



A Comparative Survey of

*DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT*

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Back from the Future: Ambivalence in Taiwan's  
Democratic Conditions



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# Asian Barometer

A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

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**Back from the Future:  
Ambivalence in Taiwan's Democratic Conditions**

Chih-yu Shih

**Abstract**

The paper presents the result of a series of survey data cluster analyses of pertaining especially to traditional value, authoritarian value and social cleavage on the one hand, and on the other hand, political efficacy and political style in Taiwan. There appear to be a variety of ways that democratic and non-democratic attitudinal traits can be combined into single personalities, suggesting that the political culture of democracy, however defined, cannot be a future destiny for Taiwan's constituency. The theory of democratic transition and consolidation that presumes this destiny could be misleading in looking for variables or factors that explain the emergence of stable democracy. Instead of seeing the chance for democratic destiny affected by attitudinal traits, this paper argues that one should look at democratization as the independent variable to explain the development of attitudes as dependent variables. The paper then explores the epistemological implications of this reversion of causal linkage--because the combination of traits is not externally determined and, once a personality type submerges, how each of these traits influences behavior is not externally determined, then the person's decision in each specific context is in him or herself the source of behavior. It is probably the postcolonial conditions of Taiwan that have rendered the direction of a number of clusters undecidable.

## Democracy as a Contested Field of Meaning

Echoing the modernization theory of earlier periods, studies of democratic transition as well as democratic consolidation implicitly consider indigenous political culture as a hindrance to democracy.<sup>1</sup> The whole notion of transition presupposes a local legacy to be transcended. Similarly, the nascent attention to consolidation alludes to the threat to democracy posed by the lingering local legacy. Even though the literature in some way recognizes the contribution of local cultural traits to the institutionalization of democratic government,<sup>2</sup> defined first in terms of periodic, competitive and fair elections and second as constitutionally limited government, local traits are generally understood as in need of transformation. While it is true that institutional democratization demands adjustment of local political culture, which typically honors some hierarchical order, the studies of transition and consolidation together close off the possibilities that the meaning of democracy can be opened for reinterpretation. In other words, democracy becomes a future destiny and therefore presumes a fixed, shared meaning among those countries where leaders and intellectuals designate one another as democracy. Given democracy's status of destiny in the political discourse on democracy, transition and consolidation are almost unavoidable premises of one's research agenda. This is why when democratization runs into practical difficulties, it is always the local condition, instead of democracy, to which democracy scholars assign responsibility.

This paper addresses the issue of democracy in Taiwan by looking at it from the vantage point of local conditions rather than viewing the local conditions from a universal democracy's perspective. It does not take democracy as a definite destiny for Taiwan's political future to the extent that democratization has created different meanings. Democracy as a destiny is increasingly obscure.<sup>3</sup> In Taiwan, political development has witnessed a process of de-constitutionalization whereby popularly elected political leaders openly denounce constitutional structures, refuse to abide by legislative sovereignty, and expand Presidential power through extra-constitutional mechanisms, particularly populist mobilization. Theoretically, Taiwan appears to be a perfect place for scholars on democratic consolidation.<sup>4</sup> By studying what lingering cultural traits continue to drag democratization, presumably one should be able to diagnose the problems and prescribe institutional solutions. Accordingly, one should study which cultural traits cause the problems by correlating the traits with lack of efficacy, authoritarian personality, or poor democratic performance. Identifying the problematic factors is the core of consolidation scholarship.

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<sup>1</sup> Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian rule: comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Larry Diamond et al (eds.), *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Andrew Nathan, *China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Lucian Pye, *The Mandarin and the Cadre: Chinese Political Culture* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Daniel Bell, *East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Zhao Suisheng (ed.), *China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for Democratic China* (London: Routledge, 2000); Chih-yu Shih, *Collective Democracy: Political and Legal Reform in China* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press of Hong Kong, 1999).

