook and Gronke (2001) used both exploratory and confirmatory factor

analysis to reveal a much more complex structure of institutional trust. Pooling cross sections of the General Social Survey from 1973 to 1998, Cook and Gronke found Republicans tend to have less confidence in the media but more in other institutions, while Democrats tend to have more confidence in the media but less in other institutions. While Cook and Gronke tested the effect of *party identification per se*, Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane (2006) focused on *identification with the party in control of an institution*. Their findings show that American party identifiers tend to have more trust in Congress when their own party is in control.

These studies indicate that institutional trust is a psychological attitude that depends on both the trusting citizen's party identification and the type of the institution to which trust is to be conferred. None of the works cited above, however, has investigated the effects of partisanship on different types of institutions at the individual level. In this paper, we propose that the effect of partisanship on institutional trust is moderated by institutional type, specifically whether the institution in question is partisan or neutral in nature. Our argument is based on the social psychological theory of cognitive dissonance to which we now turn.

## **Theory and Hypotheses**

The literature discussed above shows that institutional trust may be influenced by various

sources, including government performance, social capital, news consumption, and party identification. In this paper, we focus on the relationship between institutional trust and party identification. Specifically, we follow Rothstein and Stolle (2008) in distinguishing between partisan institutions and neutral institutions and examine their respective relationship with party identification. We consider the media as a separate dimension concerning institutional trust but do not investigate its determinants.

The reason that trust in partisan institutions and trust in neutral institutions are fundamentally different, we argue, can be better illuminated by the theory of cognitive dissonance in social psychology (Festinger 1957). When conflicting ideas or events cannot be reconciled, people tend to alter their cognitions in order to reduce the discomfort caused by the resulting disequilibrium. Cognitive dissonance is likely to be at work when the occurrences of new events are compounded by the lack of information. The theory has been used to explain the so-called issue projection in which voters' perceptions of candidates' issue positions are influenced by their own positions and their evaluations of those candidates (Brody and Page 1972; Kinder 1978; Conover and Feldman 1982; Lin 2010). Specifically, a voter who supports a political candidate may perceive a proximity closer than reality between the candidate's position and the voter's own position because a wider distance, even if objectively true, is hard to

reconcile with the fact that the voter supports the candidate. Likewise, a voter who opposes a candidate may perceive a distance wider than reality between the candidate's position and the voter's own position. Such subjective perceptions help balance conflicting cognitions and reduce the discomfort caused by cognitive dissonance.

We argue that cognitive dissonance is likely to be at work when a party identifier is asked to appraise the trustworthiness of a political institution. To the extent that the institution is associated with partisan politics, identifiers of the incumbent party are likely to perceive it as more trustworthy than what is objectively justified by the performance of the institution. Conversely, identifiers of the opposition party are likely to perceive the institution as less trustworthy than justified. Overall, there is going to be a significant gap in institutional trust between identifiers of the incumbent party and those of the opposition party, controlling for social capital, government performance, news consumption, etc. The trust gap should manifest itself in political institutions in general because voters tend to perceive the incumbent party as responsible for all governmental institutions. However, we argue that, when partisan institutions are separated from neutral institutions, the trust gap pertains mainly to partisan institutions because the politicians in control of these institutions are unmistakably affiliated with the political parties with which citizens may or may not identify. Conversely, we argue that the trust

gap should be less prevalent concerning neutral institutions.

In contrast with the asymmetry in the effects of party identification on trust in partisan vs. neutral institutions, we argue that the asymmetry should not be present in the effects of social trust. The notion of social trust is non-partisan in nature. There is no reason to expect asymmetric effects. We expect social trust to have significant effects on both partisan and neutral institutions.

Overall, we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Controlling for social capital, government performance, news consumption, and socioeconomic status, identifiers of the opposition parties, compared with identifiers of the incumbent party, tend to have less trust in political institutions in general.

Hypothesis 2: Controlling for social capital, government performance, news consumption, and socioeconomic status, identifiers of the opposition parties, compared with identifiers of the incumbent party, tend to have less trust in partisan institutions. However, they do not necessarily have less trust in neutral institutions.

Hypothesis 3: *Ceteris Paribus*, social trust tends to have positive effects on both partisan and neutral institutions.

