Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia:
Reassessing the Asian Values Debate

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Today, East Asia represents a region of democratic underdevelopment. More than three decades after the third wave of democratization began to spread from Southern Europe, much less than half the countries (six of sixteen) in the region meet the minimum criteria for electoral democracy. This ratio is much lower than the worldwide average of six democracies for every ten countries.

Why does a region, blessed with rapid economic development, remain cursed with democratic underdevelopment? What makes it hard for democracy to take root in the region known as culturally Confucian Asia? To explain a lack of democratic development in the region, many scholars and political leaders have often promoted Confucian values as Asian values, and vigorously debated their influence, either actual or potential, on the democratic transformation of authoritarian regimes in the region from a variety of perspectives.

For decades, politicians and scholars have vigorously debated whether Confucian cultural legacies have served to deter the democratization of authoritarian regimes in the region. Lee Kuan Yew (2000) and other proponents of the Asian Values thesis, for example, have claimed that Western-style liberal democracy is neither suitable for nor compatible with the Confucianism of East Asia, where collective welfare, a sense of duty, and other principles of Confucian moral philosophy run deep in people’s consciousness. These proponents advocate a benevolent and paternalistic form of governance as a viable alternative to a liberal democracy based on the principles of Western individualism.

Kim Dae Jung (1994), Amartya Sen (1999), and many other advocates of liberal democracy, on the other hand, have denounced the Confucian Asian Values thesis as a politically motivated attempt to legitimate authoritarian rule and have rejected it as anachronistic and oppressive. Francis Fukuyama (1995) also rejects the portrayal of Confucianism and democracy as antithetical doctrines. However, Fareed Zakaria (2003) argues that democracies in Confucian Asia are likely to remain “illiberal democracies” because elites and ordinary citizens are reluctant to embrace and observe the fundamental tenets of constitutional liberalism.

Despite decades of the debate, there is little intellectual consensus about the relationship between the fundamental values and norms of Confucianism and those of democracy. Empirically also, there is little agreement about the relationship between Confucian legacies and a lack of democratic development in East Asia. In the theoretical and empirical literature, therefore, there is much left to explore and understand concerning the influence Confucian legacies and democratic politics have on each other.

My new book “Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia”, which was published by Cambridge University Press last year, offers a comprehensive review of the theoretical debate on Confucianism and democracy and public opinion survey research on their relationship. It also
offers a variety of empirical evidence and theoretical insights that can help to conclusively settle the age-old Asian Values debate. In addition, it examines the implications of key empirical findings in Confucian East Asia for competing theories of cultural democratization. This paper aims to highlight the most notable of the empirical findings and theoretical contributions presented in the book.

Organizationally, this paper consists of seven sections. The first section of the paper reviews claims and counterclaims of the Asian Value thesis and identifies three theoretical theses for empirical testing. It is followed by a brief review of what has been done to test those theses empirically. The third section discusses how my study conceptualized the two central terms of Confucianism and democratization to offer a comprehensive and balanced account of their linkage. The next two sections discuss how broadly and deeply East Asians remain attached to Confucian legacies and their attachment to those legacies affect their engagement in civil life and reaction to democratic politics. The final two sections summarize the main contributions of the study reported in the book for the Asian Values debate and for the theoretical literature on cultural democratization.

Theoretical Debates

To date, numerous scholars and politicians in East Asia and elsewhere have vigorously debated the actual and potential role which Confucian cultural legacies can play in the process of democratization. These scholars and politicians generally espouse one of three perspectives, each of which will be reviewed and analyzed here. The first camp argues that the political and social ethical principles of Confucianism are fundamentally incompatible with those of liberal democracy. In contrast, the second camp interprets some key principles of Confucianism as analogous to or compatible with democratic values. The third camp suggests that some characteristics of Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated to create a hybrid system that can be more suitable for historically and culturally Confucian societies. Of these three contrasting perspectives, the incompatibility thesis is known as orthodoxy (Nuyen 2000, 133).

The Incompatibility Thesis

Proponents of this interpretation focus on the overall character of Confucianism, and its prime concern as a system of social and political ethics, and evaluate its fundamental principles as undemocratic or antidemocratic Confucianism (Pye 1985). Specifically, they interpret Confucianism as a system of social and political ethics that emphasizes collective good, hierarchical social relations, and meritocratic rule by the wise and virtuous. Confucianism, therefore, constitutes an ethical system fundamentally different from the liberal ethical system of the West, which places priority on individual freedom and rights, and mass participation and competition in the political process. In short, Confucianism and democracy are viewed to constitute two distinct and incompatible value systems (Chan 1999; Li 1997, 1999).
The incompatibility thesis, therefore, reflects a very comprehensive analysis of Confucianism as a system of both social and political ethics, and offers a very critical assessment of the relationships between its social and political values and those of democracy. According to Baogang He’s (2010, 20) recent literature review, Confucianism represents “a political order in which the rule of the gentleman prevails, where duty is central, political inequality if taken for granted, moral concern overrides the political bargaining process, and harmony prevails over conflict. Confucian political order, therefore, conflicts with a democratic political order in which the rule of law prevails, rights are central, political equality is taken for granted, the political bargaining process overrides moral consensus, and conflict is seen as a necessarily normal condition of political life.” To put it differently, the fundamental values that serve as prerequisites for democracy, particularly the values of freedom, equality, and pluralism, are incompatible with the Confucian key values of duty, responsibility, and loyalty (Nuyen, 2000, 135; Li 1997, 187).

Many scholars and political leaders subscribe to the incompatibility thesis. Samuel P. Huntington is the most outspoken of scholars in this incompatibility camp. He claims that classical Confucian thought is inherently antidemocratic, and Confucian democracy is a contradictory term (1991, 30). Accordingly, Confucian-influenced societies are inhospitable to democratization because Confucian heritage promotes the group over the individual; authority over liberty; and responsibilities over rights; and it offers no institutional protection of individual rights against the state (Huntington 1991, 24; 1996, 238). Several East Asian leaders also espouse such ideas as well, with Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamed suggesting publicly that the dominance of Confucian Asian values in those states precludes any emergence of Western liberal democracy. Other critics maintain that state leaders in Confucian East Asia have used Confucian doctrines to justify illiberal policies (Brennan and Fan 2007; Zakaria 1994).

What specific principles of Confucianism and democracy are most incompatible with one another? Supporters of the incompatibility thesis point to the qualifications of rulers and the role of the ruled in the political process as one discordant area. In democracy, which is a form of collective self-rule, people rule themselves directly or indirectly through the selection of their representatives. In Confucianism, only those capable of discharging the responsibility of governing are allowed to serve as rulers (Analects 4:14). It is moral elites, i.e., the wise and virtuous, who are charged with ruling the state. Confucius and Mencius emphasized ordinary people as “the root of the state,” meaning their interests are paramount (Mencius 7:9, 9:5), but neither Confucius nor Mencius talked about self-rule. Nor were they willing to permit the masses to participate directly in the process of making decisions.

