



A Comparative Survey of

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Quality of Democracy and Regime Legitimacy in East

Asia

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**Asian Barometer**  
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## Quality of Democracy and Regime Legitimacy in East Asia

### I. Introduction

Over the last two decades, three organizing concepts – democratic transition, democratic consolidation and quality of democracy – have in turn guided the analysis of political change in the developing world. In the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the analysis of the concurrent movement toward democracy in the developing world was influenced by the pioneering work by Guillermo O’Donnell, Juan Linz and Lawrence Whitehead as well as that of Adam Przeworski.<sup>1</sup> Their analysis on democratic transition placed enormous emphasis on the analysis of the choices and strategic interactions of contending elites in an authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition.

Entering the second half of 1990s, the focus of the analysis on third-wave democracies has shifted to consolidation as most countries have moved beyond the stage of the introduction of democracy. While literature on democratic consolidation has varied greatly in terms of the breadth and depth of coverage of political arena, they share one central research question, i.e., the survivability of the new democratic regime.<sup>2</sup> This lopsided emphasis on the endurance of democracy was understandable but it also left social scientists, democracy practitioners, concerned citizens and aid agencies with a growing sense of dissatisfaction. As Philippe Schmitter pointed out that democracy may become consolidated at any level of quality, so long as citizens and politicians come to accept the rules of democratic competition.<sup>3</sup>

Over the last few years, a growing number of students of democracy have sought to develop means of framing and assessing the quality of democracy and identify ways to improve the quality of democratic governance.<sup>4</sup> This stream of theory,

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<sup>1</sup> Guillermo O’Donnell, Juan Linz and Lawrence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin American* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> See for example, Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, Latin America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), Leonardo Morlino, *Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis. Parties, Groups and Citizens in Southern Europe*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>3</sup> Philippe Schmitter, “The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability,” in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., *Assessing Quality of Democracy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005): 18-31.

<sup>4</sup> See for example, David Beetham, Stuart Weir, Sarah Raching, and Lan Kearton. *International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment* (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001); David Beetham, “Towards a Universal Framework for Democracy Assessment,” *Democratization* 11 (April 2004): 1-17;

methodological innovation, and empirical research was prompted by a growing concern among social scientists, democracy practitioners and donor organizations that many third-wave democracies might be stuck in a low-quality equilibrium and run out of the steam of deepening democratic reform. Many empirical studies have shown that the gap between the reality and promise of democracy has been widening and there are widespread perceptions that democratically elected governments and officials are corrupt, incompetent and unresponsive and untrustworthy.<sup>5</sup> In a bulk of third-wave countries without concerted efforts to improve democratic quality it is unlikely that democracy can achieve a broad and durable legitimacy.

If deepening democratic reform is an imperative for all emerging democracies, it is even more so for young democracies in East Asia. In this region democracy not only faces gathering problem of growing popular dissatisfaction or even disillusion but some fierce competitors. Democracy has to compete not only with its predecessor that still lingers on in people's memory (sometimes in a nostalgic way) but also with its efficacious authoritarian and semi-authoritarian neighbors. In this context, the democratic future of East Asia depends very much on the emerging characteristics as well as the performance of the region's existing democracies.<sup>6</sup> If the perceived quality of democracy fails to live up to people's expectation, democracy will not be able to win over the heart of the people in the long run. Also, if democracy does not shine in the eyes of the people of East Asia, its demonstration effect will be very limited and the region's further democratization will be cast in doubt.

However the relationship between democratic legitimacy and quality of democracy is a complex one. The conventional wisdom holds that popular commitment to democratic regime will gain strength if the characteristics as well as the performance of the democratic regime are perceived to be superior to the old regime on some important indicators of good governance, such as political liberty, equality, rule of law, accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. On the other hand, symptoms of bad governance, such as rampant corruption, electoral fraud and protracted gridlock, corrode people's trust in democratic institution.<sup>7</sup>

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David Altman and Anibal Perez-Linan, "Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries," *Democratization* 9 (Summer 2002), 85-100; Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., *Assessing Quality of Democracy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005)

<sup>5</sup> Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, "Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan," *Journal of Democracy*, 12, 1 (February 2001): 122-136; Micheal Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Marta Lagos Cruz-Coke, "A Road with No Return?" *Journal of Democracy* 14, 2 (April 2003): 163-173.

<sup>6</sup> Yun-han Chu, "Third-Wave Democratization in East Asia: Challenges and Prospect", *ASIEN*, 100 (July 2006); Yutzung Chang, Yun-han Chu and Min-hua Huang, "The Uneven Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in East Asia," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 18 (Summer 2006): 246-255

<sup>7</sup> Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes. "Support for Democracy In Africa: Intrinsic Or Instrumental?"

There are two ways to make sense of people's evaluation of the quality of democracy. From the supply side, political leaders and institutions are oftentimes identified as major factors shaping the characteristics of a democracy. One can always trace the root cause of bad governance to corrupt politicians and faulty institutional design, which have failed to supply the valued properties of liberal democracy. The other side of the same equation, however, concerns the demand side. How people evaluate quality of democracy on various scores also depends on what and how much they expect out of a democratic regime. Some prior empirical research suggests that people holding stronger belief in liberal democratic values may demand more out of a democratic regime and become more critical of the actual performance of their real-life democracy. In this sense, "democrats" can be democracy's tough customers.<sup>8</sup> This is intrinsically not a bad thing because at the macro level the causal relationship may operate in a reverse way. At the macro level, strong aggregate demand based on widespread popular commitment to liberal democratic values may compel politicians and parties to deliver good governance, which in turn reinforces the legitimacy of the democratic regime.

In this paper, we aim to accomplish a three-fold analytical task. First, we review the recent efforts to conceptualize and measure quality of democracy by way of introducing a comprehensive battery for measuring some essential properties of liberal democracy. This battery was designed and employed by Asian Barometer Survey (ABS).<sup>9</sup> Next, we present an empirical assessment of the quality of East Asian third-wave democracies based on the data clued from the latest wave of ABS. We examine to what extent do East Asian citizens think their current regimes have embodied the essential properties of liberal democracy? What particular properties do they perceive to be most and least lacking in the regimes? Third, we explore the complex relationship among various aspects of quality of democracy, popular support for democracy and belief in liberal democratic values. Through a multivariate analysis, we identify dimensions of quality of democracy that are most important to the growth

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*British Journal of Political Science* 31 (2001): 447-474; Eric Chang and Yun-han Chu, "Political Corruption and Institutional Trust in East Asia," *Journal of Politics*, 68, 2 (May 2006).

<sup>8</sup> Yun-han Chu and Chin-en Wu, "The Voice of the People: How East Asians Evaluate the Quality of Democracy," paper presented at the 20th IPSA World Congress, Fukuoda, July 9-13, 2006.

<sup>9</sup> The Asian Barometer survey (ABS) represents the region's first collaborative initiative to develop a regional network of democracy studies based on surveying ordinary citizens. Between June 2001 and February 2003, the ABS implemented its first-round comparative survey in eight East Asian countries and territories, namely Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong and China. The ABS launched its second-round survey in October 2005 and its geographical scope was enlarged to cover five more countries in the region. By July 2007 the fieldwork in South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Japan was completed and the survey in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia. All ABS data were collected through face-to-face interviews of randomly selected eligible voters in each participating country. Interested readers are welcome to browse the project's website ([www.asianbarometer.org](http://www.asianbarometer.org)) for methodological details.

of popular commitment to democracy. Also, we examine the syndrome of “disaffected democrats” and explore its implications for the development of liberal democracy.

## II. Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Democracy

The quality of democracy has recently become a subject of increasing and widespread concern in policy circles and the scholarly community. How well do democracies perform as governments by the people and for the people? What type of democratic regime is most likely to provide “kinder and gentler qualities of democracy”? What qualities of democracy do new democracies most lack? These questions have been raised in response to a growing sense of public discontentment with the democratic political process in both old and new democracies.<sup>10</sup>

In recent years, an increasing number of individual scholars and research institutions have attempted to address these questions by discerning the distinct qualities of democracy and distinguishing high-quality democracies from low-quality ones. In doing so, individual scholars and research institutions have employed a variety of political goals, principles, and values as criteria or standards for appraising the quality of democracy. The number of these criteria varies considerably from one study to another as do the substantive characteristics or natures of the criteria. Yet, all the research thus far seeks to assess the extent to which political regimes actually embody generic values of democracy and they satisfy some of its standard procedures or procedural norms.