## **Data and Methods**

To test our hypotheses, we use data from Wave 3 of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). This wave of the ABS includes 11 countries, from which we chose Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, which we consider emerging democracies. Emerging democracies are particularly relevant to our investigation because, as we pointed out in the introduction, subjective factors of institutional trust may be more prevalent in these countries. Because these countries have different political systems and levels of democracy, we conduct our analysis for each country respectively instead of polling all countries together in a single analysis.

Concerning institutional trust, the ABS asked its respondents to indicate their degree of trust in 13 institutions, including the president (or prime minister), the courts, the national government, political parties, parliament, civil service, the military, the police, local government, newspapers, television, the election commission, and NGOs. We exclude NGOs from our analysis. For the exact wording of the item and the scale of trust, see Appendix 1.

An important decision for our analysis is how to define partisan institutions and neutral institutions. Conceivably, whether an institution is partisan or neutral depend on the historical and political contexts of each country. Without detailed knowledge of these contexts, one way to operationalize institutional trust is to use exploratory factor analysis to sort out the institutions. In

practice, there are difficulties with this approach as the number of significant factors may differ from country to country and those factors may not unambiguously coincide with partisan and neutral institutions. Furthermore, different operational definitions from country to country are certainly not conducive to the comparison of institutional trust in these countries. Because of these considerations, we decide to impose a consistent operational definition for all countries. We argue that the involvement of national elections, in which all major parties compete, is the principal criterion for partisan politics. Thus we classify the president/prime minister, the national government, political parties, and parliament as partisan institutions and the courts, civil service, the military, the police, local government, and the election commission as neutral institutions. Newspapers and television obviously belong to a different type of institutions which we do not explore in this paper.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the level of trust in partisan institutions and neutral institutions by country. It shows that trust in both types of institutions is generally lower in Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia than in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. A more notable pattern, however, is that trust in neutral institutions are consistently higher than trust in partisan institutions across all six countries. Furthermore, the standard deviations associated with neutral institutions are consistently smaller than those associated with partisan institutions, implying a

higher degree of consensus in citizens' trust in neutral institutions. Since our theory stipulates that trust in partisan institutions, but not trust in neutral institutions, is mitigated by partisan politics, the divergence in both the level and the spread of trust between the two types of institutions provides a sort of discriminant validity to our measures (Campbell and Fiske 1959). The correlations shown in Table 1 also indicate that although the two measures are not completely independent, the extent of overlap is at most modest.

(Table 1 about here)

The statistics shown in Table 1 are based on composite scales. In the analysis below, we turn to factor analysis. Firstly, we apply exploratory factor analysis with the principal component method to 12 indicators of institutional trust. For all six countries, there is a single, dominant factor with eigenvalue significantly exceeding 1.<sup>1</sup> We define this factor as general institutional trust, inclusive of all partisan, neutral, and media institutions. Secondly, we apply confirmatory factor analysis to extract three factors with their indicators fixed for trust in partisan, neutral and

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<sup>1</sup> The eigenvalues are 4.60 for Korea, 3.87 for Taiwan, 2.62 for Mongolia, 4.28 for The Philippines, 4.93 for Thailand, and 4.68 for Indonesia.



media institutions, respectively, according to our *a priori* definitions. Table 2 provides the results of our confirmatory factor analysis complete with goodness of fit statistics.

(Table 2 about here)

The factor scores of general institutional trust, trust in partisan institutions, and trust in neutral institutions serve as our dependent variables. To test our hypotheses, we choose as our independent variables party identification, civic engagement, social trust, government performance in the economy, government performance in anticorruption, news consumption, age, education, and income. A brief account of these measures is given in Appendix 1.

We now turn to our regression analyses and the implications of their results.

## **Results and Discussion**

As Table 3 illustrate, our first hypothesis is supported by empirical data in most cases (see column 1). Thus, citizens do evaluate political institutions in a subjective way in that partisanship plays a role that biases the evaluation. In most countries, other things being equal, citizens who identify with the opposition parties, compared with identifiers of the incumbent party, tend to

regard that political institutions are less trustworthy. Thus, studies that ignore the effect of partisanship might overemphasize the significance of other, less biased factors. Our next finding shows that more objective evaluation exists only in the assessment of neutral institutions.

