




A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Working Paper Series: No.1

Confucianism and Democracy: Empirical Study of
Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

The seal of National Taiwan University, which is a circular emblem containing a stylized figure or symbol, surrounded by a decorative border.

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Confucianism and Democracy: An Empirical Study of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong

Introduction

The overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 triggered the third world-wide wave of democratization. Originating in Southern Europe the wave spread to Latin America and Asia in the 1980s reaching Eastern Europe and most of Africa in the 1990s.¹ Observing that formerly communist Eastern Europe and third world totalitarian regimes filled the resulting ideological vacuum of their collapse with liberal democratic regimes instead of undemocratic alternatives, liberals assumed, optimistically as later events proved, that liberal democratic regimes are extensively recognized as the only viable regime for modern societies.² Francis Fukuyama even predicts that the history of human beings is ending as the era of ideological bipolarity passes; that in the absence of other ideologies, not only have western liberal democratic regimes emerged as the dominant form of human organization, we cannot envisage any future alternative.³

Nevertheless, the third wave of democratization is not a significant trend in East Asia. The constant promotion of economic development combined with nationalism has led undemocratic countries in East Asia to challenge the western notion of basic human rights and question whether further democratization is necessary. Thus, they advocate “Asian values”, or new authoritarianism, which resist the liberal democratic ideas of western society. Publicly, East Asian political leaders claim that it is not necessary for third world countries to follow the model of western development; on the contrary, there is an alternative Asian model of political

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 15.

² Marc F. Plattner, "The Democratic Moment," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 30.

³ Fukuyama Francis, *The End History and The Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 45.

economic development.⁴ Add to this East-West contrast Samuel P. Huntington's thesis that post-Cold war conflicts will increasingly be the result of different cultures instead of ideologically or economically derived, and it is clear that the conflict over development and democratization impacts on the peace and order of the future international community.

Will Asian values threaten the third wave of global democratization? First, Amartya Sen argues that democracy is a cosmopolitan value. It is inappropriate for influential political figures in East Asia to deliberately advocate Asian values or an Asian development model as unsuitable for democratic development. Instead, their purpose is merely to counteract increasing domestic pressures for democratic reform and to re-label their undemocratic regimes "democratic".⁵ Second, in several East Asian countries, especially Taiwan, South Korea, Philippine, and Thailand, rapid economic growth altered other aspects of society; in particular capitalization, social circulation, improved education standards, and hierarchical power structures. These are the initial successes of democratic transformation.⁶ Clearly, traditional cultural elements do not prevent some East Asian countries from democratic transformations. However, as L. H. M. Lin and Chih-yu Shih point out, "Confucianism with a liberal face" is a more accurate description of East Asian democratization. These processes conflict with traditional social value systems in East Asia. Therefore, the outcome of the East Asian democratization is open-ended; currently it is neither liberal nor Confucian.⁷ Finally, is there a distinctive set of Asian values? The cultural heterogeneity of Asia makes it impossible

⁴ Alan Dupont, "Is There an 'Asian Way'," (*Survival*), vol.38, no. 2 (1996), pp 13-33.

⁵ Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," (*Journal of Democracy*), vol.10, no.3 (1999). P. 15.

⁶ According to O'Donnell, the third wave democratization must have two transition: the first is toward democratic government(or democratic transition), the others is toward democratic regime(or democratic consolidation). See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes", in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela(eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p.18.

⁷ L. H. M Ling and Chih-yu Shih, "Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan,"(*The Review of Politics*),vol. 60, no.1(1998),pp 55-82.

to cluster all the Asian countries together and assign it a collective identity. There is much more safe to talk about Confucian values, Buddhist values, etc.⁸

Therefore, what effects do Confucianism elements have on the second political transformation, namely, consolidating democracy, in East Asia countries? To answer this we must continue observing. The research theme of this paper is to understand how modernization and democratization pressures transform traditional Confucianism through the analysis of empirical data gathered in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. How does traditional Confucianism interact with the liberal democratic thoughts of western society? Moreover, will East Asian values or Confucianism become obstacles to democratic development?

Three Theoretical Perspectives

There are three main explanatory perspectives of how Confucianism interacts with modernization and democratization: they are discussed separately under the labels of Modernization, cultural relativism, and Communitarianism.

Modernization

Modernizationists believe that the bias between eastern and western cultures will eventually disappear through the processes of global modernization and democratization. They also believe that liberal democratic regimes will replace other forms of political regimes and in turn become the best and only option. Francis Fukuyama argues that any changes in political institutions (the upper structure) will not by any means damage the integrated Confucian social order (the lower structure). Confucian-culture can combine with authoritarianism or

⁸ Donald K. Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate," (*Journal of Democracy*), vol. 6, no. 4(1995), pp 95-105; Yi-Huah Jiang, "Asian Values and Communitarian Democracy," paper presented at the *International Workshop on Deliberating the 'Asian Value Debate: National Values, Chinese Values and Muslim Values in Southeast Asia*, Taipei (1998), p. 18.

semi-authoritarianism, for example mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore; or they can combine with democratic regimes, such as Japan, Taiwan, and south Korea.⁹ Furthermore, Fukuyama argues that although Confucianism does not value individualism, it does value remarks, education, and mutual tolerance, all of which can be readily combined with democratic regimes.¹⁰ Therefore, Fukuyama proposes that the reason some East Asian countries will become democratic and others authoritarian lies in a most important element—the degree of modernization. Increasingly, research on democratization in East Asian countries demonstrates that the development of modernization and industrialization assist the development of democracy.¹¹ Robert A. Scalapino supports Modernization with similar reasoning. The development of East Asia economies, he argues, proceeds the distribution of social structure and high mobilization, all of which are beneficial to democratic development.¹²

