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The Mass Public and Democratic Politics in Mongolia

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The Mass Public and Democratic Politics in Mongolia

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Mongolia represents Asia’s first successful transition to democracy from the totalitarian rule of communism. Moreover, it is the only post-communist country outside of Eastern Europe that scores high in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and press freedoms. Among the family of third-wave democracies, therefore, Mongolia is often regarded as “one of the least likely cases” to have undergone a successful transition to democracy (Fish 1998, 128).

Prior to its democratic transition, Mongolia was a loyal member of the communist block dominated by the Soviet Union, which dictated its domestic and foreign policies with large amounts of economic aid (Batbayar 2003). As a communist state, the country was a one-party totalitarian state ruled by the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP hereafter) and the ideology of Marx-Leninism. For more than six decades, beginning when a communist dictatorship replaced a monarchy in 1924, Mongolia remained a totalitarian state that prohibited any criticism of one-party dictatorship and its communist ideology and centrally planned economy.

The democratic transformation of Mongolia’s age-old communist rule began in the wake of the democratic upheavals that took place in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. After Gorbachev announced in 1986 the policy directives of “Glasnost” and “Perestroika” to reform the stagnant Soviet system of communism, they produced ripple effects in Mongolia’s drive toward democratization (Batbayar 2003; Boone 1994). The collapse of Marx-Leninism in the Soviet Union as its ruling ideology also led to Marx-Leninism’s unexpected death in Mongolia. This testifies that the political histories of both nations are intertwined and interlinked despite their cultural, ethnic, and religious disparities.

Samuel Huntington (1991, 113) characterizes Mongolia’s transition to democracy as the process of transplacement mainly because democratization resulted from joint action by groups
both in power and out of power. In the early 1990s, the democratic opposition led by the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU hereafter) began hunger strikes in front of the government palace to demand political freedom and human rights. The ruling elite initially ignored these demands; however, when they intensified, the MPRP in power agreed to a round table meeting with the MDU in opposition. This process of transplacement led to Mongolia’s first-ever democratic elections in the summer of 1990. Since those elections, Mongolia has exhibited a persistent but muted nostalgia for communism by electing the re-constituted party of the old communist regime to the presidency and parliament (Severinghaus 2000).

Despite these electoral victories by the former communist party, many scholars recognize Mongolia as a successful case of democratic transition from communism (Batbayar 2003; Ginsburg 1998; Finch 2002; Fish 1998). Its transition to democracy was bloodless and no violent attempts were made to overthrow the freely elected government. Unlike many Eastern European and Central Asian countries, its democratically elected regime has been highly stable. Furthermore, a few powerful politicians did not dominate Mongolia’s democratic political process, a common occurrence among third world nations. Even if the MPRP often opts for the authoritarian method of governance, it remains attached to democratic ideals and committed to free and regular elections, mainly because of its dependence on foreign aid (Batbayar 2003, 57).

International lending agencies have stipulated that any regress back to authoritarianism can result in a substantial decrease in loan guarantees, so the MPRP has maintained policies that promote individual rights, trade liberalization, and continued privatization. Such demands and pressures from international as well as domestic forces for democratic governance have thus helped Mongolia remain a politically free nation since its transition to democracy in 1990 (Freedom House 2004). Internationally, therefore, the country is often regarded as a third-wave
democracy that has outperformed its East European and Central Asian counterparts, which are either partly free or unfree.

However, it appears that Mongolia’s ruling elite remains superficially committed to democratic pressures from international donors. To date, constitutional reform and economic liberalization based on the advice of international financial institutions have not produced a stable middle class, nor have these reforms narrowed the chronic gap between the rich and the poor that became endemic in post-communist Mongolia (Brooks 1998; Nixson, Suvd and Walters 2000). Furthermore, the mere holding of periodic elections and institutional changes have done little to reduce the prevalence of political corruption and human rights violations, to weaken the strong-arm tactics of the ruling party, and to expand the freedom of the press. In short, Mongolia today can be characterized as a “feckless” democracy where strains of an authoritarian legacy stubbornly persist and the mass public remains apathetic to the political process (Carothers 2002).

**Institutional Features of Democratic Governance**

Mongolia held its first free and fair elections in the summer of 1990. Following the general elections and formation of the new government, the process of drawing up the fourth constitution began. In January 1992, its first democratically elected parliament adopted a constitution, which allows for a multi-party electoral process, and a governmental system that mixes presidential and parliamentary systems. The 1992 Mongolian constitution proclaims that Mongolia is a parliamentary democracy that places a premium on human rights and personal freedom. This stipulation for human rights and basic freedoms is the first codification of the government’s commitment to democratic values in Mongolia’s 2000 years of existence (Fritz 2002).

According to the constitution, the president is the head of the state and the symbol of the people’s unity. The election of the president proceeds in three phases. The first phase involves the nomination of candidates. The constitution allows only the political parties represented in the
parliament to nominate candidates. Of these candidates, a majority of voters chooses one to the presidency. Finally, the parliament formally recognizes the mandate of the president elected by the voters (Sanders 1992; Ginsburg 1995; Fish 1998). In the 1993 presidential election, P. Ochirbat, the candidate of the Democratic Force Party, was elected as the first president with 58 percent of the vote. In 1997 and 2001, N. Bagabandi, the candidate of MPRP, was elected with 61 and 58 percent, respectively.

The constitution places much political power on a one-chamber parliament composed of seventy-six legislators who are elected every four years. The political significance of Mongolia’s parliament is that it is more powerful than the presidency. The parliament possesses the power of the purse, and it is capable of directing, influencing, advocating, and enacting policy initiatives. These initiatives range from trade investment and economic liberalization to budget allocation used for rural development. The presidency, on the other hand, is in large part merely a ceremonial position that represents the country, although its occupant does hold the power to veto all or parts of any legislation.

Parliamentary and presidential elections in Mongolia are known to be fair, free, and competitive. Although the old regime’s party, the MPRP, has maintained exclusive control of parliament since Mongolia democratized in 1991, opposition parties continue to gain political support from voters and remain competitive. At the same time, the MPRP appears to have gained a greater political advantage by monopolizing legislative committees in parliament and by blocking any attempt to accommodate or conciliate policy proposals or recommendations made by the opposition.