<sup>3</sup> Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's Unique Challenge" in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), *Democracy in East Asia*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

<sup>4</sup> Hung-mao Tien (ed.), *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave* (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1996) ; Shelley Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy* (New York : Routledge, 1999); Bruce J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (Oxford, U.K. : Oxford University Press, 1997); Yun-han Chu, "Consolidating Democracy in Taiwan: From *Guoshi* to *Guofa* Conference?" in Hung-mao Tien and Steve Yui-sang Tsang (eds.). *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1998).

This paper adopts a less commonly used methodology, cluster analysis, in order to identify the kinds of people who answer the call of democratization. In contrast with factor analysis, which sorts out the probable fields of problems, cluster analysis looks at “problematic people.” This is key to turning around the methodology of democratization. Only when the problematic people are identified can one understand the nascent meanings that democratization has created for them. The democratic transitional experience and the local culture mix and interact differently in each person. Asking how each of them, both individually and in groups, view democratization allows one to treat democratization as a contested concept, thereby acknowledging that democratization has no fixed destiny. As a result, democratization becomes an independent variable, responsible for the change of local cultural traits embodied in each respondent, not a destiny, the reaching of which demands one-sided cultural transformation en bloc. Once the local culture is subject to changes that have no fixed end, the meaning of democracy is legitimately open to reinterpretation. This is perhaps a higher form of democracy, at the ontological level, that welcomes democratic reinterpretations of democracy.

### **Traditional Values**

Cultural traits conceptually carry tradition. The contemporary studies of cultural traits are necessarily influenced by modernization.<sup>5</sup> This is especially true in the case of Taiwan, which the world has long regarded as a model of modernization.<sup>6</sup> Modernization theory, not unlike democratization theory, has discursively placed Taiwan on a dimension to be judged by the degree of modernization. Modernization and democratization supposedly move the Taiwanese in the same direction as the former emancipates people from immobile villages and social roles to give them more freedom and resources to rationally pursue their individual goals while the latter free them from subjugation by lords, strongmen, or revolutionary leaders to become participatory citizens. Modernization of culture contributes to democratization by fostering a sense of individuality essential to the operation of a democratic polity. Citizens who adhere rigidly to traditional social norms lack the psychological independence from political leadership necessary to make political judgments. For democratization scholars, it is useful to examine whether or not the masses in the society are able to overcome traditional attitudes toward hierarchy and social relational bondage.

While a simple factor analysis may highlight the longitudinal trend (defined in terms of a modernization scale) toward forming modern attitudes on a number of dimensions, it misses the bifurcation or multiple possibilities within the trend. Instead of a single, unidirectional trend, there are actually two smaller trends working in opposing directions.<sup>7</sup> Rather than a simple evolution from traditionalism to modernism, there are simultaneous movements toward more traditional and more modern attitudes. There could also be cyclical or dialectical movements in between. As a

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<sup>5</sup> June Tuefel Dreyer, *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition* (New York: Longman, 2000); Peter R. Moody, Jr., *Tradition and Modernization in China and Japan* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1995).

<sup>6</sup> Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The first Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.), *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); John F. Copper, *Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections, and Foreign Relations* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> Yu An-bang, The Nature of Achievement Motivation in Collectivist Societies (with Kuo-shu Yang). in U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S. C. Choi, & G. Yoon (eds.), *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), pp.239-250.

result of these trends, new meanings of traditionalism and modernism are constantly evolving, and the old meanings are continually being reinterpreted.<sup>8</sup>

Exploring multiple trends, a cluster analysis using the survey result of a modernization scale divides the respondents into four clusters. (Table 1 here) Note that all clusters converge on two dimensions, namely, the family interest and gender equality. All clusters tend to accept the wisdom that for the sake of the family, the individual should put his (or her) personal interest second. This attests to a universal traditional attitude. On the other hand, all clusters tend to disagree that a man will lose face if he works under a female supervisor, therefore testifying to a universal modern attitude. The universal presence of this familialism-gender equality mix suggests that modern values and traditional values can and do coexist for real survey respondents. Although the mix may or may not change in the future, the message is unambiguously that modernization is not just a matter of degree. Rather, modernization can be separated into compartments with one advancing and others remaining constant. The four clusters shown here reveal a variety of combinations of modernity and traditionalism. The attitudes of people in the first cluster are modern almost across the board, except on the family and seniority dimensions. This means that it is not impossible for a Taiwanese to feel comfortable with hybrid values. Most nonetheless prefer to stay traditional in one way or another. Their differences in combination of modern and traditional traits are of particular interest to this paper.