According to early Confucians, only morally upright people called gentlemen and sages, not the masses, have the capacity to grasp the Way (ethical living) and put it into practice. The common people, therefore, are incapable of governing themselves, and thus should not be entrusted with governance. Instead, they ought to be made to follow

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1 Huang (1997) and Kang (1999) offer highly critical assessments of Huntington’s scholarship on Confucianism.
virtuous leaders as “the grass bends to the wind” (Analects 12:19). “Confucianism”, therefore, “does not contain any fundamental democratic values or principles, such as political equality or popular sovereignty” (Chan 2007, 191). In short, the Confucian political world is a hierarchical political order in which the common people remain passive. ²

Classical Confucianism, moreover, equates good government with paternalistic meritocracy in which the relationship between rulers and masses are analogous to that between parents and children (Murphy 2000). The role of government is, therefore, analogous to that of a good father and mother, who make decisions on behalf of their children. As mother and father to the people, moral elites make decisions concerning their welfare. Although the Confucian government of moral meritocracy allows for some degree of popular consultation, dissent, and remonstration, it is, at best, a form of guardianship (Chan 2007, 187). This indeed is a stark contradiction to the Western notion of democracy as government by the people, which requires their participation in policymaking.

The second set of incompatible principles concerns the proper relationship between rulers and the ruled. Confucius and his followers promoted an organic notion of the state in which the family serves as a model for it. As in the family, therefore, its structure and process are hierarchically organized. In this hierarchically organized state structure, political powers are usually concentrated into the hands of a prime minister or a president, a practice which contrasts sharply with the Western democratic state structures with the powers divided into different branches of government (Subramanian 2000, Robinson 1991).

In Confucian government, moreover, ordinary citizens must exhibit proper conduct and loyalty to their political leaders (Hahm 2001, S. Lee 2001, Mahbubani 1995, Pertierra 1999). By stressing their obedience to authority and discouraging them from engaging in any behavior that undermines political stability. As Chenyang Li (1997, 185-186) points out, Confucian norms of loyalty and propriety are known to make it impossible for ordinary people to express their interests in the process of policymaking and challenge their government policy.

In the past, political leaders especially in China, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan often invoked Confucian values stressing national unity and welfare, and legitimized their oppressive authoritarian rule as benevolent and inherently necessary (Kang 2006). Rulers in such situations embody O’Donnell’s (1994) conception of “delegative democracy,” identified by the firm entrenchment of political power within the executive branch. Citizens are technically allowed to vote, but every decision of any importance is made by executive leaders and is imposed on society from above. This is clearly antithetical to Western democracy, which rests upon the existence of competing ideas – political debates and political contestation, which are essential for preventing any type of

² Tu (2002, 6) challenges this view, arguing that “In the Mencian tradition, min (the common people), is absolutely not a passive element to be manipulated by rulers.”
authoritarian ruler from assuming control. In this regard, then, historical Confucian values certainly appear to be antithetical to democratization and liberalization.

On the proper role the state ought to play for the people, Confucianism and liberal democracy are also in conflict. In Confucianism, the state, like the family, is a paternalistic institution in charge of the welfare of its members. It is supposed to fulfill parental functions. In principle, therefore, there is no limit to what it should do to ensure the welfare of the people by promoting economic prosperity, political stability, and social harmony. It has the authority to intervene in the economic as well as moral affairs of its citizens if such interventions are deemed necessary for the welfare of the people (Bai 2008, 24; O’Dwyer 2003, 45). Such an interventionist state runs counter to a liberal democratic state, which is morally neutral and non-intervening in economic and private affairs (Chan 2007).

The final irreconcilability between Confucianism and Western democracy discussed here focuses on the role virtue plays in Confucian politics. Confucianism deems virtue to be far more important than formal political institutions in governance, stressing the need for moral leadership over institutional safeguards against official behavior. Confucius, for example, portrayed virtuous leaders as north stars in the *Analects*, for all are expected to turn towards them in search of enlightenment (*Analects* 2:1). As Shaohua Hu (1997) notes, there is a major shortcoming in such a Confucian notion of political leadership, however. What should be done when morality fails?

While Confucianism’s optimistic notion of virtue would be useful for societies in which leaders always place national welfare above their own, the ideology provides no clear mechanism for resolving conflict when issues do arise (Nuyen 2000). Small agrarian communities emblematic of Chinese life during Confucius’s era no longer exist. In large urbanized and industrialized societies where values continue to shift, morality in flux alone cannot motivate leaders to do what is right and avoid doing wrong. Confucian countries must guarantee that the rule of law is upheld in order to make political leaders and institutions work for the people. For those who view Confucianism and Western democracy as fundamentally irreconcilable, it is strict adherence to the rule of law, not virtuous political leaders, which historically Confucian societies urgently need to become well-functioning democracies.

The Compatibility Thesis

The establishment of democratic institutions and processes in historically Confucian East Asia has not always been an easy process. Yet those institutions and processes are firmly established in three—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—of the seven countries in the region. Throughout the region, moreover, democracy is championed by an increasing number of ordinary citizens and political leaders. According to former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung (1994), Confucianism enables the region to expand democracy beyond Western standards. According to former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui (2006), Confucian doctrine is capable of balancing the excess of
individualism and mending other shortcomings of democracy by enhancing the welfare of individual citizens and the groups of which they are a part of at the same time.

There are also scholars who argue that Confucianism contains “democratic seeds, and these seeds can serve as the very foundation of sustainable democracy in Confucian East Asia (Hsu 1975, chap. 9; Murphy 2000; Xu 2006; Yung 2010). According to Joseph Chan (2007), four leading Confucian scholars co-authored Manifesto to the World on Behalf of Chinese Culture in the 1950s, and advocated the compatibility thesis. They examined Mencius’ notion of the heavenly mandate and other Confucian principles of social and political order, and emphasized their compatibility with those of democratic government. The prominent aspects of Confucianism that are often considered reconcilable with democracy include political accountability, equality, dissent, tolerance, and social participation.

The first similarity noted by scholars proposing a compatible relationship concerns political accountability. While Confucianism clearly values societal order and civilian loyalty to the state, the doctrine’s basic tenets never approve of a ruler’s arbitrary action against the ruled. Instead, a ruler’s accountability to the people is the core of those tenets. At the root of such accountability are two principles of government, minben (people as the root) and the Mandate of Heaven. The minben principle holds that “the people are of supreme importance” (Mencius 7B:14), and the ruler ought to take care of their welfare. The Mandate of Heaven holds that people’s acceptance or consent is the basis of legitimate rule (Mencius 9:5). Although neither of these principles fully meets the definition of democracy as government by the people, both are in agreement with its definition as government for the people. The Confucian practice of selecting government officials by public and open examinations, on the other hand, can be viewed as an institutional alternative to the free and competitive elections of political leaders (Nuyen 2000, 143).

Political constraint of leaders is also present in both Confucianism and democracy. Though the Confucian belief in a “mandate of heaven” grants leaders considerable authority, such power is fully contingent upon continued ethical leadership. Confucian governance is a form of political stewardship – upon being deemed appropriately wise and virtuous, leaders essentially become God’s representatives on Earth. Confucian leaders are expected to respect public opinion, remain cognizant of societal demands, provide for the national welfare, and maintain liberty, equality, and impartiality (Hsu 1975). If a leader fails to remain accountable to his subjects, his citizens need no longer respect his rule. In this regard, Tu Wei-ming (1994) suggests that while state leaders do enjoy a great deal of power in historically Confucian East Asia, their authority is often checked by the citizens, who remain attached to the Confucian notion of government for the people.