In terms of political parties, post-transition Mongolia has been in a state of constant flux. This is due to the plurality system of electing legislators and the absence of a proportional system. Adding to the dynamics of party overturn are the frequent political mergers, alliances, and purges.
Mongolian opposition parties have continually merged and formed ad hoc alliances for the sake of increasing their representation in the legislature. Alliances have also contributed to the political longevity and saliency of small opposition parties, which have become peripheral as a result of the MPRP’s dominance in legislative elections.

To help defeat the MPRP, powerfully equipped with robust political machinery and grassroots connections with nongovernmental organizations, three opposition parties (the Mongolian Democratic Party, the Mongolian National Progressive Party, and the Renaissance Party of Mongolia) merged into the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) in the early 1990s. After the large losses of seats in the 2000 legislative election, the MNDP formed an alliance with five political parties that are usually opposed to its policy proposals. The newly formed Democratic Party was intended to achieve greater electoral success by forgoing policy differences and uniting MPRP’s opposition. The new party also represented an effort to decrease the MPRP’s political dominance in the legislature (Fish 2001).

It is apparent that despite the stipulation in the Mongolian constitution for a multi-party system, there is a movement toward political re-alignment into a two-party system. The newly formed Democratic Party, which comprises the MNDP and other socialist peripheral parties, is more than an electoral alliance that presents center-right proposals. Because the Democratic Party purges socialist peripheral parties that continue to espouse Marxist or Leninist ideologies, it continues to remain the loyal opposition of the MPRP. Today, both the MPRP and the Democratic Party remain Mongolia’s two dominant brokerage political parties.

Mongolia’s realignment and movement toward a two-party system are unique among third-wave democracies. Compared to other new democracies where parties remain splintered and lack an ideological drive, Mongolian political parties have clearly followed the Western European tradition of demarcating between the center-left (represented by the MPRP) and the center-right
(represented by the Democratic Party), fully articulating their party manifestos and ideological manifestations. Thus, Mongolia’s party system has undergone the integration of smaller peripheral parties into two larger brokerage parties and is moving toward a stable two-party system, which is rarely seen in the current wave of global democratization. This movement toward a two-party system promotes, in principle, a sense of accountability and transparency in governance. Perhaps this is the reason why international agencies have categorized Mongolia as a rapid reformer and a fairly successful liberal democracy (Fritz 2002; Promfret 2000; Sabloff 2002). These agencies have rated the civil society in Mongolia to be more active than those of its Central Asian counterparts (Clearly 1995).

Missing from these ratings and external assessments by international agencies of Mongolia’s democratization are the views of its ordinary citizens, who experience the change on a daily basis. To understand the dynamics and consequences of democratization more accurately and meaningfully, therefore, one must take into account their conceptions of democracy and perceptions of regime change and performance. This chapter offers subjective assessments of democratization in Mongolia through the eyes of ordinary Mongolians. These assessments are based on the East Asian Barometer (EAB hereafter) survey of 1,200 randomly selected voters, which was conducted between November 2002 and February 2003.

**Conceptions of Democracy**

To assess the cognitive capacity of Mongolians with regard to the notion of democracy, the EAB survey asked respondents to offer a definition or meaning of democracy. Thus, an attempt was made to determine whether Mongolians have a minimalist (procedural) or maximalist (substantive) understanding of what democracy constitutes. A procedural understanding of democracy normally constitutes a basic institutional understanding of democracy, which includes the right to suffrage, majority rule, or political freedom in general. A substantive understanding
goes beyond a procedural definition and deals with social justice, socio-economic equity, civil liberties, and quality of life.

**Awareness**

Specifically, the EAB survey asked Mongolian respondents the question “To you, what does democracy mean?” This question prompted respondents to name up to three specific properties that are definitive of their own subjective interpretation of democracy. To this open-ended question, 11 percent of Mongolian respondents were not able to name any element of democracy, and 31 percent could identify only one. A mere 27 percent were able to give at least two elements, and 32 percent were able to name three elements of democracy. Considering these figures together shows that nearly nine-tenths (89%) of Mongolians are cognitively capable of defining democracy with at least one property. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of the results concerning the general awareness of democracy among Mongolians.

(Figure 1 here)

With regard to the most frequently (modal response) mentioned element of democracy in each of the three responses, Mongolians’ modal first response was freedom in general (19%), followed by 7 percent equating democracy with an open society and 6 percent defining it as social justice. The modal second response was freedom in general, constituting 15 percent of respondents, followed by equality and justice (8%), and promoting an open society (6%). The modal third response was, once again, freedom in general (11%), followed by social justice (5%) and an open society (5%). Interestingly, 45 percent of Mongolians associate democracy with a definition of freedom in general, which represents a basic, rudimentary cognitive knowledge of democracy that lacks substantive depth (cf. Sabloff 2002). Far fewer offered definitions indicative of a more complete understanding. Only 18 percent described democracy as promoting an open society, and only 19 percent described democracy as promoting social justice.
**Procedural and Substantive Conceptions**

Do Mongolians understand democracy procedurally or substantively? If one is to use Dahl’s (1971) procedural definition of periodic elections and institutional factors that promote political rights, 86 percent of Mongolians equate democracy with a procedural definition. Surprisingly, substantive interpretations of democracy among Mongolians are minimal at best. Only 28 percent of Mongolians equated democracy with socio-economic fairness, 8 percent characterized it as reflecting good governance, 7 percent associated it with a free market economy, and just less than 7 percent connected it with promoting the politics of populism. Likewise, 9 percent gave it an abstract, substantive definition. This confirms that Mongolians as a whole tend to identify democracy with a minimalist definition of basic freedoms. In general, Mongolians lack cognitive sophistication in terms of equating democratic precepts with deeper substantive interpretations such as social justice, economic and gender equality, and promoting the virtues of capitalism.

**Attachment to Liberal Democracy**

Another major component of measuring Mongolians’ cognitive capacity to comprehend democracy concerns the extent to which Mongolians are attached to the liberal notion of democracy. To this end, we used individual rights and limited constitutional government as the two most important substantive and procedural characteristics. The strength of attachment to liberal democracy is measured in terms of the number of times respondents referred to each of the two characteristics. Mongolians who include both procedural and substantive characteristics in their definitions were rated as strongly attached to the notion of liberal democracy. Mongolians who referred to more than one element in the same category of procedural or substantive elements were rated as moderately attached, and Mongolians who mentioned only one element—substantive
or procedural—were categorized as weakly attached. Mongolians who referred to neither procedural nor substantive characteristics were labeled as unattached.

