



A Comparative Survey of

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Political Culture and Diffuse Regime Support in Asia

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Andrew J. Nathan

What do differing levels of regime support in Asia tell us about the dynamics of state-society relations in different types of regimes, and about the stability of such regimes? This paper uses the 2002 EAB data and the preliminary 2006 AB data to address these questions, focusing on the role of political culture in shaping diffuse regime support, or legitimacy. In particular, I ask how two key key sets of political-cultural values (traditional social values and democratic values) interact with perceived regime performance to affect respondents' support for their country's current regime. In the process, the paper addresses some issues of general theoretical interest about both legitimacy and political culture, including how to measure them and how to assess the influence of culture on political behavior and attitudes.¹

Besides its substantive focus, this paper is an early attempt to use the 2002 and 2006 datasets together. Since these are not the same in every detail, the attempt raises questions of how to compare using partly different measures. I will appreciate colleagues' comments on conceptual and methodological problems encountered in doing so.

Because the 2006 data are not final, I have not tried to integrate the analysis of 2002 and 2006 data into the same tables. Instead, I have generated parallel tables as a basis for preliminary comparison and discussion.

The puzzle: levels of regime support and political culture. As we often note, our two datasets contain information about citizens' attitudes in different kinds of regimes. Most of the systems we study are democracies, but they vary in many ways, including their degree of consolidation.² China (and I suppose we will say Singapore) has an authoritarian system, Hong Kong a partial democracy, and Japan an old established democracy. This diversity in regimes affords the opportunity to compare various

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Southern California U.S.-China Institute's conference on "The Future of U.S. – China Relations," April 20-21, 2007. My thanks to the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, for supporting my work on this project, to Takayoshi Wiesner for research assistance, and to Kai-Ping Huang for answering questions about the datasets and other help.

² Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin, eds., *How East Asians View Democracy*, under submission to Columbia University Press.

political dynamics across regimes. The focus in this paper is on the determinants of diffuse regime support.

Diffuse regime support is synonymous with what we usually mean by political legitimacy, when that term is used in its behavioral or empirical rather than normative sense.³ David Easton distinguished among the political community, regime, and authorities, and between specific and diffuse support. Standing between the community – the state or nation – and the incumbent authorities, the regime is the system of political institutions. Diffuse support, Easton said, “refers to evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does.... Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall while this support, in the form of a generalized attachment, continues.”⁴

In general, political theory expects democratic regimes to be more legitimate than authoritarian regimes.⁵ Even though what Easton called “specific” support for the “authorities” rises and falls with political events (economic downturns or prosperity, losses or wins in war, political scandals, and so on), in a democracy diffuse regime support is thought to remain robust over time because citizens understand that the regime is accountable and the authorities or their policies can be changed if they perform badly and displease the citizens. Accountability (or responsiveness) is a feature of democratic regimes that citizens like, so their support for such regimes remains solid even when their support for the incumbent authorities is weak.

So goes the theory. We will not be able to use EAB/AB data to test it until we have accumulated data over a longer period of time. However, as I will discuss in a moment, the data we have now, shown in Tables 1a and 1b, raises red flags. The authoritarian regimes in our survey – China and Singapore – have some of the highest levels of regime support in Asia. The one old established democracy – Japan – has one of the lowest levels. I will come back to this in a moment.

In addition to the theory about regime type and legitimacy, four other bodies of theory offer hypotheses about causal chains that might affect a given public’s diffuse support for its regime. First, modernization theory suggests that socio-demographic changes in the population (urbanization, rising education levels, rising income levels) may render citizens more aware and critical of government; this in turn can affect legitimacy in different ways depending on regime type and performance. Second, communications theory suggests that access to and the contents of media can affect regime legitimacy positively or negatively, given a particular regime type and regime performance, depending on what kinds of messages the media convey. Third, public opinion studies suggest that perceived government performance affects legitimacy; regimes that deliver on issues that the public considers important gain support, and those that don’t lose support. Finally, political culture theory suggests that deeply-rooted attitudes about authority will affect citizen’s acceptance of different kinds of regimes.⁶

³ Normative legitimacy is the rightness of the regime’s claim to rule. Behavioral or empirical legitimacy is the level of the relevant public’s diffuse support for the regime.

⁴ David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5:4 (October 1975), p. 444.

⁵ Literature review on this point pending.

⁶ Literature review pending and the arguments need to be expanded.

These causal paths are complex and interacting, and we should not expect to find a formula that predicts regime legitimacy in a straightforward way from a simple suite of variables. But we can use the EAB project's comparative structure to throw light on how the four different causal chains interact in a variety of concrete national-historical circumstances.⁷ In this paper I want to focus in particular on the role of political culture in affecting regime legitimacy. Whether political culture matters has been much debated.⁸ Whether it matters for regime legitimacy is one of the interesting questions within this discourse. Thus I wish to ask whether political culture – understood as deeper, slower-changing public values and attitudes – has an effect of its own within the complex, contending set of processes that affect regime legitimacy.

Tables 1a and 1b frame the puzzle. They display the findings for several variables and scales from the EAB and AB that are relevant to our understanding of regime support in Asia, although not all of them are measures of diffuse regime support as such. Diffuse regime support is a difficult concept to measure. It is separate from public support for, or the popularity of, specific policies or specific incumbents. It is intrinsically multidimensional and in principle cannot be captured by a single questionnaire item. And the field so far lacks an established, accepted measure or set of measures of this concept.⁹ Therefore I have included in these tables as many variables from our two surveys as I could, for their informational value. Table 1a includes seven variables and Table 1b six variables, since the seventh variable does not exist in the 2006 dataset. While the first two variables in the tables come closest to measuring the concept of diffuse regime support, the others have reference value and will remain within our scope of analysis in this paper.

(Tables 1a and 1b about here)

The first item represents the concept of diffuse support most straightforwardly by asking respondents to agree or disagree with the proposition, “Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is still the best for us.” The second item mentions “democracy.” But since all the regimes that we surveyed claim to be democracies, I believe the question reveals a diffuse attitude toward the existing regime, even in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which have regimes whose claims to be democratic are generally not accepted by outside observers.

The next two items assess support for the regime in its specific character as a (self-claimed) democratic regime. The first is a scale derived by asking respondents to agree or disagree with four (in 2002) or three (in 2006) proposals to replace current institutions with various forms of authoritarian rule. We can argue that the respondent who rejects such alternatives is displaying an aspect of diffuse support for the current regime. (Only two of these questions were asked in China in 2002, about military rule and technocratic rule, since China already in effect has strongman rule and one-party

⁷ This paper does not explore the impact of media, but the EAB and AB datasets have variables that will make it possible to do so in future refinements of this investigation.

⁸ See, among others, Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000). More literature review to come.

⁹ Bruce Gilley, “The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries,” *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006), pp. 499-525. I will draw more broadly on Gilley's work in the future development of this project.

rule.) The second scale, commitment to democracy, is derived from a series of questions probing the respondent's support for democracy in five dimensions (whether it is desirable for one's country, suitable for the country, capable of solving the country's problems, preferable to other forms of government, and equally or more important than economic development). If the respondent agreed with three or more of these items he is coded as committed to democracy. For present purposes I treat this scale as assessing an aspect of diffuse regime support in places where the regime claims to be democratic, which as already noted includes all of the regimes we are studying.

The last three/two questions are less directly related to diffuse regime support, but are useful comparison points for our inquiry. "Satisfied with the current government" expresses support for the incumbents and policies rather than the regime; trust in government institutions focuses on specific institutions (the courts, the central government, parliament, the military, and local government) and asks about trust, which is presumably a component of support; "expects democratic progress" (Table 1a only) is a measure of optimism about the trend of events in the regime over the next five years.

The tables are arranged so that the country with the highest average level of positive responses on all these questions (Thailand in Table 1a and Singapore in Table 1b) is located on the left and the country with the lowest level (respectively Japan and the Philippines) is on the right. (The average itself has no strict meaning but is a convenient way to order the countries for a first impression of the data.) Cell percentages that are at or above the row average are in boldface (red) while those below the average are in nonbold (green). (The row average has no substantive meaning but simply provides the cutoff point for these typographical cues.)

