

ASIAN  BAROMETER

A Comparative Survey of  
*DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT*

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Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship:  
The Case of South Korea



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# Asian Barometer

## A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

### Working Paper Series

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## **Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship: The Case of South Korea**

Recent theory and research on democratic consolidation increasingly emphasize the role of a vibrant civil society. In his seminal work, *Making Democracy Work*, Robert Putnam demonstrates that the existence of a civic community is important for democratic institutional performance.<sup>1</sup> Michael Foley and Bob Edwards point out that an active civil society promotes democracy by mobilizing civic resistance to an authoritarian state.<sup>2</sup> Larry Diamond notes its role in restraining the exercise of power by democratic states as well as democratizing authoritarian states.<sup>3</sup> James Gibson maintains that theories of democratization require understanding of civil society as a set of autonomous organizations.<sup>4</sup> It is now widely believed that the existence of a vibrant civil society is an important factor, if not the single most important one, in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy.

To date, the theory and research have focused primarily on the role of civil society at the macro-level of systemic change.<sup>5</sup> As a result, relatively little is known about how civil society consisting of autonomous organizations affects the process of democratization at the micro-level of individual citizens, especially in the context of third-wave democracies.<sup>6</sup> It has also been the case for democratizing South Korea (hereafter Korea).<sup>7</sup> In this paper, by using Korea as a case in point we examine the impact of social capital, a key feature of civil society, on democratic citizenship at the individual level.

More specifically, we address the following questions: Does involvement in social networks induces individuals to trust each other? Does social involvement and trust promote, individually or jointly, support for democracy and political activism? Are individuals bound together in social networks, infused with norms of trust more supportive of democratic institutions and principles and more involved in politics than those not so well endowed with networks and

norms? These and other related questions are explored in the context of the East Asia Barometer (EAB hereafter) survey in Korea, which was conducted during the month of February 2003.<sup>8</sup>

### **Prior Research**

Forty years ago, in their pioneering work, *Civic Culture*, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba emphasized the importance of social participation and interpersonal trust for democracy, even though they did not explicitly use the term “social capital” in their work.<sup>9</sup> According to them, the propensity of civic cooperation is rooted in social attitudes, such as having faith in people, which is cultivated through taking part in voluntary associations. They argued that such associations infuse their members with habits of cooperation and norms of reciprocity conducive to civic engagement. They viewed involvement in social organizations as one of the ultimate sources of democratic citizenship, a crucial feature of civic culture.

Drawing upon de Tocqueville’s early work on American democracy, Robert Putnam explicitly relates civil society to democratic governance through the concept of social capital in his analysis of the performance of regional governments in Italy.<sup>10</sup> He argues that a dense network of voluntary associations generates social capital by supporting norms of reciprocity and trust and providing networks of social relations for civic action, which ultimately contribute to the effective performance of democratic institutions. Civic associations are considered to contribute to democracy both internally and externally. Internally, these associations help their members not only to acquire participatory skills and resources but also to learn democratic norms and values. Externally, they facilitate the articulation and representation of citizen interests to a democratic state. Civil society is viewed to determine the quality of democratic governance through social networks and norms of trust.

Despite some sharp disagreements on the sources of social capital in the scholarly community, a growing number of social scientists follow Robert Putnam’s lead and further

elaborate the thesis that social capital is important for democracy.<sup>11</sup> For instance, in their analysis of American public opinion data John Brehm and Wendy Rahn identify the aggregate phenomenon of social capital at an individual level by demonstrating its presence in the form of a tight reciprocal relationship between civic engagement and interpersonal trust.<sup>12</sup> In his study of state governments in the United States Stephen Knack shows that generalized trust is associated with better governmental performance while social connectedness is unrelated to governmental performance and calls into question the use of social capital that mixes social networks and trust.<sup>13</sup> In his analysis of Russian public opinion data James Gibson shows that individuals embedded in extensive social networks are more likely to support key democratic institutions and processes, but points out that interpersonal trust is not a prerequisite to support for democratic institutions and processes.<sup>14</sup> In their analysis of New Russia Barometer survey data Richard Rose and Craig Weller find that neither trust nor organizational membership influences commitment to democratic values and suggest that any positive effects of social capital may be contingent.<sup>15</sup> In their comparative study of Germany, the United States and Sweden Dietlind Stolle and Thomas Rochon show that associational membership is related to higher political activity and awareness, as well as higher levels of generalized trust and that there are national differences in the relationships.<sup>16</sup> By using World Value survey data Kenneth Newton demonstrates that “associational membership is not unimportant for the generation of social trust, but less important than some other social and political factors.”<sup>17</sup>

### **The Notion of Social Capital**

Robert Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.”<sup>18</sup> According to this notion, social capital consists of three conceptually distinct phenomena: networks, trust and consequences.<sup>19</sup> Since effects should be distinguished from

causes, the present study excludes consequences and focuses on networks and trust, which constitute, respectively, the structural and cultural components of social capital. The structural component reflects the ties or associations between individuals while the cultural component the types of ties between individuals.<sup>20</sup>

### ***Social network***

The relationship between the two components of social capital is generally assumed to be asymmetric rather than reciprocal. Between these two components, social networks are believed to produce norms of reciprocity and trust, even though such social norms may help build social networks. Hence, social networks can be regarded as the core component of social capital.

Recently, scholars of social capital point out that all social networks are not alike. For instance, Robert Putnam and Kristin Goss make four distinctions such as formal versus informal, thin versus thick, inward-looking versus outward-looking, and bridging versus bonding ones.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, Pamela Paxton notes that individuals can be informally connected to others through friendship networks or through formal group membership and thus distinguishes informal networks from formal associations.<sup>22</sup> Dietlind Stolle and Thomas Rochon find that heterogeneous associations are more likely to inculcate norms of reciprocity and generalized trust among their members than homogenous associations.<sup>23</sup>

Since consequences of social networks for political life are likely to vary across their types, it is essential to make distinctions such as horizontal-hierarchical, formal-informal, heterogeneous-homogeneous ones. In earlier research, networks of co-equal volunteers are found the most likely to produce norms of reciprocity and trust.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, associations vary considerably in terms of the way they are organized. The different ways they are organized are known to have divergent effects on the processes of socialization and democratic learning among individual members. The associations that are organized bureaucratically or hierarchically are found even detrimental to the

growth of democratic orientations because they tend to develop patron-client or dependency-exploitation relationships.<sup>25</sup> The associations that are organized horizontally are the ones conducive to the norms of civic life and democratic politics.