The results of this analysis show that the liberal notion of democracy is not widely shared among ordinary citizens in Mongolia. Its communist past of one-party rule appears to have created a citizenry incapable of fully understanding the comprehensive meaning of liberal democracy (see Figure 2). A large majority (86%) are weakly attached or entirely unattached to a liberal understanding of democracy. Likewise, only 1 percent of respondents are strongly attached, and 12 percent are moderately attached. Comparatively, these figures indicate that Mongolians are largely unattached to liberal notions of democracy, reflecting an inherent democratic cognitive deficit. This shortcoming, which is commonly found in new democracies, may cause citizens to become indifferent to the political process and thus lead to limited expectations of further improvements in democratic governance.

(Figure 2 here)

**Perceptions of Regime Change**

How do Mongolian citizens perceive their current and past political systems? Do they perceive the current regime as a democracy? Do they recognize the communist regime of the past as a dictatorship? Do they believe that the communist regime has been transformed into a democratic regime? To address these questions, the EAB survey asked Mongolians to rate their past and current regimes on a 10-point ladder scale. This scale allows respondents to answer according to their own understanding of democracy and dictatorship. A score of 1 on this scale indicates complete dictatorship, while a score of 10 indicates complete democracy. The scores reported on this scale were collapsed into four categories that indicate different regime types: (1) hard authoritarianism (1 and 2); (2) soft authoritarianism (3 through 5); (3) limited democracy (6 through 8); and (4) advanced democracy (9 and 10).
According to Table 1, the mean score of the past regime is 3.7, which falls nearly two points below the scale’s midpoint (5.5). This rating signifies that Mongolians tend to perceive the past regime under the MPRP as undemocratic. The mean score of the present regime, on the other hand, is 6.6, which is substantially above the midpoint. Furthermore, more than three-fourths (77%) perceive the past regime as undemocratic, while a slightly smaller majority (70%) perceives the current regime (even if it is controlled by the MPRP, the reformed party of the communist past) as democratic. Comparing these undemocratic and democratic regime perceptions reveals that a majority of Mongolians recognize the occurrence of democratic regime change. Yet in their eyes, the new democratic regime remains of a limited nature, having yet to evolve into an advanced state of democracy. Clearly, perceptions on regime change show an incremental change reflecting a gradual and not monumental change to democracy.

(Table 1 here)

To estimate the extent of perceived democratic progress accurately, we subtracted individual respondents’ ratings of the past regime from those of the current regime. This index runs from a low of –9 to a high of +9. The minimum score of –9 indicates regression from complete democracy to complete dictatorship, while the maximum score of +9 indicates the drastic transition from complete dictatorship to complete democracy. Respectively, positive and negative scores on the index indicate democratic transition or authoritarian regression. On this 19-point index, respondents to the Mongolian EAB survey averaged +2.9. According to this mean score, the average Mongolian thinks the political system has taken 2.9 steps upward on the 10-step ladder of democratization. Such an upward shift represents considerable progress in the democratic transformation of one-party communist rule.

Nonetheless, the Mongolian people are not in complete agreement on the nature and extent of the political change they have experienced. Slightly one-eighth (13%), for example, perceived
no such democratic progress. Additionally, as many as one out of 16 Mongolians (6%) reported retrogression to authoritarian rule rather than progression toward democracy. To further ascertain the nature and extent of the experienced political change, we considered together Mongolians’ ratings of the past and current regimes on a 10-point scale and identified six perceived patterns of the regime change that took place more than a decade ago. The patterns are: (1) authoritarian reversal (from a democracy to an authoritarian regime); (2) authoritarian persistence (an authoritarian regime of either a hard or soft nature remains little changed); (3) authoritarian liberalization (from a hard authoritarian regime to a soft authoritarian regime); (4) limited democratic transition (from an authoritarian regime to a limited democracy); (5) advanced democratic transition (from an authoritarian regime to a substantially advanced democracy); and (6) democratic persistence (from a democracy to a democracy).

Of these six views, limited democratic transition is most popular with 44 percent of respondents. This is followed by democratic persistence (14%), authoritarian persistence (13%), advanced democratic transition (10%), authoritarian liberalization (9%), and authoritarian reversal (3%) (see Table 2). When upholders of the views of limited and advanced democratic transition are considered together, it is clear that a majority (54%) of the Mongolian people accurately recognizes the occurrence of democratic regime change in the aftermath of the demise of communist rule. Yet even after they have lived under democratic rule for more than a decade, more than two-fifths (46%) have yet to recognize the regime change.

(Table 2 here)

**Consequences of Democratic Regime Change**

The citizen evaluation of regime performance is essential in order to determine how the democratic transformation of communist rule has affected the quality of life among Mongolians. To evaluate the various consequences of such transformation, the EAB survey asked respondents
to rate each of nine major life domains, including freedom of speech, freedom of association, equal
treatment, citizen empowerment, judicial independence, anticorruption, law and order, economic
development, and economic equality. With five categories ranging from “much better than before”
to “much worse than before,” the survey allowed respondents to compare current circumstances
with those under the past communist regime.

For each of the nine performance domains, Tables 3 presents a mean score on a numeric
scale ranging from –2 (much worse than before) to +2 (much better than before). The table also
presents three percentage ratings, including negative and positive ones and a percentage
differential index (PDI hereafter), which is calculated by measuring the difference between the
positive and negative scores. PDI scores have a range between a low of –100 to a high of +100.
Consequently, positive PDI scores indicate a positive evaluation of the quality of life domains,
while negative PDI scores show a negative assessment. Therefore, PDI scores can be used as a
yardstick to determine if Mongolians have felt a substantial improvement, stagnation, or
deterioration in their quality of life in the wake of democratic regime change.