The process of modernization in East Asia affects the outcome of democratization. In another approach, Plattner points out that democratic regimes are extensions of liberalism. This means that though the essentials of liberal thought in the East Asian region of the third wave democratization are explicitly weak, as an advocate of democratization, liberalism will continue to strengthen as the third wave expands. In contrast, the anti-liberal cultural tradition will wane.¹³ Although, as Gerald L. Curtis argues, civic culture in traditional East Asian society is not solid, as democratization proceeds in this region, it will rapidly cultivate a civic culture that will benefit democratic stability in East Asia.¹⁴

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," (*Journal of Democracy*), vol. 6, no.1(1995), p.12.

¹⁰ Francis Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy," (*Journal of Democracy*), vol. 6, no. 2(1995), pp 25-6.

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, "The Illusion of Asian Exceptionalism," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp 224-5.

¹² Robert A. Scalapino, "A Tale of Three Systems," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.). *Democracy in East Asia*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 230.

¹³ Marc F. Plattner, "From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy," (*Journal of Democracy*), vol. 10, no.3 (1999), pp 130-3.

¹⁴ Gerald L. Curtis, "A Recipe for Democratic Development," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 222.

Cultural Relativism

People who agree with cultural relativism argue that the East Asia have vivid paternalistic power and superior-inferior relations, which will never disappear with the modernization of the social economy.¹⁵ In contrast, rapid social economic shifts will result in an individual sense of insecurity, creating a new form of power-dependency.¹⁶ In addition, Huntington argues that Confucianism values group interests greater than individual interests, political authority more than individual freedoms, and social responsibility over individual rights. Meanwhile, Confucian society lacks traditions that guard against the consolidation of national power, and thus the concept of individual rights has never existed. Essentially, Confucian thought encourages social harmony and cooperation, prevents conflict, values the attainment of social order and maintains hierarchical social structures. More importantly, Confucian thought regards society and the country as identical, and thus leaves no space for autonomic social groups. These characteristics of traditional East Asian culture will not assist the development of democracy in the region.¹⁷

Fareed Zakaria, the executive editor of *Foreign Affairs*, proposes that even though East Asian countries can undergo a democratic transformation and constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism.¹⁸ Instead this region of the third wave will emerge as an essentially authoritarian illiberal political culture not western liberal democracy.

What is the essence of illiberal political culture? Daniel A. Bell proposes that this culture has three characteristics: the non-neutral state, techno-paternalism, and managed public

¹⁵Lucian W. Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society in Asia," in Robert I. Rotberg(ed.), *Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Historical Perspective*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 381.

¹⁶Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Culture Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 325.

¹⁷Samuel P.Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of Third Wave,"(*Journal of Democracy*), vol. 8, no. 4(1997), p. 10.

¹⁸Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," (*Foreign Affairs*), vol. 76, no. 6(1997), p.28.

space and dependent civil society. Where traditional western liberalism values the common right of the people to choose what kind of policy is the best for themselves, in a non-neutral state, the ruler speculates on which policies are necessary for the people; and as a result, attempts to intervene in any aspects of people's lives for the ruler's own reasons. Under techno-paternalism, the illiberal state develops technical bureaucracies for the promotion of rationality and law. Through these instruments the rulers manage the developing country in a similar manner to a firm. When the public space is managed and civil society dependent upon the State, civic activities are managed and controlled by the state, leaving few opportunities for the development of public space.¹⁹

Communitarianism

Both perspectives are in accordance with how traditional liberal democracy is used to evaluate the process of democratic consolidation in democratized countries in East Asia. However, the communitarian approach attempts to eliminate the liberal framework, they also seek democracy, but they acknowledge democracy differently from liberals. First of all, communitarian definitions of the role of the State conflict with the liberal tradition. According to the latter, the existence of the State is based grounded upon the social contract and individual values, and thus the aim of the State is to pursue and protect basic individual political rights. Meanwhile, the State becomes meaningless if it loses its role as a protector of individual values. On the contrary, communitarianism argues that society dwells within a collective value system and claims that the fulfillment of collective goals is a higher priority than individual interests. Thus society values national interests over those of individual citizens. The State exists for itself and the national interest and asks each citizen to sacrifice to meet the collective goal. Secondly, communitarianists tend to isolate the party politic as they view the party politic to be merely an institutional arrangement for a few politicians to pursue political

¹⁹Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David M. Jones, *Toward Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp 163-7.

power. Finally, communitarians are not interested in the “distribution of power” and liberal “checks and balances”, instead they desire high political participation from community members.²⁰

Recently communitarians have established that Confucian culture values deference to authority, communitarianism, cooperation, while valuing education, self-discipline and diligence, and respecting the established order, State, and older generations. These cultural characteristics are similar to those advocated by communitarianism especially as both reduce the relative importance of individualism. Hence, traditional Confucianism is not necessarily equipped with authoritarian characteristics; however, neither is it suitable for developing “notions of human rights” nor “the principles of democracy.”²¹ In reality, there are a number of ideas in Confucian thought, for example “people as the foundation” and “for the people,” that are similar to the notion of procedural democracy in western society.²² As a result, communitarianists suggest that Confucian culture and Asian values will provide a base from which to reinterpret the substantial definition of democracy. Thus, the product of third wave of democratization in East Asia will be similar to communitarianism democracy, transcending the “liberal democracy” of western society.

