



A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Working Paper Series: No. 64

Jointly Published by

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Congruence and Variation in Sources of Regime
Support in Asia

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Asian Barometer

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The Asian Barometer (ABS) is an applied research program on public opinion on political values, democracy, and governance around the region. The regional network encompasses research teams from thirteen East Asian political systems (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal). Together, this regional survey network covers virtually all major political systems in the region, systems that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

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The topics covered in the Series range from country-specific assessment of values change and democratic development, region-wide comparative analysis of citizen participation, popular orientation toward democracy and evaluation of quality of governance, and discussion of survey methodology and data analysis strategies.

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Congruence and Variation in Sources of Regime Support in Asia

Yun-han Chu, Bridget Welsh and Alex Chang

Preliminary Third Wave ABS findings prepared for Conference

“How the Public Views Democracy and its Competitors in East Asia: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective”

Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA

May 26-27, 2012

Introduction:

The question of regime legitimacy or the “right to rule” has fascinated political scientists since Aristotle, as the discipline has long debated the extent to which citizens in different countries support different types of regimes and why. Over the last few decades a plethora of research has not only explored the level of citizen support for democracy and authoritarian regimes, it has offered reasons why. From analyses of critical citizens and political culture to governance and nationalism, we now have a series of alternatives to weigh in assessing the underlying factors of regime support. Implicit in this discussion of regime support has been the closely related issue of regime resilience, whether democratic and authoritarian regimes persist and why. Here explanations range from issues of income levels and economic conditions to electoral competition. Most of the work has centered on understanding democratic regimes, although increasingly studies have looked at more authoritarian systems across regime types.

This paper makes a modest attempt to expand the discussion of regime support by weighing different explanations of regime legitimacy in Asia. We explore the levels of regime support and underlying factors that explain regime legitimacy in eleven different regimes using the third wave of the survey data of the Asia Barometer Survey (ABS) collected from 2010-2012. This body of survey data represents the most up-to-date and comprehensive set of questions involving political attitudes in Asia. Using mixed effect linear regression, we illustrate that there are indeed common underlying factors accounting for regime support across the region, and, importantly, differences both in the levels and underlying factors in different regime types.

Why Asia?

Asia provides an important arena to assess whether different regime types are supported more than others, and why. Over the last decade East Asia has experienced considerable regime transformation. Beginning in the mid-1980s, East Asia became part of the “third wave” of democratic transitions, as authoritarian regimes in Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand embraced more democratic forms of government. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia transitioned toward democratic rule, after thirty-two years of military power. The Asian Financial Crisis did not provoke the same level of change elsewhere in the region, however, as the more resilient electoral authoritarian system in Malaysia, for example, weathered calls for reform.

East Asia entered the 21st century with broadening democratic governance, yet the first decade would test many of the regimes. Political polarization, elite infighting, partisan gridlock and corruption scandals debilitated governments. This decade saw the rise of authoritarian rule in East Asia, with the 2006 military coup and 2008 judicial coup in Thailand, electoral fraud in the Philippines in 2004, and the 2004 marred elections in Mongolia. China's robust economic success, replicated in Vietnam, served to reinforce an authoritarian Asian role model in these one-party systems, as the United States after 2001 lost its luster as a democratic example. Even while regimes such as Indonesia became more democratically consolidated, concerns about political freedoms and entrenched elite rule rose to the fore.

In this current decade, the authoritarian tide appears to be turning. The last few years have showcased greater contestation for power in Singapore and Malaysia.. This was evident in Singapore's 2011 legislative and presidential elections, and with Malaysia's growing intense electoral competition. Democratic forces are gaining ground, both in the expansion of civil society and electorally. This is tied in part to rising inequality, generational changes, persistent concerns about governance, especially corruption, ineffective public engagement, and importantly, changing values. Even in the traditional democratic regimes, Taiwan and Korea weathered the partisan gridlock through a series of elections. Japan was severely tested by a tragic tsunami in 2011. Nevertheless democracy persevered and arguably strengthened. Thailand and the Philippines held free and fair elections in 2011 and 2010 respectfully. These strides towards democracy have also occurred amongst more authoritarian outposts. Myanmar, which is not yet part of this survey, has been in the lime light recently with its recent moves towards democracy. Similarly pressures for democratic change are occurring elsewhere in one party systems. Exposures of scandals in China and Vietnam have led these governments to engage their electorates, although the scope of this engagement remains narrow. The internet and social media have provided alternative forms of information and lowered transaction costs for political participation.