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3 These four scholars are Carson Chang, Tan Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and Mou Zongsan. Albert Chen (2007) reviews their analyses of linking Confucianism to democracy.
4 Another Confucian institution of accountability is the Censorate of the Chosun dynasty (1392-1920). For further details, see Mo (2003).
The provisions expected of an ideal Confucian leader are quite similar to values associated with democratic polity. As Shaohua Hu (1997) notes, both Confucianism and democracy oppose the despotic behavior of political leaders, and both belief systems promote the right and ability of the people to remove malevolent leaders from power. If leaders use their positions for personal gain rather than for the promotion of the national welfare, citizens of both Confucian and democratic states are fully justified and authorized to replace those rulers with better-qualified leaders. Democracy might emphasize the protection of personal liberty from governmental oppression to a greater degree than Confucianism, but both doctrines still maintain that citizens deserve leaders who are accountable to the populace.

A similar concept of accountability is evidenced in Confucianism’s tradition of remonstrance, in which a country’s residents maintain open dialogue with leaders on pressing issues. According to Xu (2006), early Confucians viewed governance as an act of mutual commitment on the part of rulers and the ruled. According to Mencius (4A:20), the real loyalty of the former to the latter includes “rectifying the evils in the ruler’s heart.” “If the ruler made serious mistakes, they would remonstrate with him, but if repeated remonstration fell on deaf ears, they would depose him” (Mencius 5B:20).

These Confucian ideas of criticizing authority and dismissing unresponsive leaders are similar to the democratic political practices of conducting competitive elections and impeaching those leaders peacefully. The divine obligation of political leaders to serve and follow the people in Confucian societies can be, therefore, viewed as equivalent to the Western rule of law – if either is broken, leaders must be held responsible for their actions (Ackerly 2005).

Besides the domain of political accountability, Confucianism and democracy are also deemed similar to each other in their views of equality. All Confucians believe in the equality of man by nature (Analects 7:2; Mencius 6A:7). Confucianism emphasizes universal education for citizens from all walks of life, and equal opportunity for political appointment. The Confucian ideal of universal education is compatible with the principle of democratic citizenship that requires the development of an informed citizenry (Collins 2008).

Although not all citizens possess the abilities needed to become political leaders, everyone has an opportunity to take merit-based civil service examinations, and to be appointed as a government official. Individual citizens in Confucian societies, as in democratic societies, are expected to respect the rights and personal sovereignty of others, for all residents of a country are equally integral components of their national network. These norms certainly parallel democracy’s emphasis on equality and opportunity, indicating that while East Asian societies today might not always impose such values in actuality, Confucianism can be used to foster such democratic behavior.

A closer inspection of historical Confucian documents shows that tolerance of diverse ideas is also encouraged by the doctrine. The very concept of harmony incorporates diversity and the tolerance of diversity, as Confucius (Analects 13. 23)
admonishes “Exemplary persons [to] value harmony but not conformity; petty persons value conformity but not harmony. ”In the ideal world of Confucianism, harmony refers to the blending of diverse ideas, not the eliminating of opposing views. As Bell (2008b, 120) aptly points out, it is “harmony in diversity” that is sought after, though uniformity and conformity are often championed in practice.

In principle, it is unnecessary to sacrifice pluralism in attaining societal harmony, for harmony presupposes the existence of diverse views, and can be achieved by blending those views. Healthy societies are possible only when individuality and harmony enhance one another, benefiting both the individual and the nation (Nuyen 2000; Collins 2008). The Confucian idea of social harmony and the historical practice of tolerating multiple religions can promote the Western liberal tradition of tolerating and combining diverse interests to help the state advance.

Emphasizing the importance of order and stability, Confucianism seems inherently contradictory to liberal democracy’s championing of political contestation. Yet, several scholars suggest that dissent, which can be expressed through the practice of remonstration, is a fundamental element of Confucian values (Ackerly 2005; Tan 2003a; Collins 2008). In principle, the Confucian notion of dao or ethical living, allows people to speak out against any injustice or malice transgressing basic human values. And shared communal problems ought to be solved only when all citizens participate in democratic fashion, challenging existing ideas when necessary to ensure that the optimal outcome is reached (Hsu 1975).

In practice, however, Confucianism permits popular opposition only when such actions do not incite political mayhem or rebellion (Hall and Ames 1999). Order and harmony are tantamount above all else for all Confucian states, and national peace should not be disturbed. In both Confucianism and democracy, however, dissent can be an important component of political procedure, although its expression is much more restricted in the former.

A final domain of compatibility between Confucianism and democracy concerns the issue of societal participation. Societal participation is certainly a hallmark of traditionally democratic societies, for Western liberalism rests upon the notion of the people choosing leaders and shaping policies through free and fair elections. While widespread participation might not seem as emblematic of Confucianism, Confucian values are still certainly utilized to promote robust civil societies. Mencius wrote of the state’s responsibility to promote public participation through the provision of equal education, a statement interpreted by some scholars as promoting societal mobilization through instruction (Bai 2008). Education has always been one of the most fundamental ways in which individuals fully develop themselves, and an intellectually advanced population is apt to be more willing to place demands on state leaders (Yung 2010).

Strong civil societies have long played a role in East Asian history and culture, though the most prominent civic movements in the region are found in Korea. While it is difficult to identify the exact emergence of societal organizations in Korea, scholars
suggest that such groups first gained traction during the Choson dynasty of the early nineteenth century (Cho 1997). As the Korean national identity faced serious threats from Chinese and Japanese mercantilists at the time, progressive intellectuals formed independent associations designed to prevent foreign influences from eroding traditional norms. In Korea’s case, civil society was created to preserve the nation’s very identity. Korea’s civil society also relied on the Confucian tradition of remonstrance, providing citizens with greater opportunity to communicate with political elites. Contemporary Korean scholars argue that the rising civic movements witnessed during this era were the first instances of state capitulation to popular demand anywhere in East Asia (Cho 1997).

It is important to note that the similarity between Confucianism and Western democracy promoted by scholars in this school of thought is concerned primarily with societal, rather than political, participation. Civic organizations have a long history in East Asia, and often serve as a mediating factor between the state and the family. Confucianism’s historical view of political participation is a bit less established as the preceding section indicates that if a state’s leader behaves virtuously and responsibly, citizens are expected to remain content and loyal. Widespread political participation is a much more recent phenomenon in the region, and is not as closely attuned to Confucian ideals as is societal participation.

The Convergence Thesis

In the scholarly works reviewed so far, there is a tendency to evaluate the relationship between democracy and Confucianism as dichotomous – Confucian values are perceived as either compatible or incompatible with democracy. Such dichotomous perceptions often overlook the existence of the similarities between the two phenomena, and fail to take note of their potential to overlap. Their relationship actually becomes much more complex with each of them being transformed by a host of other factors. When they focus exclusively on the democratic or undemocratic of Confucian values, scholars are likely to ignore the intricacies of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, and overlook the areas of their potential linkage as well.