Empirical research on social capital to date has been concerned mostly with formal associations mainly because they are easy to identify. However, when formal associations are compared with informal groups, the latter are found the more productive structural component of social capital. Unquestionably, people tend to spend most of their daily lives in informal groups rather than in formal associations. Hence, it is pointed out that informal groups are more likely to play “the socialization role of creating ‘habits of the heart’.”<sup>26</sup> Similarly, it is argued that social capital grows more often than not in small groups where face-to-face interactions take place than large groups.<sup>27</sup>

In view of these prior works, the present study recognizes the importance of differentiating social networks into three distinct pairs of types: horizontal-hierarchical, heterogeneous-homogeneous and formal-informal types. With the data at hand, however, this study selects the pair of formal and informal types and seeks to describe patterns of social involvement among the Korean population and to determine whether, in Korea, types of social involvement matter for the democratic norms of civil society.

### ***Social trust***

Social trust constitutes the cultural dimension of social capital. Although it is an elusive concept, it generally refers to the way people relate each other. For instance, Kenneth Newton considers it “the collective attitudes people have about their fellow citizens.”<sup>28</sup> Pamela Paxton considers trust reflecting “the types of ties between individuals, where the presence of positive ties is essential.”<sup>29</sup> Bernard Barber sees trust “expectations that people have each other.”<sup>30</sup> Toshio Yamagishi and Midori Yamagishi define trust as “expectation of goodwill and benign intent.”<sup>31</sup>

As how people relate each other varies a great deal in kind, there are many different types of trust.<sup>32</sup> More importantly, not all types of trust contribute equally to the formation of a civic community. What really matters for civic virtues involves trust in strangers, or the people whom one does not know personally. This type of trust, which is often called generalized trust, is built on expectation of unknown people's goodwill or benevolence. Unlike other types of trust, it requires interactions among people of heterogeneous rather than homogenous backgrounds.

In contrast, the type of trust in particular individuals or members of their group may not contribute to the formation of a civic community. This type of particularized trust is likely to grow among those who share similar demographic backgrounds or socio-economic statuses. By failing to transcend social differences, homogeneous groups are not likely to generate "identity-bridging" social capital.<sup>33</sup> Such groups tend to promote trust in members of one's own group and distrust in those of other groups. Particularized trust cultivated among members of homogeneous groups may be regarded as "unsocial" rather than "social" capital.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the present study finds it necessary to distinguish generalized trust from particularized trust in order to fully understand political consequences of social capital.

### **Conceptualization and Measurement**

Social capital is a concept referring to the properties of collective units rather than those of individual citizens.<sup>35</sup> With the micro-level data at hand, however, we focus on the micro-level implications of social capital for the development of democratic citizenship. The social capital thesis implies that those embedded in social networks, infused with norms of trust tend to be supportive of democracy and politically active. Thus, we develop social involvement and trust as the micro-level variables and conceptualize social capital as the aggregate of these behavioral and psychological characteristics of individual citizens.

### ***Social Involvement: Non-joiners, Informal, Formal and Full Joiners***

From the EAB survey, we selected two questions to measure social involvement. One question asked about involvement in formal associations: “Are you a member of any organizations or formal groups?” Respondents were allowed to name up to three of the most important formal associations they joined. The other question asked about involvement in informal groups or circles: “Are you a member of any private groups, circles or regular gatherings?” Respondents were, once again, allowed to name up to three of the most important informal groups they joined. Responses to these two questions were considered together to develop one quantitative measure and one qualitative measure of social involvement. The quantitative measure estimates the level of social involvement by counting the number of affiliated groups. The qualitative measure identifies its distinct types by ascertaining the formal and/or informal characteristics of those groups.

Specifically, the level of social involvement is estimated in terms of an index summing the number of formal and/or informal groups to which each respondent reported he or she belonged at the time of the survey. The value of each index ranges from 0 to 3. A score of 0 means being uninvolved, while a score of 3 means being highly involved. Nonetheless, it should be noted that each index is incapable of differentiating the degrees of activism in the networks. It is because the EAB survey failed to ask about the extent to which respondents were active in the groups to which they belonged. The EAB survey also failed to ask about organizational features of those groups such as their composition, structure, and operation. Consequently, social involvement here cannot be classified into distinct types in terms of horizontal-vertical or heterogeneous-homogeneous distinctions.

By asking respondents to name, on a separate basis, the formal and informal groups they joined, however, the EAB survey allows us to distinguish four distinct types of social involvement.

They are: (1) non-joiners; (2) informal joiners; (3) formal joiners; and (4) full joiners. Non-joiners are those involved in neither formal nor informal groups. Informal joiners are those involved exclusively in informal groups, while formal joiners are those involved exclusively in formal groups. Full joiners, on the other hand, are those involved in both formal and informal groups.

***Social trust: generalized, particularized, commitment-based and competence-based***

From the EAB survey, we selected two questions to measure social trust and to ascertain its distinct types. One of them has been repeated in numerous surveys around the world: “Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with them?” Since this question appears to reflect trust in more abstract people rather than specific individuals, it may be considered as a measure of abstract trust. To supplement this question which does not specify the type of people, we selected another question: “Would you agree or disagree with the statement that when hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends?” Unlike the first question, it measures attitudes toward strangers more directly and less abstractly. Although it may be considered a measure of nepotism, it encourages each respondent to reflect his or her openness to, or confidence in, unknown people. Tapping directly into attitudes toward strangers outside the immediate circle of friends and relatives, it measures the extent to which trust is generalized into the context of dealing with unknown people.

Responses to both questions are considered together to construct a four-fold typology of social trust. The four types of trust are: (1) generalized trust; (2) competence-based trust; (3) commitment-based trust; and (4) particularized trust. In the first type of generalized trust, most people are trusted to the extent that any of them as a stranger, if competent, can be hired as an employee. In the second type of competence-based trust, most people are not trusted in principle, but some of them are trusted on the grounds of professional or technical competence. In the third

type of commitment-based trust, most people are trusted in principle, but trust in them is yet to be practiced due to committed relations with friends and relatives. In the fourth type of particularized trust, trust is confined only to an immediate circle of friends and relatives.