In his pioneering work, Arend Lijphart compared the quality of democracy in 36 countries and concluded that consensus democracy tends to be the “kinder and gentler” form of democracy.<sup>11</sup> In assessing and comparing the quality of these democracies, he considered a large number of democratic political values and principles, including representation, equality, participation, proximity, satisfaction, accountability, and majority rule. In their seminal attempt to assess the quality of democracy in Latin American countries, David Altman and Anibal Perez-Linan considered a more limited set of criteria — participation, competition, and civil liberty.<sup>12</sup> Besides individual scholars, a number of national and international institutions have also made serious efforts to assess the quality of democracy. Most notably, the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance in

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<sup>10</sup> For the analysis of popular disenchantment in established democracies, see for example, Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Disaffected Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

<sup>11</sup> Arend Lijphart. *Patterns of Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999): 275.

<sup>12</sup> David Altman and Anibal Perez-Linan, “Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries,” *Democratization* 9 (Summer 2002), 85-100.

Stockholm has launched a multinational project assessing the democratic political practices of new democracies.<sup>13</sup> Two basic principles of representative democracy underlie its assessment framework. They are popular control and political equality. From these principles, the IDEA derived seven standards: participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and solidarity. These standards were used to measure the democratic strength of particular countries.

Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino have put forward a most systematic conceptual scheme to date for identifying the essential properties of liberal democracy. They began their analysis by offering clear-cut definitions of the terms “democracy” and “quality,” and then tried to integrate the two into a multidimensional conception of democratic quality. They posited that democracy requires four elements at the minimum: 1) universal, adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information. They further reasoned that there must be some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena, permitting citizens to articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests to make truly meaningful, free and fair elections possible. In addition, formal democratic institutions should be sovereign in fact, that is they should not be constrained by elites or external powers that are not directly or indirectly accountable to the people. Furthermore, they suggested that once a regime meets these basic conditions, it can be further analyzed if and to what extent it achieves the three main goals of an ideal democracy—political and civil freedom, popular accountability and political equality—as well as broader standards of good governance, such as transparency, legality, and responsible rule.<sup>14</sup>

Quality usually refers to one of three following things: procedure, content or result. From the perspective of quality in terms of procedure, they identify five dimensions: the rule of law, participation, competition, and accountability, both vertical and horizontal, on which democracies vary in quality. From the perspective of quality in terms of content, they identify two dimensions: respect for civil and political freedoms, and the progressive implementation of greater political equality. From the perspective of quality in terms of result, they identify one key dimension, i.e., responsiveness, which links the procedural dimensions to the substantive ones by measuring the extent to which public policies correspond to citizen demands and preferences, as aggregated through the political process.

Riding on the tail of their intellectual advancement, Asian Barometer Survey developed and employed a full array of indicators that correspond to the eight dimensions mentioned above in its latest wave of region-wide comparative survey.

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<sup>13</sup> Beetham et. al., *International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment*.

<sup>14</sup> Larry Diamond and Leonardo, “Introduction” in Larry Diamond and Leonardo eds. *Assessing Quality of Democracy* (2005): x-xi.

The only deviation from their original scheme is that we allow measurement of political corruption to be a separate dimension, rather than just a component of rule of law, to capture its extraordinary impact in shaping people's orientation toward democracy.

For each of the nine dimensions, ABS typically designed two or three indicators. All together ABS employed the following twenty items to cover the nine dimensions:

**A. Rule of Law**

- 1) Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.
- 2) How often do national government officials abide by the law?

**B. Corruption**

- 1) How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?
- 2) In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?

**C. Competition**

- 1) Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.
- 2) How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?
- 3) On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?

**D. Participation**

- 1) In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?
- 2) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?
- 3) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?

**E. Vertical Accountability**

- 1) People have the power to change a government they don't like.
- 2) Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible



for its actions.

- 3) How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?

#### **F. Horizontal Accountability**

- 1) When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.
- 2) To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?

#### **G. Freedom**

- 1) People are free to speak what they think without fear.
- 2) People can join any organization they like without fear.

#### **H. Equality**

- 1) Everyone is treated equally by the government.
- 2) People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.

#### **I. Responsiveness**

- 1) How well do you think the government responds to what people want?

For the sake of measurement quality, we intentionally avoid following the same question format for all twenty items.<sup>15</sup> Some questions were phrased as a descriptive (factual) statement to solicit agreement or disagreement from the respondents. A disagreement means that the respondents don't think the description fit the current situation. An example is the first item for measuring Rule of Law, "Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials", which is followed by a four-point response grid, ranging from "Strongly Agree," "Somewhat Agree," "Somewhat Disagree," to "Strongly Disagree."<sup>16</sup> Also, not all the questions are phrased in positive direction. Some of them are intentionally set in a negative tone. For example, the second question measuring vertical accountability, which reads, "Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions." Disagreement to this statement is taken as a positive assessment.

At the same time, many questions were phrased as an interpolative statement to solicit a substantive response from the interviewees. The second item for measuring Rule of Law belongs to this category. After we prompted our respondents with the statement, "How often do national government officials abide by the law?" they were asked to select one out of four substantive response categories: "Always," "Most of

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<sup>15</sup> Multi-format and multi-indicator approach is widely regarded as a prudent strategy to enhance the reliability of one's measurement.

<sup>16</sup> All together, there are nine items following this format. Please refer to Appendix A for details.

the Time,” “Sometimes,” “Rarely”<sup>17</sup>.

Most of the twenty questions follow either one of these two formats with the exception of three items for measuring level of political participation, which were designed as dichotomous variables getting straight “Yes” or “No” answer.

Given the constraints of questionnaire space, respondents’ patience and their willingness to cooperate, we were not able to employ as many indicators as necessary to match the full breadth and depth of the conceptual scheme developed by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. But the twenty-item battery the second-wave ABS employed, we believe, represents the most comprehensive and systematic effort thus far to empirically assess the quality of democracy through survey research in East Asia or anywhere in the world.

Our approach privileges public opinion survey because epistemologically we believe that quality, like beauty, is assumed to lie in the eye of the beholder or the person experiencing the democracy. Regardless of how international donors or academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a given country, this form of regime will be consolidated only when the bulk of the public believes that democracy actually is better for their society and that democracy of an acceptable quality is being supplied. In a nutshell, the citizens are the final judges of the legitimacy as well as the characteristics of their democracy. Public opinion surveys such as Asian Barometer offers a valuable vantage point on whether the citizenry considers that political institutions produce an acceptable degree of democracy and deliver an acceptable level of good governance.

### III. Assessing Quality of Democracy in East Asia

The ABS conducted its second-round survey in the region’s all six third-wave democracies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand (which was a democracy before the military coup of September 2006),<sup>18</sup> between October 2005 and December 2006. During the same period, it was also implemented in Singapore, a semi-democratic regime that can serve as a point of reference for comparison purpose.<sup>19</sup> Altogether 9,366 East Asian citizens were interviewed with each country surveying more than 1,000 adults.

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<sup>17</sup> The verbal response grid for this type of question is custom made for each question. Please refer to Appendix A for the complete wording of each question.

<sup>18</sup> The second-round ABS survey in Thailand was conducted in April and May of 2006, just four months before the military coup.

<sup>19</sup> All surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of respondents that represents the adult population in each country. The research instrument was translated into local languages. Trained fieldworkers conducted each interview in the local language of the respondent’s choice.

In Table 1.1 thru 1.9, we report the percentage distribution of positive evaluation based on each of the twenty questions. For the sake of space, all four-point response grids were collapsed into dichotomous variables and only the percentage of giving a positive answer is reported in the tables. All questions are given an ID code, which corresponds to its serial number in the original questionnaire. For instance, 59.5% in the first row of the first column in Table 1.1 means that 59.5% of our Korean respondent answered “Strongly agree” or “Somewhat agree” to Q104, which reads “Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.” Another example, 23.6% in the first row of the second column in Table 1.2 means that less than a quarter of our Mongolian respondents answered either “Hardly anyone is involved” or “Not a lot of officials are corrupt” to Q118, which reads “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?” Lastly, answers to all twenty questions are aligned in one direction, i.e., positive assessment (which means better quality or more democratic).

Also for each of the nine dimensions, we calculate some summary statistics for an easy grasp of the overall picture. For instance, 9.4% in the first column of the second last row of Table 1.1 means that in South Korea only 9.4% of the respondents gave positive answers to both items measuring the extent to which the functioning of the current political system conforms to rule of law.

Table 1.1 shows that in most East Asian countries a majority of people expressed some confidence in the independence of their judicial system when it comes to punishing wrong-doing high-ranking officials except Taiwan where only 44.6% think that “our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.” Singaporean citizens registered the highest level of confidence in judicial independence with 84.1% of the respondents giving a positive answer. Table 1.1 also show that when it comes to the criterion of law-abiding government, in all East Asian third-wave democracy only a tiny minority believe think that their national government officials always or most of the time abide by the law. In Thailand and South Korea, only 16% and 17% of the respondents respectively gave a positive answer. In contrast, in Singapore 77% of the respondents believe that their national government always or most of the time abides by the law. Based on this paired set, the current Singaporean system (with 65.6 % of respondents giving a positive answer to both items) conforms to the criteria of rule of law far better than any of the East Asia emerging democracies. In all six of them, less of a quarter of their citizens gave a thumb up to both items.