(Table 3 about here)

Our second hypothesis postulates that the effect of partisanship is only significant in relation to partisan institutions due to the characteristics of these institutions. As columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 show, partisanship does play a role affecting trust in partisan institutions even when controlling the assessment of government performance. On the other hand, the effect of partisanship almost entirely disappears in relation to neutral institutions. This hypothesis gets strong support especially from Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand, where identifiers of the main opposition parties (first party under the category of party ID), compared with identifiers of the incumbent party (the intercept), feel that partisan institutions are less trustworthy. However, when evaluating neutral institutions, party ID does not play a role that biases the evaluation; people are more likely to assess them based on government performance. This finding is important since it indicates that citizens do not assess all political institutions in a similar way; they

incorporate subjective assessment on partisan institutions but objective assessment on neutral institutions. If we lump both types of political institutions together, we might not be able to detect the difference. Nonetheless, we notice that people without any party ID in Taiwan and identifiers of other parties in the Philippines show more negative attitude toward neutral institutions. They might be cynical citizens who distrust the government in general and thus bias is present in both types of institutions.

Cases that cast doubt to the hypothesis are Mongolia and Indonesia. For Mongolia, identification with the Democratic Party has no effect on trust in partisan institutions but a negative effect on neutral institutions. For Indonesia, identification with none of the opposition parties has significant effects on either partisan or neutral institutions (although nonpartisans do tend to distrust neutral institutions as compared with supporters of the incumbent Democratic Party). Although further probing to the results is necessary, here we offer some explanations. We argue that the answer lies on the level of politicization of political institutions in these two countries.

The political situation in Mongolia after 2008 was mired in electoral dispute. Although the Democratic Party lost the election, it became a coalition partner of the MPRP's government. Moreover, in 2009 a Democratic candidate was elected as president (Bulag 2009, 2010). The

reconciliation of the two main political parties lessened partisan confrontation, and this situation is reflected in the level of trust in partisan institutions of party identifiers. On the other hand, it seems that the electoral dispute damaged the reputation of the election commission and the civil service. Doubts about their impartiality might lead the supporters of the opposition parties to trust them less.

The Indonesia case exhibits no clear partisan cleavage in institutional trust. This might be due to the high popularity of the current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly known as SBY), who was re-elected in 2009 without a runoff. The popularity of SBY has taken a toll on the other two major parties, Golkar and PDIP-Struggle (Sherlok 2009). To lessen the concern over the domination of his party, SBY invited parties in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to join his cabinet (Mietzner 2010, p. 189). The gesture of SBY that reduces partisan contestation might help explain the nonfinding.

These two cases do to an extent qualify our second hypothesis and/or typology of institutions on which the hypothesis is based. The presumption that neutral institutions are impartial players in politics sometimes does not hold in new democracies. Moreover, political parties might choose to cooperate despite their ideological differences. Any generalization that does not take into account local context is incomplete. Nonetheless more studies are required for

the two deviant cases.

Our third hypothesis concerning the effect of social trust gets support in all cases except Thailand.<sup>2</sup> This indicates that the relationship between social trust and institutional trust is present in new democracies in East Asia. On the other hand, the relationship between civic engagement and institutional trust is absent in all cases except South Korea. Between the two essential components of social capital, social trust seems more relevant than civic engagement as determinants of institutional trust. Thus, Putnam's causal relationship of joining and trusting is not substantiated here. Our results are more in agreement with Rothstein and Stolle's (2008) argument that social trust has a stronger state effect than does networking. For instance, in ABS Wave II, social trust in Thailand was high: 45% of respondents thought that most people could be trusted. That trust level declined dramatically in 2010 when ABS Wave III was conducted, with only 26% of respondents deeming their fellow citizens as trustworthy. Meanwhile, membership of formal organizations has increased from 24% to 44%. The contradictory trends do not square with social capital theory. We suspect that the political conflict resulted from the military coup of 2006 has decreased social trust which in turn decreased trust in partisan institutions.

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<sup>2</sup> The result of Thailand needs further study since only 38% of the observations are analyzed in the regression model. This is due to large amounts of missing values in questions about government performance, civic engagement, and income.

## **Conclusion**

The profound influence of institutional trust on regime legitimacy has long been confirmed.

It is thus very important to investigate the determinants of institutional trust. Existent studies tend to neglect the effect of partisanship and, hence, omit a crucial factor of institutional trust.

This paper addresses the issue by looking into how partisanship affects trust in political institutions in general and partisan and neutral institutions in particular. Empirical findings from six emerging East Asian democracies largely support our theory and hypotheses.