While there have been openings and greater political liberalization, authoritarian forces remain entrenched. These take the form of hardliners in regimes, such as in Vietnam and Malaysia, and among conservative groups that are willing to fan nationalistic fervor and ethnic tensions to hold onto power. Human rights violations of free expression, political assembly and religious freedom, among others, remain serious. These issues are moving from state actors to non-state actors, broadening the challenges facing democratic regimes in the region. The 2011 attacks on religious freedom in Indonesia are illustrative. While there are signs of democratic expansion, serious obstacles remain. The ABS third wave survey was conducted in this context, as both democratic and authoritarian regimes are being challenged and transformed in the region.

For the purposes of our analysis below we have classified the eleven countries into four different regimes types, outlined in Table 1 below. The three Northeast Asian countries of Japan, Korea and Taiwan comprise "liberal democracies", where there are long standing democracies with significant records of competitive elections, civil liberties and changes in government. Electoral democracies are comprised of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Mongolia. These systems hold free and fair elections, but are comparatively less free with regard to political freedoms. The more authoritarian systems of Malaysia and Singapore are classified as electoral authoritarian regimes, as there are regular

elections but there has been a lack of power rotation and limited civil liberties. China and Vietnam are viewed as one-party authoritarian systems, as they do not hold regular competitive elections and the communist parties continue to dominate politics.

Table 1: Regime Classification in Asia

Regime Classification	Countries
Liberal Democracy	Japan, Taiwan, Korea
Electoral Democracy	Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Mongolia
Electoral Authoritarian	Malaysia and Singapore
One-Party Regimes	China and Vietnam

This regime type diversity allows us to compare levels and factors underlying regime support in depth cross-nationally and across regime types.

Methodology, Variables and Hypotheses:

We adopt a mixed effect linear regression model that allows for comparison within and amongst countries. We examine three issues: a) the levels of regime support, b) common underlying factors explaining regime support and c) differences in the underlying factors accounting for regime support among regime types and across countries.

Our measurement of regime support has been constructed from a series of questions included in the ABS third wave questionnaire (detailed in Appendix A) asking respondents about their preference, pride and confidence in their own system of government. Special attention has been taken to differentiate the “system of government” from the specific government in office, their performance and governance. Also, this concept also does not focus on the trust in specific institutions, but is an umbrella for the system as a whole. As constructed, regime support is synonymous with David Easton’s (1965) “diffuse regime support” and Bruce Gilley’s (2006, 2009) regime legitimacy. The new battery of questions allowed for a strong comparison of differences across regime types and the region as a whole. Unlike Latin America and Europe, Asia is highly diverse in the types of regimes, with many of the regimes “hybrid” in character, usually electoral authoritarian systems. Thus, there is a need to capture regime variation to understand regime support in the region.

In identifying the causal variables for our mixed effect linear regression we draw broadly from current debates about the underlying factors shaping regime legitimacy. These varied explanations are grouped in five different rubrics – government performance, governance, political values, citizen politics and demographic variables, outlined below in Table 2. The questions corresponding to these variables are detailed in Appendix A.

Table 2: Explanations of Regime Support

Rubric	Variable	Variable	Variable	Variable	Variable	Variable	Variable
Government Performance	Leadership Satisfaction	Economic Performance	Government Responsiveness	Access to Services	Safety		
Governance	Corruption	Freedom	Horizontal Accountability	Vertical Accountability	Political Competition	Equality	Rule of Law
Political Values	Authoritarian values	Social Traditionalism	Nationalism	Xenophobia			
Citizen Politics	Political Interest	Social Capital	Electoral Participation	Non-Electoral Participation	Partisanship – Winner/Loser		
Demographic Variables	Age	Rural-Urban	Education	Income	Gender	Social Status	

Rubric 1: Government performance

In Asia especially regime legitimacy has been interwoven with the output of governments. Whether this involves the perceptions of specific leaders or their performance in the economy, focus centers on what governments do. Here we include not only the satisfaction with the leader in office, but economic performance, government responsiveness, access to services and safety. Traditionally in Asia, the first two factors have been given center stage. Leaders have been seen to be equated with specific regimes, such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and Suharto in Indonesia. Even as the region has democratized the regime’s legitimacy has been closely tied to individual leaders, for example Thaksin Shinawarta in Thailand and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the Philippines. Economic legitimacy similarly has been given considerable weight, as bread and butter issues such as growth, jobs and inflation have been seen to be extremely important for regime support. Economic crisis and mismanagement has been identified in destabilizing regimes, with the example of Indonesia in 1998 illustrative. The close tie of Asian regimes with economic performance, tied to the developmental states of the 1960s-1980s, has made the economy prominent. Closely associated with the economic is the provision of services and management of safety or crime. Finally, regimes are evaluated on the ability of their governments to be responsive to citizens. Given the prominence of the leadership and economy in Asia, we expect these factors to be significant explanations of regime support in Asia.