This paper aims to examine the three theoretical perspectives above. If the perspective of modernization is correct, the value of traditional social culture will decline rapidly and the

²⁰Henry Tam, *Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp 12-8.

²¹See Joanne R. Bauer, and Daniel A. Bell (eds.), *The East Asian Challenge for Human Right*.(Cambridge: Cambridge University,1999); Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Confucianism and Human Rights in China," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner(eds.), *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 42-56. W. M. Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu (eds.). *Confucianism and Human Rights* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Russell A. Fox, "Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Liberal Democracy," (*The Review of Politics*), vol. 59, no. 3(1997), pp 561-592; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *The Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China* (Chicago: Open Court. Hall & Ames, 1999).

²²Byung-Kook Kim, "Korea's Crisis of Success," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *Democracy in*

orientation of liberal democratic value will be reinforced through improved educational standards and generational replacement. However, if the perspective of cultural relativism is accurate, then modernization and the experience of democratization will have an ineffective influence on the formation of democratic political culture. Finally, if the perspective of communitarianism is most representative, such collective values will be combined with the notion of popular sovereignty as well as isolating the ideas of individual liberalism.

The Problem of Measurement

Our research includes political systems having different characteristics. The socialist regime in mainland China is characterized by a single-party system, a planned economy and public ownership of major means of production. Taiwan is a relatively open, increasingly competitive polity with a capitalist economy that has a strong manufacturing and export sector. Hong Kong is a colony and metropolis; it has a bureaucracy that is allegiant to the British government and largely autonomous from society and that exercises minimum control over its citizenry and over its export-oriented economy. The research design will allow us to explore the effects of system type(that is, modernization, institution and traditional culture) upon democratic values. Because the three systems vary so greatly, at this level of analysis our study should not be considered a multivariate study but a comparative case study. Within the limits of this method, we will be able to compare how system type affects the ways in which various independent variables impact on culture.

The empirical data of this paper is derived from a transnational research project which was carried simultaneously in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong by two authors of this paper and other eight scholars in 1993.²³

East Asia (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.128.

²³They are Fu Hu, Huoyan Shyu, Ming-tong Chen, Andrew Nathan, Tianjian Shi, Hsin-chin Kuan, Siu-kai Lai, James Tong. About our sample design, see Yun-han Chu and Yu-tzung Chang, "Culture Shift and Political Stability: Comparative Studies in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong," in Shing Hua (ed.). *China Political Culture*. (New York: M. E. Sharp, 2001), pp. 320-347; Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Values and Political Trust: A

Confucian Values

According to the classification of Weiming Tu, Francis Fukuyama divides Confucian thoughts into two categories: political Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics. Political Confucianism emphasizes Imperial and gentry power, which together define a ruling social hierarchy as the upper structure of society. In a different perspective, Confucian personal ethics stress family values and a system of personal ethics; this is the true essence of Confucian culture. The Confucian personal ethic states that it is necessary to obey family elders. It also stresses that one's personal behavior must honor the ancestors. In order to not humiliate family members, it is often even necessary to take on the responsibility of "breeding." In one's social life it is necessary to follow the opinions of the elders. Moreover, Confucian ethics advocate that people should respect the older generation and successful people, and by doing so encourage a harmonious and cooperative society. Accordingly, this paper intends to use five questions to measure the degree of traditional Confucian culture in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. To facilitate statistical analysis, each question will have five possible responses: "highly disagree" for 1 point, "disagree" for 2 points, "agree" for 3 points, "highly agree" for 4 points, and "have no idea" for 2.5 points. The accumulated results constitute an important indicator of the influence of traditional Confucian thought. The higher the scores are, the more traditionally Confucian people's thoughts tend to be. Consequently, the lower the scores, the less people tend to have traditionally Confucian thoughts

The outcome of the statistical analysis is presented as Table 1. It is necessary to point out that this paper divides the samples in Mainland China into two groups: an urban sample and a total sample (including urban households and rural households). The purpose here is to compare the influence that the degree of modernization has on the orientation of values. The

Comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan,"(*Comparative Politics*), vol. 33, no. 4 (2001).

degree of modernization is ordered by sample starting from the highest degree: Hong Kong, urban regions in Mainland China, Taiwan, and the rural regions of Mainland China. The degree of democratization is the same as the order of modernization.

Table 1 shows that the indicator, “daughter-in-law should obey her mother-in-law,” is highly related to the degree of modernization, but not to democratization. Rural regions in Mainland China supported this perspective most, followed by Taiwan, then urban Mainland China, with Hong Kong least. Their average scores were 2.58, 2.52, 2.40, and 2.32. Another indicator, “doing honor to ancestors,” is irrelevant to the degree of modernization and democratization. Samples in Taiwan and rural mainland China supported this indicator most, urban mainland China third, with Hong Kong least again. Respectively, their average scores were 2.46, 2.43, 2.29, and 2.15. The indicator, “being expecting, having a boy is better than a girl,” is related little to the degree of modernization and irrelevant to democratization. Under the policy of “giving birth to only one child,” the sample from rural mainland China supported this perspective, but people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and urban mainland China did not support it. Their average scores were 2.90, 2.82, 2.71, and 2.42. The indicator, “encountering conflicts, people should ask for intervention from the old generation,” fully corresponds to the degree of modernization but not to democratization. People in rural mainland China supported this perspective a lot, then Taiwan, followed by urban mainland China, and trailed by Hong Kong. Their average scores are 2.90, 2.82, 2.71, and 2.42. Finally, the indicator, “obeying others,” is irrelevant to the degree of modernization and democratization. People in Hong Kong support this perspective a lot, then rural regions in mainland China, third is Taiwan, and then urban mainland China. Their average scores were 2.73, 2.64, 2.51, and 2.47; note the values are very similar.