An increasing number of scholars have recently begun to note that Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated in such a way that new and hybrid regimes can be built throughout the region (Bai 2008; Bell 2006; Y. Kim 1997; Tan 2003a). Proponents of this perspective, on the one hand, perceive traditional Confucian values of order and efficiency as helpful for building stronger democracies, because such norms promote societal stability and cooperation. On the other hand, they recognize that the introduction of democracy into East Asia can encourage the growth of liberal thought and self-reliance, while still respecting the Confucian ideals of the common good and mutual responsibility. This final section surveys scholarly work, while evaluating possible convergences between Confucianism and democracy, and studying ways in which each might build upon the other to create potential paths in the future.

Though democracy and Confucianism clash on several significant points, many scholars have identified elements of each doctrine that can benefit both doctrines. One of
the most prominent linkages between the two doctrines concerns the Confucian conception of human rights (de Bary 1991; Chan 1999; Freeman 1996 Tu 2002). The Confucian principles of benevolence and reciprocity stress humanism, or consideration of other people in society. Governmental leaders might find it desirable to limit certain liberties in order to maintain political power, but they can reformulate these principles of humanism to promote democratic government for the people, not just by the people, in East Asia today. Confucianism could also be used to strengthen existing democracies in East Asia. Yung Myung Kim (1997), for example, points out that the Confucian emphasis on societal order and respect for authority might indeed aid the survival of burgeoning democracies.

Institutionally, what features might a fusion of Confucian and democratic governance possess? Daniel A. Bell (2006) argues that government solely by the people is inappropriate for historically Confucian societies, for democratically elected representatives might not be fully able to measure long term consequences of their decisions. He proposes instead a system combining Confucian ideals of government by intellectual elites with liberal ideals of electoral accountability of government to citizens, utilizing both traditional and modern institutional frameworks. More specifically, his model of Confucian democracy consists of two chambers of policymakers – one elected by the people, one selected on the basis of competitive examinations. Shielded from the demands of voters concerned with their short-term interests, the upper chamber would be able to serve the interests of the people as a whole. Bell’s ideal upper chamber would also be able to protect unpopular individuals and vulnerable minorities from the verdicts of majorities in the lower house (Bell 2006).

It is entirely possible that Confucian values might be used to amend the less desirable aspects of Western liberal democracy. Confucian norms can remedy problems such as rampant individualism and lack of commitment to family and community. Democracy, when forged with Confucian ideals, could produce a uniquely regional system of democracy that combines the principle of government by the people with that of government for the people. In Confucian Democracy, for example, Sor-Hoon Tan (2003) proposes an alternative to liberal democracy. Tan argues that unlike a liberal democracy that operates under the constraints of interest groups, Confucian democracy is capable of promoting both individual freedom and the common good. Further, Tu Wei-ming (2000a, 211) points out: “democracy with Confucian characteristics is not only imaginable but may also be practicable.” To put such a notion of Confucian democracy into practice, however, we have to find out how Confucianism can be democratized and how democracy can be Confucianized. This is because “the present institutional forms of Asian Confucianism and Western democracies are sufficiently distinct to preclude a marrying of the two (Hall and Ames 2003, 124).

Ensuring the mutual existence of liberal democracy and Confucianism in East Asia, therefore, requires a great deal of effort, but scholars in this third and final school of thought believe that such goals are entirely achievable. Electoral democracy and Confucian practices both possess some innate flaws, and arriving at a convergence
between the two may be the best way to prevent any future problems. Sor-Hoon Tan’s promotion of Confucian democracy and Daniel A. Bell’s notion of a legislature based on both democratic principles and Confucian ideals serve as important theoretical steps on the path to implementing such systems in the future. It is, however, difficult to predict the actual developmental passage that democratic governance will experience in East Asia, but the growing convergence between history and modernization will certainly be an interesting and dynamic journey.

Why is there so much debate and division over the compatibility or incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy? Why has the debate persisted for so long? To begin with, disagreements originate over which concepts of Confucianism and democracy are used in analyses and how they are conceptualized. The opposing conceptualizations of Confucianism and democracy have contributed to different interpretations of their relationships (Chan 2007; Collins 2008; S. Hu 1997; Xu 2006).

Specifically, democracy is conceptualized procedurally as government by the people or substantively as government for the people. Similarly, Confucianism is conceptualized liberally in terms of benevolence, reciprocity and other humanistic values or illiberally in terms of conformity, duty, and other authoritarian values. Those who define democracy substantively and/or Confucianism liberally tend to promote the pro-democratic argument of compatibility (de Bary 1991; Hsu 1975; Tu 2002). Those who conceptualize democracy procedurally or liberally and/or Confucianism illiberally tend to advocate the anti-democratic argument of incompatibility (Huntington 1996; X. Kang 2006). Those who define either democracy procedurally and Confucianism liberally or democracy substantively and Confucianism illiberally are likely to subscribe to the convergence argument (Bell 2006; Hahm 2004; Tan 2003a, 2007). Such divergent conceptualizations are at the heart of the compatibility debate.

**Empirical Studies**

How does Confucianism affect democracy? Can Confucianism accommodate democratic politics? To date, the debate on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy has been mostly in theoretical conjecture terms, and lacks empirical validation. Undoubtedly this debate has helped to identify the important components that underlie each of the three different types of their relationship. Remaining largely speculative without empirical support, theoretical interpretations need to be tested against the patterns of the relationship that actually exist in the minds of the people of historically Confucian societies.

Scholars have only recently begun to use public opinion data from East Asia to assess the impact of Confucian values on the democratization process taking place among individual citizens. Russell Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc Ong (2006) examined how social authority orientations in six historically Confucian countries affect popular support for democracy. Their analysis of the World Values Surveys revealed no strongly significant
relationship between the two variables. Contrary to what is expected from the incompatibility thesis, a belief in parental respect, obedience, and deference to authority is not a powerful force deterring people in those countries from supporting democracy.

By contrast, Joel Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper (2007) found that among the Taiwanese, valuing family loyalty actually increases support for democracy and women’s rights. This finding that Confucianism strengthens support for human rights confirms the compatibility thesis. Among South Koreans, Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin (2006) found that adherence to the Confucian norms rejecting adversarial politics detracts from support for democracy. Among the people in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Yu-Tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu and Frank Tsai (2005) also found that Confucian family values detract significantly from popular support for the democratic values of political freedom and equality. These negative findings between Confucian and democratic values support the incompatibility thesis.

All in all, the results of previous empirical studies are not consistently supportive of any of the three contrasting theses discussed above. The direction and magnitude of the relationships between Confucian and democratic values vary considerably from one study to another and from one country to another. As discussed earlier, these differences are largely due to the divergent conceptions of the two variables, and the divergent measurements of the selected components of each variable. More notably, these studies have failed to consider how all or most of the core norms and values of Confucianism are distributed throughout the entire region of historically Confucian Asia. They have also failed to examine the effects of those norms and values on the various dimensions of democratic citizenship, including the most fundamental cognitive dimension of democratic citizenship.

Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations

My study was designed to conclusively settle the age-old Asian Values debate by testing all three intellectual perspectives on the relationship between Confucianism and democratization empirically. To this end, I first distinguished Confucian values from Asian values by rejecting the equation of Confucian values with Asian values which the Asian Values Thesis has often implied. Conceptually, therefore, Confucianism was regarded in my study as a phenomenon covering the region of East Asia identified as historically East Asia.