Table 1.2 shows that combating corruption is a major challenge to East Asian young democracies. Among the six third-wave democracies, only a minority believes that in the national government “hardly anyone is involved” in corruption or “not a lot

of officials are corrupt. The only exception is Thailand where 62% of people offering a positive evaluation. In Mongolia and Taiwan, only 23.6% and 29.4% respectively of our respondents gave a positive answer. This suggests that a majority of Taiwanese and Mongolian citizens believe that in their respective national government “most officials are corrupt” or “almost everyone is corrupt”. This is a very disparaging assessment. On the second question, in most East Asian countries more than half of the population think the government is working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes. But in the Philippines only 39.1% think that way. On both account, Singapore fares far better than the rest with 90.2% of Singaporeans believing most officials are not corrupt and 89% believing that the government working seriously to crackdown corruption and root out bribes.

In Table 1.3, we found that in citizens’ view most East Asian young democracies by and large meet the minimum standard of allowing for competitive, free and fair elections. Most East Asians think that in their country “political parties or candidates have equal access to the mass media during the election period.” Also most of them consider the country’s last national election is largely free and fair. Taiwan is a notable exception, where partisan control of the Central Election Commission has been an outstanding issue and only 48.8% of the respondents evaluate the freeness and fairness of the election positively. On the question “whether our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates”, the picture is more mixed. In Thailand and Indonesia, citizens are more or less the choices the election has to offer while a majority of voters in South Korea and the Philippines don’t feel that way. Most notably, Singapore no longer shines on measures of competition. In fact, only 52.3% of Singaporeans think that political parties or candidates have equal access to the mass media and only 49.6% of Singaporeans feel that “elections offer the voters a real choice”. On these on measures, Singapore registers the lowest and second lowest respectively in the region. This conforms to the general view that Singapore is semi-democratic. However, an overwhelming majority (87.4%) of Singaporeans do believe that the country’s last national election is largely fair and free.

Table 1.4 shows that level of participation varies significantly among East Asian countries. Mongolian voters are most active in taking part in electoral process with 26.8% engaging in all three types of activities – voting, attending rallies and persuading others how to vote – and 40.1% engaging in two out of three. Adding the two together, more than two third (66.9%) of the Mongolian electorate have participated in at least two election-related activities during the last national election. In contrast, Singaporeans are least active with less than 1% of its citizenry taking part in all three activities. Apparently, the non-competitiveness of its electoral process has turned off most voters. In most other East Asian young democracies, the level of

electoral participation is comparable to the established democracies in the West.

[Table 1.1 thru Table 1.4 about here]

Table 1.5 shows that most East Asian democracies meet the minimum standard of vertical accountability for an electoral democracy, i.e., throwing the rascal out through voting. In all six young democracies a majority feel that their current system gives them “the power to change the government people don’t like” with the exception of South Korea. Sense of exercising vertical accountability through election is also relatively low among Singaporeans. At the same time, much fewer people feel that they can “hold the government responsible for its action between elections.” This is a widely shared perception across all seven countries. On the question of transparency, arguable a pre-requisite for effective vertical accountability, the picture is more mixed. In Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, most people think that only “sometimes” or “rarely” do “government officials withhold important information from the public view”. In South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Mongolia, only a minority feel that way, suggesting that many citizens suspect that government officials “always” or “most of the time” withhold important information from the public. On this last question, one can interpret its meaning and cross-country variation in a totally opposed way. It is plausible to argue that most people in Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore don’t know how much they don’t know while skeptical citizens in South Korea at least know something about “known unknown”. However, popular perception of a lack of transparency still matter. It tends to undermine people’s trust in democratically elected government and political institutions.

Table 1.6 reports the findings from our measures for horizontal accountability. It shows that most people sense that “when the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.” The sense that the judicial system cannot keep a law-breaching government in check is most strongly felt among citizens in Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. In South Korea, only 23.2% of our respondents answered “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” to this question (Q107). When it comes to the question about legislative oversight, more people think “the legislature is capable of keeping the government in check”. In virtually all countries, slightly more than 50% of the citizenry sense that the legislative is “very capable” or “capable” of doing so, with Thailand being the only exception. On the other hand, the number of people who don’t think effective legislative oversight has been in place remains considerably large.

For the measurement of the freedom dimension, the paired set that ABS employed address freedom of speech and freedom of association respectively. Table

1.7 shows that on both scores most East Asian citizens think that their political system permits citizens to articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests. The only exception is Singapore, where only 38.9% of our respondents agreed that “people are free to speak what they think without fear and only 46.2 % felt that “people can join any organization they like without fear.” In virtually all East Asian young democracies, either one of the two indicators get positive responses from more than two thirds of their citizenry. However, our survey also shows that most East Asian democracies are still far from being “completely free”. In South Korea, only 51.2% of our respondents gave a positive response to both questions. This summary measure in a few other East Asian third-wave democracies also projects a not so reassuring picture as it hovers around 60%. The country where freedom is most lacking is Singapore, where it drops to 31.8%.

[Table 1.5 thru Table 1.7 about here]

Table 1.8 reports the distribution on the paired questions on equality. The result from the first question suggests that in East Asian third-wave democracies, equal treatment remains an unfulfilled promise for most citizens. The percentages of positive assessment in Mongolia, the Philippines and Taiwan are all below 50%. Singapore fares substantially better on this score than most East Asian young democracies. On the question of guarantee of basic socio-economic necessities, most East Asian countries turn in some encouraging figures. However, there are two puzzling figures which require further investigation. On the question asking whether “people have the basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter,” the percentage of giving positive assessment by respondents from South Korea, one of the most affluent countries, is surprisingly low (29.2%) while the ratio from the Philippines, one of the socio-economically less developed countries, is impressively high (83.2%).

Lastly, in Table 1.9 we examine the outcomes from the most encompassing question dealing with the responsiveness of government. The overall picture is not very encouraging. For the seven countries as a whole, only 39.7% of East Asian citizens think that the government is “very responsive” or “largely responsive” to what people want. In South Korea, Mongolia and the Philippines, the percentage is below one third. Paradoxically, Singapore is the only East Asian country where two thirds of its citizenry perceive their government being responsive to what people want.

[Tables 1.8 and 1.9 about here]

Overall speaking, our survey shows for the great majority of East Asian citizens,

their respective democracy is still far from being a high-quality democracy. Most third-wave democracies systems in the region are still lacking many of the highly valued properties of liberal democracy. In particular, three procedural dimensions, controlling corruption, horizontal accountability and rule of law are most lacking in most countries. Also, the result dimension in terms of responsiveness has ample room for improvement. In stark contrast, Singaporean system is faulty in terms of competition, freedom and participation. But in the eyes of its citizens, Singapore performs deliver a high-quality governance in terms of rule of law, controlling corruption, horizontal accountability, equality and responsiveness. Democracy in East Asia is indeed facing some fierce competitors.

#### IV. Quality of Democracy and Orientations toward Democracy

After reviewing the general situation of democratic quality in East Asia, we now turn to two inter-related analytical issues. First, what are the implications of people's assessment of democratic quality for the legitimacy of democratic regime? Which aspects of quality of democracy are more important to the growth of popular support for democracy? Second, how do people's political values shape their assessment of the properties of democracy? Do people holding stronger belief in liberal democratic values become more critical of the actual performance of their democracy?

To address these two issues, we need to employ additional two batteries: one for measuring strength of popular support for democracy and the other strength of liberal democratic value orientation. For each of them, ABS has designed a fully-fledged battery.