Rubric 2 Governance

Rather than look at what governments do, governance focuses on how they do it. Key components in governance include corruption, freedom, equality, political competition, rule of law and horizontal and vertical accountability. Studies have shown that one of the most important factors shaping perceptions of regimes involves corruption. From the corruption charges levied initially against the KMT and later against the former leader of the DPP in Taiwan to the cries of cronyism in the Philippines and Indonesia, corruption has been a focal point of government criticism. Below we look at whether corruption matters in regime support. In light of its prominence in the region, we predict it to be an important underlying factor of regime support. Closely related to corruption is the protection of the rule of law, whether those in government adhere to this practice. We also examine whether Asian publics support their

regimes for attaining the goals of equality and freedom. How much does the promotion of equality, for example matter? Asian governments, especially before the Asian financial crisis were lauded for achieving growth with equality, and similarly argued amidst the Asian values debate of the 1990s that Asian publics valued the provision of housing and other basic needs over civil liberties. We expect that both of these factors will also be significant for regime support, with political freedom important in democratic regimes. Accountability across institutions in the government with viable checks and balances – horizontal accountability and between citizens and power holders in the forms of vertical accountability and political competition are other governance markers. Overall we expect many of these factors to be important in Asia, although less than government performance indicators.

Rubric 3 Political Attitudes

The issue of values and culture is deeply rooted in the understanding of politics in Asia and took the international stage in the 1990s “Asian values” debate where it was contended that Asians have more authoritarian and socially conservative outlooks. Explicitly Asian values have been connected with regime support across regimes types in the region. As such we examine two different dimensions of Asian values, social traditionalism which captures traditional values about society and authoritarian values which examine support for more authoritarian power structures. We bring in two other sets of values, nationalism and xenophobia, to see whether regimes gain support from promoting nationalism and fear of foreigners. We expect given the prominence of political culture in understanding support for democracy that political attitude variables will be as important as government performance.

Rubric 4 Citizen Politics

Not to be left out of the study are the actions and characteristics of different citizens themselves. Citizens engage their polity and each other differently, leading to differences in their regime support. We examine variation in political interest, electoral participation (voting and participation in a campaign), non-electoral participation (signing petitions, local issues, protests etc), whether they have voted for the winner/loser camp and levels of social capital (networks with other people). For example, we project that citizens who engage more politically, are more critical aka critical citizens, will have different levels of regime support than those that are more acquiescent. Partisan affinity, with the political party in power, is also seen to be tied to regime support.

Rubric 5 Demographic Variables

Finally, the control variables in the study are the socio-economic criteria, namely age, education, income, gender, self-perceived social status and rural/urban backgrounds. Differences among generations, classes, and locality have long been highlighted in assessing support for regimes. Education, similarly, has been seen to correspond to regime support in the modernization paradigm. Traditional arguments run that upper and lower incomes support authoritarian regimes more than democratic ones, for example. The rural-urban dichotomy has been especially sharp in the case of Asian polities, with rural support a traditional base for more authoritarian systems. We explore the range of these indicators to learn whether they continue to matter and how. These indicators we expect to be less important for regime support than government performance, governance and political attitudes.

With this analytical framework, we are able to ask three important sets of questions. They include: 1) What are the levels of regime support in Asia, and do these vary across regime types? 2) What are the common factors that explain regime support across Asia and what do these common factors tell us about how Asians view their governments? Do cultural variables, for example, explain regime support to a greater extent than citizen participation or government performance? Or do political attitudes trump other factors? These questions address the core debates on the role of values in shaping perceptions of regimes in the region, as analyses continue to heavily weigh cultural explanations. 3) Third, do different regime types in Asia have different underlying factors accounting for their support from citizens? Do more democratic regimes draw their legitimacy from a different set of factors than more authoritarian regimes? These three questions – level of regime support, common and different underlying factors of regime support – help us understand regime legitimacy in Asia.

Levels of Regime Support in Asia:

The ABS third wave data suggests that all the regimes in Asia receive considerable support from their citizens, with all of the countries surveyed receiving positive affirmation in their regimes. Figure 1 below shows that all of the regimes received a mean score of more than “2” (out of 4), indicating that citizens collectively support their regimes.


Yet, what is striking is that more democratic systems receive much lower regime support than more authoritarian regimes. Democracies have lower levels of regime support than authoritarian countries. This pattern was consistent with the findings in Southeast Asia in the second wave of the ABS, as well. Illustrated below, the Asian liberal democracy scores of an average of 2.4 are lower than the average of one-party authoritarian systems with an average of 3.1. As regimes in Asia get more authoritarian, the levels of regime support generally increase.

On the surface, the immediate take-away from this finding is that Asians have more support for authoritarian rule. Moreover, it would also suggest that democracies are more vulnerable to regime change, given the comparatively lower level of regime support. These impressions however are incorrect, in that they fail to appreciate the nature of democratic regimes. With the greater political space for freedom of expression, democracies allow for greater criticism. Furthermore, democracies generally include more critical citizens, individuals willing to speak out, and be more critical of their system of government. Thus is it not surprising to find that the more democratic the regime is, the more criticism there is of the system.