### **Patterns of Social Involvement**

To what extent are the Korean people involved in social networks? In which type of social networks are they more involved, formal or informal ones? To explore these questions, Table 1 reports the number of those groups Koreans joined as members. The most notable feature of this table is that an absolute majority (91%) of the Korean people (as compared to 33% for Japan and 71% for Taiwan) stays away from formal groups, such as professional associations, labor unions, and civic associations. This means that less than one-tenth (9%) of ordinary Korean (as compared to 67% for Japan and 29% for Taiwan) joined this type of formal groups. Another notable finding is that those who joined two or more formal groups account for only about two percent, a very tiny minority (as compared with 40% for Japan and 10% for Taiwan). These findings suggest that the Korean people as a whole remain reluctant to join formal groups, even though the number of civic organizations has steadily grown in the wake of political liberalization and democratization during the past decades.<sup>36</sup>

(Table 1 here)

What sorts of formal organizations are most and least popular among the Korean people? Table 2 shows the distribution of their membership across eleven different types of organizations including residential associations, labor unions, political parties, and sports and leisure clubs. Among the minority of Korean people who joined these formal organizations, a plurality (39%) belongs to alumni associations. This figure is contrasted sharply with those for its neighboring countries. In Japan only a small minority (19%) belonged to alumni associations. In Taiwan a tiny minority (3%) mentioned alumni associations. More notable is that the membership of such

associations, which is confined only to alumni, is larger than the combined membership of vocational organizations such as trade associations, agricultural cooperatives, and labor unions. In Korea, where the economy represents the eleventh largest in the world, school ties remain a more important basis for social connections than vocational or professional ties. Networks of school ties are the kind of networks that produces “identity-bonding” rather than “identity-bridging” social capital so that they are likely to be limited in inculcating generalized trust among their members.

(Table 2 here)

To what extent are the Korean people involved in informal networks of social life? As seen in Table 1, nearly a half (47%) belongs to at least one informal group. Their membership in informal groups is contrasted sharply with their meager membership (9%) in formal groups. Those involved in the former are more than five times as many as those involved in the latter. The average Korean today belongs to less than one informal group, but remains largely unconnected to any formal organization. The Koreans are as likely to join informal groups as the Japanese (49%) but more likely to join them than the Taiwanese (37%). Among the Koreans socially connected through informal networks, nearly a half (51%) belongs exclusively to informal alumni circles (see Table 3). The prevalence of informal circles of classmates in Korea is especially notable, as compared to its neighboring countries. In Japan the most popular type of informal groups turns out to be circles of friends sharing common hobbies or favorite past time. In Taiwan only less than one-tenth of those joining informal groups mentioned circles of classmates.

(Table 3 here)

As shown in Table 1, when formal and informal groups are considered together, nearly a half (49%) of the Korean people are not involved in any social networks. Only one-third (18%) are multiple joiners with membership in two or more groups (as compared to 55% for Japan and 24% for Taiwan). An absolute majority (96%) of the Korean people belongs to fewer than three groups

(as compared to 60% for Japan and 88% for Taiwan). The average Korean belongs to less than one formal or informal group. These findings indicate clearly that the Korean people as a whole are socially connected neither broadly nor densely.

Finally, we considered jointly responses to the two questions of group membership and identified four types of joiners. As Figure 1 shows, nearly two-fifths (42%) of ordinary Koreans turn out to be informal joiners, belonging to informal groups only (as compared to 8% for Japan and 24% for Taiwan). Only one-twentieth (5%) appears to be full joiners, belonging to both formal and informal groups (as compared to 42% for Japan and 14% for Taiwan). A similarly smaller minority (4%) are formal joiners, belonging to formal groups only (as compared to 26% for Japan and 16% for Taiwan). Non-joiners, on the other hand, comprise a plurality (49% as compared to 25% for Japan and 47% for Taiwan). These findings illustrate that Korea today is a mixed nation of non-joiners and informal joiners, as is Taiwan. In contrast, Japan turns out to be a nation of joiners.

(Figure 1 here)

As shown in Table 4, types of social involvement do vary across some socio-demographic categories of the Korean people. The proportion of joiners is higher among men, the middle-age cohorts (40 to 59), the lowest income group and the residents of rural communities. Yet, it does not vary much across educational groups. More non-joiners than joiners are found among women, the young (20 to 29) and the elderly (60 and older), the poorly educated (less than high school education), the more prosperous and the residents of small or medium-sized cities. Regardless of any socio-demographic categories ordinary Koreans are either non-joiners or informal joiners.

(Table 4 here)

In summary, social involvement in contemporary Korea, as measured by formal group membership, is hardly prevalent. Only a very small minority belongs to formal associations with a

written constitution, elected officers, and paid staff. Even most of these formal associations appear to be the kind of networks that do not transcend social differences. To connect themselves to other people, Koreans prefer to rely on informal friendship networks, which tend to be highly homogeneous especially in social and cultural identities. They are hardly crosscutting networks. Consequently, prevailing social networks in Korea appear not to be of the bridging kind with inclusive membership. Instead they seem to be of the bonding kind with exclusive membership.

### **Patterns of Social Trust**

How do the Korean people relate each other? Do they trust most of their fellow citizens? Or do they instead take extreme care in dealing with other Koreans? When the EAB survey asked the standard interpersonal trust question, less than two-fifths (39%) of the Korean people expressed trust in other people (as compared to 29% for Japan, a surprisingly low figure, and 40% for Taiwan). Even in principle, a substantial majority was reluctant to trust most of those whom they do not know personally. When the same survey asked another question regarding trust in action, however, a greater majority (74%) of the Korean people expressed trust in strangers who were capable of performing the work for them competently (as compared to 57% for Japan, another surprisingly low figure, and 69% for Taiwan). Only one-quarter of ordinary Koreans remained committed to relatives and friends because they believed strangers, even if competent, could not be trusted in the business context.