The ABS battery for gauging popular support for democracy is designed around the premise that normative commitment to democracy comprises of many attitudinal components. These attitudinal components include the following five attitudinal dimensions, namely the *desirability of democracy*, *preferability of democracy*, the *suitability of democracy*, the *efficacy of democracy*, and the *priority of democracy*. Desirability of democracy refers to the degree which citizens want their country to be democratic now. Preferability of democracy refers to the belief that democracy is always superior or more preferable to any other forms of government. Suitability of democracy refers to the degree of which citizens feel that democracy is appropriate for their country. Efficacy of democracy dwells on the effectiveness of democratic regime in dealing with the country's major problems. Priority of democracy focuses on how important democracy is as compared with other desirable societal objectives. ABS has designed specific items for measuring the five attitudinal components

mentioned above.<sup>20</sup>

The ABS also employed a series of questions that probe respondents' value orientations toward some fundamental organizing principles of liberal democracy, such as rule of law, liberty and freedom, popular accountability and separation of power.<sup>21</sup> Their responses to this battery reveal both the substance and depth of their commitment to liberal democratic norms.<sup>22</sup>

In Table 2.1, we first examine the relationship between people's perceived quality of democracy with their satisfaction with democracy. The later is measured with a widely used four-point item asking "Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in our country, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?" We calculate correlations coefficients between the summary scores on the nine dimensions of quality of democracy with this four-point scale for each of the seven country samples as well as the merged cross-national sample. This exercise reveals how much people's perceived properties of the political system shape their overall satisfaction with democracy.<sup>23</sup> All nine correlation coefficients for the merged sample (in the right-hand most column of Table 2.1) are statistically significant and they are all in the positive direction. This means the better the perceived qualities the higher the satisfaction. Among the possible sources of people's dissatisfaction with the way democracy work, controlling corruption and responsiveness stand out (carrying the two largest coefficients).

[Table 2.1 about here]

Symptoms of bad governance not only cause people's dissatisfaction with democracy, they also erode people's support for democracy itself. Table 2.2 reports the correlation coefficients between the summary scores on the nine dimension of quality of democracy with that of five-item scale for measuring popular support for democracy.<sup>24</sup> We calculate correlations coefficients for each of the seven country samples as well as the merged seven-nation sample. All nine correlation coefficients

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<sup>20</sup> Please refer to Appendix A for the wordings of the four-item scale.

<sup>21</sup> Please also refer to Appendix A for the wordings of this nine-item scale.

<sup>22</sup> This value-orientation battery was originally designed by Hu Fu. This scale treats pro-authoritarian legitimacy orientations and pro-democratic values as the two sides of the same coin. It was designed to measure not just belief in democratic norms but also mass belief and attitudes that are typically nurtured under authoritarian or anti-democratic regimes. See Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu.

"Neo-Authoritarianism, Polarized Conflict and Populism in a Newly Democratizing Regime: Taiwan's Emerging Mass Politics." *Journal of Contemporary China*, 5, 11 (1996): 23-41.

<sup>23</sup> It also serves the purpose of a methodological check. If our various measures of quality of democracy are valid and reliable, most of them should be significantly correlated with satisfaction with democracy.

<sup>24</sup> To measure the overall level of normative commitment to democracy, we constructed a 6-point index ranging from 0 to 5 by counting the number of pro-democratic responses on the five dimensions discussed above.



for the merged sample (in the right-hand most column of Table 2.2) are statistically significant and they are all in the positive direction. This means that people's perceived properties do matter. The higher their evaluation the stronger their support for democracy. This applied to all nine dimensions. However, certain dimensions matter more than others. In the order of importance, controlling corruption, vertical accountability, responsiveness are the three most important considerations affecting people's commitment toward democracy.

[Table 2.2 about here]

This generalization applies to most of the countries we surveyed. However there are some notable exceptions. In Mongolia, citizens' perceived quality of democracy does not seem to have much impact on their commitment to democracy. This is perhaps because on measures of democratic quality, most Mongolians gave an equally disparaging assessment across the board. In addition, certain dimensions may matter much more for some countries than others. For instance, in South Korea and Taiwan, perceived quality on the horizontal accountability dimension turns out to be more important than controlling corruption or responsiveness. This suggests that under their respective semi-presidential regime, effectiveness horizontal accountability is a property that concerns citizens more saliently than elsewhere.

Table 2.3 allows us to explore the phenomenon of "disaffected democrats". It reports the correlation coefficients between summary scores of nine quality dimensions with the arithmetic sum of the nine-item battery for measuring belief in liberal democratic values. It by and large confirms our expectation that the stronger people believe in liberal democratic values the more critical they become in evaluating to what extent their democracy deliver the valued properties. In the left-hand most column, one finds that eight out of nine coefficients are all negative. One also finds similar patterns in each of the seven country samples. Given the present state of democratic practice in most East Asian countries, respondents with higher expectation are likely to be less satisfied with the current practice. Thus, they are more likely to give a lower rating of the current system.

[Table 2.3 about here]

## V. Exploring the Theoretical Significance of Quality of Democracy through Path Analyses

For a more robust estimate of the importance of perceived quality to popular

support for democracy, we have to apply multivariate analysis to our data. But before we delve into analytical exploration regarding quality of democracy and regime legitimacy, it is necessary to test the dimensionality of the twenty questions we included to measure quality of democracy. While theoretically this battery is designed to capture the nine dimensions, it is not clear whether the empirical data will confirm our conceptualization and whether we can simplify our measurement if statistically a more parsimonious factor structure fits the data best. We apply a dichotomous two-parameter IRT method by TESTFACT to conduct the test of dimensionality and the criteria is whether it is worth adding more latent factors to improve the fit statistics given we compromise the parsimoniousness of the factor model. Once we add more latent factors but cannot significantly improve the model fit, then we should stay at the original one based the parsimonious principle. Table 3.1 reports the result.

[Tables 3.1 about here]

As can be seen in Table 3.1, the two-factor model is obvious the best model given the parsimonious principle since adding a third latent factor not only make the model more complicated but also bring worse fit statistics. To see how to interpret the two-factor model, Table 3.2 shows the factor loadings of each battery item.

[Tables 3.2 about here]

Among the twenty items, ten of them can be significantly explained by the first latent factor. These items include the specific questions asking respondents to evaluate the rule of law under given regime (q104, q113), the questions about corruption (q118, q120), whether the country has a fully competitive electoral system (q43, q114), whether the government information is transparent enough (q112), whether respondents think they have power to keep government in check (q107, q115), and an all-embracing question about government responsiveness (q116). The item loadings of the first four questions (measuring rule of law and corruption) are stronger than most of the rest. This means that these items can be taken as anchor items that define the nature of this underlying dimension. Also substantively other items such as transparency and horizontal accountability are highly relevant to the concept of “rule of law” broadly defined. So we may label the first factor “rule of law”. The second latent factor only explains four items, and particularly the loadings are anchoring on freedom: q105, q103, q110, and q111. We decide to drop the two non-freedom items and let the second factor simply refer to “freedom”, but take q103 as independent variable to measure accountability since it is the core question in many other

well-known survey. Finally, there two items nearly have split loadings on the two latent factors: q108 and q109. Both item refer to equality and we make use of them to form an independent variable of “equality”. In addition to the above items, participation is not significantly related to the two latent factors and should be viewed as another independent variable. The only item left is q106 and it simply does not have measurement validity.

The following multivariate analyses will be based on the above result to reformulate the battery into four (reduced) dimensions of quality of democratic governance: namely rule of law, freedom, equality, and accountability. Political participation is treated as has its own concept and does not belong to this category.

In addition, after conducting factor analysis on the five items measuring support for democracy, we found belief in priority of democracy does not converge on the same factor as do the other four. This suggests that we should treat priority of democracy as an independent measure and use it as a control variable in multivariate analysis. The result of the factor analysis is reported in Table 3.3.

[Tables 3.3 about here]

To explore the complex relationship between people’s assessment of quality of democracy and their attitudes toward democracy, we apply path analyses to our seven-country merged data. We regress the factor score of support for democracy on the following independent variables: political participation, two measures of people evaluation of the economic conditions (one for the country’s overall economic condition and the other personal economic condition), four variables related to quality of governance (rule of law, freedom, equality, and accountability), democratic orientation, two attitudinal variables reflecting citizen’s concern about politics (priority of democracy and interest in politics), and finally three background demographic variables (education, gender, and age). Details about the variable construction can be found in Appendix B.

The rationale behind the selection of independent variables is that many previous researches have found that the predictors such as active political participation, better economic conditions, positive evaluation of quality of governance, and more concern about politics can account for why people support democracy. Besides, the three background demographic variables are included to be our control variables. In fact, there has been an on-going debate among students of democracy over whether the delivery of material goods is more or less important than the delivery of desired political goods, i.e., good democratic governance, in sustaining citizens’ support for

democracy.<sup>25</sup> It is theoretically interesting to gauge the relative explanatory power of perceive quality of democracy against that of a most frequently cited factor explaining the level of popular for democracy.<sup>26</sup>

All the effects of independent variables are supposed to be positive if they have explanatory power. Our preliminary regression analysis shows that rule of law is the strongest and most consistent explanatory variable, and which is almost two or three times powerful than any other independent variable in six of the seven country samples.<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the two measures of people's evaluation of the economic conditions hardly have any explanatory power. The first cut of our regression analysis shows that delivery of political goods is much more important than delivery of material goods in explaining support for democracy.