(Table 3 here)

A careful scrutiny of Table 3 reveals that Mongolians have experienced drastic
improvements in the degree of their political and personal freedoms. The greatest improvements
are felt in the two domains dealing with the freedom of speech (+81%) and freedom of association
(+80%). In the other three domains of political performance—equal treatment, popular influence,
and independent judiciary—the table also shows positive improvements. On the PDI, the five
political performance domains average +45, indicating that Mongolians, in general, have felt
substantial increases in the freedom to associate, equal treatment under the law, and the ability to
influence the government to entertain or enact specific policy.
However, Mongolia faces the predicament of negative evaluations concerning the current regime’s policy performance, which is a common feature among democratizing nations especially with a totalitarian past. In three of the four policy performance domains listed in Table 3—anticorruption, law and order, and economic equality—Mongolians report experiencing more negative than positive consequences from democratic change. Such evaluations indicate better policy performance of the state under the previous communist regime. Only in the domain of economic development do Mongolians report marked improvements in the wake of the shift to privatization and a market economy. Despite a PDI score of +41 on economic development, the average PDI score of state institutional/public policy performance is –16, which is an indication of the mass public’s negative assessment of the state’s public policy performance. This low score is evidence that corruption and a worsening condition of criminality and economic inequality have characterized Mongolia’s democratic transition.

The most notorious branch of the Mongolian government in terms of corruption, bribery, bureaucratic red tape, and cronyism is the judiciary. The Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI hereafter) conducted a survey on corruption in the year 2000, and the Mongolian Judicial Reform Project (JRP) conducted a public opinion poll that included questions on judicial corruption (quoted in Robert 2002). Both of these surveys affirm that judicial corruption (as a result of a lack of an independent judiciary) is widespread. For instance, 42 percent, a large minority of respondents to the survey by the MCCI, regard judicial institutions as the “most corrupt” institution.\(^1\) In the JRP survey, 56% of respondents claim that legal institutions cannot be trusted because of the persistence of corruption in the local courts.\(^2\)

The rampant increase in criminality, corrupt judicial activity, and the erosion of citizen trust in the courts appears to have created a generational divide where communist nostalgia among the older generation is more prevalent compared to the younger generation. Naturally, older
citizens have a historical frame of reference to compare the institutional efficacy of the courts and the police during the reign of communism with what is present now under democratic rule. The deteriorating performance of police authorities and judicial agencies that became manifest in the wake of democratic transition is a cause for alarm. This situation can lead into the revival of law and order political parties that may champion restrictions on individual freedoms, representing a regression back to totalitarian features of the past. This nostalgia for law and order parties with totalitarian predispositions is a common feature of political life among Eastern European countries in democratic transition. Such public sentiment is unsettling in Mongolia because the newly instituted opposition Democratic Party has a rightist wing that calls for the curtailment of basic freedoms to preserve the rule of law and to strengthen the prosecutorial power of the judiciary so that it can maintain social order.

Finally, it should be noted that Mongolians in general give economic equality the highest negative PDI rating at -53, indicating the widening gap between the rich and the poor in the aftermath of democratization. Perhaps this is a heavy price Mongolians have paid as a result of transition. In the past, the communist ideology tried to promote a classless society where economic enterprises were state-owned. With the advent of market liberalization and privatization, Mongolia has become a society that now devalues social equality, income equity, and the promotion of a paternalistic state. This may make the older generation remember the days of communism as a glorious time when the concept of capital accumulation was non-existent and the emphasis on the equal distribution of wealth produced a society that valued the inherent virtues of a classless society, which promoted the values of economic and social justice, and fairness.

**Appraising the Quality of Democracy**

A regime can be considered truly democratic only when citizens are able to espouse the tenets of republicanism through active participation in civic affairs. Furthermore, democratic
consolidation can occur only if citizens have incorporated values associated with democratic citizenship and if they have high levels of trust for their respective political leaders and state institutions. As Robert Putnam (1993) points out, mass public trust and activism have a ripple effect that generates effective, transparent, and responsive governance.

**Democratic Citizenship**

Democratic citizenship pertains to the ability of citizens to cognitively and behaviorally engage in civic or political participation. This notion of democratic citizenship, therefore, goes beyond the ability to exercise one’s right to suffrage. It can range from the capacity of citizens to influence legislation through petition drives or face-to-face meetings with legislators to their ability to engage in political rallies or demonstrations to criticize national policy. Do Mongolians perceive their ability to participate in the political process as democratic citizenship? Do they believe they are capable of influencing public policymaking through civic participation?

To address these questions, the EAB survey in Mongolia asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with a pair of statements: (1) “I think I have the ability to participate in politics” and (2) “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what is going on.” Affirming responses to the first statement and disaffirming responses to the second one were chosen as indicators of citizen empowerment, the capacity of citizens to formulate and express their preferences in the political process. These responses were considered together in order to identify four types of democratic citizenship among the Mongolian people. The categories are: (1) fully incapable; (2) cognitively capable; (3) behaviorally capable; and (4) fully capable.

As Table 4 shows, when asked about their ability to understand the complexities of politics and government, nearly one-half of Mongolians (46%) expressed their cognitive capacity to do so. When asked about their capacity to take part in politics, however, a smaller minority (43%)
affirmed their behavioral capacity to do so. Positive responses to the two above statements, when considered together, reveal that a plurality (28%) is cognitively as well as behaviorally incapable of meeting the requirements of democratic citizenship. These Mongolians who are fully incapable are followed by the cognitively capable (27%), the behaviorally capable (23%), and the fully capable (19%). As in the case of other East Asians, the cognitively capable Mongolians outnumber the behaviorally capable. More notable is the finding that those fully incapable not only constitute the largest proportion of the Mongolian electorate but they also outnumber those fully capable by a large margin (28% versus 19%). A majority of the Mongolian people, although either cognitively or behaviorally capable, has yet to acquire both the understanding and ability necessary to perform their citizen responsibilities in a democratic state.

(Table 4 here)

Political Leadership

Political corruption is widely regarded as the most pervasive and serious obstacle to the consolidation of new democracies. In this regard, Cooter (1997) claims that a democratic state must not only provide for the protection of civil liberties and individual rights but must also ensure that market forces are devoid of cronyism and nepotism so that a state can maintain a semblance of Rechtsstaat. In essence, corruption among democratically elected political leaders indicates the poor substantive quality of democratic rule.