Theoretically, the study is based on the assumption that the installation of competitive elections and multiple political parties alone do not make for a fully functioning democratic political system. As Rose and his associates (1998, 8) aptly point out, these institutions constitute nothing more than “the hardware” of representative democracy. To operate the institutional hardware, a democratic political system requires “software” that is congruent with the various hardware components (Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1966). Both the scholarly community and policy circles widely recognize
that what ordinary citizens think about democracy and their reactions to its institutions are key components of such software.

To build such an effectively functioning democracy, moreover, ordinary people have to develop “the social ability to collaborate for shared interests” through norms and networks of civic engagement (Putnam 1993, 182; see also Nuyen 2002; Tan 2003b). They also have to develop the political ability to appreciate the virtues of democracy and then must commit themselves to those. Civics and politics are, therefore, assumed to constitute two distinct arenas where individual citizens can democratize and contribute to the building of an effective democracy.

This perspective that the civic and political spheres of life are interdependent comes from the Confucian ethic that individuals are not autonomous but are social beings defined and refined through their relationships with others and with their communities (Nuyen 2002). Rights, duties, and responsibilities, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of the individual but must be defined in terms of the relationship between the individual and his or her community (Fox 1997). Citizenship is, therefore, always a reciprocal and social idea; it requires a strong sense of solidarity and active participation in social networks where rights and responsibilities are mutually supportive (Park and Shin 2006; Putnam 1993).

This broad and deep notion of citizenship, which Charles Tilly (1996) characterizes as “thick citizenship,” contrasts sharply with the liberal notion of “thin” citizenship in which a citizen’s responsibilities are minimal and subordinate to any concern about rights. In the liberal notion of the West, citizenship refers primarily to the right for autonomous individuals to pursue their conceptions of the good life freely. In such an atomized vision of human existence, there is little room for self-interested individuals to reflect about the importance of community in terms of their social responsibilities and role. As Xinzhong Yao (1999, 34) points out, “freedom without responsibility would result in the collapse of the social network and in the conflict between individuals and society.”

To avoid such conflicts, early Confucians advocated civic life as a crucial component of citizenship in the belief that any polity, either democratic or non-democratic, cannot be sustained without citizens caring for each other and their community. Following this Confucian notion of “thick citizenship”, I broadly defined democracy as a community of mutual caring and considered citizens’ engagement in civic affairs together with their commitment to democratic politics. I also broadly defined Confucianism as a system of social and political ethics, which Confucius and other early Confucians advocated for the achievement of datong shehui, a community of grand harmony.

As civic life plays a vital role in educating people about the art of democratic politics (Putnam 1993), I examined how Confucian social ethics of familism and communitarianism affect the way in which people in Confucian Asia engage with their fellow citizens behaviorally and psychologically and how these ethics affect how people in Confucian Asia become members of a civic community. Specifically, we measure
civic engagement in psychological terms—how civic-minded are they—and behavioral terms—how are they interacting with other people.

As traditional political values influence how people orient themselves to or away from the democratization process (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Putnam 1993; Nathan and Chen 2004), I examined how Confucian political ethics of paternalism and ethical meritocracy affect the ways in which people react to the process cognitively and affectively and become democrats, with a small “d”. Specifically, becoming a democrat requires an accurate understanding of democracy as a distinctive system of government and unconditional endorsement of it as the preferred regime structure and policymaking process.

In a nutshell, my study aimed to offer a comprehensive account of the roles Confucianism plays and can play in making democratic citizens by investigating its effects on the civic and political life of individual citizens. To analyze the effects on civic life, I chose civic engagement as a key conceptual tool and examine it in both behavioral terms, for example, joining voluntary associations, and psychological terms, for example, placing trust in other people. To analyze the effects on political life, I chose democratic enlightenment and commitment as a key conceptual tool and examine its cognitive and affective characteristics in terms of understanding democracy as a distinct political system and embracing it as “the only game in town.”

The Prevalence of Confucian Values

How broadly and deeply do people in historically Confucian countries, which include China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam, uphold the legacies of Confucian political and social ethics? Which of the legacies do they uphold most broadly and deeply? Across the region are Confucian East Asians more united or divided in upholding those legacies? If they are divided, what are the fault lines separating them?

To address these questions, I analyzed the attachment ordinary citizens of these countries have to the social and the political legacies identified in the Asian Values Debate as most incompatible with the ideals and practices of liberal democracy. The social legacies are hierarchal collectivism, familism, and communitarianism, while the political legacies are paternalism and elitism. Analyses of the surveys conducted by the Asian Barometer and World Values Survey projects suggest four points about the prevalence of these legacies.

In historically Confucian East Asia today, popular attachment to Confucianism is miles wide but only inches deep, as most of the population reports attachment, but shallow attachment, to Confucian legacies. Even in the wake of socioeconomic and political transformations, majorities in all of the region’s countries remain at least partially attached to what Confucius and his followers taught about the good life and good government more than two millennia ago. However, none of the legacies considered draw unqualified support from a majority of the Confucian Asian population.
In the informal and formal spheres of civic life, for example, people in every country remain far more attached to the Confucian model of interdependent and cooperative civic life than the Western liberal model of independent and competitive civic life. Those who are attached exclusively to the Confucian model form a small minority in all six countries. In every country, however, more people support it in the informal sphere than in the formal sphere.

In the region, people are less attached to Confucianism as a model of conduct, or way of life than as a source for politics, or a system of government. They are less attached to the social norms of civic life than those of family life. It appears that socioeconomic modernization, which impacts how people go about their lives, has been a more powerful force than democratization in eroding Confucian legacies. Also, socioeconomic modernization has affected the public sphere of life more powerfully than the private sphere.

Historically Confucian East Asia is no longer a single cultural zone in regards to the mass public’s commitment to the legacies of Confucian social and political ethics. The region is divided into two cultural sub-regions: in one, there is broad, though not deep, support for Confucian legacies; in the other, support is neither broad nor deep. Because these two cultural sub-regions fall roughly along the same lines separating authoritarian and democratic regimes—and because both the authoritarian and democratic regimes have similar Confucian legacies—this finding of two cultural sub-regions also suggests that non-democratic rule promotes continued orientation toward the Confucian model, while democratic rule promotes a turning away from it.

Finally, none of the Confucian legacies analyzed in this study constitute a unique set of cultural characteristics found only in historically Confucian East Asia, where the teachings of Confucius and his followers served as the ideological and institutional foundations of political and social life. Certainly, the finding that these legacies are equally or more prevalent in other non-Western regions indicates that it is unsound to attribute the lack of democratization in Confucian East Asia exclusively to Confucian legacies, as the Asian Values Thesis does. It also suggests that some of the values long considered “Confucian” might be better labeled as “non-Western traditional values”.

**Confucian Legacies as an Influence on Democratic Citizenship**

How do the political and social legacies of Confucianism affect the way Confucian Asians understand democracy and embrace it? Analyses of the surveys conducted in Confucian Asia and other regions reveal that contrary to the Asian Values thesis, not all Confucian legacies considered to be incompatible with democratic politics have a significant effect on each important component of citizenship, and not every significant impact that does exist is negative.