Table 1a shows that China had the highest percentage of citizens in the region in 2002 who said "our form of government is the best for us" (94.4%), and the second highest who were "satisfied with how democracy works in our country" (81.7%). By contrast, the oldest established democracy in the region, Japan, had the lowest percentage on both measures. In Table 1b, in 2006, Singapore scored highest in both of these measures. These are the results I was referring to earlier which raise doubt about whether democratic regimes have the most robust legitimacy.¹⁰ But the doubts will not be

¹⁰ In fact, the findings may seem so surprising that some readers will ask whether the data are correct. To answer this question, one might first explore whether the samples and interview procedures were valid in each country. To this end we have compiled a methodological statement for the EAB and need to do so for the AB. Second, one would look at the performance of the datasets as a whole in a series of analyses, including those in this paper and in other publications, to see whether the data make sense across a wide range of findings. Third, questions about reliability and validity are alleviated when one looks at a variety of related items and scales as I do in this paper, a procedure that shows that the Chinese regime enjoys rather high support and the Japanese regime rather low support, comparatively speaking, on a variety of probes. A fourth question might be whether Chinese respondents in particular were answering truthfully; Tianjian Shi has addressed that question in the affirmative in a variety of publications; see the China chapter by Shi in *How East Asians View Democracy*; also Shi, "Survey Research in China," in Michael X. Delli Carpini, Huddy Leonie, and Robert Y. Shapiro, eds., *Research in Micropolitics* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAL Press, 1996), pp. 213-250, and Shi, *Political Participation in Beijing* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). Also, the EAB findings on regime support in China are consistent with those of some other survey researchers who have worked in China independently of us; see, e.g., Wenfang Tang, *Public Opinion and Political Change in China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Jie Chen, CITE TK; Lianjiang Li, "Political Trust in Rural China," *Modern China* 2004 CITE TK; also see Tianjian Shi, "Why Distrust of Incumbents Does Not Make People in PRC to Distrust the Regime," draft paper, n.d. A final question might be whether my coding, scaling, and statistical procedures are correct, which can best be

answered until we have over-time data that help us to see how different kinds of regimes survive shocks to their legitimacy. So I will not pursue that aspect of the topic further here.

Tables 1a-b contain a lot of other interesting information. I will comment only on two points. First, in Table 1a, we see that Japan leads all the other systems in its rejection of authoritarian alternatives. Thus, while the Japanese are critical of their democracy (and in this sense show low diffuse regime support), they are not anxious to jump to another kind of system. This constitutes a kind of reserve legitimacy, akin to what Larry Diamond calls “the Churchillian definition” of democratic consolidation as the acceptance of democracy as the worst alternative except for all the rest. Not only is this probably a more realistic portrayal of the state of mind of most democratic publics than the romantic vision that democratic publics love their regimes, but it also suggests why authoritarian rejection may be an important measurement to include when we try to measure diffuse support in regimes that claim, as most do, to be democratic.

Second, it is interesting to compare changes in different kinds of regime support from 2002 to 2006 for the five countries from which we currently have two sets of data. There is a lot of lability in the item “satisfied with current government,” which measures specific, incumbent support: a rise from 41.3% to 77.3% in Taiwan and from 35% to 84.9% in Korea, and a drop from 89.7% to 18.3% in Mongolia. It is consistent with Easton’s theory that this measure can change dramatically over short periods of time. Our best measure of diffuse regime support also performs consistently with theory: “Our form of government is best for us” changes only a few points over four years in four of the five countries, with the exception being Korea where it fell from 36.0% in 2002 to 23.5% in 2006.

Without stopping to analyze Tables 1a-b further, let us push ahead toward the central question. What causes high regime legitimacy in China and Singapore, and lower legitimacy in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines?

Performance versus culture as determinants of legitimacy. One possible set of causes of high or low regime support are citizens’ perceptions of the regime’s policy performance. The hypothesis would be that regimes gain support when they deliver for citizens and lose support when they do not.¹¹ The 2002 EAB included nine items about regime performance; the 2006 AB only three. For the purposes of this paper it will be sufficient to discuss the 2002 results.

The EAB measured respondents’ perceptions of the current regime’s policy performance in each country by asking them to compare it to the preceding regime with respect to how well it delivered in each of nine policy domains. (The previous regime is the old authoritarian regime in the five new democracies, the pre-1945 regime in Japan, the pre-1979 regime in China, and the pre-1997 regime in Hong Kong.) The nine domains were as follows (divided for convenience into two categories): freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal treatment of citizens by government, providing citizens with popular influence over government, and providing an independent judiciary

answered by looking at my SPSS syntax; but here again, the similarity of findings across a range of variables tends to suggest that the findings are broadly robust even if some of them are found to involve questionable coding decisions.

¹¹ Literature review pending.

(these five are classified under the rubric “democratic performance” in Table 2); and working against corruption, providing law and order, providing economic development, and providing economic equality (classified under the heading “policy performance”).¹² Citizens were asked to rate the current regime’s performance in each domain on a 5-point scale, ranging from “much better than before” (+2) to “much worse than before” (-2).

Table 2 provides a summary measure of each of the two clusters of perceived performance: the difference between the percentage of respondents in each country seeing improvement and the percentage seeing a decline for each of the two clusters of policy performance. The table is arranged so that the country with the highest level of perceived democratic performance comes first (Thailand) and the one with the lowest level comes last (Hong Kong).

(Table 2 about here)

We can interpret the table as showing that citizens throughout Asia in 2002 had a realistic understanding of their government’s performance. The citizens of the new democracies and of Japan all recognized that their current political systems provided greater freedom and accountability than did the old authoritarian systems. The citizens of Hong Kong considered that the new Special Autonomous Region (SAR) government did a worse job of protecting individual freedom and independence of the judiciary than the former British colonial government.

China ranked third in the region after Japan and Thailand in the preponderance of positive over negative evaluations of the direction of change in the regime’s delivery of democratic goods. Although the Chinese regime remains authoritarian, Chinese believe that they are much freer now than they were under Mao. The PDI for individual items in China ranged from 82.1% for freedom of speech to 25.2% for popular influence.

Citizens throughout the region drew harsher judgments on their regimes’ performance in the policy arena. At the time of the EAB survey many of the countries were experiencing problems of corruption (especially Japan, China, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand), slow economic growth (Japan, Taiwan), and/or widening income gaps (China). These problems were reflected in citizens’ ratings of their regimes’ policy performance. In half of the countries there were more citizens who gave negative than positive ratings to the current regime’s policy performance compared to that of the old regime; and in three of the other four countries the positive ratings were anemic. Only in Thailand did a robust net plurality of citizens give positive ratings.¹³

Tables 1a and 2 viewed together suggest – not surprisingly – that there is some relationship between perceived policy performance and diffuse regime support, although it is not ironclad. The order of countries in the two tables is almost the same. Given the highly aggregated nature of the statistics, the fact that Korea and the Philippines have changed places carries little meaning. The fact that Japan ranks number 8 in the first table and number 2 in the second reinforces the impression discussed earlier, that Japanese citizens hold the complex view that their regime is better than the alternatives even though it is disappointing.

¹² In Hong Kong, in the policy domain, only the anti-corruption question was asked.

¹³ For country-by-country details on the ratings and the situations confronted by citizens see the country chapters in *How East Asians View Democracy*.

In short, perceived regime performance does go part way to explain regime legitimacy. But it cannot explain it entirely. This finding opens the way to my main question: does political culture also play a role in shaping regime legitimacy?

Operationalizing political culture: traditional social values. The first step toward answering this question is to operationalize political culture. Political culture is usually defined in survey research as the distribution in a political system of values, attitudes, and beliefs about political objects.¹⁴ The concept covers a wide range of attitudes. For present purposes I am not interested in more changeable attitudes and evaluations (such as pro and con policy positions and approval ratings of incumbents) but in deeper norms and values that are learned relatively early in life, change relatively slowly, and which, I hypothesize, shape citizens' evaluations of the appropriateness of political regimes. The EAB and AB surveys measured two components of political culture: traditional social values and democratic values.

The traditional social values battery used in the EAB grew out of the work of H.C. Kuan and S.K. Lau in Hong Kong, who in turn based their research on qualitative studies of Asian values going back to Max Weber and including, more recently, the work of Lucian Pye.¹⁵ Kuan and Lau's questionnaire items were designed to measure beliefs in norms and values thought to have been prevalent in pre-modern societies in Asia, which have been replaced with alternative values at varying rates as Asia has modernized, but which still have identifiable support throughout the region, especially among older residents, lesser educated residents, rural residents, and females. Nine of Kuan and Lau's questionnaire items were adopted with the agreement of the other seven country teams for the EAB survey's social values battery.¹⁶ They are displayed in Table 3a. In the AB survey, four of these questions were retained and six were added, adopting different questions which also grew out of Kuan and Lau's work.¹⁷ These ten items are displayed in Table 3b.