In the second cluster, respondents retain most of the traditional values. Traditional values do not deprive them of agency for some transformation, though. Note that they would not feel embarrassed for working under a woman. I call the respondents belonging to this cluster “gender-neutral conservative”. In the third cluster, one finds a slightly narrower extent of acceptance of traditional values, as the respondents tend to avoid both nepotism and conflict resolution through an elder’s intervention. The respondents thus display an agency that enables them to avoid the potential abuse of the cultural tradition as a form of social capital. This can be either an asset for promoting professionalism, as in the case of avoiding nepotism, or a liability during conflict resolution, as in the case of reluctance to enlist seniority. I call this sort of respondents upright Confucians. The fourth cluster exhibits slightly less independence from tradition than the first cluster by extending the traditional imperative of social harmony to co-workers, indicating a drop of professionalism. In other words, the respondents in this cluster are interestingly still obliged to harmonious social relations only when they step outside of their immediate social circles. I call them small-family actors. Only in the first cluster, which I call modest modernist, do most of the traditional values cease to exist.

The four clusters demonstrate how diversified a society can be in between modernity and tradition. If one looks at the cluster analysis of the Mainland Chinese survey, which also results in four clusters, the mix of tradition and modernity in these four groups is additionally different from all the identified clusters of Taiwanese respondents. (Table 2 here) Interestingly, the Chinese clusters converge in the same way on the family-individual interest and gender equality. In addition, there is a third widely held attitude. All Chinese clusters are prone to involving an elder in conflict resolution. The first Chinese cluster, one of “unsure modernist,” shows a relatively wider range of modern attitudinal traits. Harmonious relations with neighbors are valued here, in contrast with the modest modernists in Taiwan. The second Chinese cluster is exactly the opposite of the Taiwanese upright Confucian group. In this second category, which I call socially mediated actor, people accept

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<sup>8</sup> Thomas A. Metzger, *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1977); Eric Wu and Yun-han Chu, *The Predicament of Modernization in East Asia* (Taipei, Taiwan : National Cultural Association, 1995).

nepotism while refusing all other traditional values, denoting a certain traditional legacy. In the third cluster, nepotism and fatalism are denied while other traditional values are accepted. I call this cluster one of “disciplined actors.” Respondents in the final category, pseudo-conservative, have stopped demanding filial piety in the family and harmony among colleagues in the work place while complying with traditional attitudes when outside of family and work place. This hints at a post-Cultural Revolution environment in which a desire for self-assertion is still constrained by the secondary social relationships.

What I want to argue is that there is no set track as to how to mediate between tradition and modernity, nor a guarantee of the latter replacing the former in due time. Each of the eight clusters has its own internal logic. Second, the notion of tradition has evolved into new dimensions such that the socially mediated actor can treat the tradition both as an asset and a liability. This recalls a famous formula the late Qing intellectuals used in coping with the introduction of Western modernity—the Chinese being the body and the Western being the instrument. Third, paralleling the changing meanings of the tradition, the meanings of modernity also evolve. For example, in both Taiwan and Mainland China, the modern attitude is useful in distinguishing in-circle from out-circle relations. People in both the Taiwanese small family cluster and the Chinese unsure modernist cluster seem unable to transcend traditional values in a larger social setting. One enjoys modernity only within a close circle. If this is true, the modern attitude is no longer an independent variable explaining behavior or other attitudes, but a dependent variable to reflect, and therefore be explained by, the need to distinguish different relationships. Fourth, the juxtaposition of eight possibilities does not exclude the emergence of new clusters in the future. The message is that people may shift to a different cluster without worrying about social suppression, opening up the potential for stronger agency to use modernity as an attitudinal instrument than as a fixed ideal destination.