With the result that rule of law is the most powerful predictor to explain why people support democracy, we want to step further to investigate what reasons make people positively evaluate the quality of democratic governance. To fulfill this analytical purpose, we specify the variable of rule of law as an intermediate variable of all the other independent variable and see which predictor can account for its variance and whether there exists any countervailing path effect to offset the explanatory power on support for democracy.

The result of the path analysis is reported in Table 3.4. If we focus on the upper half table, we can find the strongest explanatory variable to explain support for democracy is rule of law in either the overall samples, or in most of the individual country samples except Mongolia and Indonesia. No other independent variable has significant explanatory power in more than five country samples, but generally democratic orientation, priority of democracy, and interest in politics are more powerful predictors. This finding can be easily concluded from the result of the merged-data samples (greater beta-coefficients) and it indicates that variables of political culture are also more important than provision of economic goods to explain support for democracy, but the explained patterns might vary from country to country. Therefore, in the discussion below we will focus on the strongest and most consistent explained variable "rule of law".

[Table 3.4 about here]

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<sup>25</sup> Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, "Support for Democracy In Africa: Intrinsic Or Instrumental?" *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (2001): 447-474.

<sup>26</sup> For example, Pippa Norris ed. *Critical Citizens: Support for Democratic Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

<sup>27</sup> For the sake of limited space, we do not present the regression analysis on support for democracy in each country sample. However, similar results can be found in the path analysis reported in Table 3.4 and generally the beta coefficients on support for democracy are quite closed.

Before we proceed the exploration of how the variable “rule of law” mediates the impact of other independent variables to explain democratic legitimacy, we want to give some explanations to those findings that are not consistent to our expectation. In Mongolia, none of items related to quality of governance matters in explaining support for democracy, and the most powerful predictor is the belief in priority of democracy. Together with the other two strong predictors of democratic orientation and interest in politics, the factors account for support democracy in Mongolia are much associated with political values instead of provision of political or economic goods. As to the case of Indonesia, while rule of law is not the strongest predictor, it is still the second most powerful predictor and does explain significant variance, but education is the variable that has the most explanatory power on support for democracy.

There is no surprise when it comes to signs of the causal relationships we want to test, either for the four items of quality of governance or for other independent variables. The only two exceptions are found in Philippines (where those who think they have enjoyed better economic condition are less likely to support for democracy) and in Thailand (where those who have stronger democratic orientation are actually less likely to support for democracy).

It is not difficult to understand this finding since democracy in Philippines for past two decades always means political fray and lack of order. For the middle class or people who have better economic condition political order is more important than democracy since the former brings stable society and economic prosperity but the later might lead to social unrest and economic recession. With regard to Thailand, the middles class and urban residents for a long time were not very satisfied with the government under the rule of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. From the hindsight this finding reflects the social atmosphere before the coup in September 2006 that paradoxically the political experiences under Thaksin’s might have eroded popular support for democracy especially among those who hold stronger belief liberal democratic values and could be otherwise more supportive of democracy under normal circumstance.

To explore what shape people’s evaluation of the quality of governance, specifically the quality of rule of law broadly defined, we need to examine the lower half of the findings in Table 3.4. As can be seen, equality is consistently the strongest correlate in all of the country samples. This means that these two dimensions of quality of democracy tend to go together. Again, this may be easily understood since the core elements of rule of law are highly related to the concept of equality in terms of equal rights and non-discrimination. Nevertheless, the most noteworthy finding is that there are many negative significant relationships as well. For example, those who

participate more actively in political processes, believe they can change the government if they want, have stronger democratic orientation, or are more educated are actually less likely to give the present government a positive evaluation regarding rule of law.

These are strong evidences for syndrome of “critical democrats”. Peoples who are more active in politics and stronger believers in liberal democratic values tend to expect more out of democratic regime and become tougher customers for democracy. In other words, while those who support democracy are usually identified with the characteristics of having more political participation, stronger political efficacy, stronger democratic orientation, or better education, it is likely that these factors might work in another (counter-veiling) path that attenuates the support of democracy since a higher standard has been set up and therefore these people might be more easily disappointed at democracy once the experience does not meet their expectation.

It is useful to calculate direct and indirect path effects from Table 3.4 to evaluate the overall relationships. As can be seen in Table 3.5, the finding in most of the cells confirms what we expect that shows a positive relationship between predictors and the dependent variable. However, we found that political participation, economic conditions of the country as a whole, personal economic condition, and vertical accountability do not have significant explanatory power on democratic legitimacy, no matter it is referred to direct or indirect effects. The main source accounting for democratic legitimacy comes from the broadly defined concept of “rule of law”, but generally the other two variables related to quality of governance such as freedom, equality and also the three political culture variables, democratic orientation, priority of democracy, and interest in politics, all have quite considerable impact on democratic legitimacy.

[Table 3.5 about here]

In addition to the above general patterns of explanation, some exceptions do exist and democratic orientation is obviously the strong case that shows people tend to reject democracy if they are more demanding on how democracy works and what it should achieve, especially in the dimension of rule of law.

For the other exceptions, the negative relationship between political participation in Korea and Singapore can be interpreted that political mobilization in these two countries are much more powerful, and a large portion of people who participate political activities do not mean to support democracy but have other social meanings. In additions, the negative relationship of personal economic condition in Philippines and education in Thailand has been discussed earlier. Finally, we believe that people

who have stronger sense of political efficacy in Indonesia are less supportive of democracy might be related to the negative image of democracy brought by the mixed results of democratization since 1998.

We can summarize three concluding points to wrap up our path analysis. First, positive evaluation of quality of governance is indeed a strong source of democratic legitimacy. Second, among different aspects of quality of governance, fulfilling the many aspects of quality of democracy under an encompassing concept of “rule of law” is the most important one to foster popular support for democracy. Since the concept of “rule of law” broadly defined is a composite variable of the following: law-abiding government officials, independent court, clean politics and rooting out corruption, a competitive, free and fair electoral system, transparent government and functional mechanism for citizens to hold the government officials responsible, and a responsive government, all these desired characteristics matter in fostering popular support for democracy. Third, however, people who hold stronger belief in liberal democratic values tend to be more critical of government performance and their disappointment with the real-life democracy might dampen their support for democracy at least in the short run.

## VI. Conclusions

Our empirical analyses confirm that in East Asia popular support for democracy depends on to a large extent whether the citizenry experiences that political institutions produce an acceptable degree of democracy and deliver an acceptable level of good governance. At the same time, the perceived quality of democracy is also shaped by what citizens expect out of and demand from their political leaders and institutions.

The growth of democratic legitimacy is also shaped by some short-term factors, such as economic performance, as well as by some long-term forces, such as values change. It is important to know that citizens in East Asian democracies are able to distinguish between the political and economic dimensions of regime performance. This means a large number of citizens may come to value democracy for the political goods it produces even when its economic performance is perceived to be sluggish. This is a no small point because most East Asian emerging democracies are not likely to repeat its past record of miraculous growth. Over the long-term, the state’s overall capacity in the provision of a stable and enabling economic environment is severely constrained by the forces of globalization.

For East Asian citizens, of all of the properties people expect out of liberal

democracy, nothing is more important than the delivery of clean politics. Unfortunately it is also the property that is most lacking in virtually all East Asian third-wave democracies. This suggests that all East Asian democracies desperately need more serious attempts to strengthen the legal deterrence against the corruption of elected politicians. They all need more rigorous regulations on campaign finance and financial disclosures to arrest the encroachment of money politics. At the same time, it is imperative to strengthen the independence and integrity of the judicial branch making it less susceptible to political influence. Without this a systematic crackdown on the un-ethical conducts of elected politicians remains an illusive goal.

In the future, we need more research on ways to improve democratic quality. Drawing on experiences of East Asia, one can identify at least three important set of factors that are significantly associated with the quality of democracy. First, political elite matters. Lack of strong commitment of a country's significant leaders of opinion, culture, business, and social organizations, and all major leaders of government and politically significant parties to democratic norms and procedures is a sure recipe for cooking low quality of democracy. Second, mass political culture matters. If a majority of citizens firmly endorse the principle of freedom and rights protection, limited government, democratic accountability, and rule of law, state officials will feel compelled to follow the procedure of good democracy. State officials violating individual freedom and or engaging in illegal practices and corruption will definitely worry about being replaced through elections. Lastly, civil societies also play an important role in determining the quality of democracy. A strong civil society and a tradition of civil engagement are also crucial in shaping politicians and parties' incentives. Under such circumstance, the civil society as a whole is more likely to generate strong constraints on state officials.



**Appendix A**  
**Survey Questions**

**I. Indicators of Quality of Democracy**

**A. Rule of Law**

Q104) Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q113) How often do national government officials abide by the law?