¹⁴ The definition comes from Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

¹⁵ Literature review, citations pending to Kuan and Lau, Pye, Inkeles & Smith, Inglehart, and Tianjian Shi, among others.

¹⁶ One question was not asked in Korea.

¹⁷ I doubt that the new battery is an improvement over the old one. Three of the new items make sense on their face as measures of traditionalism, (student-teacher, follow own beliefs, secure immediate interests). But I have problems with the other three because they explicitly mention government or politicians (politicians quarrel harmful, government and people are like parents and children, support decisions of government). Since I want to correlate traditionalism as a pre-political attitude with explicitly political attitudes, I fear contamination of the measure.

A related question is how investigators should pick and chose among items in either year's scale. In my country-by-country factor analyses of the 2002 nine-item battery, most of the items in most countries loaded onto two core values which I describe as "seeking harmony while avoiding conflict" and "respecting collective interests while submerging individual interests." The last three items in Table 3a clustered less clearly with the two core factors in most countries. If in future I engage in more fine-grained comparison of the impact of different dimensions of traditionalism on behavior or attitudes I will be tempted to drop these three items. Working with the 2006 battery I will need also to do factor analyses and will consider dropping some items.

Tianjian Shi has created a six-item traditionalism battery which he uses with China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong data from 1993 and 2002, using four of the nine items designed for the 2002 questionnaire (if

(Tables 3a and 3b about here)

The tables are arranged so that the country with the lowest overall rate of agreement with the propositions – that is, the country with the (by this measure) least traditional, most modern, set of cultural values – is on the left (Hong Kong in Table 3a, Taiwan in Table 3b) while the country with the highest percentage of people agreeing with the set of traditionalist propositions is on the right (Mongolia and Singapore respectively).

Since this battery has changed so much from 2002 to 2006, the first question is the extent to which they measure the same thing. A first impression can be gained by comparing the two tables. On the positive side, the five countries with repeated datasets have almost retained their original rank order: the only change in rank order from lowest to highest average percent traditional is that Korea and the Philippines have switched places as numbers two and three. Also, of the four questions repeated in the two surveys, three of them showed similar rates of average agreement across the region, even though the four years had elapsed and three countries were deleted from and two added to the dataset (the exception was “conflict with neighbor,” which changed from 63.8% average agreement in 2002 to 48.3% in 2006 – why?). On the negative side, the new battery generates national average percent traditional scores that are from 4.6% to 13.5% higher than the old battery – in effect it redefines traditional social values in a direction that more people in Asia agree with. Additional work will be needed in future to compare the two batteries, weed out ineffective questions, and decide how best to use the two sets of items in comparative work.

In any case, the order of countries within each table reveals an Asia in which traditional values still have strong appeal, and where modernization seems to be creating rapid change (to the extent one can judge from what are in effect for this purpose two synchronic datasets). The average rate of agreement with the nine traditionalist propositions in Table 3a ranges from 43.5% in highly modern, totally urban Hong Kong to 59.1% in mostly rural Mongolia, a spread of almost 16 percent. The more rural societies of Thailand and China are closer to Mongolia and the highly modernized societies of Taiwan and Japan are closer to Hong Kong. In Table 3b, with its different array of questions, traditionalism represents a majority position in all seven countries, but ranges from a low of 51.0% in more modernized Taiwan to 63.7% in more rural

quarrel ask elder, not insist own opinion, parents demands unreasonable, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law), while adding two from elsewhere in the questionnaire (groups competing damage interests, state is big machine). On both conceptual and factor-analytic grounds he divides these items into two orientations, orientations toward authority and orientations toward interest. These are similar to the two factors I discern in the nine-item measure. But for reasons noted above I am not comfortable with his substitution of two items that have explicitly political referents for two non-political items to generate his measure. So for the time being I am reluctant to adopt his scale.

The good news is that for most analyses – such as the ones I am presenting in this paper – it probably does not matter exactly which questionnaire items one uses to construct the scale of traditional social values. Since they are all intercorrelated, any combination of the various traditionalism items is likely to perform in roughly the same way as one another, when used in such exercises as the one presented in Tables 7a-b of this paper. But this argument also suggests that fine-tuning the battery by revising it every year to gain precision in measurement is not worth the damage it does to cumulativeness.

Mongolia. In this context the Singapore results are puzzling, and I look forward to colleagues' comments on them.

To some extent – more markedly in the 2002 than in the 2006 dataset – the order of countries in Tables 3a and 3b is roughly the reverse of that in Tables 1a and 1b. It appears that regime support and related attitudes are stronger where traditional social values are stronger. Perhaps conflict-avoidant, community-oriented norms incline citizens to be deferential to their regimes, regardless of whether the regimes are democratic or authoritarian. By the same token, then, should we conclude that citizens in societies where more modern values are prevalent are more critical of their regimes and less likely to offer diffuse support, even if the regime is perceived as preferable to the alternatives and as performing well, as we saw was the case in Japan? This may be broadly the case, but we should not expect a simple answer to the puzzle of diffuse support. Japan, for example, is the wealthiest and (except for Hong Kong) most urbanized of the eight EAB countries, yet traditional values are approximately 5% more prevalent there than in Korea and are no different from the level found in the Philippines. So the relationships among the various attitudinal syndromes are not tight, nor should we expect them to be.

China lies toward the right of Table 3a. Although the country is urbanizing rapidly (its urban population is now over 50%), most of its urban residents came from the countryside and are not legal urban residents. So China's placement makes sense.¹⁸ Yet we should also notice that its average rate of agreement with the nine 2002 traditionalism propositions is less than fifty percent. Rapid modernization is evidently undermining traditional attitudes.

The tables are arranged so that the top row displays the item that got the highest rate of agreement throughout the region (in both tables, the proposition that the individual should subordinate his interests to those of the family), while the last row shows the item that got the lowest level of agreement (in 2002, that a man should not work under a female supervisor and in 2006, that a student should not question a teacher). The range of values from most agreed to least agreed proposition is wide, opening a gap of over sixty percentage points in Table 3a and of over forty points in Table 3b.

There are several possible interpretations of this gap. First, some of the propositions at the bottom of the two tables may not really be traditional Asian social values. However, if one tests the appropriateness of these items by correlating respondents' agreement with them with other indicators that should indicate a person's traditional leanings, such as other traditional attitudes, age, sex, and education, all nine items in Table 3a survive. I have not yet done the corresponding analysis for the 2006 battery. In any case, this kind of correlational analysis is not decisive, because it rests logically on the same assumption that is to some extent being tested, that those who are elderly, female, and less-educated are more traditional-minded. Whether this is really true and what constitutes "tradition" has ultimately to be defended by looking at the literatures of anthropology, sociology, and intellectual history, because we do not have survey research going back far enough in time to adjudicate the point.

Second, one may hypothesize that "social desirability effects" have depressed the rates of agreement with some of the items, such as hiring a relative, rejecting a female

¹⁸ Check Japan, China urban population data and source; also for the fact that they came from the countryside – can run that datum from our China dataset.

supervisor, and deferring to a teacher: respondents in contemporary Asia may know that views on these questions that used to be socially acceptable are disapproved of today, so they may not reveal their true opinions.

A third interpretation of the range of responses to the traditionalism items is that different elements of an interlinked cultural syndrome change at different rates. The value of subordinating individual to family interests is apparently robust throughout the region, even in highly developed capitalist economies like Hong Kong and Singapore, perhaps in part because of this attitude's functional utility for running family-based enterprises. On the other hand, the desirability of a husband asking his wife to obey his mother, or for children to obey parents no matter how unreasonable they are, are upheld only by minorities in most countries, perhaps because of the decades-long trends throughout the region for different generations to live separately and for children to be more independent.

Traditional social values should not be expected ever to disappear totally in Asia, any more than they have elsewhere. If culturally appropriate similar questions were asked in the U.S., presumably some substantial fraction of people would agree with them. The right question to ask is whether some or all of the traditional values will diminish below some threshold, and whether they will do so in a socially differentiated way such that the more modern sectors of society believe in them less than the less modern sectors. With further analysis the EAB/AB's diachronic and comparative structure should allow us to track these patterns of change over time.