Last, most observers would probably think of Taiwan as a more modern society than the Chinese mainland. However, the higher number of people with modern attitudinal traits does not have to mean that one is more modern. The two societies seem to maintain their traditional traits in different manners. A majority of Chinese could be doing this by strangely applying the modern values to a closer circle. Perhaps this is a reaction to the damage to the traditional values that regulate the in-circle relationships that was attacked in the Cultural Revolution. A relative majority of Taiwanese practices the modern attitudes in a wider scope. The epistemological point of difference is that traditional values can be a long-existing, therefore independent, variable explaining democratic performance while modernist values are an emerging, and therefore dependent, variable meeting the need for social transformation. These are two separate scales.

### **Democratic and Authoritarian Values**

Concerning democratic values, Taiwanese respondents can be divided into two clusters. (Table 3 here) The analysis of these clusters is similar to that applied to the tradition scale. Note that there is consensus on four dimensions: equality, legislative independence, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought. The overwhelming majority agrees that the executive branch cannot perform adequately with too much legislative interference. They also agree that too many ways of thinking may cause chaos. Both are manifestations of authoritarian attitudes. By contrast, on the equality scale, all disagree that education should be a prerequisite for political participation. All likewise disagree that the government should intervene in deciding the range of ideas allowed for discussion in the society, a reflection of modern tolerance of pluralism. All four attitudinal traits appear universally, producing a combination impossible to anticipate prior to its actual emergence.

The second cluster is composed of what might be called ambivalent authoritarian actors. On the one hand, these people have a dim view of existing political practices in Taiwan, which seem to be causing discomfort, such as legislative assertion of power (Q137) and very competitive market of expression (Q139). However, their suspicions toward these practices do not lead them to embrace all authoritarian values. They are hesitant to submit to government leadership in ideology or to discriminate on the basis of education. Nonetheless, they are skeptical about the formation of groups lest this should possibly destroy social harmony, lack sensitivity toward the executive intervention in the judicial decision-making, and expect morally upright leaders to act on their behalf. In other words, a portion of the constituency cannot comfortably accept what is widely considered to be democratic phenomena in Taiwan's legislative process or speech market, but even these respondents hold certain democratic values.

The respondents of the first cluster, the ambivalent democrat, demonstrate a much stronger commitment to democracy with only two exceptions, one on the aforementioned anxiety about too many different ways of thinking and another about the legislative supervision over executive policy making. Just as traditional values fail to lock the respondents into certain types of attitudes, a general predisposition to democratic values cannot determine respondents' more specific attitudes, either. In fact, people in the first cluster exhibit a certain amount of anxiety toward democratization, wanting unity of thought while opposing government indoctrination. This seeming paradox reflects the limits of the discursive power of democracy, which in this case is strong enough to inculcate respondents with respect for freedom of thought but not strong enough for them to feel comfortable with ideational divergence.

### **Political Efficacy**

Democracy theory rests upon citizens' sense of efficacy, which liberates the citizens from some dependency complex characterizing the traditional society. Political efficacy is thus an important intervening variable explaining the strength of democratic culture.<sup>9</sup> However, the cluster analysis suggests that efficacy is a complicated affect that can pull individual people in several different directions. It is not simply a matter of degree. To begin with, if Taiwanese respondents are divided into four clusters, none of the four trust the government to do the right thing. (Table 4 here) This being true, all four clusters then share one intriguing aspect. If the government is not trustworthy in principle, whether or not one willingly submits to government leadership does not mean that much. In short, even when one claims no efficacy, one's silence does not grant the government legitimacy to act. This analysis applies particularly to the third cluster in which the respondents are intellectually equal, if not superior, to the government in all regards. Compared with the respondents in China, who overwhelmingly consider the government to be trustworthy, democratization in Taiwan does not seem to motivate citizens to identify with the leadership as much. In contrast, the post-cultural revolutionary generations in the Chinese Mainland are ready to trust the government. Taiwanese in the third cluster display a frustrated efficacy, that is, a sense of efficacy that they lack a motivation to effectuate.