Corruption is a pervasive feature of Mongolian political life. In April 2002, about six thousand Mongolians protested outside the national government’s headquarters in Ulan Baator, demanding that four government ministers resign. The opposition Democratic Party galvanized the “corruption” rallies, accusing the ruling party (MPRP) of giving the Russians more ownership rights to Mongolia’s copper industry (Erdenet Mining Corporation) than what was publicly known. Several rallies proliferated around Mongolia during this period because the opposition
party also accused the ruling party of secrecy and a lack of transparency in allocating governmental contracts and bids to favored corporations. Such secrecy and favor created a semblance of cronyism politics, in which the ruling party rewards lucrative business deals to close associates and personal relatives of governmental ministers. Despite these accusations, however, print and broadcast media rarely reported corruption at the local and national levels because they operate under tight oligarchic control of the press.\(^3\)

The EAB survey asked respondents to assess how widespread corruption is at the local and national levels. To measure the degree of corruption, citizens were asked the question “How widespread do you think corruption is at the local and national levels?” The respondents were asked to estimate corruption at the national and local governments in terms of the following categories: (1) Almost everyone is corrupt; (2) Most officials are corrupt; (3) Not a lot of officials are corrupt; and (4) Hardly anyone is involved in corruption. The first two categories as an aggregate correspond to the perception that political leaders engage in cronyism, bribery, or other illegal practices, while the last two categories as an aggregate indicate that political leaders mostly conduct their business with minimal irregularities or without graft and corruption.

When asked about the extent of corruption among those officials at the national level of government, three-fifths (60%) perceived corruption in “almost everyone” (20%) or “most” (40%) everyone. About the officials working for local governments, nearly one-half (47%) gave the same replies: “almost everyone” (16%) and “most” (30%). Considering together responses to both questions reveals that nearly two-fifths (36%) perceived almost everyone or most of national and local government officials as corrupt. In addition, nearly one-third (30%) perceived almost everyone or most officials working in either the national or local government as corrupt. It is only a minority (32%) who did not perceive almost everyone or most of either local or national government officials to be corrupt.
Another notable feature of political corruption in Mongolia concerns the perceived gap between the two levels of government. Mongolians typically rank national officials as more corrupt than local officials (60% vs. 47%), indicating that corruption is more rampant at the national level. Perhaps this is because the political behavior and activities of national governmental officials are still protected by censorship laws, which result in no transparency in governance. This contrasts with local governmental activity that can be reported easily by word of mouth in smaller communities, especially in the Mongolian Aimags (provinces), where the bonds of community and solidarity persist in demanding effective and honest governance. The perception that hardly anyone is involved in corruption is significantly less pervasive at the local level than at the national level (5% vs. 17%). A case can be made that corruption is less pervasive at the local level and more pronounced at the national level on the basis of the subjective assessments of the Mongolian mass public.

**Institutional Trust**

Political culture theorists argue that mass public trust of governmental, political, and private institutions converts itself into social capital, and social capital, in turn, translates itself into democratic nurturance by producing effective and responsive government (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). Accordingly, trust in state institutions is often considered the bulwark for further democratization. Trust in private institutions is also known to influence the process of democratic consolidation by shaping the process of economic development (Fukuyama 1996). In this regard, it is important to investigate the degree of trust Mongolians place in public and private institutions and whether there are marked differences in the level of trust across the distinct categories of institutions.

The EAB survey asked respondents how much trust they had in twelve public and private institutions. Table 5 provides the percentages of positive and negative ratings of these institutions.
Among political institutions, the local and national governments and parliament were rated as more trustworthy than untrustworthy by more than one-half of Mongolians. The national government’s above-average rating on the trustworthiness scale is surprising in view of the allegations of widespread graft and corruption. Political parties, however, are regarded by a large majority (61%) as untrustworthy. This may emanate from the inability of the ruling party (the MPRP) to rectify chronic poverty and its ill-conceived policies regarding haphazard privatization and debt alleviation programs that are often tainted with graft, corruption, cronyism, and nepotism. Overall, only a mere 16 percent of Mongolians trust all four political institutions, including parliament, political parties, and the national and local governments.

(Table 5 here)

Among governmental institutions, the military and the election commission are regarded as the two most trustworthy institutions. More than three-fifths of Mongolians rate these two institutions positively. The positive ratings of the election commission are encouraging because its duty is to promote free, fair, and competitive elections. Yet many opposition party legislators have accused the election commission of being partial and biased toward the ruling MPRP. The election commission has also been accused of being lenient to the ruling party, especially when the MPRP violates election laws to gain an electoral advantage. Mongolians as a whole tend to rate the civil service more positively than negatively. Yet they do not hold much confidence in the performance of the police and courts. When all five governmental institutions are considered together, only a small minority of one-seventh (14%) places full confidence in those institutions.

With regard to private institutions, including the news media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Mongolians appear to view them as more trustworthy than political and governmental ones. More than one-fifth (22%) expresses trust in the three private institutions of newspapers, television, and NGOs. Surprisingly, Mongolians trust the television media (79%)
more than the print media (42%). Despite allegations from MPRP’s opposition that there is press censorship, the print media have begun to take a course of independence from governmental monopoly. For instance, one hundred newspapers representing different political ideologies are freely circulated on a national basis. Still, oppositionists argue that they do not have full access to the print media, and it should be noted that the government recently closed down two newspapers, allegedly accusing them of promoting pornography without conclusive evidence. The broadcast media remains nationally controlled, which means that the ruling party has much influence on its programming content, often denying programming rights and access to the opposition.

Surprisingly, a large minority (44%) of Mongolians perceives non-governmental organizations and private institutions that deal with humanitarian relief work and poverty alleviation programs as untrustworthy. Could this be attributed to the perception that NGOs are closely affiliated with the ruling party, the MPRP? Some opposition party legislators in parliament have made the accusation that NGOs are the government’s crony agencies because they are staffed and administered by officials handpicked by the ruling party. There is also a widespread belief among opposition party legislators that NGOs are incorporated and co-opted by the state to give the ruling party more power over votes in rural Aimags, translating into more parliamentary seats and ruling party longevity in the great Hural (parliament).