In the context of the present paper, the main purpose of this section is to provide a measure of one of our two political-cultural variables for use in the upcoming regression analysis. By summing each respondent's pro-traditional and anti-traditional responses to the nine 2002 or ten 2006 items, we assign each respondent a score for the strength of his or her belief in traditional social values, a score to be used in the next step of analysis.

Operationalizing political culture: democratic values. First, however, we need to construct the second cultural scale, to measure democratic values. The scale is based on a battery in the EAB/AB questionnaire that was developed, tested, and used over a series of surveys by a research team at National Taiwan University. The battery is the same in our 2002 and 2006 surveys. It asks respondents to agree or disagree with eight propositions. None of them uses the "d" word – democracy – so as to avoid triggering the socially desirable (pro-democracy) answer to the question. The agree answer is the democratic answer in some cases and the disagree answer is the democratic answer in other cases.¹⁹ The battery tests five core democratic values (political equality, political liberty, separation of powers, government accountability, and political pluralism). It does so with one question for each of the first two values and two questions for each of the next three.

Tables 4a and 4b, which display the results, are organized similarly to Tables 3a-b. The item with the highest level of pro-democracy responses across the region (people with little education should have as much say) is in the first row and the item with the lowest level of pro-democracy responses (too many ways of thinking will make society chaotic) is in the bottom row. Arranged in this way, the order of the items did not change

¹⁹ It was not possible to design the same desirable feature of different response valences into the traditional social values battery because of the nature of the questions.

much from 2002 to 2006: the third, fourth, and fifth items reversed their order, but since they were separated by only a few percentage points this shift does not seem to be important.

Similarly, in the columns, the country with the highest average level of pro-democracy responses (Japan in 2002, Korea in 2006) is in the left column and the country with the lowest level (respectively Thailand and Mongolia) is in the right column. Again the order of countries (among the five for whom we have repeat data) remains consistent; only Thailand and Mongolia have changed position at the right of the table, and this because of a sharp decrease in democratic values reported in Mongolia – a phenomenon on which we might solicit the views of the Mongolia team. Except for Mongolia, the national percentages pro-democratic have not changed much in the other four countries for which we have two data points, which speaks well for the reliability of the battery.

(Tables 4a and 4b about here)

The tables display the by-now familiar rough rank-ordering of countries. The most traditional countries (Mongolia and Thailand) are also the ones with the least well established democratic values. The least traditional countries (Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan) have the most strongly established democratic values.

The range of the national average level of belief in democratic values (over 35% in 2002, over 33% in 2006) is more than twice as large as the range in national average traditionalism (15.6% in 2002, 14.2% in 2006), suggesting that if modernization is gradually homogenizing social values in the region it is not doing the same thing equally rapidly with political values. The range, however, of average beliefs in the values themselves is smaller – in the 2002 data, a gap of over 60% between the most- and the least-accepted traditional social values compared to a gap of only 37.1% between the most- and least-accepted democratic values, with a similar pattern seen in the 2006 data. In this sense, then, social values are changing in an uncoordinated way while political values (measured by our democratic values battery) are more tightly coordinated. Such a difference was predetermined by the way the two batteries were conceptualized. The democratic values battery tests a set of norms that are inherently more tightly “constrained” – more logically related – than the wide-ranging set of values tapped by the traditional social values battery.²⁰

This pair of tables invite comments on a few countries in particular. First, Thailand: we saw in Tables 1a and 2 that the Thais showed the highest degree of enthusiasm for democracy of all the EAB countries in 2002. However, the information in Tables 4a and 4b suggests that their enthusiasm was directed at the idea and the symbol rather than at the substance of democracy, given that they rank relatively low in regional perspective in support for substantive democratic values.²¹ Japan is a somewhat opposite case. Table 4a shows it to be the country where substantive democratic values are most

²⁰ Factor analysis confirms that the democratic values questions load on one dimension (to be reconfirmed).

²¹ Notable, however, is the disparity in their 2002 and 2006 scores on the value of political equality (the first item in both tables). The gap is so large that one suspects measurement error somewhere along the line. I hope the Thai country team will comment on this.

strongly established. Yet, as shown in Table 3a, traditional values are also quite strong there.

China in Table 4a shows quite strong non-democratic values. The country's pro-democracy average is elevated by the high level of agreement with the principle of political equality, which is rooted as much in China's socialist tradition as in ideas of liberal or pluralist democracy.²² A majority of Chinese also believe that the legislature should play its role as a check on the administration. But when it comes to freedom of speech and tolerance for political disagreement, only a quarter to a little over a third of Chinese respondents give the pro-democratic answers.

The Thai and Chinese data underscore the importance of separating the assessment of democratic values from the word democracy. The "d" word elicits high levels of positive response from respondents throughout the region. Indeed, it is the very vagueness and breadth of meanings given to the word that makes it possible to treat it as a near-synonym for "our regime" in some of the items in Tables 1a-b. But not everybody who likes the d word necessarily subscribes to the values that political scientists associate with that word, nor do all the people who subscribe to those values necessarily respond favorably to the word. This is illustrated by the fact that Thailand and Japan occupy reversed positions in Tables 1a and 4a. The Thai public responds to the word democracy with the strongest enthusiasm and the Japanese public with the least; but the Japanese public subscribes most strongly to substantive values of equality, accountability, and liberty and the Thai public least.

For the purpose of our main line of investigation in this paper, this section provides us with a democratic values score for each individual respondent. As with the traditional social values score, the score is the sum of each respondent's pro-democratic and anti-democratic responses to the eight items in the democratic values battery.

Correlates of traditional and democratic values. I noted above that countries with higher levels of traditional values had lower levels of democratic values. I suggested that this reflects the influence of social changes associated with modernization, such as urbanization, rising incomes, and rising levels of education. Theory and comparative research suggest that such socio-economic changes bring about value changes away from conflict avoidance toward interest assertiveness, and away from prioritizing collective interests toward prioritizing individual interests.²³ These social changes also contribute to the rise of the kinds of values tested in the EAB/AB's democratic values battery. Such value changes occur partly through new personal experiences (individuals change their beliefs after they move to the cities or take up industrial employment) and partly by virtue of generational replacement (younger generations have different socialization and educational experiences which train them in different values from those of their elders).²⁴

²² The contribution of socialism to Chinese ideas of democracy is discussed in Tianjian Shi's chapter on China in *How East Asians View Democracy*.

²³ Literature review pending.

²⁴ For the first mechanism, see e.g., Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: The Free Press, 1958), and Alex Inkeles and David Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). For the second, see, among his other works, Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Post-Modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Social Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

These causal mechanisms function, and can be observed, at the macro (societal) level, as we have done above in comparing the rank-ordering of countries in different tables, but also at the micro (individual) level, an analysis that we undertake in Table 5, restricted for now to the 2002 dataset. The table's left-hand panel describes the bivariate relationships between additive scales of traditional and democratic values and some standard socio-demographic variables, the first four of which directly reflect the effects of modernization.

(Table 5 about here)

The first thing to notice in this panel is that the signs on the correlation coefficients are always the opposite for traditional and democratic values. Any social process that promotes a decline in belief in traditional social values also promotes an increased belief in democratic political values. Across Asia, the better educated, more urban, higher income, and younger respondents are less likely to hold traditional social values and more likely to hold democratic political values than their opposites. Males are also somewhat more likely than females to be non-traditional and pro-democratic, but the role of this variable is statistically less marked. One reason for this effect is that males usually get involved in modernization earlier than females, for example by going to secondary school or college or by moving to cities.

While these relationships hold generally true across the region, they are markedly stronger in the three Chinese societies than elsewhere, followed by the other two societies with Confucian heritages (Korea and Japan), and the relationships grow weaker in the remaining three societies, which have non-Confucian backgrounds. This is an interesting illustration of the fact that a social science theory can be generally true, yet operate with greater or lesser intensity in different contexts. If one asks what salient difference among the eight societies might explain this pattern of differential cultural impact of modernization, the first answer that comes to mind is the different importance given to education in each respective cultural heritage. But this is another of the many loose ends that this paper has to leave unexplored.

The second panel of the table explores some of the effects that traditional social values and democratic political values in turn exert upon other political attitudes and perceptions. (Causation in the other direction is ruled out by virtue of the assumption in culture theory that social and political values are early-established, deep-seated, and slow changing, while the kinds of attitudes and perceptions tested in the second panel are more recently established and change more easily in response to political stimuli.) Here again the signs on the coefficients are usually opposed, showing that traditional and democratic values have opposite effects. In general, those holding traditional values are less psychologically involved in politics, have lower levels of political efficacy, have less political trust, view leaders as less responsive, and (albeit less consistently) tend to perceive less progress in political rights and democracy, while those with democratic values tend to have the opposite set of attitudes perceptions.