To sum up, from the measurements of these five indicators, it is clear that the process of democratization does influence the shift of core Confucian values. However, traditional

Confucian values are not weakened by the process democratization, because the Taiwanese sample, as the first practicing democracy, is very similar to the rural regions of mainland China on these five indicators. While Hong Kong is more similar to urban mainland China. On the other hand, although the samples indicate that traditional Confucian values weaken with the degree of modernization, it is not comprehensive. Take for example the indicators “being expecting, having a boy is better than a girl” and “thinking for others.” Hong Kong, the highly modernized region, does not score low, while rural regions in mainland China do not score high in every indicator measuring Confucian values.

Table 1. The analysis of measuring the indicators of Confucian values

Questions	Area	Hong Kong		Taiwan		Urban China		All China	
		Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Though there is an argument between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, a husband should encourage his wife to obey his mother.		2.32	0.58	2.52	.65	2.40	.59	2.58	.60
The diligence of a person is to do honor to his ancestors.		2.29	0.55	2.46	.61	2.15	.46	2.43	.54
If you can only have one child, having a boy is better than a girl.		2.16	0.55	2.13	.64	2.04	.48	2.31	.61
Encountering conflicts, people should ask for intervention from the old generation.		2.42	0.59	2.82	.60	2.71	.57	2.90	.50
When one’s opinions are different from others’, the best way is to obeying others.		2.73	0.56	2.51	.62	2.47	.56	2.64	.53
	N	892		1402		705		3296	

Democratic notions

This paper will develop an orientation of values of five power structure relationships according to Professor Hu Fu’s position of constitutional liberalism as the indicators for

measuring democratic notions.²⁴ First of all, among democratic regimes, relationships between members are founded on the basis of equal relations; meaning all people should be treated equally and share the same power regardless of race, gender, education, wealth, religion, class, and social background. However, in many societies, the majority of people believe in hierarchical social relations. Particular individuals have greater political status and can isolate others from the right to participate in political affairs. Moreover, in democratic countries, the government should be responsible for its citizens, for the power of government comes from the agreement of the people. In contrast, the majorities in many societies cannot accept the design that the people control the government, as they fear this arrangement will cause chaos and instability. Thirdly, in traditionally western liberal democratic thought, State power is limited; an individual acting within his or her private rights is outside of jurisdiction of the State, especially the rights (freedoms) of speech, action and exorbitance. In some societies, however, most people are not cognizant of these passive rights or freedoms. Thus the state will intrude upon the individual rights of freedom as it wishes. Fourthly, in western democratic countries, most people believe that society has the right of spontaneous association, and that the state is unable to limit this right with the excuse that it threatens social stability. However, in certain societies, most people agree that the state can interfere with the constitution and intervene in the operation of civil society to preserve social stability and cooperation. Finally, western democratic regimes stress the principle of institutionalized checks and balances to prevent the State from abusing its power. Nevertheless, in some societies, most people believe that it is necessary to give more power to the state to strengthen its ability to intervene in society.

The discussion above highlights five discernible principles: “political equality,” “Popular sovereignty,” “political liberty,” “political pluralism,” and “separation of powers.” Each of the above indicators is represented by one question. As in the previous section, there are

²⁴ See Fu Hu, *Political Culture and Political Life* (Taipei: Sun-ming, 1998). (in Chinese)

five available responses to each question: “highly disagree” for 4 points, “disagree” for 3 points, agree ” for 2 points, “highly agree” for 1 point, and “have no idea” for 2.5 points. The higher the accumulated scores, the more democratic people’s notions tend to be, and the lower the scores, the less democratic they are.

The results of the statistical analysis from the above questions are presented as Table 2. In Table 2, the indicator, “the principle of political equality,” is irrelevant to the degree of modernization, but related to the degree of democratization. Among these four samples, Taiwan’s society supported the right of equality most, followed by Hong Kong, trailed by both urban and rural mainland China. Their average scores were 2.81, 2.68, 2.32, and 2.31. The second indicator, “popular sovereignty,” is partially related to the degree of modernization and democratization. Hong Kong supported this indicator most, then Taiwan, followed by urban mainland China and rural mainland China. Their average scores are 2.81, 2.68, 2.32, 2.19 and they are substantially different from each other. The indicator “political liberty” is somewhat related to the degree of modernization and democratization. People in Hong Kong supported this indicator most, then Taiwan, followed again by urban mainland China, and rural mainland China. Their average scores were 2.75, 2.67, 2.48, and 2.31. The fourth indicator, “political pluralism,” is irrelevant to the degree of modernization and democratization. People in Hong Kong supported this indicator the most, then urban and rural mainland China, trailed by Taiwan. Their average scores are 2.54, 2.46, 2.43, and 2.33. They are close to each other. The last indicator, “separation of powers,” is irrelevant to the degree of modernization and democratization. The sample from urban mainland China supported this indicator the most, followed by rural mainland China, then Hong Kong, and least Taiwan. They are also close to each other.