System Responsiveness

On the whole, how well or poorly do the Mongolian people think their current political system performs as a democracy? To address this question, we first selected a pair of items that have often been used to tap a political system’s responsiveness. The first item in this pair asked respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the statement “The nation is run by a powerful few, and ordinary citizens cannot do much about it.” Only 38 percent affirmed the responsiveness of the current system by disagreeing with this statement. The second item asked the
same respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the statement “People like me don’t have any influence over what the government does.” A slightly larger minority of 42 percent affirmed the current system’s responsiveness by disagreeing with this statement. When responses to both questions were considered together, less than one-quarter (23%) rated the system as fully responsive and another one-third (32%) as partially responsive. A plurality of 45 percent, on the other hand, judged it to perform more unresponsively than responsively.

For a comprehensive assessment of the regime’s overall quality, we selected another pair of items from the EAB survey. The first item asked, “On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country?” Contrary to what one would expect from the low levels of institutional trust and system responsiveness, two-thirds (67%) expressed at least some degree of satisfaction with the way the current regime was performing as a democracy. When asked to respond to the statement “Whatever its faults may be, our form of government is still best for us,” more than two-thirds (69%) reported agreement. Even among those who expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of Mongolian democracy, a majority (58%) endorsed it as the best system for their nation. Only to a small minority (14%) does democracy represent a system of a greater evil that performs poorly or much worse than its communist predecessor.

**Commitment to Democracy**

Support for democratic politics goes beyond a cognitive or behavioral capacity to engage in the democratic system. Citizens with a limited democratic upbringing may remain nostalgic of the communist past’s hierarchical order and consequently may espouse both democratic and totalitarian proclivities (Rose and Mishler 1994). Therefore, it is incumbent upon new democracies to foster a citizenry that will endorse the legitimacy of democracy and actively choose it over totalitarianism and other anti-democratic alternatives. Only then can those incomplete democracies
endure and grow into complete ones. This section focuses on Mongolians’ orientations toward democracy and against its alternatives.

**Attachment to Democratic Politics**

How strongly are ordinary Mongolians attached, in principle, to democracy as a system of government? How strongly are they committed to its practices? A set of five questions allows us to estimate the general level of support for democracy in principle as well as in action. These questions address the desirability of democracy, the suitability of democracy, the preference for democracy, the efficacy of democracy, and the priority of democracy. Positive or pro-democratic responses to the questions are considered, individually and collectively, to measure the specific and general level of commitment to democratic governance.

With regard to the desirability of democracy, respondents were asked to indicate on a 10-point ladder scale how democratic they want their current political regime to be. A score of 1 on this scale indicates complete dictatorship, while a score of 10 indicates complete democracy. A vast majority (89%) of Mongolians articulated a clear desire for democracy, choosing a score of 6 or above. More notably, a plurality of one-third (30%) expressed the desire for complete democracy, choosing 10 on the scale. It is evident that at least in principle, most Mongolians desire to live in a democracy more than in any of its alternatives.

Desirability is not enough, however, to build a democratic nation. Democracy has to be accepted as suitable for the nation’s socio-economic condition and other situations. To measure suitability, the EAB survey asked respondents to rate this quality on a 10-point scale. A score of 1 indicates complete unsuitability, while a score of 10 indicates complete suitability. As with desirability, a large majority (83%) believes democracy is suitable for their nation, and more than one-quarter (27%) believes it is completely suitable, choosing 10 on the ladder scale. Thus, in addition to viewing democracy as a desirable form of government, many Mongolians also perceive
democracy as a suitable regime type that fits in with their societal configurations. For another indicator of general support for democracy as a viable political system, the EAB survey asked respondents whether or not they believe “democracy is capable of solving the problems facing the country.” A substantial majority (72%) replied affirmatively, asserting democracy’s efficacy. This percentage is, however, much lower than the percentages expressing desire and suitability (see Figure 3).

(Figure 3 here)

To determine whether Mongolians remain attached to communist rule, the EAB survey asked respondents if they would always prefer democracy to authoritarian rule or authoritarianism over democratic rule, or if they have no preference at all. Once again, a majority (54%) preferred democratic rule to authoritarian rule, while only a minority (26%) expressed feelings of communist nostalgia (choosing totalitarian rule over democratic rule). A small minority (19%) of Mongolians does not believe that regime type matters. What is noteworthy about these findings is that more than one out of four Mongolians prefers non-democratic rule to democracy.

To test the real depth of attachment to democratic politics, respondents were asked if they would prefer economic development to democratic governance. This question sought to probe the relative importance of democracy vis-à-vis economic development as a national development policy. A bare majority (54%) replied that economic development is far more (28%) or somewhat more (26%) important than democracy. Slightly more than one-quarter (26%) said that democracy is somewhat more (15%) or far more (11%) important than economic development. Nearly one-fifth (19%), on the other hand, considered economic and democratic development of equal importance. Considering these ratings together reveals that nearly one out of two Mongolians (45%) value democracy as importantly as or more importantly than economic development as a national development policy.
Figure 3 lists the percentages expressing favorable orientations toward democracy with regard to desirability, suitability, efficacy, preference, and priority. These percentages, when compared, clearly show that Mongolians, like citizens of other new democracies, are more supportive of democracy as a political ideal than as a political enterprise. Even among those who embrace democracy as the best method of governance, it is not widely regarded as a highly salient development goal.

To measure the depth of support for democracy, pro-democratic responses regarding desire, suitability, efficacy, preference, and priority were placed on a 6-point index measuring attachment to democracy (see Figure 4). The lowest score of 0 indicates the absence of any attachment, while the highest score of 5 indicates complete or deep attachment. On this index, Mongolians average 2.9, a score that is slightly above the index midpoint (2.5). Although this score indicates that Mongolians as a whole accept some democratic precepts, the degree of their attachment is still embryonic and formative. This conclusion is also supported by the finding that only one out of seven Mongolians (15%) is fully or nearly fully attached to democracy, choosing one of the two highest scores on the index.

(Figure 4 here)

**Detachment from Authoritarianism**

As mentioned previously, authoritarian nostalgia can persist in a country like Mongolia because old communist values linger, especially among the older generation. Reminiscing about greater economic equality, less crime, and the administrative efficiency associated with a communist system, citizens can have ambivalence or a growing antipathy toward democratic rule. The following questions are therefore pressing: Have Mongolians truly relinquished their preference for communist or totalitarian rule? Are institutional changes and reforms associated
with democratic transition effective enough to lead members of the mass public to detach themselves completely from non-democratic alternatives?