Considering jointly the responses to the two questions that deal, respectively, with trust in principle and trust in action, we identified four distinct types – particularized, commitment-based, competence-based, and generalized – of trust among the Korean people (see Figure 2). Comparing the percentages of these types, we now empirically determine the particular types that are most and least prevalent among the Korean people. Of the four types, the type that features trust only in action is the most prevalent one with a plurality expressing it. Nearly half (45%) of the Korean

people (as compared to 44% for Japan and 41% for Taiwan) refuse to trust strangers in principle, but they are willing to trust those judged to work competently. Next to this type that emphasizes professional competence over personal ties is the type featuring generalized trust, i.e., trust not only in action but also in principle. A substantial minority (29%) of the Korean people (as compared to 22% for Japan and 33% for Taiwan) falls in this type of unqualified trust in strangers. A much smaller minority (16% as compared to 23% for Japan and 8% for Taiwan) belongs to the third type of particularized trust in which trust is confined only to the small circle of relatives and friends. The smallest proportion (10% as compared to 11% for Japan and 8% for Taiwan) exhibits commitment-based trust in which strangers are trusted only in principle. Despite their avowed trust in other people in principle, they remain committed to those with whom they have private ties in the real world of business. There are no notable national differences in the distribution of types of social trust. Korea is a nation of high competence-based trust, if not generalized trust, as are its neighboring countries.

(Figure 2 here)

As shown in Table 5, types of social trust do not vary much across most of socio-demographic categories of the Korean people. Yet, the proportion of those expressing generalized trust is higher among the middle-age cohort (40 to 49), the better educated, the more prosperous, and rural residents. The proportion of those expressing competence-based trust is higher among the young (20 to 39), the less prosperous, and urban residents. The proportion of those expressing commitment-based trust is higher among the elderly (60 or older), the poorly educated (less than high school education), and rural residents. The proportion of those expressing particularized trust is higher among the old age cohorts (50 or older) and the less prosperous. Regardless of any socio-demographic categories, however, far more Koreans tend to display competence-based trust rather than generalized trust or particularized trust.

(Table 5 here)

In a nutshell, the cultural component of social capital, as measured by generalized trust, does not appear to be in adequate supply in Korea. It is encouraging, though, that only a small minority exhibits particularized trust, which is often viewed as negative social capital. It is also encouraging that a plurality displays competence-based trust, which is more inclusive than particularized trust. Yet, it is discouraging that a majority has yet to demonstrate generalized trust, the type of trust that is most inclusive and least restrictive.

### **Social Involvement and Social Trust**

The theory of social capital posits that social networks generate norms of reciprocity and trust. In a society where people interact with their neighbors, to join together in voluntary associations, and to act collectively in the public sphere, generalized trust becomes prevalent. In contrast, in a society where people interact only with the members of their own group and to stay away from civic life, particularized trust becomes dominant. In this section, we assess this thesis at the micro-level by analyzing the relationship between social involvement and social trust.

As Table 6 shows, the relationship between social involvement and social trust is more complicated than what is generally assumed in the social capital literature. Non-joiners, for example, do not express generalized trust to a significantly lesser extent than do joiners. Nor do non-joiners express particularized trust to a significantly greater extent than do joiners. The percentage differences between non-joiners and joiners who express such types of trust vary less than four percentage points. Although the number of formal and full joiners in the sample may be too small to make a highly reliable estimate, this finding suggests that social involvement itself would not necessarily lead to higher generalized trust or lower particularized trust.

(Table 6 here)

A further analysis using the levels of social involvement yields similar results. There are no notable differences in the percentages of those exhibiting generalized trust (31% vs. 27%) or particularized trust (16% vs. 16%) between those with at least one group membership and those with no such membership. The number of associations or groups the Korean people joined matters very little for trust, either generalized or particularized. These findings indicate that the exact nature of the relationship between social involvement and trust may not be as simple as what has been suggested in the literature.

Why does social involvement not lead to higher generalized trust among the Korean public? Perhaps it may have to do with the kinds of networks they are embedded in. Depending upon their kind, social networks are expected to have either positive or negative effects on generalized trust. According to Alexis de Tocqueville,<sup>37</sup> it is the secondary groups with a voluntary character, not primary groups of friends and families, which would be conducive to the generation of civic virtues. Dietlind Stolle and Thomas Rochon show that heterogeneous associations are more likely to generate generalized trust than homogeneous associations.<sup>38</sup> Robert Putnam notes the importance of horizontal social network by saying “A vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation.”<sup>39</sup> Bonding social ties are not likely to lead to generalized trust because they tend to be exclusive, homogeneous, or hierarchical. Perhaps because the types of networks Koreans are embedded in are bonding rather than bridging ones, even joiners appear to be as likely as non-joiners to express particularized trust.

As presented before, ordinary Koreans most often join alumni associations or circles. Among those affiliated with formal associations, nearly two-fifths (39%) reported membership in alumni associations. Similarly, among those reporting informal group membership, one in two (51%) mentioned membership in alumni circles. Although those organizations undoubtedly hold

some characteristics of voluntary and horizontal associations, they run as highly exclusive and homogeneous forms of social organization. Therefore, their members tend to develop identity-bonding solidarity only among themselves and to distrust non-members in general. Although the number of relevant cases is small, it is found that those joining alumni associations are much less likely to express generalized trust than those joining trade associations (26% vs. 38%). At the same time, those joiners of alumni circles turn out to be more likely to express particularized trust than those joining hobby circles (17% vs. 12%).

Evidently, formal or informal networks of school ties do not necessarily lead to higher generalized trust. It may actually do the opposite because they are “inward-looking” networks rather than “outward-looking” networks. Because Koreans tend to join this kind of networks, it is hardly surprising that their social involvement does not translate into generalized trust. This finding, however, should not be taken to refute the social capital thesis that social networks are a source of generalized trust. Rather it should be interpreted to suggest that not any types of networks but the particular ones matter for the generation of such trust.

### **Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship**

Scholars of social capital maintain that networks and trust, two key attributes of social capital, are conducive to democracy. They emphasize the importance of social networks in cultivating the norms of reciprocity and trust among the mass public. They also highlight the role that these norms of civil society play in developing democratic political attitudes and behavior among the citizenry. They contend that a dense network of associations and widespread social trust jointly play a significant role in consolidating democracy.