Again the three culturally Chinese cases tend to display the dominant patterns more strongly than do the other cases. In some cells of the second panel, however, the major patterns are weak or, in some cases, even reversed. For example, institutional trust is enhanced by traditional values and decreased by democratic values, rather than the

reverse, in four of the political systems: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan. The probable explanation for this is that more pro-democracy citizens are more critical of the regimes in these countries, more aware of corruption, and more skeptical of the incumbents, while more traditional-minded respondents are more deferential toward the authorities. Other anomalous findings in the second panel can probably be explained in similar ways.

Overall, Table 5 shows that although political culture is complex, it does identifiably exist and it has some coherence (the citizen who leans more to tradition tends to lean less to democratic values); that culture responds to processes of social change, although with lag and unevenly across social processes and specific values; and that cultural values have effects on other political attitudes.

Effects of culture on political participation. Culture, then, exists, and to some extent it matters. But how does it matter? We have shown in Table 5 that values affect certain individual attitudes toward politics. But this is an effect of one attitude on another attitude, which is not a particularly striking finding. What about an effect of attitudes on behavior? Do respondents with different sets of values and beliefs behave differently in their political actions?

If the dependent variable is the most common form of citizen-level political activity – voting, and some associated activities in the electoral arena – the answer, according to Table 6, using only the 2002 dataset, is “only a little.” The dependent variable in Table 6 is an additive scale of three activities: casting a vote in the most recent election, attending a campaign rally, and trying to persuade someone how to vote. The table is not intended as a model of electoral behavior.²⁵ It merely tries to see whether the two cultural syndromes we have identified can help explain who engages in electoral activity and who does not, when a few other obvious variables are controlled for. The control variables are basic socio-demographic variables that have been found to have some effect on electoral behavior in other political systems, selecting only those which are available in our dataset with few missing cases so that we can avoid having missing cases bias the results we are curious about – the impact of culture on behavior.

(Table 6 about here)

The regression shows that cultural values have little effect on electoral participation. One might have hypothesized that persons holding traditional values would be less likely to vote because they are deferential – or the opposite, that they would be more likely to vote because they are easily mobilized. The second hypothesis does hold true in Japan, the Philippines, and Mongolia, although the effect is strong only in the Philippines. One might have hypothesized that people holding democratic values would be more likely to vote because they believe in the citizen’s right to influence politics – or the opposite, that in certain political systems they are less likely to vote because they are alienated from the regime’s authoritarianism or corruption. The former of the two

²⁵ For an example of such a model see, for example, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, enlarged edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). The EAB questionnaire did not include all the variables needed to construct models of voting, because it was not designed as a voting study.

hypotheses pans out in Hong Kong and Japan, but not elsewhere. In short, political culture has some effect on electoral behavior, but the effect is not strong.

Effects of culture on regime support. This brings us to the key question of this paper. How do cultural values affect diffuse support for regimes in Asia?²⁶ Here the answer, as shown in Tables 7a and 7b, is more affirmative than was the case for electoral participation. Traditional social values and democratic values each have a strong impact on most forms of regime support in most of our eight Asian countries, even after a series of other relevant variables are controlled for. Overall, moreover, the impact of culture on regime support is more important than the impact of perceived regime performance. One could say that cultural legitimacy matters more than performance legitimacy.

(Tables 7a and 7b about here)

These two rather complicated tables are constructed in the following way. We calculated a series of regression models for each country, treating each of the variables in Tables 1a and 1b as a dependent variable one by one. Traditional social values and democratic values were entered into each regression as independent variables. Likewise included as independent variables were the available measures of perceived regime performance – two such measures for the 2002 dataset (policy performance and democratic performance) and one (democratic performance) for the 2006 dataset. The goal was to compare the impact upon regime support of performance and culture.

In order to isolate the effects of culture and performance, eight other variables were entered into the regression models as control variables, thus purging the regression coefficients for the cultural and policy performance variables of whatever variance should instead be attributed to these other variables. The control variables were selected if they met two criteria: each has a plausible connection to regime support, and each appears in the dataset with only a small number of missing values. The control variables are sex, age group, years of education, urban or rural residence, social capital (measured in 2002 by the number of formal groups plus the number of private groups the respondent reported belonging to and in 2006 by the single variable “membership in organizations”), psychological involvement in politics (measured in 2002 as described in the notes to Table 5 and in 2006 by the combination of self-reported interest in politics and following news about politics), the respondent’s evaluation of the nation’s economic condition today on a scale of 5 from very good to very bad, and the respondent’s evaluation of his/her personal economic condition today on the same scale.

Tables 7a-b leave out a large amount of information from the regressions in order to highlight the findings of interest. The tables include the standardized regression coefficients for only the performance and cultural variables that we are investigating, leaving out the regression coefficients for the control variables for ease of comprehension and because they are not the focus of our interest here; and it includes only those coefficients that are statistically significant. Type faces are used to distinguish among

²⁶ This is an attitude-to-attitude effect, rather than an attitude-to-behavior effect. But in contrast to some of the attitudes treated as d.v.’s in Table 5, this attitude is less about oneself and one’s role in the political system, and more about an entirely different object, the regime. In other words it is an attitude more remote from the i.v. than some of the attitudes addressed in Table 5.

three different levels of statistical significance, with the bold-faced regression coefficients displaying the highest level of statistical significance. The adjusted R indicates how well the entire suite of independent and control variables taken together explains the dependent variable; the n indicates how many valid cases were entered into that regression equation for that dependent variable for that country.

The column at the right deserves our attention first. It summarizes how many times (out of a possible 8 in 2002 and a possible 7 in 2006) the variable in question achieved a statistically significant level in explaining that particular dependent variable. Thus in Table 7a, for the variable, “Our form of government is best for us,” democratic values had a statistically significant impact eight times out of a possible eight, traditional social values seven times out of a possible eight, democratic performance twice, and policy performance zero times (hence it is not shown). If a variable was statistically significant every possible time, it would be significant 54 times in Table 7a (since there are seven different dependent variables and eight countries, minus two dependent variables that were not available for China). Running down the last column we see that democratic values achieved statistical significance 45 of these possible 54 times, traditional social values 38 times, democratic performance 23 times, and policy performance 15 times. In Table 7b, out of a possible 42 times, democratic performance was statistically significant 33 times, traditional social values 25 times, and democratic political values 22 times.

In other words, pre-existing cultural attitudes are consistently important in affecting regime support, arguably more so than perceived regime performance. Legitimacy depends on culture as much or more than on performance.

How does culture affect legitimacy? The first point to be noticed is that the signs on traditional social values and democratic values are almost invariably reversed. This is the same pattern we noted in Table 5. There we showed that people who have more traditional values are likely to have less democratic values and vice versa. In Tables 7a-b we see that the effect upon regime support of holding relatively strong traditional values is always the opposite of the effect of holding relatively strong democratic values.

The ways in which these two sets of values affect various measures of regime support make sense. On our best measure of diffuse regime support, “our form of government is best for us,” throughout the region people holding stronger traditional values hold more negative attitudes toward their regimes and those holding more democratic values hold more positive attitudes. This reflects the fact that all the regimes claim to be democratic, and many of them had gone through triumphant democratic transitions at times not long before our surveys. The effect is often highly statistically significant and in several cases it is large (over .200).

On the other hand, the people holding democratic values are *less* rather than more likely than those holding traditional values to be “satisfied with how democracy works in our country.” Here it is important to remember that the assessment of democratic values was done without using the “d” word (Tables 4a-b). The measure does not assess people’s approval of democracy as a symbol or idea but their adherence to substantive values like political equality and accountability. Tables 7a-b show that believers in these values are dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Hong Kong, China, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and Singapore – all of them places where democratic practices fell short of democratic rhetoric at the time of our surveys. In Korea, China, the Philippines, Taiwan,

Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore, there was a statistically significant tendency for respondents holding more traditional values to be more satisfied with how democracy worked. Put otherwise, they were less demanding of the regime, and more deferential to the authorities.

Turning to the third set of regressions in the tables, the findings are again not surprising. With high levels of statistical significance and large coefficients, those holding democratic values were more likely to reject authoritarian options and those holding traditional values were less likely to do so. Likewise through the remainder of the two tables: democratic values rendered respondents more committed to democratic governance and more skeptical of existing regimes, while traditional values had the opposite effects. Throughout Table 7a, the impact of perceived policy performance was less. One way to read the implications of these patterns is that Asian regimes are more robust when they face downturns in policy performance than is often thought, but over the long run they are vulnerable to shifts in deeper values.