While we found significant direct consequences of Confucian civic norms on the breadth of informal and formal associations, the norms of familism, together with communitarianism, contribute significantly to interpersonal trust and tolerance, two foundational components of democratic civic life. This finding, linking the two Confucian social norms to the making of civic-minded citizens, supports the Confucian tenet that “filial piety and fraternal duty are the
roots of humanness” (*Analects* 1:2) and that family relations thus serve as the foundation for social life. This finding also confirms the counterclaim of the Asian Values Thesis that Confucianism contains the seeds of democratic politics. It also disputes Francis Fukyuma’s (1995) claim that Confucian familism is a sort of amoral familism, which limits the extending of trust to those outside the family and thereby hinders economic development.

The legacies of Confucian social ethics contribute significantly to the development of hybrid or non-liberal misconceptions of democracy. For example, of the four types of culture considered—hierarchal, individual, egalitarian, and fatalist—Confucian hierarchal culture is the one most often associated with a misconception of the distinctive characteristics of democracy and its alternatives, even when the influences of socialization and modernization variables are statistically removed. As a result, a misconception of democracy as a hybrid regime is most prevalent among upholders of Confucian culture.

The political legacies of Confucianism, like its social legacies, remain a significant influence on the way in which people conceive of democracy and government. Specifically, attachment to paternalistic meritocracy contributes significantly to understanding democracy in substantive terms, while it has an equal negative effect on understanding democracy in procedural terms. Further, those attached to paternalistic meritocracy are very reluctant to understand democracy merely in liberal terms. Authentic liberal democratic conceivers, who equate democracy exclusively with freedom and who prioritize freedom as its most essential characteristic, constitute a very small minority (6%) of the Confucian East Asian population. As compared with their peers, even in non-Confucian East Asia, moreover, people in historically Confucian East Asia remain less attached to the notion of liberal democracy (6% vs. 11%). Undoubtedly, such non-liberal conceptions of democratic politics have a lot to do with the Confucian legacy of good government that prioritizes economic well-being.

Equally notable is the finding that the legacies of Confucian ethics neither orient people away from the democratic system of government nor toward its authoritarian alternatives, at least at the abstract, regime level. Most people in Confucian East Asia desire to live in a democracy, rather than in an authoritarian regime, regardless of their attachment level to Confucian legacies. Even among those who are strongly attached to those legacies, a large majority of nearly four-fifths (79%) prefer to live in a democracy, while a very small minority (2%) prefer to live in an authoritarian regime. Contrary to what is expected from the central claim of the Asian Value Thesis—that Confucianism is incompatible with democracy—attachment to Confucian legacies turns out to be compatible with democratic regime preferences and incompatible with authoritarian regime preferences.

When people are attached to the legacies of paternalistic meritocracy, however, they feel differently about the two different types of democratic systems: they are favorably disposed toward non-liberal democracy, characterized by democratic regime structure and authoritarian mode of governance, and unfavorably disposed toward liberal democracy, characterized by democratic regime structure and democratic mode of governance. In the minds of people in Confucian East Asia, therefore, it is a non-liberal democratic system, not an authoritarian political system, which is most compatible with Confucianism. It is, moreover, liberal democracy, not electoral or delegative democracy, which is incompatible with Confucian legacies.
Finally, it should be noted that attachment to Confucian political legacies constitutes one of the two most powerful forces shaping regime orientations. They shape both cognitive and affective orientations to democracy more powerfully than does either of the two core components of socioeconomic modernization: education and income. Specifically, the political legacies of paternalistic meritocracy have more than twice as much influence over liberal and non-liberal democratic orientations as does each of the two socioeconomic resources. To put it differently, Confucianism detracts from liberal democratic support more powerfully than the two resources that promote that support enhance it. Because attachment to Confucian legacies is a very powerful force, this finding indicates that Confucian legacies are capable of offsetting the liberalizing effect of socioeconomic modernization on cultural democratization. It also suggests that liberal democracy is not likely to become the only political game in Confucian East Asia in the near future.

Unlike Confucian political traditions, however, we found attachment to Confucian social legacies to have no significant effect on democratic orientations, either liberal or non-liberal, although Confucian hierarchal culture, as compared to the three other types of culture, is least likely to foster liberal democratic orientations and most likely to foster non-liberal democratic orientations. This suggests that the Confucian way of life, featuring hierarchism and collectivism, affects popular reactions to democracy indirectly by orienting people toward the Confucian notion of good government featuring paternalism and meritocracy.

Confucian legacies, when considered as a whole, cannot be judged to deter the general process of cultural democratization, i.e., building a nation of democratic citizens. Their effects, instead, represent a mixed bag. Political legacies appear to be inimical to the particular process of orienting citizens to liberal democracy in which individual freedom and interests matter above the community’s. Social legacies, on the other hand, are compatible with the process of orienting citizens toward communitarian democracy in which individual members cooperate with each other instead of competing against each other.

These and other findings presented in the book contradict the central claim of the Asian Values Thesis that people in Confucian Asia remain broadly and deeply attached to the legacies of Confucian political and social ethics, and their attachment to these legacies discourage them from embracing democracy.

Reassessments of the Asian Values Debate

The Asian Values Thesis maintains that the political and social legacies of Confucianism are incompatible with the norms, values, and structures of democratic politics and are instead compatible with those of authoritarian politics. Supporters of this thesis thus conclude that a democratic system of government is unsuitable for historically Confucian East Asia, where it is assumed ordinary people and their leaders remain attached to Confucian ethical norms and values. In view of the survey findings presented above, we first evaluate these claims of the thesis empirically. Then we recast the thesis in the framework of Harry Eckstein’s (1966)
congruence theory, and examine the Asian Values Thesis’s limitations as a theory of democratic underdevelopment in view of the recent fine tunings of Eckstein’s theory.

As a theory of democratic underdevelopment, the Asian Values Thesis bases its claim of an incompatibility between a Confucian heritage and full democratization on three highly dubious premises. The first is the premise that Confucianism constitutes a well-unified or integrated system of thought, with all of its components mutually supportive of one another. The second premise is that the key components of Confucianism are all pro-authoritarian and anti-democratic and thus consistently or uniformly negative in their effect on democratic politics. The third premise is that all Confucian legacies influence democratic politics, but none are influenced by it. Confucianism is, therefore, considered exclusively exogenous to democracy; the two phenomena are not endogenous to each other.

Confucianism does not represent a well-integrated system of exclusively authoritarian social and political ethics. Instead, it is one of many multi-vocal systems of political doctrines and social ethics (Stepan 2000). Being loosely structured, it consists of many conflicting elements. On religious and spiritual matters, for example, Confucius told his students not to “serve the spirits” (Analects 11:12), while preaching the virtue of practicing ancestor worship (Analects 1:11). As suggested in the following passage, he even emphasized the importance of understanding the spirit of Heaven: “Without understanding the ordinance of Heaven, it is impossible to become a superior man” (Analects 20:3); “Wealth and honor depend upon Heaven” (Analects 7:5).

Contrary to what is expected from the thesis, moreover, the legacies of Confucian political and social ethics are not uniformly detrimental to the development of democratic citizenship. Some key norms of interpersonal relationships, such as familism and communitarianism, are found to contribute to, rather than detract from, democratic citizenship. Other Confucian norms such as meritocracy and paternalism are found to be compatible with popular preference for non-liberal democracy. As discussed earlier, democracy, not its authoritarian alternatives, is the most preferred system of government among residents of Confucian East Asia, even among those who are unqualified in their commitment to Confucian norms of paternalistic meritocracy.