Some scholars of social capital regard trust as distinct from or even primary to networks.<sup>40</sup> They argue that generalized trust motivates people to join voluntary associations and to get involved in other civic actions. Nonetheless, as most scholars of social capital do, we assume that

networks are causally prior to norms and examine whether networks and norms, individually and jointly, influence democratic citizenship.

We first differentiate qualities of democratic citizenship into two dimensions, attitudinal and behavioral.<sup>41</sup> The attitudinal dimension of democratic citizenship is captured by support for democracy along three separate sub-dimensions: (1) democracy as an idea,<sup>42</sup> (2) institutional checks and balances,<sup>43</sup> and (3) the rule of law.<sup>44</sup> The behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship is captured by political activism along three separate sub-dimensions: (1) political involvement,<sup>45</sup> (2) political efficacy,<sup>46</sup> and (3) political participation.<sup>47</sup>

In order to estimate the independent and relative effects of networks and norms on democratic citizenship, we develop two regression equation models. In the first model we regressed six sub-dimensions of democratic citizenship, respectively, on types of social involvement along with five socio-demographic control variables. In the second model we added types of social trust as explanatory variables to the first model.

### ***Social capital and support for democracy***

As Table 7 shows, the first model only accounts for 0.6 percent of the variance in support for democracy as an idea, 2.6 percent of the variance in support for institutional checks and balances, and 1.2 percent of the variance in support for the rule of law. In contrast, the second model accounts for 4.1 percent of the variance in support for democracy as an idea, 4.5 percent of the variance in support for institutional checks and balances and 3.8 percent of the variance in support for the rule of law. The most notable finding is that most of the variance in support for democracy is left unexplained. This indicates that social networks matter little for the attitudinal dimension of democratic citizenship. Another notable feature is that the addition of social trust sharply increased the amount of variance explained. This indicates that social trust plays a more important role in fostering support for democracy.

(Table 7 here)

Let us examine the effects of social capital on support for democracy. First, most types of social involvement apparently have no significant effects. Being joiners instead of non-joiners has no significant effects on support for institutional checks and balances or the rule of law. Being formal or full joiners instead of non-joiners has some effects on support for democracy as an idea. Yet, its effects completely vanish after types of trust are controlled.

Second, most types of social trust have significant effects on support for democracy even after the types of social involvement are controlled. Having generalized or competence-based trust instead of particularized trust has significant effects on every sub-dimension of support for democracy. Their effects are in the expected positive direction and substantial in magnitude. Having even commitment-based trust instead of particularized trust has significant effects on support for democracy as an idea.

Lastly, socio-demographic variables except community size have no significant effects on support for democracy. Community size has some effects, but they are not in the consistent direction. Especially, urban residents are more likely to support institutional checks and balances or the rule of law than rural residents.

Overall, the results evidently show that norms rather than networks determine political attitudes associated with democratic citizenship. The effects of associational membership are largely negligible. This finding should not be taken to refute the social capital thesis. Rather it is best interpreted as a caution that the effects of associational membership are contingent.

### ***Social capital and political activism***

As reported in Table 8, the first model accounts for 10.7 percent of the variance in political involvement, 2.7 percent of the variance in political efficacy and 4.4 percent of the variance in political participation. In contrast, the second model accounts for 10.7 percent of the variance in

political involvement, 2.8 percent of the variance in political efficacy and 5.1 percent of the variance in political participation. Notable is that most of the variance in political activism is left unexplained. This indicates that social capital contributes little to political activism. Another notable feature is that the addition of social trust did not increase the amount of variance explained. This shows that social trust plays no role in stimulating political activism.

(Table 8 here)

Let us examine the effects of social capital on the behavioral dimension of democratic citizenship. First, most types of social involvement have significant effects on political activism. Being full joiners instead of non-joiners have significant effects on political involvement, efficacy and participation. Its effects are in the expected positive direction and substantial in magnitude. Being formal joiners instead of non-joiners also have significant effects on political involvement and participation. Its effects are in the expected positive direction and substantial in magnitude. Being even informal joiners instead of non-joiners have significant effects on political involvement and participation. Weak though its effects are, they are in the expected positive direction. It is important to note that the effects of types of social involvement on political activism remain unchanged even after types of social trust are controlled. No effects of types of social involvement are mediated through types of trust. This indicates that associational membership directly influences political activism, not through social trust.

Second, types of social trust have no significant effects on political activism after types of social involvement are controlled. Having generalized or competence-based trust instead of particularized trust has no significant effects on political involvement, efficacy and participation.

Lastly, some socio-demographic variables have significant effects on some sub-dimensions of political activism. Men are more likely to be politically involved and efficacious than women. The elderly are more likely to be politically involved and active than the young. The better

educated are more likely to be politically involved, efficacious and active than the poorly educated. Income makes no significant differences in political activism. Notable is that rural residents are more likely to be politically involved than urban residents.

Overall, the results show that networks rather than norms determine political action associated with democratic citizenship. The effects of social trust are non-existent. In contrast, even after types of social trust are controlled, the effects of types of social involvement are substantial and in the expected direction.

In summary, it is found that the relationship between social capital and democratic citizenship turns out to be complicated. Social networks, one key attribute of social capital, contributes to democratic citizenship not by fostering democratic beliefs and attitudes, but by providing participatory resources and opportunities. In contrast, social trust, the other key attribute of social capital, does the opposite. It contributes to democratic citizenship not by providing participatory and opportunities but by fostering democratic beliefs and attitudes.<sup>48</sup> Depending upon types of associations, social involvement is expected to have different consequences for democratic citizenship.<sup>49</sup> The most typical groups in Korea are the kind of exclusive groups that primarily serve parochial identities and private interests. Such groups tend to mobilize their members for defending their identities and interests, which foster particularized thick trust among their members. This may explain why in Korea social involvement has notable external effects but negligible or no internal effects. This interpretation suggests that if growing associational life in Korea is conducive to democratic citizenship, it is by stimulating political activism rather than by cultivating democratic norms as the social capital theory would suggest.