The degree of democratization in Taiwan was the highest amongst these four regions. However, in two indicators, “popular sovereignty” and “political liberty”, Taiwan is inferior to

Hong Kong. When compared on “political pluralism” and “separation of powers” Taiwan is not only inferior to Hong Kong but to mainland China as well. This is not difficult to explain. Though Hong Kong is a semi-democracy, it has possessed rights of freedom and plurality for many years, while democracy in Taiwan is relatively recent. Moreover, during the process of democratization Taiwan had a number of unpleasant experiences, including social demonstrations when democratization began. In addition, the constant chaos within the Legislative Yuan makes it difficult for Taiwanese to believe that Taiwan’s parliament is part of a system of institutional checks and balances. While in Hong Kong and mainland China the administration dominates the legislature and does complement it. As a result, institutionalized checks and balances remain nonexistent and people are unable to appreciate the positive effects of such an arrangement.

Table 2. The analysis of measuring the indicators of democratic values

Questions	Area		Hong Kong		Taiwan		Urban China		All China	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
The higher the degree of education people have, the more rights of speech and politics they tend to have.	2.54	0.64	2.66	.66	2.40	.50	2.24	.45		
The head of government is like the parents in a big family, everything should lie on their decision.	2.81	0.58	2.68	.63	2.32	.54	2.19	.47		
The government can determine whether an opinion is allowed to be available in society or not.	2.75	0.56	2.67	.58	2.48	.54	2.31	.46		
If the government is usually controlled by parliament, it will never become a big government.	2.54	0.57	2.33	.59	2.46	.54	2.43	.48		
N	892		1402		705		3296			

Communitarianism

The organization of a modern democratic political community is composed of two parts: the existential and the compositional. According to western liberal democratic tradition, the reason that a State exists lies in a social contract on individual values, where the aim of the State is to pursue and protect basic individual political rights. A state will have no reason to exist if it is unable to protect these rights. In contrast, certain societies stress communitarian values and strongly advocate the fulfillment of collective goals over individual interests. As a result, everything is subordinated to national interests. Thus, the State exists for itself and requires each person to sacrifice for the collective good. Compositionally, the western liberal democratic tradition views the constitution of the modern state as being founded on voluntarism, and therefore respects the individual right of self-determination. If necessary, individuals are able to agree to minority rights and different sovereign conditions over part of a territory, especially when it is clear that the population is not homogenous. This is substantially different from modern nationalism, especially in newly decolonized countries. Modern nationalism requires “complete territorial sovereignty” and “national unification” thus the territory’s sovereignty, physical cohesion, or legal status cannot be compromised by segregation or separation.

Building on this discussion, this paper adopts two questions to measure communitarianism. Again each question has five possible ranked responses: “highly disagree” for 4 points, “disagree” for 3 points, “agree ” for 2 points, “highly agree” for 1 point, and “have no idea” for 2.5 points. The weighting on the answers to the second question will be reversed: “highly disagree” for one point, “disagree” for 2 points, “agree ” for 3 points, “highly agree” for 4 points, and “have no idea” for 2.5 points. The higher the accumulated score the greater the communitarian position of the sample and vice-versa.

The statistical analysis of the responses is presented as Table 3. In Table 3, the “the

priority of national interest” indicator is irrelevant to the degree of modernization but partially related to democratization. Both samples from urban and rural mainland China had strong notions of collectivism, especially in urban regions, their average score was 3.09 and 2.93 respectively. In contrast both samples from highly democratized Taiwan and Hong Kong achieved substantially lower scores, 2.30 and 2.28 respectively. Similarly, the “unification” indicator is unrelated to the degree of modernization and somewhat related to the degree of democratization. Again both urban mainland China rated highly with a score of 3.13 while the total score of mainland China was 2.99. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong achieved slightly lower scores, 2.84 and 2.81 respectively.

Table 3. The analysis of measuring the indicators of Communitarianism

Questions	Area	Hong Kong		Taiwan		Urban China		All China	
		Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
The individuals come first and then the countries appear.		2.28	0.58	2.30	.70	3.09	.48	2.93	.51
The country is founded on the individual.									
The country is a big family, and even the ethnic minority should not press for separation.		2.81	0.53	2.84	.56	3.13	.47	2.99	.45
	N	892		1402		705		3296	

Socioeconomic Background, Confucian values, Communitarianism and Democratic Values

In order to confirm the structural relationships between Confucian values and democratic consciousness, this paper will use a multiple-regression statistical model to analyze the data. Regarding the choice of explanatory variables, this paper addresses the following concerns. Firstly, can differences in socioeconomic background, such as gender, age, education and degree of modernization indicators, account for the different levels of democratic

consciousnesses? Secondly, are communitarianism and democratic ideals interlinked? Thirdly, will East-Asian traditional culture become an obstacle to the development of democratic consciousness?

The Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and Liberal Democratic Consciousness

Table 4 displays how socioeconomic background, Confucian values and communitarianism account for the varying levels of democratic consciousness across samples. In the multiple-regression model, we find that these independent variables can explain the degree (high or low) of democratic consciousness. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan explain more than 20 percent variances (Adjusted R^2 are .223 and .205 respectively), and while the explanation does not fit China as well, urban China is more related than rural China (Adjusted R^2 are .187 and .139). Here we have ranked the independent variables in terms of their affect on democratic consciousness: Confucian values, years of education, presence of communism, age, and gender. As for Confucian values, the Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and the entirety of China are -.246, -.258, -.295 and -.307 respectively. This means that the more Confucian values the less the liberal democratic consciousness. In contrast, the less Confucian values the greater democratic consciousness. This mirrored by years of education. Here Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and the entirety of China are .281, .198, .106 and .116 respectively. Indicating that people who have less years of education will tend to have less democratic consciousness. Again, in contrast, people with longer education will tend to have more democratic consciousness. As for communitarianism, though it cannot explain the affect on Hong Kong and urban China, it can explain Taiwan and the results for all of China. The Beta coefficients of Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and total China are -.057, -.130, -.067 and -.105. Indicating that in general people who are apt to be more communitarian will have less democratic consciousness, and