These pan-regional effects were, broadly speaking, less marked in China than elsewhere. The Chinese coefficients work in the same direction as those in the other countries, but they are often significant at a lower level and either small or middling in size compared to the size of the coefficients in other countries. I want to refine the table and see the second-wave China data before over-interpreting this comparison, but if it survives further testing, the implication might be two-fold.

First, at the present time diffuse support for the Chinese regime is more consistent across cultural groups than is the case elsewhere in Asia. People believing in democratic values and people believing in traditional values give not-so-different levels of diffuse support to the regime. Instead, as we saw in Table 1, support is generally high. To judge from Table 7a, this is not because of any massive impact of perceived regime performance on diffuse support – e.g., not due to the regime’s economic performance. It may be due to the impact of regime propaganda, or to the impact of nationalistic feelings, or to other causes which I have yet to investigate.

But second, it remains the case that Chinese citizens who believe in political equality and accountability – who subscribe to democratic values when the “d” word is not invoked – are more critical of the regime than others. If the number of such persons increases over time (as Table 5 suggests that it will), *and* if the impact of cultural values increases to levels closer to those they exert in the other countries in Table 7, then one can expect the Chinese regime over time to be increasingly vulnerable to a weakening of its currently robust legitimacy.

I do not mean by this to imply that democratization will necessarily follow. Tables 1a-b and 7a suggest that regimes like Taiwan and Japan with very critical citizenries can still survive. And I have argued elsewhere that the Chinese regime has shown resourcefulness in adapting to challenges to its survival.²⁷

Conclusions. Culture matters in politics. Its impact, however, is complex. It does not matter to the same extent in every aspect of politics nor to the same extent or in the same manner in each country. Culture, as we measured it here in two syndromes, is more influential in helping to explain patterns of regime support than in helping to

²⁷ Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” *Journal of Democracy* 14:1 (January, 2003), pp. 6-17.

explain electoral behavior. Within the ambit of regime support, it influences certain aspects or dimensions of regime support more than others. And it does this more markedly in some countries than in others.

Since this is a partial report from an ongoing research project, I am not ready to offer an answer to the puzzle I posed at the outset, about the high level of diffuse support for the Chinese and Singapore regimes. The tentative conclusion I can offer at this point is that the Chinese regime draws support both from its economic performance and from the prevalence of traditional values. The same pattern seems to apply as well in Singapore, despite the tremendous social and economic differences between the two societies. Regime control of information in both societies may also play a role, which I have not begun to investigate here.

Values, however, in general change with modernization (although it appears they have not done so very markedly in Singapore). As values change, at any given level of perceived regime performance, we can expect regime legitimacy to come under greater challenge. But we should not wait for this with bated breath, because diffuse regime support in China and Singapore start from high points and still have a long way to fall before they would converge with the levels of diffuse support found in most of the region's democracies.

Table 1a. Regime Support and Democratic Support in Asia, 2002 dataset

(Percent of total sample who express support)

		Thailand	China	Mongolia	Taiwan	Philippines	Korea	Hong Kong	Japan	Average
Regime support	Our form of gov't best for us	68.2%	94.4%	69.8%	67.3%	53.6%	36.0%	54.5%	24.3%	58.5%
	Satisfied with how democracy works in our country	90.4%	81.7%	69.8%	53.4%	52.5%	61.8%	57.6%	49.0%	64.5%
Support for democracy	Rejects authoritarian alternatives	77.3%	74.3%	75.4%	82.7%	70.4%	86.6%	83.9%	95.4%	80.7%
	Commitment to democracy	92.2%	66.1%	84.0%	50.1%	73.5%	76.6%	52.0%	74.9%	71.2%
Related attitudes	Satisfied with current gov't	89.7%	N/A	55.2%	41.3%	58.5%	35.0%	34.6%	37.1%	50.2%
	Trusts gov't institutions	64.3%	72.2%	52.0%	39.2%	41.4%	28.6%	63.2%	31.3%	49.0%
	Expects democratic progress	96.2%	96.7%	92.1%	87.5%	82.3%	95.0%	59.1%	85.0%	86.7%
Average		82.5%	79.3%	71.3%	63.6%	63.0%	62.1%	61.2%	58.7%	67.7%

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

"Rejects authoritarian alternatives"=respondent rejects at least half of the authoritarian alternatives on which s/he expresses an opinion; "Commitment to democracy"=respondent agrees with three or more of five preferred positive attitudes toward democracy; "Trusts government institutions"=summed trust scores for five government institutions is more positive than negative; "Expects democratic progress"=on a scale of degree of democracy from 1 to 10, respondent expects regime five years from now to be equally or more democratic than present regime.

Bold (red) numbers are at or above the average for that row, nonbold (green) numbers below the average

N/A=not asked.

Table 1b. Regime Support and Democratic Support in Asia, 2006 dataset									
(Percent of total sample who express support)									
		Singapore	Indonesia	Taiwan	Thailand	Mongolia	Korea	Philippines	Average
Regime support	Our form of gov't best for us	85.8%	83.4%	68.5%	66.1%	65.5%	23.5%	52.8%	63.7%
	Satisfied with how democracy works in our country	85.2%	63.6%	58.8%	83.9%	64.6%	52.1%	38.9%	63.9%
Support for democracy	Rejects authoritarian alternatives	93.5%	87.0%	89.3%	80.7%	70.4%	94.2%	71.2%	83.8%
	Commitment to democracy	77.1%	75.3%	60.1%	78.5%	77.1%	67.5%	54.9%	70.1%
Related attitudes	Satisfied with current gov't	N/A	32.7%	77.3%	18.3%	56.2%	84.9%	69.2%	56.4%
	Trusts gov't institutions	58.7%	46.8%	22.6%	47.2%	35.1%	8.1%	24.0%	34.6%
Average		80.1%	64.8%	62.7%	62.4%	61.5%	55.1%	51.8%	62.6%

Notes:

Source: 2006 Asian Barometer Surveys, preliminary 7-nation dataset as of July 2007

"Rejects authoritarian alternatives"=respondent rejects at least half of the authoritarian alternatives on which s/he expresses an opinion, out of a possible total of three; "Commitment to democracy"=combined measure of five positive attitudes toward democracy; "Trusts government institutions"=summed trust scores for five government institutions is more positive than negative.

Bold (red) numbers are at or above the average for that row, nonbold (green) numbers below the average

N/A=not asked.

Table 2. Difference in Perceived Performance of Current and Past Regimes, 2002 dataset

(Percent perceiving improvement minus percent perceiving worsening)

	Democratic performance	Policy performance
Thailand	69.7	57.3
Japan	60.8	15.2
China	53.1	-8.2
Mongolia	51.8	-16.8
Taiwan	50.0	-11.1
Korea	31.5	-23.1
Philippines	26.8	8.9
Hong Kong	-24.1	1.3

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys

Entries are "percentage differential index" (PDI): the percent of respondents perceiving improvement minus the percent perceiving worsening.

Democratic performance includes freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal treatment of citizens by government, providing citizens with popular influence over government, and providing an independent judiciary. Policy performance includes working against corruption, providing law and order, providing economic development, and providing economic equality.

"Past regime" is the regime before the country's transition to democracy in the five new democracies; for Japan it is the pre-1945 regime, for China the pre-1979 regime, for Hong Kong the pre-1997 regime.

Table 3a. Traditional Social Values in East Asian Countries, 2002 dataset									
(Percent of those answering who agree or strongly agree)									
	Hong Kong	Taiwan	Japan	Philippines	Korea	China	Thailand	Mongolia	Average
For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.	90.2%	86.1%	72.7%	79.0%	69.9%	91.0%	88.1%	73.6%	81.3%
If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute.	36.9%	68.9%	66.2%	75.8%	44.2%	72.4%	76.7%	70.9%	64.0%
When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.	67.1%	46.1%	75.4%	45.8%	71.4%	71.9%	50.7%	82.3%	63.8%
A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.	53.4%	63.0%	61.4%	57.0%	61.4%	51.6%	62.3%	66.7%	59.6%
Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.	23.6%	23.7%	43.5%	29.2%	47.5%	34.2%	37.5%	69.0%	38.5%
When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother.	37.7%	48.4%	23.3%	27.9%	---	53.5%	43.3%	26.9%	37.3%
When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends.	35.2%	28.4%	33.6%	24.9%	26.3%	36.7%	46.6%	65.6%	37.2%
Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate.	40.1%	27.3%	26.7%	55.1%	29.5%	24.4%	43.5%	46.5%	36.6%
A man will lose face if he works under a female supervisor.	7.0%	9.7%	15.4%	23.6%	26.7%	8.5%	46.7%	30.3%	21.0%
Average percent traditional	43.5%	44.6%	46.5%	46.5%	47.1%	49.4%	55.0%	59.1%	49.0%

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys

Percentages of 50 or above in boldface (red), percentages below 50 unbolded (green).