In looking at levels of regime support in Asia, a stronger interpretation of comparative regime support would be gained by looking at differences among similar regimes and to consider ranking differently within these differences. Among the more authoritarian regimes – Vietnam, China, Singapore and Malaysia- lower levels of regime support would point to less regime support, and raise questions about regime resilience. Among the four countries, China stands out as the anomaly, with considerably lower regime support than the other authoritarian regimes. What is striking also is that similarity in the scores of Singapore and Malaysia; both electoral authoritarian systems facing greater challenges for political

liberalization. The logic of interpreting lower scores as less regime support is based on the fact that in these more politically closed systems, expression of dissent are indicators of opposition to the regime.

In contrast, the scores in the democratic regimes need to be seen through an opposite lens. The lower the scores, the higher the regime support for the more open political system. Dissent is a core ingredient of democratic rule and its presence indicates confidence in this system. Following this logic it is thus not surprisingly that the more liberal democracies have lower numbers, namely Korea, Japan and Taiwan. The standout here is Thailand, who most recently had a return to authoritarian rule in the form of a military coup in 2006 and continues to be politically polarized. To get a better sense of how to interpret these numbers and their implications, it is necessary to look at the underlying factors explaining regime support in these countries.



Factors Underlying Regime Findings: Commonalities

We look at the underlying factors across the different regime types. These are detailed below in Table 3. The different levels of regime support beg the question of the underlying factors accounting for regime. They are listed in the order of their explanatory power.

The most striking finding is the common factors that explain regime support across the different regime types. The table highlights the features that all regimes have in common. These include authoritarian

values, equality, anti-corruption, leadership satisfaction (with party trust as a proxy in the one-party regimes that do not ask about leadership), economic performance, political competition and rule of law.

Table 3: Common Factors Underlying Regime Support

Liberal	Electoral Dem	Electoral Auth	One-Party	Overall***
Leadership Satisfaction (0.2479)	Equality (0.1912)	Leadership Satisfaction (0.2427)	Social Traditionalism (0.2091)	Equality (0.2278)
Equality (0.1504)	Leadership Satisfaction (0.1695)	Equality (0.1697)	Corruption (0.167)	Economic Performance(0.2209)
Corruption (0.1191)	Corruption (0.1341)	Partisanship (0.1519)	Equality (0.1503)	Corruption (0.1491)
Political Competition (0.1145)	Social Traditionalism (0.1085)	Social Traditionalism (0.1278)	Authoritarian values (0.1286)	Social Traditionalism (0.1159)
Age (0.0992)	Xenophobia (-0.0944)	Authoritarian values (0.1186)	Xenophobia (-0.1189)	Authoritarian values (0.1129)
Vertical Accountability (0.0903)	Political Competition(0.086)	Economic Performance (0.1031)	Horizontal Accountability (0.1145)	Xenophobia (-0.1018)
Authoritarian values (0.0742)	Political Interest (0.0791)	Corruption (0.1005)	Party Trust (Leadership Satisfaction) (0.113)	Education (-0.0957)
Rule of law (0.0735)	Economic Performance (0.0742)	Horizontal Accountability (0.0964)	Political Participation (0.0855)	Political Competition (0.0861)
Economic Performance (0.0681)	Education (-0.0703)	Political Participation (-0.094)	Age (0.0586)	Rule of Law (0.0857)
Electoral Participation (0.0528)	Access to Services (0.0692)	Freedom (0.0916)	Rule of Law (0.0569)	Horizontal Accountability (0.0673)
Nationalism (-0.0488)	Authoritarian values (0.0658)	Political Competition (0.0758)	Economic Performance (0.0568)	Vertical Accountability (0.0327)
Government Responsiveness (0.0411)	Partisanship (0.0509)	Education (-0.0745)	Political Competition (0.0485)	Freedom (0.0301)
Freedom (0.0369)	Freedom (0.0394)	Rule of Law (0.064)	Access to Services* (0.0453)	Political Interest (0.0293)
Xenophobia (-0.0342)	Rural urban (-0.0353)	Social Status (0.0468)	Safety (0.0319)	Electoral Participation (0.0281)
Horizontal Accountability (0.0263)	Horizontal Accountability (0.0341)	Electoral Participation (-0.0467)	Nationalism (0.0313)	Social Status (0.0255)
Safety* (0.0258)	Age (0.0336)	Vertical Accountability* (-0.0354)	Electoral Participation (0.0296)* \\	Safety (0.0175)
Gender* (0.0239)	Rule of Law* (0.0281)		Vertical Accountability (0.0211)	Age (0.0169)
N=3957	N=4087	N=1418	N=2370	N=12279