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<sup>9</sup> Chung-li Wu, Ching-Ping Tang, and Chi Huang, "A Pilot Study on Measuring the Sense of Political Efficacy in Taiwan," *Journal of Electoral Studies* 6, 2 (1999): 23-44; Fu Hu et. al., "Emerging Mass Politics in a Democratizing System: The Evolution of Political Culture and Political Participation in Taiwan in the 1980s I and II," presented at the Workshop on Comparative Study of Political Culture and Political Participation in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, East-West Center, Hawaii, U.S.A. (1992); Shyu, Huo-yan, "Empowering the People: The Role of Elections in Taiwanese Democratization," presented the 1997 Copenhagen Workshop on "Power and Authority in the Political Cultures: East Asia and the Nordic Countries Compared," the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), Copenhagen (October 13-19, 1997).

The fourth cluster includes the respondents who show efficacy in all aspects. I call theirs full efficacy. Note that full efficacy is the least common type of efficacy in Taiwan. The third cluster is more intriguing. The respondents in this cluster believe that they themselves are intellectually ready to participate and that the government is not under control of elite or in any perfect condition. Ironically, they say they do not have the ability to participate or have influence. I call it frustrated efficacy, which is at best humble efficacy. The aforementioned lack of motivation to participate, because of the government being not good enough, can be a useful clue to the psychological condition wherein one is intellectually capable of understanding but affectively alienated. There could arise a feeling of relative deprivation between the assessment favoring participation and the actual retreat from participation.

The second cluster is characterized by what might be self-deception. According to the respondents in this group, they do not have sufficient knowledge to participate meaningfully. Furthermore, they believe that the government is run by elite and already in its best possible form. They themselves have little influence over what the government does. Despite this submissive attitude, they claim that they have the ability to participate. I call this mobilized efficacy, which is semantic, trained and superficial. The distinction between the second cluster and the third cluster is worth wondering about. Is the difference no more than whether or not one is aware of one's inability to participate? If one is aware of it, one falls into the frustrated category. If one is not, one falls into the second category of mobilized efficacy. The pertinent point is that efficacy could be self-deceiving. The outside observers can also be entrapped by the result of this efficacy scale. (Observers may fail to understand that high levels of participation may occasionally result from the manipulation of the masses by government elites)

In contrast, the first category includes those respondents rating low on all scales, indicating a lacking of efficacy that hardly motivates participation. I call this exit efficacy, suggesting that their distrust toward the government finds no outlet in the system. This is the largest of the four clusters. This reading of efficacy questions the widespread impression of Taiwan democracy lauding the participatory rigor of its electoral constituency.<sup>10</sup> Only when one looks at the persons who embody different types of efficacy can one realize that efficacy on one single dimension is not efficacy of a degree, but efficacy of a kind. The strength of efficacy of one kind is not a good indicator of the strength of another kind, let alone a useful measure of overall agency for change in politics. Democratization can thus change people's sense of efficacy in at least two unconventional ways—by enhancing a sense of efficacy not to be actualized as in the third cluster or by playing to the rhetoric of efficacy in the second cluster. The former alludes to the emergence of relative deprivation, while the latter reflects the discursive ability to camouflage the actual lack of efficacy.

### **Efficacy in Context**

One can examine how the four different clusters divided by the approaches to traditional values fare on the efficacy scale. (Table 5 here) On the whole, most people fall in the categories of exit efficacy (45.4%) and mobilized efficacy (32.6%). This does not deny the fact that various types of traditional attitudes can be associated with various types of efficacy. That is to say, how one combines the traditional and modern values does not determine how one feels about participating in politics. The statistics seems to suggest, however, that the gender-neutral conservatives and the upright Confucians are somewhat less likely to consider themselves knowledgeable about politics.

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<sup>10</sup> Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, "Neo-authoritarianism, Polarized Conflict and Populism in a Democratizing Regime: Taiwan's Emerging Mass Politics," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 5(11), 23-41; Chih-yu Shih, "From Democratic Personality to Parenting Personality" *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs* 6, 1 (Fall 2001) (Taipei).