accordingly, people who are less apt to be communitarian will have more democratic consciousness. Age is an effective variable; except for Hong Kong it can explain Taiwan, urban China and total China. Their respective Beta coefficients are -.045, -.076, -.187 and -.063. On the other hand, people who are substantially older will have less democratic consciousness and the youth will have more. Gender is a little effective explanation power; except for Hong Kong and Whole China, it can explain Taiwan, and urban China. Their respective Beta coefficients are .049, .076, .109 and .016. In the other words, males have more democratic consciousness than females.

Table 4: Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and Democratic values: multiple regression analysis

Regions Independent Variables	Dependent variable : Democratic values							
	Hong Kong		Taiwan		Urban(China)		Whole China	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (male)	.049	.111	.076**	.095	.109**	.094	.016	.043
Age	-.045	.005	-.076*	.004	-.187***	.003	-.063***	.001
Years of education	.281***	.014	.198***	.012	.106**	.008	.116***	.005
communitari anism	-.057	.070	-.130***	.050	-.067	.064	-.105***	.029
Confucian values	-.246***	.035	-.258***	.029	-.295***	.032	-.307***	.013
Adjusted R ²	.223		.205		.187		.139	
N	877		1383		705		3294	

* Signif. LE .05, ** Signif. LE .01, *** Signif. LE .001

Note 1: Sex is a dummy variable.

Note 2 : All independent variables pass the Mullicollinearity and outlier test.

Although it is clear Confucian values and communism hinders the development of democracy, will they interfere in general or just in particular aspects of democratic consciousness? In order to examine whether the process of modernization, democratization, the Confucian value system and communitarianism are combined with constitutional democracy in some conditions, we will now use the previous explanatory variables and five dimensions of power relations to be the dependent variables.

Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and the Principles of Political Equality

Table 5 presents how socioeconomic background, Confucian values and communitarianism explains the various conditions of equal political rights. In the multiple-regression model, we find that these independent variables adequately explain the different positions on equal rights. Their affect on Hong-Kong and Taiwan is greater than 10 percent variances(Adjusted R^2 are .113 and .108), however their explanatory affect on China is much less (Adjusted R^2 of urban and all China is .063 and .069). Among these independent variables, the most influential is Confucianism (especially in China), followed by years of education (particularly Hong-Kong and Taiwan), age (notably Taiwan), while communitarianism and gender have no explanatory power. With Confucian values, the respective Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and all China are -.180, -.127, -.203 and -.228 respectively. This indicates that more Confucian values one has, the less equal political rights one will have, and the less Confucian values, the more equal political rights. As for education, the respective Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and all China are .214, .157, .044 and .076. This means that fewer years of education are mirrored by less equal political rights, and the more years of education, the more equal political rights are. The age indicator cannot explain Hong-Kong, urban China and all China, with the exception of Taiwan. The Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and the entirety of China are -.020, -.126, -.066 and -.025 respectively. This means that the older one is, the less equal political rights they will have, and in contrast, the younger one is, the more equal political rights.

Table5: Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and Political Equality: multiple-regression analysis

Regions	Dependent variable: equal rights							
	Hong Kong		Taiwan		Cities and towns in China		Whole China	
Independent Variables	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (male)	.037	.042	.044	.035	.054	.037	.003	.016
Age	-.020	.002	-.126***	.001	-.066	.001	-.025	.001
Years of Education	.214***	.005	.157***	.004	.044	.003	.076***	.002
Communitarianism	-.016	.026	.022	.019	.035	.025	-.030	.011
Confucian values	-.180***	.013	-.127***	.011	-.203 ***	.013	-.228***	.005
Adjusted R ²	.113		.108		.063		.069	
N	877		1383		705		3294	

* Signif. LE .05, ** Signif. LE .01, *** Signif. LE .001

Note 1: Sex is a dummy variable.

Note 2 : All independent variables pass the Mullicollinearity and outlier test.

Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communism and the Principle of Popular Sovereignty

Table 6 presents how socioeconomic background, Confucian values and communitarianism explain the condition of popular sovereignty in each region. In the multiple-regression model, we find that these independent variables explain the different condition of popular sovereignty reasonably well. The explanatory power for Hong-Kong and Taiwan is more than 10 percent variances(Adjusted R² are .118 and .173), but the explanation is less effective for China (Adjusted R² of urban and all China are .077 and .080). Among these independent variables, the most explanatory is Confucian values (particularly in Taiwan and China), followed by years of education (especially in Hong Kong and Taiwan), and finally communitarianism (notably Taiwan and China). Age and gender have no explanatory effect. As for Confucian values, the Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and all China are -.178, -.264, -.190 and -.226 respectively. This indicates that the greater the Confucian values, the less aware of popular sovereignty, and the less Confucian values, the

greater the awareness of popular sovereignty. Regarding education, the Beta coefficients factors for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and all China are .206, .201, .094 and .082 respectively. This means that the shorter the education the less the appreciation of popular sovereignty, and vice-versa. As for communitarianism, it cannot explain the position of Taiwan, nor both Chinese samples, with the exception of Hong Kong. The Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China and all China are -.005, -.103, -.129 and -.113 respectively. This indicates that the greater the communitarian spirit, the smaller the consciousness of popular sovereignty, and in contrast, the smaller the communitarian spirit, the greater the awareness of popular sovereignty.