1. Always
2. Most of the time
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely

**B. Corruption**

Q118) How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?

1. Hardly anyone is involved
2. Not a lot of officials are corrupt
3. Most officials are corrupt
4. Almost everyone is corrupt

Q120) In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?

1. It is doing its best
2. It is doing something
3. It is not doing much
4. Doing nothing

### **C. Competition**

Q105) Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q114) How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?

1. Always
2. Most of the time
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely

Q43) On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election?

1. Completely free and fair
2. Free and fair, but with minor problems
3. Free and fair, with major problems
4. Not free or fair

### **D. Participation**

Q38) In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?

1. Yes
2. No

Q40) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?

1. Yes

2. No

Q41) Thinking about the national election in [year], did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?

1. Yes
2. No

### **E. Vertical Accountability**

Q103) People have the power to change a government they don't like.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q106) Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q112) How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?

1. Always
2. Most of the time
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely

### **F. Horizontal Accountability**

Q 107) When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree

3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q115) To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?

1. Very capable
2. Capable
3. Not capable
4. Not at all capable

### **G. Freedom**

Q110) People are free to speak what they think without fear.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q111) People can join any organization they like without fear.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

### **H. Equality**

Q108) Everyone is treated equally by the government.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q109) People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree

4. Strongly disagree

### **I. Responsiveness**

Q116) How well do you think the government responds to what people want?

1. Very responsive
2. Largely responsive
3. Not very responsive
4. Not responsive at all

### **II. Popular Support for Democracy**

#### **A. Preferability**

Q121) Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?

1. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government
2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one
3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime

#### **B. Efficacy**

Q122) Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?

1. Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society
2. Democracy can not solve our society's problems

#### **C. Priority**

Q123) If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important?

1. Economic development is definitely more important
2. Economic development is somewhat more important
3. Democracy is somewhat more important
4. Democracy is definitely more important
5. The two are equally important (recorded but not explicitly offered)

#### **D. Suitability**

Q98) Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our country. If “1” means that democracy is completely unsuitable for [name of country] today and “10” means that it is completely suitable, where would you place our country today?

1. Democracy is completely unsuitable
2. ....
3. ....
4. ....
5. ....
6. ....
7. ....
8. ....
9. ....
10. Democracy is perfectly suitable

**IV. Belief in Liberal Democratic Values**

A.

Q77) The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q134) Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q135) The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q136) Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q137) When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q138) If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q139) If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q140) If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q141) When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

### **III. Economic Conditions**

#### **A. Country's Economic Condition**

Q2) How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years? Is it ...

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse

#### **B. Household Economic Condition**

Q5) How would you compare the current economic condition of your family with what it was a few years ago? Is it ...

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse



## V.

### A. Democratic Value on Horizontal Accountability

Q137) When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q138) If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

### B. Democratic Value on Vertical Accountability

Q134) Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q139) If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

### C. Democratic Value on Freedom and Pluralism

Q135) The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q136) Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q140) If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

#### **D. Democratic Value on Rule of Law**

Q77) The most important thing for political leaders is to accomplish their goals even if they have to ignore the established procedure.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

Q141) When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**Appendix B**  
**The Construct of the Variables**

<b>Variable Name</b>	<b>Operationalization</b>	<b>Range</b>
Support for Democracy	The factor score formulated by a categorical factor analysis (Mplus 4.2) of q97, q98, q121, and 122.	-1.385 (do not support democracy) to 0.396 (support democracy)
Political Participation	Index is the sum of q038, q040, and q041.	0 (no participation) to 3 (full participation)
Economic Condition-Country	Index of q002.	1 (much worse) to 5 (much better)
Economic Condition-Household	Index of q005.	1 (much worse) to 5 (much better)
Accountability	Index of q103	1 (do not have power to change a government) to 4 (do have power to change a government)
Equality	Index is the average of q108 and q109.	1 (do not have equality) to 4 (do have equality)
Freedom	Index is the average of q110 and q111.	1 (do not have freedom) to 4 (do have freedom)
Rule of Law	The factor score formulated by a categorical factor analysis (Mplus 4.2) of q104, q113, q115, q120, q43, q114, q112, q107, q115, and q116.	-0.804 (do not have the rule of law) to 0.864 (have the rule of law)
Democratic Orientation	The factor score formulated by a categorical factor analysis (Mplus 4.2) of q77, q134, q135, q136, q137, q138, q139, q140, and q141.	-0.729 (authoritarian) to 0.842 (democratic)
Education	Index of se005	1 (no formal education) to 10 (post-graduate degree)
Gender	Index of se002	1 (male), 2(female)
Age	Index of se003a	17 to 95
Priority of Democracy	Index of q123	1 (economic development is more important) to 3 (democracy is more important)
Interest in Politics	Index of q49	1 (not at all interested in politics) to 4 (very interested in politics)

Note: Details of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.

**Table1-1 Rule of Law: Percentage of Positive Evaluation**

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q104 Our current courts always punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials	59.5%	63.1%	58.0%	44.6%	73.6%	82.8%	84.1%	66.2%
n	1212	1188	1192	1556	1486	1569	1007	9204
Q113 How often do national government officials abide by the law?	17.0%	25.4%	31.3%	37.4%	16.5%	29.4%	77.7%	32.3%
n	1212	1204	1165	1553	1332	1548	996	9010
Both	9.4%	18.2%	18.1%	19.0%	10.7%	24.0%	65.5%	22.1%
Either Q104 or Q113	57.8%	50.1%	49.8%	41.0%	56.0%	58.9%	26.9%	49.5%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

Note: The number of valid cases (n) varies from one statistic to another because we left out people answering “do not understand the question” or “decline to answer”. “Hard to say” is counted as a non-positive answer.

<b>Table1-2 Controlling Corruption: Percentage of Positive Evaluation</b>								
	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q118 How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?	49.5%	23.6%	32.4%	29.4%	62.0%	46.7%	90.2%	46.3%
n	1212	1196	1171	1547	1480	1520	952	9078
Q120 In your opinion, is the government working to crackdown corruption and root out bribes?	44.6%	53.0%	35.1%	64.2%	62.8%	54.3%	76.8%	55.8%
n	1212	1202	1166	1557	1438	1546	947	8723
Both	29.9%	15.5%	13.8%	23.5%	40.8%	28.2%	68.2%	28.3%
Either Q118 or Q120	34.4%	44.1%	36.8%	43.1%	32.0%	37.9%	17.2%	34.7%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

**Table1-3 Competition: Percentage of Positive Evaluation**

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q105 Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period	66.3%	63.5%	58.0%	64.5%	63.5%	78.4%	52.3%	64.3%
n	1212	1184	1171	1514	1485	1381	983	8930
Q114 How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates	47.4%	50.6%	39.0%	52.7%	60.4%	78.1%	49.6%	55.1%
n	1212	1196	1176	1542	1426	1553	991	9096
Q43 On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election	57.3%	69.4%	55.4%	48.8%	70.5%	85.0%	87.4%	67.4%
n	1212	1187	1180	1520	1460	1567	988	9114
All of Q105 Q114 Q43	22.0%	26.4%	13.0%	18.7%	30.3%	45.6%	31.3%	27.3%
Any two of Q105 Q114 Q43	37.3%	35.9%	35.8%	34.7%	31.2%	29.3%	28.3%	33.2%
Only one of Q105 Q114 Q43	30.3%	23.3%	33.4%	26.2%	16.9%	8.6%	28.8%	23.0%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

**Table1-4 Participation: Percentage of Positive Evaluation**

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q38 Did you vote in the election?	68.2%	86.4%	80.6%	82.6%	87.5%	93.3%	62.3%	81.4%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366
Q40 Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally?	21.0%	65.8%	23.2%	13.4%	23.7%	23.4%	10.2%	25.5%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366
Q41 Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or party?	16.9%	33.4%	19.8%	16.1%	19.7%	12.3%	2.7%	17.4%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366
All of Q38 Q40 Q41	7.7%	26.8%	11.1%	6.2%	7.5%	7.5%	0.9%	9.5%
Any two of Q38 Q40 Q41	17.6%	40.1%	17.8%	15.4%	25.2%	19.5%	7.3%	20.6%
Only one of Q38 Q40 Q41	48.7%	27.0%	55.7%	63.0%	58.3%	67.8%	58.3%	55.1%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