85.9% (=48.7+37.2) and 82.5% (=49.2+33.3) of respondents in these two clusters fall in the efficacy clusters that answer negatively toward the inquiry of one's knowledge of politics. These are the two agencies that tend to subscribe to filial piety, fatalism or neighborly harmony. On the other hand, the gender-neutral conservatives, the only cluster that tend to accept nepotism, are much less likely to enjoy full efficacy. These results may correspond to the expectation that modern values contribute to agency for action in politics. However, note that those of upright Confucians are less likely to show frustrated efficacy than all the other clusters, including the modest modernists, alluding to the useful role of traditional values in establishing realistic self-awareness. Upright Confucians are the only respondents that reject both nepotism and seniority. Perhaps self-awareness in terms of the constraints and values of traditional social relationships enables them to avoid frustration.

The largest cluster, modest modernists, is not immune to self-deception. This is the only cluster that ignores harmony among co-workers. Relatively speaking, their agency for action in politics is more likely to be substantive. 26.2% (=14+12.2) of them fall in the clusters of either frustrated efficacy or full efficacy, compared with only 14.2% (12.3+1.9), 17.4% (7.9+9.5) and 22.6% (11.8+10.8) of the other three traditionalism clusters. This result is consistent with the expectation of democracy theory that traditionalism hinders political efficacy. However, note that 30% of the same cluster shows mobilized efficacy. In other words, many of these modest modernists are lacking genuine efficacy. In fact, 43.8% of modest modernists exhibit the traits of exit efficacy. On the other hand, those who are more likely to be frustrated by the unfulfilled mobilized efficacy tend to be gender-neutral conservatives (37.2%) or upright Confucians (33.3%).

As might be expected in a cross-tabulation of authoritarian and efficacy scales, the ambivalent democratic cluster is more likely to fall in the categories of frustrated or full efficacy while the ambivalent authoritarian cluster has more respondents belonging to the category of exit efficacy. (Table 6 here) However, a good number in the ambivalent authoritarian cluster (50.1%) share a sense of efficacy with those in the ambivalent democratic cluster (39.7%) in terms of their low self-assessment of both knowledge (Q127) and influence (Q129) in politics and yet also in their perceptions of opportunities for participation reflected in the incapacity of the government (Q130) and their rejection of elitism (Q128). There is no doubt that ambivalent democratic cluster embraces a wider range of efficacy, but note that a large proportion of the respondents in this group opt for exit efficacy. This alludes to the possibility that their low assessment of government capacity does not lead to political efficacy. None of the above discussion confirms any stable causal relations between the authoritarian culture as the cause and low efficacy as the effect. On the authoritarian scale, there are no respondents that consistently cluster on one side of the scale on all questions. The same is true about the efficacy scale.

In other words, the positive orientation toward authority does not enable respondents necessarily to trust the government.<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, it would be the over-participation of the legislature in the government policy making that has led this group to want to have a capable leadership. At least, a move toward democratic government could ironically be a solution even to those who appear to have a narrower sense of efficacy. As a result, there is a significant number of respondents in the cluster of ambivalent authoritarians (39.3%=33.3+6) that still feel fully capable of participating in politics. In contrast, a full 71.4% (=39.7+31.7) of respondents in the ambivalent

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<sup>11</sup> Similar is true in that the negative orientation toward authority does not mean distrust toward the government. Fu Hu, "The Transition from a Modern Authoritarian Regime and the Development of Democracy in Taiwan." For the Seminar on Taiwan's Development Experience, organized by the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for the Celebration of its 5th Anniversary, Taipei (January 16, 1994).

democratic cluster believe that they lack influence over the government. In sum, the orientation toward authority does not unilaterally fix the meaning of political efficacy for the respondents, who do not tend to group consistently among different dimensions of any scale.