*Significance of P<0.05

** Party Trust is the Proxy for Leadership Satisfaction in One Party Auth Regimes.

***Overall model excludes Partisanship and Leadership Satisfaction.

**** Highlighted are the common factors that underlie regime support

Of these seven common factors underlying regime support, the factor that has the most explanatory power is equality. Across regime types, citizens gave greater support when they believed that their respective regime was promoting equality. . There are three different aspects associated with equality- provision of basic need to all, fair treatment across income and different ethnic groups. This points to the central role that promoting basic needs and treating all the citizens in a country equally play in underlying support for a political system. Growing inequality in the region is thus not surprisingly, a major pressure point on Asian regimes. As shown in Table 4, GINI coefficients in Asia are high, especially in the more authoritarian systems and in Southeast Asia.

Table 4: Inequality in Asia

Countries	Gini Coefficients2010	Level Regime Support
Korea	31	2.3
Japan	37.6	2.4
Taiwan	n/a	2.5
Philippines	44	2.6
Mongolia	n/a	2.7
Indonesia	39.4	2.8
Thailand	53.6	3.1
Malaysia	46.2	3.0
Singapore	47.8	3.1
China	47	2.8
Vietnam	37.6	3.4

Source: Datamonitor Database

The second most important common factor is corruption, or rather the perception that the regime is not corrupt. Across the region, citizens who perceived their regimes are having less corruption supported it more strongly than those that perceived corruption to be a problem. Corruption remains an important governance indicator for regime support in Asia. It is interesting to note, however, that this persists across regime types, irrespective of the standing of different countries in their corruption performance by organizations such as Transparency International, shown below in Table 5.

Table 5: Corruption Indicators in East Asia

TI	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
	Score	Rank												
Korea	40	5	5.1	42	5.1	43	5.6	40	5.5	39	5.4	39	5.4	43
Japan	7.3	21	7.6	17	7.5	17	7.3	18	7.7	17	7.8	17	8.0	14
Taiwan	5.9	32	5.9	34	5.7	34	5.7	39	5.6	37	5.8	33	6.1	32
Philippines	2.5	117	2.5	121	2.5	131	2.3	141	2.4	139	2.4	134	2.6	129
Mongolia	3	85	2.8	99	3	99	3	102	2.7	120	2.7	116	2.7	120
Indonesia	2.2	137	2.4	130	2.3	143	2.6	126	2.8	111	2.8	110	3.0	100
Thailand	3.9	59	3.6	63	3.3	84	3.5	80	3.4	84	3.5	78	3.4	80

Malaysia	5.1	39	5	44	5.1	43	5.1	47	4.5	56	4.4	56	4.3	60
Singapore	9.4	5	9.4	5	9.3	4	9.2	4	9.2	3	9.3	1	9.2	5
China	3.2	78	3.3	7	3.5	72	3.6	72	3.6	79	3.5	78	3.6	75
Vietnam	2.6	107	2.6	111	2.6	123	2.7	121	2.7	120	2.7	116	2.9	112

The third common factor is leadership satisfaction. In the one party authoritarian regimes, we used a proxy of trust of the party for this indicator. Yet, across regime types, leadership proved to be important for regime support, especially in the more democratic regimes where this was the single most important factor in both liberal democracies and electoral authoritarian systems. The broad explanatory power of leadership satisfaction highlights the prominent role of leadership and its tie to regime support in Asia.

Governance and government performance indicators topped the list of common underlying explanatory factors. The fourth common factor, authoritarian values, brings in the importance of political attitudes. The findings suggest that individuals who hold onto strong conservative values about politics support their regimes strongly, irrespective of the regime type. Asian values – at least a certain set of values associated with political power - do affect regime support in that they reinforce acceptance of the status quo, the regime in power.

Economic performance is the next common factor underlying regime support in Asia across regime types. While this factor emerges as the most significant when assessed for all eleven countries in the region, in individual regime types its explanatory power is lower. This is especially striking in the one party authoritarian regimes of Vietnam and China, where considerable weight has been placed on the importance of economic growth for political legitimacy.

The two remaining common factors are political competition, the perception in the public that they have choice in their leadership selection, and rule of law. Not surprisingly political competition is more important in the more democratic regimes than more authoritarian systems, as there is greater competitiveness for choosing leaders. Yet, the consistent role that political competition plays across regimes points to the need for competition in elite selection in places such as China and Vietnam.

Regimes in Asia derive their legitimacy from a common set of factors. Most of these involve governance, how the regimes address issues of equality, corruption, political competition and the rule of law. Yet government performance matters, especially leadership satisfaction and economic performance. Political attitudes have less explanatory power, and where they do matter, they do so in a manner that counteracts the traditional Asian values argument that authoritarian values reinforce support for authoritarian regimes. Rather, authoritarian values in Asia societies correspond to greater support for the incumbent regime. What is also striking amongst the common explanations are the factors that were missing. Citizen politics and demographic indicators are not consistent across the region. For example, there is no common generational support for regimes nor is there a common thread with regard to political partisanship or participation. These factors emerge important in understanding the differences in regime support among the different types of regimes.