Our findings shed some lights on social capital theory. The presumption that institutional trust is generated from objective assessment of government performance does not hold true across all types of political institutions. Since partisan institutions are formed through elections, and parties in control of these institutions represent the interests of their constituents, trust in these institutions is subject to partisan bias. Because of cognitive dissonance, partisanship can be projected to citizens' assessment of these institutions.

At first glance, the implications of our findings seem pessimistic. If institutional trust is subject to partisan projection, there is a limit as to what a democratic government can do to improve trust by improving governance. In recent years, the governments of some of the East

Asian countries we investigated here have suffered from dramatic decline in political trust. Our findings raise the question as to whether such decline is due to bad governance or increasing partisan polarization. This question is especially pertinent to emerging democracies because partisan polarization is a lingering fact from these countries' authoritarian past. Obviously whichever cause it was, extensive distrust is always not conducive to a regime's legitimacy, but how to adequately address the problem will depend on the correct diagnosis of its source.

## Appendix 1.

### (1.1) ABS Items on Institutional Trust

Question	Wording
Q7-19	I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Is it <b>a great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?</b>
Q7	The president (for presidential system) or Prime Minister (for parliamentary system)
Q8	The courts
Q9	The national government
Q10	Political parties
Q11	Parliament
Q12	Civil service
Q13	The military (or armed forces)
Q14	The police
Q15	Local government
Q16	Newspapers
Q17	Television
Q18	The election commission [specify institution by name]

Note: All the questions have the same scale but the scale is reversed in the factor analysis:

1. none at all
2. not very much trust
3. quite a lot of trust
4. a great deal of trust



## **(1.2) Items used as Independent and Control Variables**

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<b>Item</b>	<b>Question</b>
Q47	Partisanship: Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to? Partisanship is recoded as dummy variables. The details of coding scheme are provided in 1.3.
Q20-22	Civic engagement: membership in formal groups. Civic engagement is recoded as 0. “Non-member” and 1. “Member(s)”.
Q23	Social trust: it is recoded as 0. “You must be careful in dealing with people, and 1. “Most people can be trusted”.
Q3	Government performance-economy: What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition a few years from now? The variable is recoded as 1. “Much worse”, 2. “A little worse”, 3. “About the same”, 4. “A little better”, and 5. “Much better”.
Q118	Government performance-anti-corruption: In your opinion, is the government working to crack down on corruption and root out bribery? The variable is recoded as 1. “Doing nothing”, 2. “It is not doing much”, 3. “It is doing something”, and 4. “It is doing its best”.
Q44	News consumption: How often do you follow news about politics and government? The variable is recoded as 1. “Practically never”, 2. “Not even once a week”, 3. “Once or twice a week”, 4. “Several times a week”, and 5. “Everyday”.
SE3a	Age
SE5	Highest level of education
SE13	Income quintile

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### (1.3) Coding Scheme of Partisanship

Country	Coding
Korea	<p>Governing Party: Grand National Party</p> <p>Main opposition party: Democratic Party</p> <p>Other parties: identifiers with parties other than the governing party and the main opposition party.</p> <p>No Party ID: respondents who are not close to any party.</p>
Taiwan	<p>Governing Party: Pan Blue parties, including the KMT, the PFP, and the New Party</p> <p>Main opposition party: Pan Green parties, including the DPP and TSU.</p> <p>No Party ID: respondents who are not close to any party.</p>
Mongolia	<p>Governing Party: MPRP</p> <p>Main opposition party: Democratic Party</p> <p>Other parties: identifiers with parties other than the governing party and the main opposition party.</p> <p>No Party ID: respondents who are not close to any party.</p>
The Philippines	<p>Governing Party: TEAM Camp, including the LAKAS and LDP.</p> <p>Main opposition party: GO Camp, including the LP, PMP, and PDP-LABAN.</p> <p>Other parties: identifiers with parties other than the governing party and the main opposition party.</p> <p>No Party ID: respondents who are not close to any party.</p>
Thailand	<p>Governing Party: Democratic Party</p> <p>Main opposition party: Peua Thai Party</p> <p>Other parties: identifiers with parties other than the governing party and the main opposition party.</p> <p>No Party ID: respondents who are not close to any party.</p>
Indonesia	<p>Governing Party: Democratic Party</p> <p>Main opposition party 1: Golkar</p> <p>Main opposition party2: PDIP-Struggle</p> <p>Religious party: PKS, PAN, and PKB</p> <p>Other parties: identifiers with parties other than the governing party, the main opposition parties, and religious parties.</p> <p>No Party ID: respondents who are not close to any party.</p>