### **Conclusion**

During the past decade, a growing number of social scientists have identified a vibrant civil society as a key factor contributing to the consolidation of democracy. Neo-Tocquevillean scholars

of social capital, in particular, have emphasized that voluntary and horizontal associations, core actors of civil society, foster the attitudes and behavior associated with democratic citizenship. Has Korea become a new democratic state with a network of such associations developing democratic citizenship among the mass citizenry?

The 2003 EAB survey of the Korean electorate presented above revealed that the Korean people as a whole tend to be involved in informal groups or private circles. Most of them, however, stay away from formally organized associations. Furthermore, the formal or informal groups ordinary Koreans join tend to be of the bonding type with exclusive membership. These findings suggest that Korea has yet to develop a civic community endowed with dense social networks.

Equally notable is the finding that the Korean people tend to differentiate trust-in-principle from trust-in-action. Nearly half the Korean people refuse to trust strangers in principle but are willing to trust those who have been judged to work competently. Those who trust others unconditionally, however, constitute a relatively small minority of the Korean population. Obviously, Korea is far from being a low-trust society, as Francis Fukuyama describes,<sup>50</sup> but a large majority of its people has yet to exhibit generalized trust, the kind that is most inclusive and least restrictive.

Does social involvement and trust have to do with the development of democratic citizenship in Korea? Contrary to what appears in the literature on the subject, social involvement does not promote favorable orientations toward democratic politics; it merely leads to more active involvement in the political process. However, social trust, unlike social involvement, motivates the Korean people to support democratic institutions and principles. Yet it does not motivate them to get involved in the political process. Thus, in Korea, social involvement contributes to democratic citizenship behaviorally, whereas social trust contributes to it attitudinally.

Consequently, what matters most for the development of democratic political orientations in Korea is generalized trust in other people. This kind of unconditional trust in the people outside the inner circles of friends and relatives appears to increase support for democratic institutions and processes. Unfortunately, this type of trust does not stem from involvement in exclusive associations or parochial groups with which a majority of the Korean people is currently affiliated.

**Table 1 Levels of Social Involvement in Korea, Japan and Taiwan**

Number of Membership	Korea			Japan			Taiwan		
	Formal Group	Informal Group	Either	Formal Group	Informal Group	Either	Formal Group	Informal Group	Either
0	91.2%	52.8%	49.2%	32.9%	51.0%	24.8%	70.5%	63.0%	47.1%
1	6.9	34.3	33.2	27.0	23.6	19.7	19.8	25.1	28.6
2	1.5	11.0	13.8	18.8	14.5	15.3	6.2	8.2	12.0
3 or more	0.4	1.9	3.8	21.2	11.0	40.1	3.5	3.7	12.3
(N)	(1,500)	(1,500)	(1,500)	(1,418)	(1,418)	(1,418)	(1,415)	(1,415)	(1,415)

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea, 2003 EAB survey in Japan and 2001 EAB survey in Taiwan.

**Table 2 Formal Group Memberships**

Types of Formal Groups	Percent Affiliated
Residential association	8.3%
PTA	7.6
Trade association	12.1
Agricultural association	3.8
Labor union	4.5
Volunteer group	20.5
Citizen movement organization	2.3
Religious group	6.1
Alumni association	39.4
Candidate support organization	2.3
Sports or leisure group	15.2
Others	3.8
(N)	(132)

Note: Each figure is a percentage mentioning a type among those respondents who are members of any formal groups. Since up to three separate responses were coded, percentages cannot be directly summed.

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea.


**Table 3 Informal Group Memberships**

Types of Informal Groups	Percent Affiliated
Circle of colleagues who interact out of work	12.4%
Group at community schools or other place of learning	1.6
Circle of friends who share common hobbies or favorite past time	17.8
Circle of friends who do business together or help out each other	5.9
Circle of friends who exchange information and points of view	4.0
Informal credit/loan circle	3.6
Informal circle of alumni	51.3
Informal circle of veterans	0.4
Informal circle of home-town natives	2.1
Informal circle of parents with students	1.1
Informal circle of co-believers	0.8
Family gathering	1.6
Mutual aid circle	0.3
Clan meeting	0.8
General social gathering	26.4
Others	1.7
(N)	(708)

Note: Each figure is a percentage mentioning a type among the respondents who are members of any informal groups. Since up to three separate responses were coded, percentages cannot be directly summed.

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea.

**Figure 1 Types of Social Involvement in Korea, Japan and Taiwan**



Note: 'Don't know' answers were excluded when the percentages were calculated.


Sources: 2003 EAB survey in Korea, 2003 EAB survey in Japan and 2001 EAB survey in Taiwan.

**Table 4. Demographic Differences in Social Involvement**

	Non-joiners	Informal joiners	Formal joiners	Full joiners	(N)
<b>Gender</b>					
Male	43.5%	44.5%	4.4%	7.5%	(744)
Female	54.8	39.6	2.8	2.9	(756)
<b>Age</b>					
20-29	61.3	34.9	2.7	1.1	(364)
30-39	43.9	45.9	3.3	6.9	(392)
40-49	40.7	48.6	4.3	6.4	(327)
50-59	39.3	46.1	5.8	8.9	(191)
60 & older	59.7	33.6	2.7	4.0	(226)
<b>Education</b>					
<High	50.7	41.3	2.9	5.1	(276)
High	48.5	43.8	3.3	4.4	(699)
College+	49.3	40.0	4.4	6.3	(525)
<b>Income</b>					
Lowest	43.6	47.4	3.0	6.0	(369)
Low	48.8	43.4	4.2	3.6	(334)
Middle	54.2	39.6	3.8	2.3	(260)
High	52.6	37.2	4.9	5.3	(266)
Highest	47.4	40.9	2.4	9.3	(247)
<b>Community Size</b>					
Large cities	47.0	46.3	2.9	3.8	(734)
Other cities	54.7	35.3	4.3	5.7	(583)
Rural areas	40.4	45.9	4.4	9.3	(183)

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea

**Figure 2 Types of Social Trust in Korea, Japan and Taiwan**



Note: 'Don't know' answers were excluded when the percentages were calculated.

Sources: 2003 EAB survey in Korea, 2003 EAB survey in Japan and 2001 EAB survey in Taiwan.