Table 6: Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and The Principle of Popular Sovereignty: multiple-regression analysis

Regions	Dependent variable: sovereign rights							
	Hong-Kong		Taiwan		Cities and towns in China		Whole China	
Independent Variables	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (male)	.040	.038	.047	.032	.086 *	.040	.021	.016
Age	-.047	.002	-.022	.001	-.086*	.001	-.066***	.001
Years of Education	.206***	.005	.201***	.004	.094*	.004	.082***	.002
Communitarianism	-.005	.024	-.103***	.017	-.129**	.027	-.113***	.011
Confucian values	-.178***	.012	-.264***	.010	-.190 ***	.013	-.226***	.005
Adjusted R ²	.118		.173		.077		.080	
N	877		1383		705		3294	

* Signif. LE .05, ** Signif. LE .01, *** Signif. LE .001

Note 1: Sex is a dummy variable.

Note 2 : All indepentent variables pass the Mullicollinearity and outlier test.

Socioeconomic Background, Confucianism, Communitarianism, and the Principle of Political Liberty

Table 7 measures the ability of economic and social backgrounds, Confucianism, Communitarianism to explain different perceptions of the political liberty. The statistical model

shows that these independent variables have some degree of explanatory power. Aside from the sample for all mainland China, the outcomes for the other three regions are over 10 percent variances (the Adjusted R^2 of Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban regions of China and the entire region of China are respectively .173, .148, .133 and .059). Of all the independent variables, Confucian value has the strongest explanatory power, followed by education, age, and the degree of Communitarianism. Gender is less useful. Confucianism was a good indicator in Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban mainland China, and the entire mainland China sample. Their Beta coefficients were respectively -.188, -.191, -.223 and -.184. This indicates that the greater their Confucianism values, the less conscious people are of the rights of freedom. The same property also holds in reverse: the weaker Confucian values, the more conscious of the rights of freedom. The length of education can also explain the position of all four samples. The Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban and all mainland China, are respectively .210, .230, .081 and .100. That is, the fewer the years of education, the less conscious of rights of freedom people are, and the greater the years of education, the more conscious of the rights of freedom. Age is not a good explanatory tool for Hong Kong and Taiwan but has some weight with the samples from urban and all of mainland China. The Beta coefficients were respectively -.070, -.042, -.218 and -.045. In general the older a person is, the less consciousness of the rights of freedom. Also generally, the younger a person is the more consciousness of the rights of freedom. Finally, though Communitarianism can be used to explain the results in Taiwan (Beta = -.089) and the all mainland China sample (Beta = -.088), it was less useful for Hong Kong (Beta = -.023) and the urban mainland China sample (Beta = -.062). That is, the more communitarian people are, the less conscious of the rights of freedom they will be, and the less communitarian they are, the more conscious of the rights of freedom they will be.

Table 7: Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and The Principle of Political Liberty: multiple-regression analysis

regions Independent Variables	Dependent variable: Political Liberty							
	Hong Kong		Taiwan		China cities		Entire China	
	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Sex (M)	.023	.036	.003	.030	.013	.039	-.030	.016
Ages	-.070	.001	-.042	.001	-.218***	.001	-.045*	.001
Yrs of education	.210 ***	.005	.230***	.004	.081*	.003	.100***	.002
Communitar ianism	-.023	.023	-.089***	.016	-.062	.026	-.088***	.011
Confucianis m	-.188 ***	.011	-.191***	.009	-.223***	.013	-.184***	.005
Adjusted R ²	.137		.148		.133		.059	
N	877		1383		705		3294	

* Signif. LE .05, ** Signif. LE .01, *** Signif. LE .001

Note 1: Sex is a dummy variable.

Note 2 : All independent variables pass the Mullicollinearity and outlier test.

Socioeconomic Background, Confucianism, Communitarianism, and the Principles of Political Pluralism

Table 8 indicates the ability of economic and social backgrounds, Confucianism, Communitarianism to explain different levels of awareness of the principles of pluralist social rights. Through the statistical model, it is clear that these independent variables are poor explanations of pluralist rights, especially in mainland China (the Adjusted R² of Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban regions of China and the entire region of China are respectively .077, .050, .000 and .003). Among the independent variables, Confucian value has the richest explanatory power, followed by the years of education and Communitarianism. However, gender and age offer very little. Confucian values offer some explanatory weight in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but little for the urban and all mainland China samples. Their Beta coefficients are -.123, -.110, -.018 and -.033 respectively. These scores indicate that the greater Confucian values, the less conscious of socially pluralist rights people will be. Consequently the less likely it is that people have Confucianism values, the more likely it is they will be conscious of socially

pluralist rights. Years in education produced Beta coefficients of .199, .070, -.007 and .005 respectively. This indicates that fewer years spent in education correspond to a lower consciousness of pluralist social rights, and vice-versa, the greater years spent in education the more conscious people will be of pluralist social rights. While Communitarianism is a useful indicator of pluralist social rights in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but not in the samples from mainland China. Their Beta coefficients were -.047, -.154, -.060, -.065 respectively. Indicating that high communitarian values are matched by a lower consciousness of pluralist social rights, and the less communitarian people are, the more conscious the will be of pluralist social rights.