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**Table 1. Institutional Trust, by Country**

	Korea	Taiwan	Mongolia	Philippines	Thailand	Indonesia
Trust in Partisan Institutions						
Mean	1.91	2.14	2.12	2.29	2.54	2.55
Std. Dev.	0.58	0.54	0.55	0.67	0.69	0.60
N	1197	1548	1210	1199	1465	1514
Trust in Neutral Institutions						
Mean	2.35	2.47	2.31	2.58	2.81	2.75
Std. Dev.	0.53	0.48	0.50	0.62	0.62	0.49
N	1203	1567	1210	1198	1494	1520
Correlation between Trusts in Partisan and Neutral Institutions						
Corr.	0.60	0.61	0.50	0.68	0.61	0.73

**Table 2. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

<b>South Korea</b>				<b>Taiwan</b>			
Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3
Executive	1.0000	--	--	Executive	1.0000	--	--
Nat. Govt.	1.2126	--	--	Nat. Govt.	.9695	--	--
Party	1.0665	--	--	Party	.7510	--	--
Parliament	1.0469	--	--	Parliament	.8621	--	--
The courts	--	1.0000	--	The courts	--	1.0000	--
Civil service	--	1.1520	--	Civil service	--	.8755	--
The military	--	1.0410	--	The military	--	1.0067	--
The police	--	1.1366	--	The police	--	.9999	--
Local Govt.	--	1.0246	--	Local Govt.	--	.9178	--
Election Com.	--	.9751	--	Election Com.	--	.7364	--
Newspaper	--	--	1.0000	Newspaper	--	--	1.0000
Television	--	--	.8594	Television	--	--	1.0663

<b>Mongolia</b>				<b>The Philippines</b>			
Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3
Executive	1.0000	--	--	Executive	1.0000	--	--
Nat. Govt.	1.5558	--	--	Nat. Govt.	1.1194	--	--
Party	1.5367	--	--	Party	.9523	--	--
Parliament	1.9585	--	--	Parliament	1.0461	--	--
The courts	--	1.0000	--	The courts	--	1.0000	--
Civil service	--	1.1721	--	Civil service	--	.8693	--
The military	--	.7719	--	The military	--	1.0690	--
The police	--	.9843	--	The police	--	1.0472	--
Local Govt.	--	1.1084	--	Local Govt.	--	.8586	--
Election Com.	--	.9842	--	Election Com.	--	.9236	--
Newspaper	--	--	1.0000	Newspaper	--	--	1.0000
Television	--	--	1.2353	Television	--	--	.9236

<b>Thailand</b>				<b>Indonesia</b>			
Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3
Executive	1.0000	--	--	Executive	1.0000	--	--
Nat. Govt.	1.0547	--	--	Nat. Govt.	1.3091	--	--
Party	.8276	--	--	Party	1.2461	--	--
Parliament	.9243	--	--	Parliament	1.3870	--	--
The courts	--	1.0000		The courts	--	1.0000	
Civil service	--	1.1184	--	Civil service	--	.7577	--
The military	--	1.3705	--	The military	--	.4887	--
The police	--	1.3174	--	The police	--	.9223	--
Local Govt.	--	.9354	--	Local Govt.	--	.8151	--
Election Com.	--	1.2041	--	Election Com.	--	.7800	--
Newspaper	--	--	1.0000	Newspaper	--	--	1.0000
Television	--	--	1.2492	Television	--	--	1.1019

### Goodness of Fit Statistics

	S. Korea	Taiwan	Mongolia	Philippines	Thailand	Indonesia
RMSEA	0.0963, 90% CI= (0.0892, 0.1034)	0.0881, 90% CI= (0.0813, 0.0951)	0.0578, 90% CI= (0.0503, 0.0656)	0.0817, 90% CI= (0.0746, 0.0889)	0.1144, 90% CI= (0.1070, 0.1220)	0.068, 90% CI= (0.0620, 0.0758)
RMSR	0.0303	0.0266	0.0272	0.0374	0.0502	0.0198
TLI	0.8560	0.8477	0.8679	0.8782	0.8199	0.9258
CFI	0.8887	0.8823	0.8979	0.9059	0.8608	0.9427
AIC	2.4e+04	2.6e+04	2.8e+04	3.0e+04	2.5e+04	2.6e+04
BIC	2.4e+04	2.6e+04	2.8e+04	3.0e+04	2.5e+04	2.6e+04