**Table 5. Demographic Differences in Social Trust**

	Particularized trust	Commitment-based trust	Competence-based trust	Generalized trust	(N)
<b>Gender</b>					
Male	16.1%	10.9%	43.3%	29.7%	(741)
Female	15.9	9.8	46.0	28.3	(755)
<b>Age</b>					
20-29	15.2	8.3	48.8	27.8	(363)
30-39	12.0	9.0	48.6	30.4	(391)
40-49	16.9	7.7	42.5	32.9	(325)
50-59	20.4	13.1	38.7	27.7	(191)
60 & older	19.0	17.7	39.4	23.9	(226)
<b>Education</b>					
<High	19.9	16.7	40.6	22.8	(276)
High	14.5	9.3	46.8	29.3	(696)
College+	15.8	8.4	43.9	31.9	(524)
<b>Income</b>					
Lowest	16.9	11.2	50.3	21.6	(366)
Low	20.1	9.3	44.9	25.7	(334)
Middle	16.5	9.6	39.2	34.6	(260)
High	13.6	11.3	38.5	36.6	(265)
Highest	11.7	11.3	46.6	30.4	(247)
<b>Community Size</b>					
Large cities	17.5	9.8	45.8	26.9	(733)
Other cities	14.7	10.2	44.8	30.3	(580)
Rural areas	14.2	13.1	39.3	33.3	(183)

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea

**Table 6 The Relationship between Social Involvement and Social Trust**

	Non-joiners	Informal joiners	Formal joiners	Full joiners
Particularized trust	15.6%	16.2%	13.0%	19.7%
Commitment-base trust	8.1	11.9	20.4	11.7
Competence-based trust	48.8	41.2	35.2	39.0
Generalized trust	27.4	30.6	31.5	29.9
(N)	(737)	(628)	(54)	(77)

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea.

**Table 7. The Impact of Social Capital on Support for Democracy**

	Democracy as an Idea		Institutional Checks and Balances		Rule of Law	
	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II
<i>Types of social involvement</i>						
Informal	.041(.043)	.023(.042)	.038(.038)	.049(.038)	-.029(.036)	-.017(.035)
Formal	.229(.109)*	.192(.108)	-.054(.098)	-.033(.097)	.026(.092)	.053(.091)
Full	.188(.094)*	.181(.093)	.001(.084)	.018(.084)	-.043(.079)	-.018(.079)
<i>Types of social trust</i>						
Commitment-based	-	.362(.079)***	-	.043(.071)	-	-.016(.067)
Competence-based	-	.179(.058)**	-	.266(.052)***	-	.260(.049)***
Generalized	-	.429(.062)***	-	.173(.056)**	-	.199(.052)***
<i>Socio-demographic</i>						
Gender	.065(.042)	.064(.041)	-.053(.038)	-.056(.037)	-.033(.035)	-.035(.035)
Age	-.010(.019)	-.012(.018)	-.038(.017)*	-.031(.017)	.011(.016)	.020(.016)
Education	.036(.038)	.033(.038)	.009(.034)	.009(.034)	.034(.032)	.030(.032)
Income	-.004(.015)	-.018(.015)	.031(.014)*	.031(.014)*	.025(.013)	.025(.013)
Community size	-.072(.030)*	-.050(.030)	.108(.027)***	.110(.027)***	.087(.025)**	.089(.025)***
(N)	(1,475)	(1,471)	(1,475)	(1,471)	(1,473)	(1,469)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.006	.041	.026	.045	.012	.038

Notes: The models include three social involvement dummies and/or three social trust dummies; the reference category for social involvement is non-joiners while that for social trust particularized trust. Entries are unstandardized estimates; standard errors in parentheses. \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p <.001.

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea.

**Table 8. The Impact of Social Capital on Political Activism**

	Political Involvement		Political Efficacy		Political Participation	
	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II	Model I	Model II
<i>Types of social involvement</i>						
Informal	.128(.041)**	.132(.041)**	.094(.039)*	.097(.039)*	.331(.064)***	.311(.064)***
Formal	.466(.105)***	.474(.105)***	.048(.101)	.057(.101)	.557(.164)**	.517(.164)**
Full	.443(.090)***	.447(.091)***	.217(.086)*	.227(.087)**	.703(.140)***	.704(.140)***
<i>Types of social trust</i>						
Commitment-based	-	-.088(.077)	-	-.120(.074)		.231(.120)
Competence-based	-	-.049(.056)	-	-.064(.054)		-.087(.087)
Generalized	-	-.091(.061)	-	-.113(.058)		.111(.094)
<i>Socio-demographic</i>						
Gender	-.299(.040)***	-.300(.040)***	-.138(.039)***	-.138(.039)***	.009(.063)	.014(.063)
Age	.049(.018)**	.049(.018)**	.009(.017)	.008(.017)	.118(.028)***	.111(.028)***
Education	.090(.037)*	.091(.037)*	.078(.035)*	.075(.036)*	.154(.058)**	.156(.058)**
Income	.006(.015)	.008(.015)	.026(.014)	.029(.014)*	.027(.023)	.018(.023)
Community size	-.179(.029)***	-.184(.029)***	.027(.028)	.023(.028)	.014(.045)	.025(.045)
(N)	(1,476)	(1,472)	(1,475)	(1,471)	(1,442)	(1,438)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.107	.107	.027	.028	.044	.051

Notes: The models include three social involvement dummies and/or three social trust dummies; the reference category for social involvement is non-joiners while that for social trust particularized trust. Entries are unstandardized estimates; standard errors in parentheses. \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p <.001.

Source: 2003 EAB survey in Korea.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>2</sup> Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy*, 7(3), pp. 38-53.

<sup>3</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>4</sup> James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(1), pp. 51-68.

<sup>5</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy*; Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley and Mario Diani (eds.), *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective* (Hanover, NH: Tufts University, 2001); Robert D. Putnam (ed.), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> A few exceptions include John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3), pp. 999-1023; Kenneth Newton, "Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies," in Pippia Norris (ed.), *Critical Citizens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 169-187; James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition"; Richard Rose and Craig Weller, "What Does Social Capital Add to Democratic Values," in Gabriel Badescu and Eric M. Uslaner (eds.), *Social Capital and the Transition to Democracy* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 200-218.