To address these questions, the EAB survey asked respondents if they would support the return to power of a one-party dictatorship or if they have a preference for a civilian dictatorship, military junta, or technocratic rule. The results, as shown in Figure 5, are notable. First, a compelling majority (71%) of Mongolians is against the return of a one-party dictatorship associated with the communist rule of the past. Second, a larger majority (82%) does not favor military rule, the governmental institution which Mongolians trust most.\(^5\) Third, three-fifths (61%) are clearly opposed to rule by technocrats. Finally, only a bare majority (57%) opposes a civilian dictatorship. This finding is troubling because it indicates that economic collapse, degeneration in law and order, or failure to bridge class cleavages may lead to the rise of a political party that can promote the systemic virtues of authoritarianism.\(^6\)

(Figure 5 here)

How deeply do Mongolians remain attached to the virtues of authoritarian rule? To address this question, we measured the depth of antiauthoritarianism with a 5-point index constructed by counting the number of authoritarian alternatives to which each respondent expressed opposition. A score of 0 on this index means no opposition, while a score of 4 means full opposition. On this index, the Mongolian people as a whole scored 2.7, indicating that the average Mongolian is detached from less than three of the four types of dictatorships surveyed. As Figure 6 shows, less than one-third (32%) is fully detached from the virtues of authoritarian regimes by expressing opposition to all four types. Nearly two-fifths (39%), on the other hand, remain attached to two or more types of dictatorship. These findings suggest that most Mongolians have yet to detach themselves from authoritarianism even after a decade of democratic rule.

(Figure 6 here)
Overall Commitment to Democracy

For a new democracy to consolidate completely, a large majority of its citizens have to embrace its ideals and practices fully while rejecting all the virtues of authoritarian rule. Especially in former communist countries like Mongolia, the norms and values associated with the totalitarian past may persist, linger, or remain endemic in the political consciousness of the mass public (Drakulic 1990). Since cultural norms associated with the hierarchical order of the communist past may render full commitment to democratic values as fleeting and unstable, the mass public may concurrently espouse varying levels of commitments to democracy and authoritarianism. It is, therefore, necessary to discern the modal pattern of democratic and antiauthoritarian orientations among the Mongolian people and to determine the degree to which Mongolian democracy is culturally consolidated.

In Figure 7, we identified seven distinct patterns of regime orientations by asking how deep democratic attachment is and how complete authoritarian detachment is. The seven patterns are: (1) very strong supporters who reject all four authoritarian regimes and accept democracy to the fullest or nearest fullest extent; (2) strong supporters who reject all four authoritarian regimes and accept democracy considerably more than half-way; (3) moderate supporters who reject all four authoritarian alternatives but accept democracy less than half-way; (4) skeptical supporters who reject all those alternatives but accept democracy minimally; (5) weak opponents who remain attached to one of the non-democratic alternatives while accepting democracy more than minimally; (6) strong opponents who remain attached to two or more authoritarian alternatives while refusing to accept democracy or accepting it minimally; and (7) the incoherent who are highly mixed in their orientations toward democracy and authoritarianism.

(Figure 7 here)
The most striking feature of the data presented in Figure 7 is that a plurality (38%) of Mongolians is incoherent in terms of regime preferences. The incoherent are followed by weak opponents (25%), very strong supporters (15%), strong supporters (11%), moderate supporters (5%), strong opponents (5%), and skeptical supporters (1%). It is a cause of concern that one-quarter of Mongolians falls into the category of weak opponents, who show an attachment for one non-democratic alternative while accepting democracy minimally. When these weak opponents of democracy are considered together with strong opponents and skeptical supporters, citizens with totalitarian predispositions and susceptibilities account for close to one-third of respondents (31%). These Mongolians who are yet to be convinced of the virtues of democracy are as numerous as those who support it very strongly, strongly, or moderately. On the whole, the Mongolian people are almost evenly divided into the three broad groups of the incoherent, the uncommitted, and the committed to democracy. From these findings, it is apparent that Mongolia typifies a nation whose citizenry is far from being deeply and unconditionally committed to the ideals and practices of democratic politics.

The Future of Mongolian Democracy

Now that the quality of the current regime as a democracy has been assessed and the commitment of the citizenry to democracy has been examined, it is imperative to explore what sorts of change Mongolians anticipate in their democratic political system. Are they optimistic or pessimistic about the consolidation of their nascent democracy? To address this question, we compared each respondent’s current and future regime ratings on the 10-point ladder scale. More than three in four Mongolians (78%) expect their political system to become more democratic, while only one in seventeen (6%) expects it to become less democratic in five years. In addition, one in fifteen (7%) expects no significant change in either direction. In Mongolia today, the optimists who expect further progress in their democracy outnumber those who do not by a large
margin of 6 to 1. These results symbolize the ingrained optimistic outlooks about the permanence of democratic rule among Mongolians despite the shallowness in their understanding of and commitment to democracy.

To analyze the nature of Mongolians’ democratic optimism and pessimism, Table 6 summarizes their current and future regime ratings in terms of the four regime categories discussed earlier. It also reports the means of those ratings on the 10-point ladder scale. According to the means reported in the table, the Mongolian people as a whole anticipate significant improvements in the advancement of their new democracy. On the 10-point scale, they expect the system to progress toward an advanced democracy by 1.4 points from 6.6 to 8.0 in the next five years. Nearly two-fifths (38%) think that five years from now they will live in an advanced democracy. This percentage represents more than a two-fold increase from the current 15 percent who placed their present regime in the same category of advanced democracy. Those who think they currently live in a soft or hard authoritarian regime would decrease from 25 percent to a future 6 percent if Mongolians’ expectations are fulfilled. Those who think they live in a limited democracy would also decrease from 55 percent to 46 percent. In fact, four in five Mongolians (84%) believe that in five years, they will live in a limited or an advanced democracy.