Table 3. Regression Analysis of Institutional Trust

**(3.1) Korea**

	General Inst. Trust	Trust in Partisan Institutions	Trust in Neutral Institutions
<b>Intercept</b>	-.998**	-.531***	-.401**
(Grand National Party)	(.294)	(.149)	(.141)
<b>Party ID</b>			
Democratic Party	-.318***	-.189***	-.078
	(.083)	(.042)	(.040)
Other Parties	-.389**	-.234***	-.079
	(.118)	(.059)	(.056)
No Party ID	-.220**	-.128**	-.046
	(.074)	(.037)	(.035)
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Civic engagement	.120*	.044	.066*
	(.061)	(.031)	(.029)
Social trust	.259***	.097**	.128***
	(.060)	(.030)	(.029)
<b>Govt. Performance</b>			
Economy	.206***	.097***	.083***
	(.036)	(.018)	(.017)
Anti-corruption	.449***	.189***	.188***
	(.044)	(.022)	(.021)
<b>News Consumption</b>	-.091**	-.031*	-.037**
	(.029)	(.014)	(.014)
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>			
Age	.002	.001	.0009
	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)
Education	-.055**	-.014	-.027**
	(.019)	(.010)	(.009)
Income	-.027	-.015	-.017
	(.025)	(.012)	(.012)
No. of observation	989	989	989
R-squared	0.2330	0.1874	0.1799

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* <.001.

### (3.2) Taiwan

	General Inst. Trust	Trust in Partisan Institutions	Trust in Neutral Institutions
<b>Intercept (Pan Blue)</b>	-1.293*** (.257)	-.755*** (.135)	-.633*** (.127)
<b>Party ID</b>			
Pan Green	-.306*** (.078)	-.312*** (.041)	-.072 (.038)
No Party ID	-.416*** (.072)	-.245** (.038)	-.172*** (.035)
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Civic engagement	-.038 (.061)	-.050 (.032)	.030 (.030)
Social trust	.138* (.062)	.060 (.032)	.079* (.030)
<b>Govt. Performance</b>			
Economy	.210*** (.030)	.141*** (.015)	.059*** (.014)
Anti-corruption	.426*** (.040)	.216*** (.021)	.194*** (.020)
<b>News Consumption</b>	-.011 (.020)	-.007 (.011)	.001 (.010)
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>			
Age	.002 (.002)	.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
Education	-.040* (.020)	-.012 (.010)	-.015 (.009)
Income	-.047 (.025)	-.022 (.013)	-.010 (.012)
No. of observation	1017	1017	1017
R-squared	0.2298	0.2870	0.1685

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* <.001.

### (3.3) Mongolia

	General Inst. Trust	Trust in Partisan Institutions	Trust in Neutral Institutions
<b>Intercept (MPRP)</b>	-.790** (.242)	-.306*** (.074)	-.249* (.104)
<b>Party ID</b>			
Democratic Party	-.110 (.083)	.023 (.025)	-.098** (.035)
Other Parties	-.488*** (.129)	-.146*** (.039)	-.209*** (.055)
No Party ID	-.477*** (.094)	-.098** (.029)	-.201*** (.040)
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Civic engagement	.072 (.076)	.024 (.023)	.033 (.032)
Social trust	.355*** (.098)	.126*** (.030)	.098* (.042)
<b>Govt. Performance</b>			
Economy	.196*** (.040)	.053*** (.012)	.077*** (.017)
Anti-corruption	.277*** (.043)	.072*** (.013)	.111*** (.018)
<b>News Consumption</b>	.042 (.033)	.017 (.010)	-.001 (.014)
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>			
Age	-.005* (.002)	-.0003 (.0008)	-.002* (.001)
Education	-.049** (.014)	-.012** (.004)	-.015* (.006)
Income	-.034 (.031)	-.013 (.009)	-.005 (.013)
No. of observation	965	965	965
R-squared	0.1501	0.1386	0.1148

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* <.001.