<b>Table1-5 Vertical Accountability: Percentage of Positive Evaluation</b>								
	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q103 People have the power to change a government they don't like.	44.1%	82.7%	67.4%	61.0%	78.5%	69.6%	51.8%	65.7%
n	1212	1193	1193	1548	1506	1539	1001	9192
Q106 Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions.	35.7%	27.4%	47.0%	34.2%	34.2%	46.5%	40.2%	37.9%
n	1212	1124	1173	1548	1417	1435	978	8887
Q112 How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?	24.6%	36.1%	41.8%	43.2%	69.5%	65.1%	65.7%	49.9%
n	1212	1188	1147	1545	1452	1524	985	9053
All of Q103 Q106 Q112	4.5%	7.6%	9.5%	11.5%	15.6%	18.5%	15.9%	12.2%
Any two of Q103 Q106 Q112	23.4%	35.3%	41.3%	30.4%	45.1%	39.1%	34.8%	35.9%
Only one of Q103 Q106 Q112	44.1%	39.8%	36.6%	36.5%	21.9%	24.4%	32.6%	33.0%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366



<b>Table1-6 Horizontal Accountability: Percentage of Positive Evaluation</b>								
	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q107 When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.	43.2%	23.2%	51.6%	39.2%	47.0%	62.2%	64.2%	47.1%
n	1212	1180	1174	1534	1475	1511	982	9068
Q115 To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping the government in check?	53.0%	55.4%	59.9%	53.0%	46.5%	66.0%	80.8%	58.5%
n	1212	1199	1149	1530	1311	1535	984	8920
Both	25.2%	13.0%	27.6%	25.3%	20.2%	40.4%	51.6%	28.6%
Either Q107 or Q115	45.9%	49.9%	49.8%	36.4%	37.5%	37.2%	34.8%	41.2%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

**Table1-7 Freedom: Percentage of Positive Evaluation**

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q110 People are free to speak what they think without fear.	56.5%	69.1%	67.4%	74.1%	72.6%	90.5%	38.9%	69.0%
n	1212	1198	1188	1565	1486	1580	1004	9233
Q111 People can join any organization they like without fear.	64.3%	79.6%	65.9%	78.2%	71.3%	92.1%	46.2%	72.7%
n	1212	1192	1187	1560	1486	1563	1001	9201
Both	51.2%	60.5%	54.6%	66.4%	61.9%	85.4%	31.8%	60.9%
Either Q110 or Q111	18.3%	25.2%	22.3%	16.7%	14.0%	7.9%	19.9%	17.1%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

<b>Table1-8 Equality: Percentage of Positive Evaluation</b>								
	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q108 Everyone is treated equally by the government.	13.0%	34.2%	37.6%	43.2%	57.2%	74.1%	68.6%	47.6%
n	1212	1198	1194	1566	1506	1567	1003	9246
Q109 People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.	29.2%	32.1%	83.2%	64.3%	89.3%	75.3%	83.1%	76.0%
n	1212	1202	1199	1571	1509	1573	1010	9276
Both	8.6%	14.6%	33.3%	36.2%	52.2%	63.9%	61.4%	39.5%
Either Q108 or Q109	25.0%	36.3%	53.8%	33.1%	37.6%	17.6%	27.5%	32.6%
n	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

<b>Table1-9 Responsiveness: Percentage of Positive Evaluation</b>								
	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Q116 How well do you think the government responds to what people want?	21.2%	25.3%	33.2%	36.3%	50.3%	45.7%	67.3%	39.7%
n	1212	1206	1185	1563	1453	1578	999	9196

**Table 2-1 Correlation with Satisfaction with Democracy**

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Rule of Law	0.170**	0.136**	0.044	0.250**	0.093**	0.166**	0.279**	0.207**
Controlling Corruption	0.258**	0.125**	0.223**	0.311**	0.261**	0.242**	0.251**	0.324**
Competition	0.170**	0.074*	0.135**	0.336**	0.282**	0.232**	0.384**	0.252**
Participation	0.005	0.008	0.065*	0.018	0.046	0.010	0.028	0.018
Vertical Accountability	0.118**	0.047	0.009	0.242**	0.111**	0.079**	0.159**	0.157**
Horizontal Accountability	0.184**	0.099**	0.116**	0.243**	0.174**	0.201**	0.277**	0.186**
Freedom	0.065*	0.065*	0.028	0.188**	0.137**	0.076**	0.173**	0.066**
Equality	0.192**	0.099**	0.124**	0.226**	0.153**	0.130**	0.269**	0.200**
Responsiveness	0.206**	0.167**	0.272**	0.273**	0.210**	0.216**	0.338**	0.292**

\*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Table 2-2 Correlation with Support for Democracy**

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Rule of Law	0.150**	-0.015	0.030	0.134**	0.019	-0.021	0.036	0.093**
Controlling Corruption	0.171**	-0.007	0.102**	0.193**	0.171**	0.134**	0.051	0.177**
Competition	0.090**	-0.109**	0.116**	0.096**	0.143**	0.100**	0.023	0.134**
Participation	-0.048	0.034	0.073*	0.019	0.094**	0.088**	0.081**	0.059**
Vertical Accountability	0.079**	-0.046	0.094**	0.199**	0.124**	0.057*	0.149**	0.143**
Horizontal Accountability	0.189**	-0.022	0.101**	0.198**	0.010	0.061*	0.016	0.097**
Freedom	0.029	0.029	0.067*	0.142**	0.142**	0.156**	-0.069*	0.072**
Equality	0.111**	-0.016	0.127**	0.062*	0.050	0.028	-0.038	0.075**
Responsiveness	0.170**	-0.032	0.109**	0.183**	0.034	0.051*	0.071*	0.125**

\*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

	Korea	Mongolia	Philippines	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	All
Rule of Law	-0.044	-0.245**	-0.163**	-0.236**	-0.301**	-0.113**	-0.267**	-0.185**
Controlling Corruption	-0.133**	-0.160**	-0.075*	-0.197**	-0.276**	-0.090**	-0.319**	-0.132**
Competition	-0.143**	-0.240**	-0.181**	-0.231**	-0.469**	-0.074**	-0.537**	-0.234**
Participation	-0.080**	-0.009	-0.101**	0.006	-0.115**	-0.024	0.123**	-0.136**
Vertical Accountability	-0.037	-0.075*	0.000	-0.078**	0.023	0.012	0.071*	-0.080**
Horizontal Accountability	0.087**	-0.089**	0.050	-0.078**	-0.093**	-0.011	-0.107**	0.022
Freedom	-0.261**	-0.203**	-0.274**	-0.109**	-0.217**	-0.005	-0.375**	-0.214**
Equality	-0.177**	-0.129**	-0.246**	-0.257**	-0.332**	-0.147**	-0.301**	-0.205**
Responsiveness	-0.134**	-0.141**	-0.104**	-0.155**	-0.295**	-0.092**	-0.381**	-0.175**

\*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Table 3.1 The Dimensionality Test of the Quality of Democracy Battery**

Items	Sample Size	Number of Factor	Degree of Freedom	Difference of Degree of Freedom	-2LL	Difference of -2LL	p-value
20	5542	1	40	19	132390.5	2673.64	0.000
		2	59	<b>18</b>	129716.9	<b>-57.84</b>	NA
		3	78		129774.7		

Note: 1. The smaller the figure of -2LL, the better the model fit.

2. The difference of -2LL can be tested by the chi-square test. The degree of freedom is the difference of the two model's degree of freedom.

3. Based on the parsimonious principle, the two-factor model is the best model since the three-factor model even fits worse than the two-factor model.

Program: TESTFACT 4.0

**Table 3.2 The Result of the Two-Factor Model**

Item	Dimensions	Difficulty	Communality	Factors	
				1	2
Q104 Court punish guilty high-ranking officials	Rule of Law	-0.43	0.30	<b>-0.47</b>	0.29
Q113 Government abide by the law		0.39	0.28	<b>-0.52</b>	-0.03
Q118 How widespread of corruption in government	Corruption	-0.08	0.45	<b>0.66</b>	0.06
Q120 Government works to crackdown corruption		0.22	0.36	<b>0.60</b>	-0.01
Q043 Free and fair election	Competition	-0.53	0.26	<b>-0.50</b>	0.12
Q105 Parties have equal access to media		-0.48	0.20	-0.24	<b>0.38</b>
Q114 Elections offer voters real choices		-0.21	0.19	<b>-0.37</b>	0.24
Q038 Vote in the last national election	Participation	-1.03	0.06	0.10	0.22
Q040 Attend campaign rallies or meeting		0.54	0.05	0.17	0.14
Q041 Persuade others to vote for certain party		0.80	0.06	0.23	0.08
Q103 People have power to change government	Vertical Accountability	-0.51	0.11	-0.02	<b>0.33</b>
Q106 Cannot hold government responsible between elections		0.26	0.03	-0.16	-0.03
Q112 Government holds information from citizens		-0.00	0.21	<b>-0.45</b>	0.12
Q107 Nothing legal system can do if government breaks the law	Horizontal Accountability	0.06	0.18	<b>-0.42</b>	0.04
Q115 Legislature can keep government in check		-0.33	0.37	<b>-0.60</b>	0.13
Q110 People are free to say what they think	Freedom	-0.65	0.74	-0.08	<b>0.86</b>
Q111 People are free to any organizations		-0.81	0.68	-0.02	<b>0.82</b>
Q108 Everyone is treated equally by government	Equality	0.07	0.46	<b>-0.55</b>	<b>0.40</b>
Q109 People have basic necessities		-0.41	0.29	<b>-0.41</b>	<b>0.35</b>
Q116 Government responds to what people want	Responsiveness	0.25	0.54	<b>-0.73</b>	0.10
Explained Variance				20.27%	8.78%

Program: TESTFACT 4.0, varimax rotation method.