Equally notable is the finding that Confucian legacies and democratic political practices have a reciprocal and highly dynamic relationship: each influences the other. Attachment to the Confucian principles of ethical meritocracy and paternalistic government motivates people to prefer non-liberal democracy over liberal democracy. A continued experience of liberal democratic rule, on the other hand, motivates people to dissociate themselves from those Confucian political principles, while a continued experience of authoritarian rule discourages them from doing so. The survey findings of such highly complex and dynamic reciprocal relationships between the two phenomena directly challenge the Incompatibility Thesis’ fundamental premises: (1) Confucianism is exogenous to democratic politics, and (2) its effect on democracy is always negative.

Theoretically, the central claim of the Thesis can be recast as that of the congruence theory advocated much earlier by political scientist Harry Eckstein (1966). Unlike the original
congruence theory, the Asian Values Thesis, as a model of democratization, is deeply flawed on conceptual and theoretical grounds. Conceptually, it is flawed because it is based on a misconception of democratization or democratic development. Theoretically, it is flawed because it fails to take into account the positive role that non-democratic values and their incongruence with democratic structure play in the process of democratization.

Conceptually, both advocates and critics of the Asian Values Thesis are concerned exclusively with the problems of maintaining the stability of democratic political order by keeping it from reverting back to authoritarian rule. Consequently, they failed to consider the problems of transforming non-democracies into democracies and of deepening and expanding limited democracies into fully democracies. As widely known in the voluminous literature on the third wave of democratization, democratization is a multi-phased phenomenon. And the stability of the democratic polity is not always the most coveted goal that democratic reformers pursue (Haerpfer et al. 2009; Huntington 1991; Rose and Shin 2001; Shin 1994).

More notably, a democratic polity cannot achieve stability solely with the cultural values that are considered intrinsic to its functioning or with the dissociation of the citizenry from non-democratic values. Instead, other competing values also play an important, balancing role in promoting democratic development (Almond and Verba 1963; Wildvasky 1993). For this reason, the congruence theory incorporates the two conflicting notions of congruence and disparities in specifying and prescribing a stable democratic political system.

While the cultural values most often associated with democracy sustain its institutions, competing cultural values keep those institutions in check. This is why Eckstein characterized a democratic culture as a culture of “balanced disparities.” For the same reason, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) emphasized the role of a mixed and balanced culture, which consists of parochial, subject, and participant orientations in democratic development. Likewise, Aaron Wildvasky (1993) characterized democracy as “a coalition of cultures” including those of hierarchism, individualism, and egalitarianism. For all the important contributions that various norms and values not normally associated with democracy can make to democratic politics, however, both proponents and opponents of the Asian Values Thesis have dismissed those values and norms as inimical to its development.

In analyzing the relationship between culture and democracy, moreover, those proponents and opponents of the thesis are alike in failing to note that even in the world of democratic polities, an incongruence or a gap often develops between the level of democracy supplied by institutions and the level demanded by the citizenry (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Norris 2011; Rose and Shin 2001; Shin 2008). When demand outstrips supply, this form of democratic incongruence does not deter the process of democratization, as assumed in the Asian Values Thesis. Instead, it contributes to the process.

Instead, it supports the further democratization of limited democratic rule by occasioning institutional reform (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 2008; Welzel and Klingemann 2008). When democratic demand and supply are in congruence or in equilibrium at a low level, moreover, democracy is known to remain “broken-back” (Rose and Shin 2001). In the world of newly emerging democracies, therefore, democratic progress is more
likely to take place when democratic structure and culture are more incongruent than congruent. The failure to consider the potentially positive role of such incongruence is another major limitation of the Asian Value Thesis as a cultural theory of democratic development.

Critics of the Asian Values Thesis including Amartya Sen (1999) and Francis Fukuyama (1995b) challenged its claim that the norms and values Confucius and other early Confucians advocated for the building of a harmonious community called datong shehui are uniquely Asian. Specifically, these critics have pointed out that harmony, order, paternalism, and family values, which in the thesis have been promoted as uniquely Asian, are also valued in other parts of the world. Further, these critics have argued that freedom and equality, the two core values of democracy, are universal values superseding country and race, and these liberal values are respected in all societies, regardless of the level of their culture and socioeconomic modernization.

Many critics of the Asian Value Thesis claim that there are no quintessentially Asian values, which are uniquely and pervasively shared only among the entire population of Asia or East Asia and which therefore can be responsible for Asia’s unique response to the third wave of democratization. There are two serious limitations with the claim. First, these critiques fail to take into account that values are a multidimensional phenomenon, consisting of preference and priority (Inglehart 1977, 1997). Of these two dimensions, these critics examined the Asian Values Thesis exclusively from the perspective of citizens’ value preferences. As a result, they completely overlooked the prioritization of those preferences among the Confucian Asian population.

Second, the critics failed to recognize that how people prioritize their values varies considerably across different societies as this prioritization depends on what Abraham Maslow (1943) called the hierarchy of human needs, which has its roots in the Confucian conception of human nature. As suggested in the following passage from the Mencius (6A:15), people even within the same society prioritize their values differently, not much differently in what they value. 5 The differences in their value priorities motivate them to engage in different patterns of thinking and behavior.

Our survey analyses have exhibited distinctive patterns of democratic conceptions. People in historically Confucian East Asia do not value the liberal democratic core value of freedom as much as their counterparts in the West do (Shin 1999, 61). As compared to their peers in non-Confucian Southeast Asia, moreover, people in historically Confucian East Asia rank political freedom as less essential, while ranking economic welfare as a more essential component of democracy. This pattern of prioritization of political and economic values among Confucian East Asians is distinctively different from the pattern observed among non-Confucian East Asians and Westerners. These differences in value priorities do have significant implications for the building of democracy, especially democracy in culturally Confucian East Asia.

5 According to Mencius (6A:13), moreover, people can avoid the act of “unthinking to the highest degree” only when the person gets priorities right.
Consequently, we conclude that to date, both advocates and critics of the Asian Values Thesis have failed to understand the essential components of democratic culture and the role these components play in the process of democratization. Further they have failed to understand the distinctive value orientations among the Confucian East Asian population and the impact of those orientations on the preferred type of democratic regime. All in all, it should be noted that Confucianism contains pro-democratic values and authoritarian values, and the conflict between these values should not be assumed to create instability; instead, it should be recognized that this conflict can “energize” and expand limited democracy into full democracy.

**Theoretical Implications**

In the literature on cultural democratization, there are three prominent sets of competing theories. A first set concerns the relative importance of early socialization and adult learning as an influence on mass orientations to democracy. While socialization theories of political learning emphasize the importance of learning during an early period of childhood or adolescence, institutional learning theories emphasize adult relearning in response to changing circumstances regardless of early socialization (Mishler and Rose 2002).

A second set of competing theories concerns the direction of the relationship between cultural values and democratic politics (Mueller and Seligson 1994). Cultural theories, such as the Asian Values Thesis, cast cultural values as an independent variable with the dependent variable being the reactions that masses of former authoritarian states have to the forces of democratization. Institutional learning theories, in contrast, cast the practices of democratic politics as the independent variable with the dependent variable being the transformation of authoritarian cultural values into democratic ones (Anderson and Dodd 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Rohrschneider 1999).