Factors Underlying Regime Findings: Differences

The differences in the factors explaining regime support in Asia are equally fascinating. Here is where political values emerge to differentiate the relationship between citizens in different regimes.

Table 6: Different Factors Underlying Regime Support

Liberal	Electoral Dem	Electoral Auth	One-Party	Overall***
Leadership Satisfaction (0.2479)	Equality (0.1912)	Leadership Satisfaction (0.2427)	Social Traditionalism (0.2091)	Equality (0.2278)
Equality (0.1504)	Leadership Satisfaction (0.1695)	Equality (0.1697)	Anti-Corruption (0.167)	Economic Performance(0.2209)
Anti-Corruption (0.1191)	Anti-Corruption (0.1341)	Partisanship (0.1519)	Equality (0.1503)	Anti-corruption (0.1491)
Political Competition (0.1145)	Social Traditionalism (0.1085)	Social Traditionalism (0.1278)	Authoritarian values (0.1286)	Social Traditionalism (0.1159)
Age (0.0992)	Xenophobia (-0.0944)	Authoritarian values (0.1186)	Xenophobia (-0.1189)	Authoritarian values (0.1129)
Vertical Accountability (0.0903)	Political Competition(0.086)	Economic Performance (0.1031)	Horizontal Accountability (0.1145)	Xenophobia (-0.1018)
Authoritarian values (0.0742)	Political Interest (0.0791)	Anti-Corruption (0.1005)	Party Trust (Leadership Satisfaction) (0.113)	Education (-0.0957)
Rule of law (0.0735)	Economic Performance (0.0742)	Horizontal Accountability (0.0964)	Political Participation (0.0855)	Political Competition (0.0861)
Economic Performance (0.0681)	Education (-0.0703)	Political Participation (-0.094)	Age (0.0586)	Rule of Law (0.0857)
Electoral Participation (0.0528)	Access to Services (0.0692)	Freedom (0.0916)	Rule of Law (0.0569)	Horizontal Accountability (0.0673)
Nationalism (-0.0488)	Authoritarian values (0.0658)	Political Competition (0.0758)	Economic Performance (0.0568)	Vertical Accountability (0.0327)
Government Responsiveness (0.0411)	Partisanship (0.0509)	Education (-0.0745)	Political Competition (0.0485)	Freedom (0.0301)
Freedom (0.0369)	Freedom (0.0394)	Rule of Law (0.064)	Access to Services* (0.0453)	Political Interest (0.0293)
Xenophobia (-0.0342)	Rural urban (-0.0353)	Social Status (0.0468)	Safety (0.0319)	Electoral Participation (0.0281)
Horizontal Accountability (0.0263)	Horizontal Accountability (0.0341)	Electoral Participation (-0.0467)	Nationalism (0.0313)	Social Status (0.0255)
Safety* (0.0258)	Age (0.0336)	Vertical Accountability* (-0.0354)	Electoral Participation (0.0296)*	Safety (0.0175)
Gender* (0.0239)	Rule of Law* (0.0281)		Vertical Accountability (0.0211)	Age (0.0169)
N=3957	N=4087	N=1418	N=2370	N=12279

*Significance of P<0.05

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***Overall model excludes Partisanship and Leadership Satisfaction

**** Highlighted are the different factors that underlie regime support

Table 6 above highlights some of the key differences across the regimes. The most striking is the role of social traditional values. Traditional values are more important explanatory factors for underlying support for more authoritarian systems. They are not significant for support for liberal democracy in the region. Also those that have social traditional values are most likely to support authoritarian systems than those that do not. This reaffirms one element of the salience of the Asian values argument: more socially conservative citizens support more authoritarian regimes.

We find a similar dynamic with regard to the role that freedom plays in more democratic regimes. Freedom emerges as an important explanatory factor in liberal and electoral democracies, and is an even sharper differentiator of support in electoral authoritarian systems. It does not emerge as important in one-party systems as citizens in these regimes correctly ascertain that there is limited freedom in their governance. The pattern that stands out is that different types of regimes rely on different sets of values and forms of governance that are tied to their regime. Traditionalism is understandably more important in non-democratic regimes, while freedom is more important in democracies.