#### Political Style

Democracy theory has for a long time ignored the stylistic issue. Attitudes toward democratic and liberal values are one thing; whether or not behavior reflects these attitudes is another. Attitudinal studies are cognitive in nature. The affective need is usually not the focus of research on democratic transition or democratic consolidation. Need refers to subconscious drives toward domination, effected by schizoid, compulsion and/or borderline identity, etc, that reflect Oedipal experiences with the maternal power.<sup>12</sup> It is still possible that people inculcated with democratic values still cannot tolerate time-consuming processes that ensure the limitation of the governmental power. Despite the educational indoctrination of liberal democratic values in the school, the need to assert one's power can be detrimental to democratic consolidation in that this power must be manifest in the public in order to mean something to the patient. This would require one to bypass procedures, show off power and punish differences. When applying to cases not involving people themselves, all the learning of democratic values may work just to its perfection. Once one is involved oneself, the need to dominate quickly overrides democratic values and becomes the key determinant of behavioral choice.

Taiwan is a highly frustrated and anxious society.<sup>13</sup> The problem lies in its lack of a national identity, a self-reading of history embedded in the image of being raped, suppressed and invaded, and a leadership carrying disintegrating mix of Japanese colonial, Chinese civil war and American cold war legacies. Indeed the respondents to the survey questions concerning leadership style reveal a variety of needs, although many show a straight liberal-democratic disposition. (Table 7 here) Similarly, they are best divided into four clusters. An absolute majority is unwilling to have leaders pursue goals at the sacrifice of due process (1161 of 1322), to the effect of ignoring minority's need (833 of 1322), or regardless of the opposition of a majority (1218 of 1322). Only one cluster on the style scale simultaneously attaches significance to procedure, shows willingness to compromise, attends to minority voices, and tolerates those who challenge their leaders' political ideals. I call it one of liberal believers.

While the absolute majority (58.7%) of respondents is liberal believers, the fourth cluster shows a style completely opposite to the liberal believer. They are not willing to see leaders tolerate challenges to their ideals and will not compromise at all. They do not even acknowledge the legitimacy of challenges in theory, and will suppress them in practice, even at the expense of due process, minority opinion or even majority opinion. This robust style of leadership matches the need for power on the one hand and answers to the democratic indoctrination to some extent on the other hand,<sup>14</sup> being the relatively unpopular stylistic attitude in Taiwan. The second largest cluster (28.4%), which I call legalist believers, is less tolerant than liberal believers to the extent that respondents disregard the views of the minority. They still care about procedures and will compromise if their ideals are against the tide of the society. The third cluster has only a small number of respondents, which I call expedient believers. The respondents belonging to this

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<sup>12</sup> James Glass, *Psychosis and Power: Threats to Democracy in the Self and the Group* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

<sup>13</sup> Susan Tiff, "Taiwan Island of Quiet Anxiety," *Times* (Sep. 16, 1985); Stephen J. Yates, "Taiwan: A Celebration of Democracy," *Policy Research and Analysis*, Heritage Foundation (March 17, 2000); Kurt M. Campbell and Derek J. Mitchell, "Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?" *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2001); Franz Schurmann, "Taiwan Worries It Could Be 'Sold Out'—and For Good Reason," *Jinn Magazine* 6.15 (July 24-August 4, 2000), Pacific News Service.

<sup>14</sup> Note that this group of people may represent an electoral majority, hence democracy in a sense.

category tend to be violators of procedures but still tolerate challengers of their ideals. Moreover, they care about the number of people on their side so much so that they take into account the minority opinion as well as the majority opinion if against them. In other words, the respondents of the third category do listen. They are much more flexible than the determined believers in that they are willing to respond to other people's opinions.

### **Political Style in Context**

Who tends to be in any of these clusters of political style? The gender-neutral conservatives are least likely to be liberal believers (48.5% compared with 63.1%, 50.8% and 60.3% elsewhere). (Table 8 here) Nevertheless, 33.9% (=27+6.9) of the modest modernists show no sympathy for the view of minorities. There is no denying that, relatively speaking, the gender-neutral conservative is more likely to violate due process (a total of 7+17.2=24.2% compared with 9.9%, 15.3 % and 10.7% of the other three) and minority opinion (27.3+17.2=44.5%, compared with 33.9%, 42.4% and 35.1% of the other three). Note that upright Confucians are almost equally capable of violating minority opinion (42.4%). This suggests that it is the preservation of a sense of in-group that is associated with the ignoring of minority opinion. (See Questions 64, 66, and 68, where the Upright Confucians and the gender-neutral conservatives share similar views.)