(Table 6 here)

What specific patterns of democratic progression and regression do the Mongolians expect in the next five years? To explore this question concerning the exact nature of expected regime change, we classified Mongolians’ current and future regime ratings into the four aforementioned regime categories, ranging from hard authoritarianism to advanced democracy. A comparison of these categories yielded seven patterns of expected regime change: (1) authoritarian persistence; (2) limited democratic transition; (3) advanced democratic transition; (4) authoritarian reversal; (5) democratic persistence; (6) democratic progress; and (7) democratic consolidation.
Of these seven patterns reported in Figure 8, the persistence of limited democracy is the most popular with a majority of 29 percent. This pattern is followed by that of continuing democratic progress from a limited democracy to an advanced democracy. More than one-fifth (22%) expects this change. A third popular pattern is to transform authoritarian rule into a limited democracy. About one-seventh (15%) anticipates this pattern. Relatively small minorities of less than 10 percent, on the other hand, expect the consolidation of limited democracy (9%), the transition to full democracy (6%), the reversal to authoritarian rule (3%), and the persistence of authoritarian rule (3%). Most notable of these findings is that nearly two in five Mongolians (37%) expect substantial democratic progress in the next five years.

(Figure 8 here)

Conclusion

Mongolia represents an East Asian case of double transition featuring political democratization and economic marketization. Unlike other third-wave democracies in the region, the country has undergone the democratization of communist one-party rule into a multi-party competitive system while transforming a planned economy into a free market economy. As many scholars (Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 1996; Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer 1998) point out, the totalitarian nature of the communist past and the financial burdens of market reform in former communist countries pose special obstacles to the process of consolidating Mongolia’s democratic rule.

Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, Mongolia does not have the cultural legacy of vibrant civil society (Clearly 1995). Nor does it have the institutional legacy of checking and mitigating constitutional abuses by the state. Introducing democracy without the modern institutions of civil society and the rule of law, therefore, makes Mongolia the best example of backward democratization in East Asia. As Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin (2001) point out, Mongolia
belongs to the group of third-wave democracies that can be haunted by the “specter of nonconsolidation.”

Although Mongolian democracy appears to be sturdy, our analysis of the 2003 EAB survey reveals that it is far from being a consolidated democracy. A substantial majority of the citizenry is not capable of understanding the liberal or substantive notion of democracy or recognizing the occurrence of the democratic regime change from communist rule, which occurred more than a decade ago. Furthermore, an equally large majority is not yet fully detached from the virtues of authoritarian rule. As a result, a plurality of the Mongolian population remains incoherent when making a regime choice between democracy and its alternatives. Only a small minority is unqualified in embracing democracy as the most preferred regime.

In the eyes of a large majority, moreover, most officials of the national and local governments are engaged in corrupt and other illegal practices. Yet this majority remains, by and large, satisfied with the way the current regime performs as a democracy, and it expects the regime to become more democratic in the near future. Such uncritical citizen views of Mongolian democracy coupled with a large dose of optimism about its future can create an equilibrium in which a low level of public demand for democracy accompanies an equally low level of elite supply of it. Such a low-level democratic equilibrium may pose Mongolia’s biggest obstacle to its further development into a complete democracy.
Endnotes

1 Reported in Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2000 survey, Annex 4, question 11.

2 Reported in the 2000 Mongolian Judicial Reform project survey conducted in conjunction with the Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.


5 According to the EAB survey, 64.8% of the Mongolian public trust the military, while a significant minority (34.3%) perceives it as an untrustworthy institution. Refer to Table 5 for citizen trust percentages concerning political, governmental, and private institutions.

6 The Oppositionist Democratic Party, for instance, has a rightist wing that calls for the abridgment of civil liberties on a law and order platform of governance.
References


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Mongolian Judicial Reform Project survey 2000, in conjunction with the Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry survey.


*British Journal of Political Science* 24 (2): 159-182.


Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


32(6):506-520.

Figure 1  Awareness of Democracy

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia.

Figure 2  Attachment to the Notion of Liberal Democracy

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia.
Table 1  Perceptions of the Past and Current Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Types</th>
<th>Past Regime</th>
<th>Current Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard Authoritarianism</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Authoritarianism</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Democracy</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Democracy</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mean on a 10-point scale) (3.7) (6.6)

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia

Table 2  Patterns of Perceived Regime Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patterns</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Reversal</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Persistence</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Liberalization</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Democratic Transition</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Democratic Transition</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Persistence</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia
Table 3  Perceived Consequences of Democratic Regime Change for Political and Policy Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Positive Change (A)</th>
<th>Negative Change (B)</th>
<th>PDI score (B-A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Association</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
<td>+79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Speech</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>85.6%</td>
<td>+80.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Treatment</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>+16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Influence</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>+27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>+22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(average scores)</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
<td>(.90)</td>
<td>(15.4)</td>
<td>(60.6)</td>
<td>(+45.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticorruption</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>-.70</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>-48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>+40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Equality</td>
<td>-.86</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>-53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(average scores)</td>
<td>(-0.28)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(46.3)</td>
<td>(30.1)</td>
<td>(-16.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia

Table 4  Types of Democratic Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Democratic Citizenship</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Incapable</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitively Capable</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behaviorally Capable</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia
Table 5  Levels of Trust in Public and Private Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Regarded as Not Trustworthy</th>
<th>Regarded as Trustworthy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Commission</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia

Figure 3  Favorable Orientations to Democracy

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia
**Figure 4  Overall Level of Democratic Support**

![Bar chart showing the overall level of democratic support with a mean of 2.9.]

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia

**Figure 5  Opposition to Non-Democratic Alternatives**

![Bar chart showing opposition to various non-democratic alternatives.]

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia
Figure 6  Overall Levels of Opposition to Non-Democratic Alternative

![Bar chart showing the percentage of people opposed to non-democratic alternatives.](chart1.png)

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia

Figure 7  Types of Support for or Opposition to Democracy

![Bar chart showing the degree of support and opposition.](chart2.png)

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia
### Table 6 Comparing the Current and Future Levels of Democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Classification</th>
<th>Current Regime Assessment</th>
<th>Future Regime Assessment</th>
<th>Expected Net Change in Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard Authoritarianism</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft Authoritarianism</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>-16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Democracy</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Democracy</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>+22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean on a 10 point scale: (6.6), (8.0), (1.4)

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia

### Figure 8 Patterns of Expected Regime Change

1=Authoritarian Persistence, 2=Limited Democratic Transition, 3=Full Democratic Transition, 4=Authoritarian Reversal, 5=Democratic Stagnation, 6=Democratic Development, 7=Democratic Consolidation, 8=Others

Source: 2003 East Asia Barometer Survey in Mongolia
Asian Barometer Survey
A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

Working Paper Series


Asian Barometer
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The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen’s political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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