Table 8: Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and the Principles of Political Pluralism: multiple-regression analysis

regions	Dependent variable: Pluralist Social Rights							
	Hong Kong		Taiwan		Urban regions of PRC		Entire region of PRC	
Independent Variables	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Sex (m)	.050	.038	.089**	.032	.055	.041	.005	.017
Age	.003	.002	.013	.001	-.044	.001	-.013	.001
Yrs of education	.199 ***	.005	.070*	.004	-.007	.004	.005	.002
Communitarianism	-.047	.024	-.154***	.017	-.060	.035	-.065***	.012
Confucian value	-.123**	.012	-.110***	.010	.018	.014	-.033	.005
Adjusted R ²	.077		.050		.000		.003	
N	877		1383		705		3294	

* Signif. LE .05, ** Signif. LE .01, *** Signif. LE .001

Note 1: Sex is a dummy variable.

Note 2 : All indepedent variables pass the Mullicollinearity and outlier test.

Socioeconomic Backgrounds, Confucianism, Communitarianism, and the Principle of Separation of Powers

Table 9 indicates the relevance of economic and social backgrounds, Confucianism, Communitarianism to idea of Separation of power. The results of the multiple regressions indicate these independent variables are not very powerful as explanatory tools. This is

particularly true in Hong Kong and Taiwan and to a lesser extent in the two mainland samples. The adjusted R² of Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban mainland China and the entire region of China were respectively .020, .023, .060 and .054. Among these independent variables, Confucian value was the most explanatory followed by Communitarianism. However, sex, age and years of education were less so. In terms of the Confucian value variable, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and both mainland samples were affected; their Beta coefficients were respectively -.089, -.115, -.172 and -.188. That is, the stronger Confucianism is the less consciousness people will be of the principle of checks and balances. And vice-versa: the weaker Confucianism, the more conscious people will be of the principle of checks and balances. Finally, though Communitarianism is related in Hong Kong and Taiwan, in the regions of mainland China it has no explanatory power. Their Beta coefficients were -.093, -.099, .053 and .009 respectively. This indicates that the more communitarian people are, the less conscious of the principle of checks and balances. By the same token, the less communitarian people are, the more conscious of the principle of checks and balances.

Table 9: Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, Communitarianism and the Principles of Separation of Powers: multiple-regression analysis

regions	Dependent variable: Separation of Powers							
	Hong Kong		Taiwan		Cities of PRC		Entire regions of PRC	
Independent Variables	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Sex(M)	-.002	.038	.061*	.030	.075*	.037	.047**	.015
Age	-.003	.002	-.059	.001	-.064	.001	-.026	.001
Yrs of education	.051	.005	-.065	.004	.060	.003	.059**	.002
Communitarianism	-.093**	.024	-.099***	.016	.053	.025	.009	.011
Confucianism	-.089*	.012	-.115***	.009	-.172 ***	.012	-.188***	.005
Adjusted R ²	.020		.023		.060		.054	
N	877		1383		705		3294	

* Signif. LE .05, ** Signif. LE .01, *** Signif. LE .001

Note 1: Sex is a dummy variable.

Note 2 : All independent variables pass the Mullicollinearity and outlier test.

Conclusion

It is not surprising that traditional Confucian values appear strong in the face of democratization. Nevertheless, modernization processes will cause shifts in Confucian Values, but not comprehensively. In fact the effect is non-linear and immeasurably difficult to measure let alone predict. The long-term historical process has cultivated deeply entrenched traditional and cultural systems that hinder change, especially changes that directly contradict existing political institutions.²⁵ Brian Girvin even points out that when established political culture engages with certain pressure that forces it to change, a specific reaction will occur. The micro-level culture changes first, then the meso-level culture; and finally the macro-level culture that is composed of the values and symbols of collective goals. This latter structure is highly resilient as it is built on the beliefs of the entire society.²⁶

More importantly, as cultural relativists advocate, Confucian value and democratic consciousness are two mutually contradictory value systems. The results of this paper have shown that Confucian value is an obstacle to the development of political liberty and pluralism consciousness in East Asia. Confucian values feed anti-democratic sentiments and values based on unifying democratic aspects or on consciousness of different levels, for example the collective. As for the inference that the tradition of Eastern communitarianism will partially correspond to democratic notions, this paper has demonstrated that this view totally contradicts the conclusions drawn from the empirical data. Among these four regions mentioned above, people who tend towards Communitarian ideals are also more likely to subscribe to a partially democratic consciousness but not every level of democratic consciousness. This may be related to the traditional Chinese social view that only has the unifying ideas of “home” and

²⁵ Larry Diamond, "Political Culture and Democracy," in Larry Diamond (ed.), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 137.

²⁶ Brian Girvin, "Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture," in John R. Gibbins (ed), *Contemporary Political Culture* (London: Sage Publications, 1989), pp 34-6.

“country,” but no space for an independent civil society.²⁷

However, we do not have to be over pessimistic about the future of democracy in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. On one hand, the process of modernization will impact upon traditional values, evident in that highly modernized Hong Kong and Taiwan support Confucian value system less than mainland China. On the other hand, this paper has demonstrated that length of education and age also has an important role in the development of democratic consciousness, as education rises and average age declines, democratic consciousness increases. The same point holds in reverse: lower education plus higher average ages equals lower democratic consciousness. As Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China continue to make progress along the road to democratization these two factors will broaden the social, political and economic space necessary for the development of democracy.

²⁷ About comparing the civil society East and West, see Philippe C. Philippe C. "Civil Society East and West," in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien(eds.), *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,1997), pp. 239-62.

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Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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