<sup>7</sup> Sunhyuk Kim, *The Politics of Democratization in Korea* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim (eds.), *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

<sup>8</sup> The EAB survey was designed for a comparative study of democratization and value changes in East Asia, see <http://www.asiabarometer.org>. The EAB survey in Korea was conducted during February 2003 by the Survey Research Center at Korea University. This was the period just after the 2002 presidential election in which Korean voters for the first time elected a progressive candidate to lead the divided nation. Of the 2,575 voters selected by multi-stage random sampling, it completed face-to-face interviews with a total of 1,500, registering a response rate of 58 percent. The sample was more or less consistent with the survey population with respect to age, gender, and region. Hence no weighting variable was constructed.

<sup>9</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>10</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.

<sup>11</sup> Jan W. van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton and Paul F. Whiteley (eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1999); Anirudh Krishna, *Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press).

<sup>12</sup> John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual-level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital."

<sup>13</sup> Stephen Knack, "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence From the States," *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(4), pp. 772-785.

<sup>14</sup> James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition."

<sup>15</sup> Richard Rose and Craig Weller, "What Does Social Capital Add to Democratic Values."

<sup>16</sup> Dietlind Stolle and Thomas R. Rochon, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism: A Three-Nation Comparison of Associational Membership and Social Capital," in Jan W. van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton and Paul F. Whiteley (eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy*, pp. 192-209.

<sup>17</sup> Kenneth Newton, "Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies," 173.

<sup>18</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 167.

<sup>19</sup> Kenneth Newton, "Social Capital and Democracy in Modern Europe," in Jan W. van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton and Paul F. Whiteley (eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy*, pp. 3-24.

<sup>20</sup> Pamela Paxton, "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessments," *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(1), pp. 88-127.

<sup>21</sup> Robert D. Putnam and Kristin A. Goss, "Introduction," in Robert D. Putnam (ed.), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, pp. 3-19.

<sup>22</sup> Pamela Paxton, "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessments."

- <sup>23</sup> Dietlind Stolle and Thomas R. Rochon, "Are All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type and the Creation of Social Capital," in Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley and Mario Diani (eds.), *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 143-56.
- <sup>24</sup> Mark E. Warren, *Democracy and Association* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- <sup>25</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*; Susan J. Pharr, "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies," in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 173-201.
- <sup>26</sup> Kenneth Newton, "Social Capital and Democracy in Modern Europe."
- <sup>27</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
- <sup>28</sup> Kenneth Newton, "Social Capital and Democracy in Modern Europe."
- <sup>29</sup> Pamela Paxton, "Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessments."
- <sup>30</sup> Bernard Barber, *The Logic and Limits of Trust* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983).
- <sup>31</sup> Toshio Yamagish and Midori Yamagish, "Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan", *Motivation and Emotion*, 18(2), pp. 129-166.
- <sup>32</sup> Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Margaret Levi, "A State of Trust," Karen S. Cook (ed.), *Trust in Society* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp.77-101.
- <sup>33</sup> Robert Wuthnow, "Religious Involvement and Status-Bridging Social Capital," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41(4), pp. 669-684.
- <sup>34</sup> Margaret Levi, "Social Capital and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*," *Politics and Society*, 2(1), pp. 45-55.
- <sup>35</sup> James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1990); Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.
- <sup>36</sup> Today, more than six thousand non-governmental organizations are known to operate in Korea. See Lim Hy-Sop, "Historical Development of Civil Social Movements in Korea," *Korea Journal*, 40(5), pp. 5-25.
- <sup>37</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Mentor, 1956).
- <sup>38</sup> Dietlind Stolle and Thomas R. Rochon, "Are All Associations Alike? Member Diversity, Associational Type and the Creation of Social Capital."
- <sup>39</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 174
- <sup>40</sup> Eric M. Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital," in Mark E. Warren (ed.), *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 121-150.
- <sup>41</sup> Axel Hadenius, *Institutions and Democratic Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- <sup>42</sup> Two questions to measure support for democracy as an idea are as follows: (1) "Which of the following statements comes to closet to your own opinion? Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government; under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; for people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime"; (2) "Which of the following statements comes to closer to your own view? Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society; democracy cannot solve our society's problems." Responses to both questions are recoded and combined to construct a 3-point index ranging from 1 to 3.
- <sup>43</sup> Two questions to measure support for institutional checks and balances are as follows: "Would you agree or disagree with the statement that (1) When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch"; (2) "If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things." Responses to both questions are recoded and combined to construct a 3-point index ranging from 1 to 3.
- <sup>44</sup> Two questions to measure support for the rule of law are as follows: "Would you agree or disagree with the statement that (1) When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation"; (2) "The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedure." Responses to both questions are recoded and combined to construct a 3-point index ranging from 1 to 3.
- <sup>45</sup> Two questions to measure political involvement are as follows: (1) "How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested or not at all interested?" and (2) "How often do you follow news about politics? Everyday, several times a week, once or twice a week, not even once a week or practically never?" Responses to both questions are recoded and combined to construct a 3-point index ranging from 1 to 3.

<sup>46</sup> Two questions to measure political efficacy are as follows: “Would you agree or disagree with the statement that (1) I think I have the ability to participate in politics”; (2) “Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what is going on.” Responses to both questions are recoded and combined to construct a 3-point index ranging from 1 to 3.

<sup>47</sup> In order to measure political participation, the number of positive responses to the following questions is counted: (1) “Did you vote in the last presidential election held in 2002?” (2) “Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally in the election?” (3) “Did you try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate in the election?” “In the past three years, have you never, once or more than once done following because of personal, family or neighborhood problems, or problems with government officials and policies? (4) Contacted non-elected officials; (5) Contacted elected officials; (6) Contacted political parties; (7) Contacted NGOs, (8) Contacted mass media; (9) Participated in protest”

<sup>48</sup> Our finding is not consistent with James Gibson’s recent finding that in Russia interpersonal trust has little to do with attitudes toward democratic institutions and processes. See James L. Gibson, “Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia’s Democratic Transition.”

<sup>49</sup> Jason Kaufman, *For the Common Good: American Civic Life and the Golden Age of Fraternity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>50</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

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## Asian Barometer

### A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

*For more information, please visit our website: [www.asianbarometer.org](http://www.asianbarometer.org)*