Table 3b. Traditional Social Values in East Asian Countries, 2006 dataset

(Percent of those answering who agree or strongly agree)

	Taiwan	Korea	Philippines	Thailand	Indonesia	Mongolia	Singapore	Average
<i>For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.</i>	88.6%	79.9%	85.3%	85.1%	86.7%	88.3%	92.1%	75.8%
The relationship between the government and the people should be like that between parents and children.	77.7%	59.2%	75.9%	75.7%	92.2%	77.8%	64.1%	65.3%
Open quarrels (criticisms) among politicians are harmful to society.	83.4%	60.8%	56.9%	69.1%	58.9%	77.8%	64.6%	58.9%
<i>A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.</i>	60.1%	N/A	60.0%	67.3%	82.0%	72.2%	78.5%	52.5%
Sometimes one has to follow one's own beliefs regardless of what other people think.	50.2%	N/A	61.9%	69.4%	76.0%	76.2%	83.6%	52.1%
<i>When one has conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.</i>	29.5%	62.0%	59.1%	37.3%	86.6%	36.8%	75.2%	48.3%
When dealing with others, securing one's immediate interests should be more important than developing a long-term.	17.7%	24.4%	59.0%	64.2%	36.4%	59.7%	38.5%	37.5%
<i>Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.</i>	27.9%	40.7%	43.7%	51.7%	33.9%	41.6%	48.4%	36.0%
People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with them.	34.5%	N/A	43.3%	50.7%	45.1%	58.0%	56.1%	36.0%
Being a student, one should not question the authority of one's teacher.	40.3%	N/A	54.5%	51.1%	35.9%	49.0%	50.8%	35.2%

Average percent traditional	51.0%	54.5%	60.0%	62.2%	63.4%	63.7%	65.2%	42.0%
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Notes:

Source: 2006 Asian Barometer Surveys, preliminary 7-nation dataset as of July 2007.

Percentages of 50 or above in boldface (red), percentages below 50 unbolded (green).

N/A=not asked.

Questions repeated from 2002 survey are in italics.

Table 4a. Democratic Values in East Asian Countries, 2002 dataset									
(Percent of those answering who give the pro-democratic answer)									
	Japan	Hong Kong	Korea	Taiwan	China	Philippines	Mongolia	Thailand	Average
People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly educated people [political equality] (agree).	90.3%	90.1%	72.2%	90.2%	91.6%	55.4%	83.0%	15.0%	73.5%
When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch [separation of powers] (disagree).	76.3%	55.2%	69.0%	66.6%	39.9%	38.7%	74.2%	40.3%	57.5%
Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions [government accountability] (disagree).	85.7%	67.3%	52.9%	66.1%	39.3%	47.5%	34.5%	41.8%	54.4%
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society [political liberty] (disagree).	70.3%	69.2%	60.1%	71.5%	36.8%	39.7%	23.2%	47.3%	52.3%
If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things [separation of powers] (disagree).	62.1%	55.7%	53.8%	29.6%	55.4%	49.9%	41.3%	47.8%	49.4%
If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything [government accountability] (disagree).	68.3%	60.5%	37.2%	62.4%	47.0%	46.9%	30.7%	25.1%	47.3%
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups [political pluralism] (disagree).	42.4%	52.1%	64.8%	38.1%	24.5%	46.2%	31.5%	16.2%	39.5%

If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic [political pluralism] (disagree).	44.2%	45.2%	52.8%	25.0%	36.9%	43.4%	19.9%	23.7%	36.4%
Average percent democratic	67.4%	61.9%	57.9%	56.2%	46.4%	46.0%	42.3%	32.1%	51.3%

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asian Barometer Surveys

Percentages of 50 or above in boldface (red), percentages below 50 unbolded (green).

Notes in square brackets indicate the democratic principle involved; notes in parentheses indicate the direction of the response coded as pro-democratic.

Table 4b. Democratic Values in East Asian Countries, 2006 dataset

(Percent of those answering who give the pro-democratic answer)

	Korea	Taiwan	Indonesia	Singapore	Philippines	Thailand	Mongolia	Average
People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly educated people [political equality] (agree).	89.4%	89.3%	81.5%	72.3%	60.9%	79.3%	56.2%	66.1%
When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch [separation of powers] (disagree).	77.3%	63.3%	61.6%	51.7%	34.2%	32.6%	45.9%	45.8%
If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things [separation of powers] (disagree).	61.3%	38.0%	62.5%	49.3%	45.8%	47.5%	39.8%	43.0%
The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society [political liberty] (disagree).	62.2%	77.0%	50.4%	26.2%	41.8%	51.1%	13.9%	40.3%
Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions [popular accountability] (disagree).	62.3%	73.3%	23.7%	42.3%	43.4%	41.8%	26.2%	39.1%
If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything [popular accountability] (disagree).	35.5%	65.6%	54.4%	41.6%	41.4%	28.1%	17.3%	35.5%
Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups [political pluralism] (disagree).	60.6%	39.6%	54.7%	48.9%	40.9%	13.3%	16.3%	34.3%
If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic [political pluralism] (disagree).	55.0%	31.8%	43.7%	32.1%	36.6%	18.9%	22.4%	30.1%
Average percent democratic	63.0%	59.8%	54.1%	45.5%	43.1%	39.1%	29.8%	41.8%

Notes:

Source: 2006 Asian Barometer Surveys, preliminary 7-nation dataset as of July 2007.

Percentages of 50 or above in boldface (red), percentages below 50 unbolded (green).

Notes in square brackets indicate the democratic principle involved; notes in parentheses indicate the direction of the response coded as pro-democratic.

Table 5. Correlates of Traditional and Democratic Values, 2002 dataset											
Socioeconomic status						Political attitudes and perceptions					
	Better educated	Higher income	Urban	Older	Male	Involved in politics	Internal efficacy	Inst'l trust	Leaders responsive	Increased pol rights	Democratic progress
China											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.462	-.207	-.301	.241		-.240	-.071	-.092	-.174	.047	-.055
<i>Democratic values</i>	.367	.182	.287	-.198	.059	.167	.071	.140	.138		
Taiwan											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.395	-.271	-.167	.414		-.150	-.221	.144	-.086	.162	
<i>Democratic values</i>	.246	.196	.092	-.219	.057	.181	.190	-.112	.099	-.073	
Hong Kong											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.426	-.227	N/A	.322	.088	-.081	-.189	.074			
<i>Democratic values</i>	.453	.328	N/A	-.309		.079	.222	-.120	.079		
Korea											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.211	-.152	-.096	.256		.116	-.218	.123	-.243		-.093
<i>Democratic values</i>	.152	.201	.119	-.166			.226	-.097	.231		.074
Japan											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.212			.274			-.121	.086	-.115		
<i>Democratic values</i>	.222	.105	-.016	-.092	.105	.165	.297	-.116	.287	-.099	.065
Philippines											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.090	-.178	.072		.057		-.071		-.132	-.105	
<i>Democratic values</i>		.067	-.069				.262		.292	.072	
Thailand											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.271	-.280	-.098	.155		-.063	-.223		-.231	-.051	.120
<i>Democratic values</i>	.157	.212	.185				.210	.069	.199		-.181
Mongolia											
<i>Traditional values</i>	-.094	-.077	-.106	.094		.058	-.139	-.071	-.135		
<i>Democratic values</i>	.150	.073		-.121	.079	.063	.244		.264		

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

Dependent variables are additive scales of respondent's disagreement or agreement with traditional-value and democratic-value questionnaire items. The scale ranges from -9 to +9 for traditional values (Korea is pro-rated on a base of 8) and from -8 to +8 for democratic values.