A stark indication of how different factors shape regime support is the role of nationalism. In the one party regimes of Vietnam and China, nationalism is positively correlated with regime support. While in the liberal democracies of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, nationalism is negatively correlated with regime support, in that those citizens that are less nationalistic are more inclined to support liberal democracy. The one party regimes rely heavily on nationalism for support, whether it is in anti-Japan sentiments promoted by China or anti-China sentiments stoked in Vietnam. For the liberal democracies there appears to be a nationalistic rejection, as democracy is seen to be a move away from the era of strong nationalism that was used to buttress the support of earlier authoritarian leaders.

Another interesting difference among regime types in Asia involves the issue of electoral participation. High participation in elections corresponds to higher regime support in both liberal democracies and one party regimes. The logic of electoral participation in these different types of regimes fits with the findings. Citizens who support democracy come out to vote in liberal democracies. Citizens who come out in one party states where there is limited choice, do so to showcase their support of the system while those who stay home are not part of the party or the party faithful. Electoral participation takes on a different dynamic in the electoral authoritarian systems. Those that vote and participate in campaigns in Malaysia and Singapore do so with the hope of changing the system. This can help us understand the increased competitiveness and engagement with elections in these countries.

Age emerges as the most important explanatory factor for understanding regime support in Asia. Older citizens are more likely to have greater regime support than younger voters. This pattern holds for all of the regimes except in electoral authoritarian countries where age differences are not significant. This finding suggests that younger Asians have less support for their incumbent regimes.

Two other factors were uniquely important for specific regimes. In liberal democracies government responsiveness was significant, as citizens expected their government to respond. In electoral

democracies the rural-urban dichotomy was important, in countries such as Thailand and Indonesia. The rural-urban dichotomy emerged as one of the most important explanations for regime support in Southeast Asian countries. This suggests that there are country-specific factors at play.

In assessing the differences in explanations for regime support across regime types in Asia the findings reinforce the need to look more carefully at how specific regime types rely on different factors to buttress their support, whether it is electoral participation or nationalism.

Ruminations: Understanding Regime Support and Regime Resilience in Asia

The findings of this mixed effect regression model showcase that regime support in Asia has significant congruence and variation. While the numbers point to higher regime support for authoritarian regimes than democratic ones, these numbers also need to be interpreted with an appreciation that we understand that citizens in democracies give their systems lower markings; they are more critical. In fact, the criticism of democracy in Asia, especially in the more liberal democracies, is a sign of democratic resilience. The levels of regime support suggest, at least on the surface, that there is only one regime that faces serious immediate challenges ahead, that is China. The level of support for this one-party authoritarian system is on par with that of the liberal democracies but without the same level of political space for criticism. There appears to be potential tensions ahead for China, as the regime responds to comparatively low regime support.

The common factors underlying regime support across regimes emphasize that regimes in Asia draw their political legitimacy from a common well. This is largely from their governance and government performance, notably leadership satisfaction and economic performance. The tie between regime support and governance indicators such as equality and corruption places pressures on Asian governments to respond more effectively to these areas. Corruption remains a serious problem in the region and is not being adequately addressed and has the potential to undermine regime support in Asia. A similar dynamic is occurring with equality as regimes in Asia are grappling with how to manage the growing inequality in their societies. These challenges are common across regime types, but the failure to manage these point to possible regime change, as this places pressures on systems, especially more closed systems. Leadership quality is also a possible point of regime vulnerability, as the quality of leadership or lack thereof remains important. Regime support remains intertwined with leadership satisfaction in Asia.

In reviewing the differences in the base of regime support across regime types it is not surprising to see a parallel between regime types and different sources of legitimacy. Nationalism continues to be important for one-party systems, social traditionalism for more authoritarian systems and freedom for more democratic ones. It is likely that different regimes in the region will continue to base their political legitimacy on these regime featured elements. Nationalism is thus likely to continue to feature in China, while threats to freedom in democracies are likely to evoke opposition in their regimes. One interesting feature that stands out here for regime resilience long term is the impact of the young, as they were less likely to support their regimes when compared to older voters. In the longer term with perhaps the exception of electoral authoritarian systems, this raises the vulnerability of regimes in Asia.

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Appendix A

Variables	Measurement	Questions	
Regime Support	Measures the extent to which people unconditionally support the regime	Q136. You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.	
		Q80. Over the long run, our system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces.	
		Q81. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government.	
		Q82. A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves the people's support.	
		Q83. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.	
		Q84. Compared with other systems in the world, would you say our system of government works fine as it is, needs minor change, needs major change, or should be replaced?	
Government Performance	Economic Evaluation	Measure Respondents' Evaluation of Economic performance	Q1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?
			Q2. How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years?
			Q3. What do you think will be the state of our country's economic condition a few years from now?
			Q4. As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today?
	Government Responsiveness	Measure the extent to which government respondents to people's demand	Q97. How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?
			Q113. How well do you think the government responds to what people want?
	Services	Measure the extent to which citizens can get access to public services	Q38. Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? An identity document
			Q39. A place in a public primary school for a child
			Q40. Medical treatment at a nearby clinic
			Q41. Help from the police when you need it
	Safety	Measures perceptions of safety	Q42. Generally speaking, how safe is living in this city/ town/ village – very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?
	Leadership Satisfaction	Measures satisfaction with the incumbent in office	Q95. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the [name of president, etc. ruling current] government? (Q10 Proxy Question: How much trust do you have in political parties used in one-party authoritarian regimes)
Governance	Anti-Corruption	Measures perceived levels of corruption,	Q116. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your