**Table 3.3 The Result of the One-Factor Model Measuring Support for Democracy**

Item	Dimensions	Difficulty	Communality	Factors
				1
Q097 I want our country to be fully democratic now	Desirability	-1.421	0.420	<b>0.648</b>
Q098 Democracy is perfectly suitable for our country	Suitability	-0.937	0.433	<b>0.658</b>
Q121 Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government	Preferability	-0.248	0.274	<b>0.523</b>
Q122 Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society	Efficacy	-0.644	0.380	<b>0.616</b>
Q123 Democracy is definitely more important than economic development	Priority	0.792	0.050	0.223
Explained Variance				31.13%

Program: TESTFACT 4.0

**Table 3.4 Path Effects Explaining Support for Democracy**

	South Korea	Mongolia	Philippine	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Singapore	Overall
Support for Democracy								
Political Participation	-0.024	-0.009	0.001	0.000	-0.032	0.016	-0.005	0.014
Economic Condition-Country	-0.015	0.067 *	-0.023	0.032	-0.040	0.010	0.048	0.040 **
Economic Condition-Household	0.055	0.031	-0.066 *	0.048	0.039	0.019	0.030	0.034 **
Accountability	0.056	0.048	-0.001	0.060 *	0.044	0.019	0.061	0.052 ***
Equality	0.143 ***	-0.006	0.098 **	0.034	-0.050	0.000	-0.036	0.009
Freedom	-0.059	0.044	0.032	0.069 *	0.056 *	0.089 ***	-0.018	0.039 ***
Rule of Law	0.226 ***	-0.008	0.134 ***	0.201 ***	0.194 ***	0.116 ***	0.212 ***	0.217 ***
Democratic Orientation	0.176 ***	0.097 ***	0.007	0.067 **	-0.057 *	0.027	0.042	0.072 ***
Education	0.044	0.023	0.055	0.091 **	0.013	0.147 ***	-0.020	0.036 **
Gender	0.063 *	-0.004	-0.011	-0.019	-0.067 **	0.013	-0.045	-0.008
Age	-0.011	-0.010	0.032	-0.017	0.002	0.083 **	-0.025	-0.017
Priority of Democracy	0.072 *	0.185 ***	0.025	0.098 ***	0.056	0.040	0.129 ***	0.086 ***
Interest in Politics	-0.016	0.077 **	0.035	0.072 **	0.105 ***	0.042	-0.047	0.057 ***
Rule of Law								
Political Participation	-0.072 *	0.077 **	0.010	-0.020	0.041	-0.046	-0.095 ***	-0.091 ***
Economic Condition-Country	0.133 ***	0.148 ***	0.071 *	0.155 ***	0.125 ***	0.123 ***	0.069 *	0.160 ***
Economic Condition-Household	0.013	0.089 ***	0.111 ***	0.084 ***	0.163 ***	0.111 ***	0.080 **	0.096 ***
Accountability	0.080 **	0.054 *	-0.047	0.068 **	0.015	-0.077 ***	0.044	-0.061 ***
Equality	0.210 ***	0.234 ***	0.150 ***	0.252 ***	0.285 ***	0.201 ***	0.271 ***	0.330 ***
Freedom	0.145 ***	0.148 ***	0.058	0.123 ***	-0.021	-0.020	0.098 **	-0.042 ***
Democratic Orientation	0.013	-0.122 ***	-0.092 **	-0.084 ***	-0.151 ***	-0.058 *	-0.262 ***	-0.097 ***
Education	0.005	-0.118 ***	-0.014	-0.053	-0.078 **	-0.168 ***	-0.018	-0.057 ***
Gender	0.006	0.054 *	0.041	-0.031	0.029	0.000	0.049	-0.008
Age	0.140 ***	0.080 **	0.024	0.082 **	0.033	0.048	0.041	0.083 ***
Priority of Democracy	0.033	-0.054 *	0.008	0.147 ***	-0.022	0.053 *	-0.061	0.001
Interest in Politics	0.113 ***	-0.050	0.133 ***	0.049 *	0.073 **	0.132 ***	-0.030	0.002
R Square								
Support for Democracy	0.127	0.063	0.044	0.123	0.080	0.057	0.061	0.076
Rule of Law	0.159	0.248	0.099	0.245	0.234	0.137	0.301	0.233
N	1212	1211	1200	1587	1546	1598	1012	9366

Source: East Asia Barometer. Program: Mplus 4.2

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients from a path effect model.

Significance Level: \* $p \leq 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ .

**Table 3.5 Overall Path Effects on Support for Democracy**

Variable	Path	Korea		Mongolia	Philippines		Taiwan		Thailand		Indonesia		Singapore		Overall		
Political Participation	Direct	—	-0.016	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Through Rule of Law	-0.016	-0.016		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Economic Condition-Country	Direct	—	0.03		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.04	0.075
	Through Rule of Law	0.03	0.03		0.01	0.01	0.031	0.031	0.024	0.024	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.035	0.075
Economic Condition-Household	Direct	—	—		-0.066	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.034	0.055
	Through Rule of Law	—	—		0.015	-0.051	0.017	0.017	0.032	0.032	0.013	0.013	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.021	0.055
Accountability	Direct	—	0.018		—	—	0.06	0.074	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.052	0.039
	Through Rule of Law	0.018	0.018		—	—	0.014	0.074	—	—	-0.009	-0.009	—	—	—	-0.013	0.039
Equality	Direct	0.143	0.19		0.098	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Through Rule of Law	0.047	0.19		0.02	0.118	0.051	0.051	0.055	0.055	0.023	0.023	0.057	0.057	0.057	0.072	0.072
Freedom	Direct	—	0.033		—	—	0.069	0.094	0.056	0.056	0.089	0.089	—	—	—	0.039	0.03
	Through Rule of Law	0.033	0.033		—	—	0.025	0.094	—	0.056	—	0.089	0.021	0.021	0.021	-0.009	0.03
Rule of Law	Direct	0.226	0.226		—	0.134	0.134	0.201	0.201	0.194	0.194	0.116	0.116	0.212	0.212	0.217	0.217
Democratic Orientation	Direct	0.176	0.176		—	—	0.067	0.05	-0.057	-0.057	—	—	—	—	—	0.072	0.051
	Through Rule of Law	—	0.176		-0.012	-0.012	-0.017	0.05	-0.029	-0.029	-0.086	-0.007	-0.007	-0.056	-0.056	-0.021	0.051
Education	Direct	—	—		—	—	0.091	0.091	—	—	0.147	0.128	—	—	—	0.036	0.024
	Through Rule of Law	—	—		—	—	—	0.091	-0.015	-0.015	-0.019	0.128	—	—	—	-0.012	0.024
Gender	Direct	0.063	0.063		—	—	—	—	-0.067	-0.067	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Through Rule of Law	—	0.063	—	—	—	—	—	-0.067	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Age	Direct	—	0.032	—	—	—	0.016	—	—	0.083	0.083	—	—	—	—	0.018	
	Through Rule of Law	0.032	0.032	—	—	0.016	0.016	—	—	—	0.083	—	—	—	0.018	0.018	
Priority of Democracy	Direct	0.072	0.072	—	—	0.098	0.128	—	—	—	0.006	0.129	0.129	0.086	0.086	0.086	
	Through Rule of Law	—	0.072	—	—	0.03	0.128	—	—	0.006	0.006	—	0.129	—	—	0.086	
Interest in Politics	Direct	—	0.026	—	—	0.072	0.082	0.105	0.105	—	—	—	—	—	0.057	0.057	
	Through Rule of Law	0.026	0.026	0.018	0.018	0.01	0.082	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.015	—	—	—	—	0.057	

Note: Entry is standardized beta-coefficient. Only significant relationships are listed, otherwise the cell is marked by a dash. No significant mediating effect exists in Mongolia.

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# Asian Barometer

## A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

*For more information, please visit our website: [www.asianbarometer.org](http://www.asianbarometer.org)*