Education measured in years, income in quintiles, age in five-year age groups, involvement in politics by expressing interest in politics and following news about politics, internal efficacy by response to four questions on one's ability to understand and participate in politics, institutional trust by expressed trust in five government institutions, leaders responsive by response to two questions on responsiveness of government leaders, increased political rights by perception current regime has improved access to up to five political rights, democratic progress by view that current regime is more democratic than previous one.

Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. Unbolded (green) numbers are significant at the .05 level, bolded (red) numbers at or above the .001 level. Blank cells indicate correlations without statistical significance. N/A=not applicable (no urban-rural variable in Hong Kong).

Table 6. Regression Analysis on Electoral Participation, 2002 dataset

(Standardized regression coefficients)								
	China	Taiwan	Hong Kong	Korea	Japan	Thailand	Philippines	Mongolia
Male	.073							
Age group	.140	.181	.214	.314	.301	.088	.201	.147
Years of education	.096			.146	.100		.145	.099
Income quintile		.173			.075	-.067	-.092	.096
Urban		.067				-.176		-.195
Traditional values					.076		.160	.076
Democratic values			.127		.077			
adjusted R ²	.030	.057	.028	.074	.087	.044	.064	.075
N=	2071	1166	439	1203	949	1413	1173	1066

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

The dependent variable is the sum of three possible acts: voted in last election, attended campaign rally, tried to persuade someone how to vote. For independent variables, see notes to other tables.

Bold (red) numbers statistically significant at the .01 level; nonbold (green) at the .05 level; empty cells not statistically significant.

Table 7a. Impact of Cultural Values and Perceived Regime Performance on Regime and Democratic Support, 2002 dataset

(Standardized regression coefficients)

	Japan		Hong Kong		Korea		China		Mongolia		Philippines		Taiwan		Thailand		# signif
	n= 1155	adjR= .053	n= 627	adjR= .197	n= 1496	adjR= .132	n= 2272	adjR= .046	n= 1076	adjR= .028	n= 1200	adjR= .050	n= 1109	adjR= .037	n1389	adjR= .161	
Our form of gov't best for us																	
Demo performance						.068				.090							2
Trad'l social values		-.155		-.097		-.122		-.076				-.131		-.110		-.066	7
Democratic values		.071		.283		.280		.057		.113		.146		.074		.322	8
Satisfied with how democracy works in our country	n= 1203	adjR= .029	n= 591	adjR= .149	n= 1487	adjR= .087	n= 2306	adjR= .209	n= 1089	adjR= .022	n= 1200	adjR= .063	n= 1156	adjR= .069	n= 1369	adjR= .090	
Demo performance				.203		-.081		-.086				-.073		-.065			5
Policy performance								.085				.068				-.109	3
Trad'l social values						.138		.054				.072		.119		.090	5
Democratic values				-.255		-.107		-.169								-.055	4
Rejects authoritarian alternatives	n= 1276	adjR= .212	n= 652	adjR= .343	n= 1497	adjR= .144	n= 2409	adjR= .147	n= 1097	adjR= .166	n= 1200	adjR= .106	n= 1197	adjR= .241	n= 1389	adjR= .083	
Demo performance		-.086								-.082							2
Policy performance										-.083							1
Trad'l social values				-.210		-.180		-.197		-.090		-.221		-.115		-.106	7
Democratic values		.374		.313		.270		.111		.326		.131		.310		.144	8
Commitment to democracy	n= 1278	adjR= .157	n= 667	adjR= .230	n= 1497	adjR= .086	N/A		n= 1101	adjR= .126	n= 1200	adjR= .083	n= 1218	adjR= .211	n= 1389	adjR= .056	

Demo performance	.130								.093				.163				4
Policy performance									-.093								2
Trad'l social values			.082		.151						.191				.070		4
Democratic values	-.293		-.234		-.218				-.281		-.131		-.168		-.170		7
Satisfied with current government	n= 1238	adjR= .131	n= 626	adjR= .151	n= 1492	adjR= .098			n= 1092	adjR= .096	n= 1198	adjR= .062	n= 1141	adjR= .203	n= 1385	adjR= .099	
Demo performance			.123		-.103		N/A						-.083				2
Policy performance					.066				-.071						-.101		3
Trad'l social values					.097				.081		.137		.118		.135		5
Democratic values	-.201		-.219		-.059				-.119				-.099		-.087		6
Trusts government institutions	n= 1278	adjR= .091	n= 667	adjR= .117	n= 1497	adjR= .101	n= 2608	adjR= .137	n= 1101	adjR= .128	n= 1200	adjR= .178	n= 1218	adjR= .095	n= 1389	adjR= .191	
Demo performance			.170				-.084		-.090								3
Policy performance							.096		-.122						-.107		3
Trad'l social values	.105				.130				.105		.156		.162		.157		6
Democratic values	-.100		-.121		-.070		-.144		-.081				-.112		-.163		7
Expects democratic progress	n= 1072	adjR= .033	n= 521	adjR= .109	n= 1493	adjR= .036	n= 2013	adjR= .121	n= 1006	adjR= .048	n= 1176	adjR= .024	n= 901	adjR= .023	n= 1302	adjR= .049	
Demo performance			.111				-.112		-.076		-.155		-.104				5
Policy performance							.139				.074				-.093		3
Trad'l social values			.096		-.085								-.101		.050		4
Democratic values			-.160				-.071		-.099						-.094		5

Notes:

Source: 2001-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys

Bolded coefficients are significant at the .001 level; those in italics are significant at the .01 level; those in regular typeface at the .05 level.

Table 7b. Impact of Cultural Values and Perceived Regime Performance on Regime and Democratic Support, 2006 dataset

(Standardized regression coefficients)															
	Korea		Mongolia		Philippines		Taiwan		Thailand		Indonesia		Singapore		# signif
Our form of gov't best for us	n = 1083	adjR= .124	n = 1124	adjR= .059	n = 1109	adjR = .078	n = 1367	adj R = .080	n = 1392	adjR= .127	n = 1313	adjR = .045	n = 963	adjR = .122	
Democratic Performance	-.181		-.094		-.087		-.179		-.073		-.092		-.183		7
Trad'l social values	.038		-.146		-.148		-.090		-.196		-.119		-.151		7
Democratic values	.218				.159		.144		.169		.092		.116		6
Satisfied with how democracy works in our country	n= 1098	adjR= .032	n= 1156	adjR= .016	n= 1114	adjR= .032	n = 1413	adjR = .090	n = 1393	adjR = .094	n= 1308	adjR= .029	n = 963	adjR = .085	
Democratic Performance	.131		.076		.054		.256		.100		.083		.172		7
Trad'l social values					.096				.081		.076		.113		4
Democratic values							-.145		-.130				-.104		3
Rejects authoritarian alternatives	n= 1157	adjR= .032	n = 1159	adjR= .129	n= 1133	adjR = .070	n = 1427	adjR = .256	n = 1394	adjR = .05	n = 1367	adjR = .130	n = 981	adjR = .140	
Democratic Performance			-.079		-.155		.049		-.065		.073				5
Trad'l social values			-.139		-.134		-.074		-.102						4
Democratic values	.193		.148		.080		.321		.116		.280		.247		7
Commitment to democracy	n= 1178	adjR= .015	n= 1164	adjR= .005	n = 1139	adjR = .028	n = 1442	adj R = .053	n = 1448	adjR = .008	n = 1390	adjR= .048	n = 993	adjR = .000	
Democratic Performance							.063								1
Trad'l social values					-.113										1
Satisfied with current government	n= 1130	adjR= .087	n= 1129	adjR = .063	n = 1127	adjR = .025	n = 1379	adjR = .168	n = 1352	adjR = .146	n = 1373	adjR = .027			

Democratic Performance	-.083		-.101		-.069		-.250		-.080		-.121				6
Trad'l social values			-.112		-.081				-.113						3
Democratic values							.182		.210		.070				3
Trusts government institutions	n= 1178	adjR= .076	n= 1162	adjR = .138	n = 1139	adjR = .054	n = 1442	adjR = .162	n = 1448	adjR= .199	n = 1390	adjR = .053	n = 993	adjR = .076	
Democratic Performance	.097		.253		.115		.262		.102		.060		.145		7
Trad'l social values			.075		.110		.074		.266		.079		.159		6
Democratic values	-.060						-.164		-.155						3

Notes:

Source: 2006 Asian Barometer Surveys, preliminary 7-nation dataset as of July 2007.

Bolded coefficients are significant at the .001 level; those in italics are significant at the .01 level; those in regular typeface at the .05 level.

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Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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