### (3.4) The Philippines

	General Inst. Trust	Trust in Partisan Institutions	Trust in Neutral Institutions
<b>Intercept</b>	-.038	-.033	.009
(TEAM Camp)	(.246)	(.146)	(.152)
<b>Party ID</b>			
GO Camp <sup>2</sup>	-.220 (.114)	-.161* (.068)	-.100 (.071)
Other Parties	-.475** (.136)	-.336*** (.081)	-.238** (.084)
No Party ID	-.238* (.112)	-.168* (.067)	-.099 (.069)
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Civic engagement	.095 (.069)	.060 (.041)	.056 (.042)
Social trust	.435*** (.124)	.132 (.074)	.322*** (.077)
<b>Govt. Performance</b>			
Economy	.144*** (.028)	.100*** (.017)	.073*** (.017)
Anti-corruption	.206*** (.035)	.129*** (.021)	.109*** (.022)
<b>News Consumption</b>	.042 (.028)	.005 (.016)	.028 (.017)
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>			
Age	-.009*** (.002)	-.004** (.001)	-.005*** (.001)
Education	-.054** (.016)	-.029** (.009)	-.038*** (.010)
Income	-.105** (.036)	-.073** (.021)	-.052* (.022)
No. of observation	946	946	946
R-squared	0.1360	0.1386	0.1163

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* <.001.

1. TEAM Camp includes LAKAS and LDP. 2. Go Camp includes LP, PMP, and PDP-LABAN.

### (3.5) Thailand

	General Inst. Trust	Trust in Partisan Institutions	Trust in Neutral Institutions
<b>Intercept</b>	-1.372***	-.1008***	-.627***
(Democratic Party)	(.303)	(.202)	(.169)
<b>Party ID</b>			
Peua Thai Party	-.516***	-.630***	-.125
	(.133)	(.089)	(.074)
Other Parties	-.108	-.405**	.107
	(.200)	(.133)	(.112)
No Party ID	-.091	-.208**	.022
	(.091)	(.061)	(.051)
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Civic engagement	.082	.015	.084
	(.077)	(.051)	(.043)
Social trust	.152	.131*	.070
	(.089)	(.059)	(.050)
<b>Govt. Performance</b>			
Economy	.332***	.225***	.148***
	(.044)	(.029)	(.024)
Anti-corruption	.364***	.229***	.179***
	(.042)	(.028)	(.023)
<b>News Consumption</b>	.025	.025	.005
	(.036)	(.024)	(.020)
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>			
Age	-.004	-.001	-.002
	(.003)	(.002)	(.001)
Education	-.087***	-.035**	-.049***
	(.018)	(.012)	(.010)
Income	-.022	.012**	-.029
	(.034)	(.023)	(.019)
No. of observation	569	569	569
R-squared	0.3401	0.3687	0.2703

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \* p<.05; \*\* p<.01; \*\*\* <.001.

**(3.6) Indonesia**

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	General Inst. Trust	Trust in Partisan Institutions	Trust in Neutral Institutions
<b>Intercept</b>	-.833**	-.371**	-.521**
(Democratic Party)	(.275)	(.127)	(.168)
<b>Party ID</b>			
GOLKAR	.071 (.154)	.061 (.075)	-.017 (.094)
PDIP-Struggle	-.235 (.145)	-.108 (.067)	-.135 (.088)
Religious Party <sup>1</sup>	-.254 (.146)	-.110 (.067)	-.156 (.089)
Other Parties	-.157 (.151)	-.064 (.070)	-.133 (.092)
No Party ID	-.253* (.164)	-.104* (.047)	-.149* (.062)
<b>Social Capital</b>			
Civic engagement	-.205 (.164)	-.027 (.075)	-.090 (.100)
Social trust	.310*** (.066)	.156*** (.030)	.152*** (.040)
<b>Govt. Performance</b>			
Economy	.282*** (.034)	.128*** (.015)	.161*** (.020)
Anti-corruption	.283*** (.040)	.122*** (.018)	.164*** (.024)
<b>News Consumption</b>	-.014 (.021)	-.014 (.009)	-.007 (.013)
<b>Socioeconomic Status</b>			
Age	.0002 (.002)	-.0008 (.001)	.0007 (.013)
Education	-.033* (.015)	-.019** (.007)	-.018 (.009)
Income	-.146*** (.028)	-.060*** (.013)	-.081*** (.017)

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No. of observation	976	976	976
R-squared	0.2098	0.2069	0.1818

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Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

1. Religious parties include PKS, PAN, and PKB.