A third, final pair of theories offers two conflicting views concerning the consequences of socioeconomic modernization on cultural change; the views differ in whether those consequences are negative or positive. While modernization theories emphasize socioeconomic modernization’s contribution to the liberalization and secularization of traditional authoritarian values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), indigenization theories emphasize its contribution to the revival and strengthening of traditional values (Huntington 1996). In this section, we evaluate the competing claims of these theories with what is known in Confucian East Asia.

In Confucian Asia, people were exposed to Confucianism as a way of life from early childhood. Their attachments formed during this early socialization may contrast sharply with their adult experience of democratic or authoritarian rule, which we measure by the type of regime in which they have lived. How do these two types of contrasting life experiences compare with each other as an influence shaping democratic support? We need to address this question to evaluate the claims of the two competing theories of cultural democratization known as early socialization and institutional learning.

In orienting Confucian East Asians away from liberal democracy and toward non-liberal democracy, early exposure to the age-old tradition of paternalistic meritocracy is far more
instrumental than citizens’ current assessments of how the existing regime performs than a clear understanding of what constitutes democracy. Early exposure to Confucianism, however, matters far less significantly than the particular type of regime experienced during adulthood.

Gender and age, which are most often used to measure early socialization, also matter much less than regime assessments and democratic knowledge. From these conflicting findings, it is difficult to determine whether it is early socialization or adult learning that matters more in the process of democratization taking place among individual citizens. What is clear from the findings, however, is that learning is a lifetime process integrating what was learned in the past with what is currently being learned (Mishler and Rose 2002).

Besides shaping popular reactions to liberal and non-liberal democracy, the experience of democratic politics is found to affect how people react to Confucian legacies. In all the Confucian political and social legacies we analyzed, upholders of Confucianism are far more prevalent in democratic than non-democratic countries even when levels of their socioeconomic resources are controlled. Between new and old democracies, attachment to Confucianism is more prevalent in new democracies. The type of regime in which people in Confucian Asia live significantly affects their adherence to Confucian political and social ethics. And the length of democratic experience also affects commitment to Confucianism significantly by reducing popular attachment to its legacies.

Institutional learning theory postulates that people are likely to become supporters of liberal democracy upon experiencing democratic politics. Cultural theory, on the other hand, postulates that people are unlikely to support liberal democracy as long as they remain attached to non-democratic values such as paternalistic meritocracy. Obviously, there is a bidirectional relationship between culture and democratic politics; neither of these two competing theories offers a full and balanced account of the contours and dynamics of that relationship. In Confucian East Asia, therefore, the two theories have to be considered together to understand just how culture and regime experience affect each other in the process of democratization.

Do Confucian East Asians dissociate themselves from traditional Confucian ethical norms when exposed to a modern way of life with greater income and education? Or does such exposure lead to greater “indigenization” of traditional Confucian values? As expected from neo-modernization theory, our analysis found people in Confucian East Asia were less willing to abide by Confucian norms of hierarchal collectivism and paternalistic meritocracy if they had achieved a higher level of education. Greater affluence, in contrast, was positively associated with a greater willingness to abide by the norms of hierarchal collectivism and to conceive of democracy as a hybrid regime.

With increased education, people in China and Vietnam become more supportive of non-liberal democracy and less supportive of liberal democracy. Supporters of non-liberal democracy are more numerous in highly modernized Singapore than in China and Vietnam, the two least modernized countries in the region. Evidently, some indigenization of traditional Confucian values is taking place in response to the rapid modernization of society; however, not all Confucian values are finding equal favor in this Confucian revival.
All these findings, when considered together, suggest that in the context of Confucian East Asia, education and income, the two key components of socioeconomic modernization, have divergent consequences on the liberalization of traditional values and the democratization of political orientations. These findings also suggest that exposure to the same force of modernization entails different consequences in different countries in the region. In short, the indigenization and the liberalization of traditional Confucian ethics are both currently taking place in the region.


### Table 3.4 The Most and Least Preferred Types of Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Fatalism</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Hierarchism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 4.1 Attachment to the Principles of Paternalistic Meritocracy

### A. Meritocracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Moral Leadership</th>
<th>Passive Citizenry</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attached Firmly</td>
<td>Attached Firmly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32.9% (3.4%)</td>
<td>49.9% (11.2%)</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>62.3 (13.7)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>32.8 (2.5)</td>
<td>81.3 (19.3)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>33.0 (1.9)</td>
<td>56.0 (2.8)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>56.7 (7.8)</td>
<td>84.2 (30.3)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>59.9 (20.5)</td>
<td>47.8 (19.9)</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>46.0 (8.3)</td>
<td>63.8 (13.9)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Paternalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parental Benevolence</th>
<th>Unconditional Deference</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attached Firmly Attached</td>
<td>Attached Firmly Attached</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>34.6% (5.0%)</td>
<td>23.9% (5.0%)</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>56.1 (12.7)</td>
<td>36.4 (12.7)</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>75.0 (12.0)</td>
<td>25.6 (12.0)</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>79.1 (8.3)</td>
<td>69.6 (8.3)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>62.6 (13.5)</td>
<td>56.5 (13.5)</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>70.0 (40.2)</td>
<td>73.7 (40.2)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>62.9 (15.3)</td>
<td>47.6 (15.3)</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 Overall Levels of Attachment to Paternalistic Meritocracy (on a 5-Point Scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Scale Points</th>
<th>High Attachment (3 and 4)</th>
<th>Scale Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.4 Cultural Preferences and Support for Confucian Political Traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Fatalism</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Hierarchism</th>
<th>(Entire)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Obey Parents</th>
<th>Sacrifice for the Family</th>
<th>Levels of Attachment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Firmly Attached</td>
<td>Attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>(6.6%)</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>(4.2)</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>(6.2)</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>(15.3)</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.9 Unadjusted and Adjusted Percentages of the Fully Civic-Minded

Table 7.6 Types of Democratic Conceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Authentic</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Others include those who fail to rate all four regime characteristics and who rate none of those characteristics as essential to democracy.

Table 7.10 Cultural Differences in Well-Informed and Hybrid Conceptions of Democracy

### A. Well-informed Conceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Fatalism</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Hierarchism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Hybrid Conceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Fatalism</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>Hierarchism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.6 Fully Informed and Hybrid Conceptions of Democracy by Four Culture Types (adjusted percentages)

Table 7.11 Procedural Conceptions of Democracy by Levels of Attachment to Paternalistic Meritocracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>(Eta)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8.3 Types of Political Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Non-democrat</th>
<th>Non-liberal Democrat</th>
<th>Liberal Democrat</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pooled)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.8 Adjusted Percentages of Non-liberal and Liberal Democrats by Levels of Attachment to Paternalistic Meritocracy

Figure 8.9 The Independent effect of Political Confucianism on Support for Non-liberal Democracy in Democracies and Non-democracies.

Figure 8.10 The Independent Effect of Political Confucianism on Support for liberal Democracy in Non-democratic and Democratic Countries.

Figure 8.11 Adjusted Levels of Support for Non-liberal and Liberal Democracy by Four Types of Culture