		with higher levels reflecting perceived cleaner governance	local/municipal government? Would you say ...? Q117. How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government [in capital city]? Would you say ...? Q118. In your opinion, is the government working to crack down on corruption and root out bribery?
	Political Competition	Measures perceptions of the level of electoral competition	Q37. On the whole, how free and fair would you say the last national election was? Q99. Political parties or candidates in our country have equal access to the mass media during the election period. Q111. How often do you think our elections offer the voters a real choice between different parties/candidates?
	Vertical Accountability	Measures perceptions of ability of people to check government	Q98. People have the power to change a government they don't like. Q100. Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions. Q109. How often do government officials withhold important information from the public view?
	Horizontal Accountability	Measures perceptions of checks and balances	Q112. To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping government leaders in check?
	Equality	Measures perceptions of equality through governance	Q103. All citizens from different ethnic communities in Country X are treated equally by the government. Q104. Rich and poor people are treated equally by the government. Q105. People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.
	Freedom	Measures perceptions of freedom	Q106. People are free to speak what they think without fear. Q107. People can join any organization they like without fear.
	Rule of Law	Measures perceived respect for rule of law, with higher levels more perceived respect of rule of law	Q101. When government leaders break the laws, there is nothing the court can do. Q110. How often do you think government leaders break the law or abuse their power?
Political Values	Social Traditionalism	Measures the level of conservative values associated with society	Q50. For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second. Q51. In a group, we should sacrifice our individual interest for the sake of the group's collective interest.

			<p>Q52. For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed.</p> <p>Q53. When dealing with others, developing a long-term relationship is more important than securing one's immediate interest.</p>
			<p>Q54. When dealing with others, one should not only focus on immediate interest but also plan for future.</p> <p>Q58. In a group, we should avoid open quarrel to preserve the harmony of the group.</p> <p>Q59. Even if there is some disagreement with others, one should avoid the conflict.</p> <p>Q60. A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.</p> <p>Q63. When dealing with others, one should not be preoccupied with temporary gains and losses.</p>
	Authoritarian values	Measures the level of conservative values associated with political life.	<p>Q129. We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.</p> <p>Q130. Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office.</p> <p>Q131. The army (military) should come in to govern the country.</p> <p>Q132. We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.</p> <p>Q138. The government should consult religious authorities when interpreting the laws.</p> <p>Q139. Women should not be involved in politics as much as men.</p> <p>Q140. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.</p> <p>Q141. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.</p> <p>Q142. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.</p> <p>Q143. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.</p> <p>Q144. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.</p> <p>Q145. If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.</p>

			Q146. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.
			Q147. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.
			Q148. When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation.
	Nationalism	Level of national identification	Q137. A citizen should always remain loyal only to his country, no matter how imperfect it is or what wrong it has done.
			Q154. How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)? Are you?
			Q155. Given the chance, how willing would you be to go and live in another country?
	Xenophobia	Fear of foreigners/ foreign involvement	Q151. Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries.
			Q152. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "We should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods."
			Q 153. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Foreign goods are hurting the local community."
Political Engagement	Political Interest	Level of Political Interest	Q43. How interested would you say you are in politics?
			Q46. When you get together with your family members or friends, how often do you discuss political matters?
	Non-Electoral Participation	Political Participation outside of Elections	Q 64. Contacted elected officials or legislative representatives at any level.
			Q67. Contacted other influential people outside the government.
			Q68. Contacted news media.
			Q69. Got together with others to try to resolve local problems
			Q70. Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition
			Q71. Attended a demonstration or protest march
	Electoral Participation	Regularity of electoral participation	Q73. Thinking of whether you voted or not ever since you became eligible for voting, how would you describe yourself –have you voted in every election, voted in most elections, voted in some elections or hardly ever voted?
	Partisanship	Measures affinity to	Q47 Among the political parties listed here

	Winner/Loser	a political party that holds power	which party if any do you feel closest to? Q48 How close do you feel to the party?
Demographic Variables	Gender	Gender	SE2. Male or Female
	Age	Age	SE3A. Age
	Education	Education Level	SE 5. What is your highest level of education?
	Social Status	Perceived social status	SE13. People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of being high or low. Imagine a ladder with 10 steps. At step one stand the lowest status and step 10 stand the highest. Where would you place your family on the following scale?