Respondents in the ambivalent authoritarian cluster are more likely to be determined believers and less likely to be liberal liberals. (Table 9 here) Note that 54% of ambivalent authoritarians fall in the category of liberal believers. This should be a more significant message than the fact that indeed they are less likely to be liberal believers than the other cluster. 59.7% (=54+5.7) of them would respect the minority opinion. More significantly, 82.3%(=54+28.3) say that they would not bypass procedures just for the sake of pushing their goals. Nearly equal proportions of the ambivalent democrat and authoritarian clusters, 28.4% and 28.3% respectively, are legalist believers. On the other hand, 4.8% of the ambivalent democratic cluster falls into the category of determined believers, suggesting that the negative orientation toward the government authority, the executive supremacy over the judicial, national unity or moral leadership do not necessarily guarantee a respondent to respect challengers forever.

### **Hybridity and Ambivalence**

A few clues caution against any teleological end of modernization and democratization in Taiwan. The cross-board convergence in both Taiwan and China in terms of the priority of the family interest over the individual interest strongly suggests that familial relationship has survived social and political changes in the past, which should at least include Leninism, class struggle, and the Cultural Revolution in China and democratization, modernization and the loss of national identity in Taiwan. On the authoritarian scale, there are also signs of continuity concerning the role of political leadership. For example, there is the cross-board worry about legislative intervention in the executive process. There is likewise some degree of anxiety in all clusters about too many ways of thinking leading to chaos. In other words, changes do not necessarily move the society toward one destiny despite conscious learning, ideologically as well as institutionally. Thanks to the resilient continuity of certain cultural traits, the meaning of democratization necessarily encounters reinterpretation and practice, which opens up new room for evolution. One cannot anticipate the destiny from the democracy theory's point of view. Politicians aside, students of democratization really should avoid any prescriptions of a future Taiwanese democracy and realize that the result of democratization in Taiwan is still open.

The lingering of existing cultural traits creates ambivalence toward democracy and modernity. This should not be anything new to anyone who studies modernization. The lesson is really that

these cultural traits have not been disappearing. Rather, they stubbornly survive in ways that, together with cultural learning on the ideological and institutional fronts, can dispute the meaning of democratization. The way traits are combined seems to affect political efficacy as well as style. In Table 5, one finds that those clusters with a similar extent of cultural learning are equally likely to take the exit approach on the efficacy scale. For example, 43.8% of the modest modernist cluster and 44.4% of the small family cluster opt for exit efficacy, in comparison with 48.7% of the gender-neutral conservative cluster and 49.2% of the upright Confucians cluster. The former two, both good cultural learners, are separated only by their different approaches to harmonious relations among co-workers while the latter two, both mediocre learners, are distinguishable only in terms of nepotism and conflict resolution through seniority. For another example, in Table 8, compare the 63.1% of the modest modernist group and 60.3% of the small family group who are liberal believers on the one hand, and the 48.5% of the gender-neutral conservatives and 50.8% of the upright Confucians who are liberal believers on the other. A similar level of cultural learning results in a closer probability of being a liberal believer.

Moreover, there is evidence that any of the traditional traits can contribute to the development of full efficacy. Take Table 5 again, in the cluster of full efficacy, the difference between the modest modernists (12.2%), the upright Confucians (9.5%) and the small family (10.8%) is not great. They are all much higher than the gender-neutral conservative (1.9%). Something in the former three groups contributes to full efficacy. While they represent very different kinds of cultural learning, would not this imply that not one single set of attitudinal traits, but different traits, can contribute to political efficacy? Accordingly, any theoretical hypothesis concerning the linkage between specific traits and efficacy would be questionable. For if indeed it is the human decision in all the contingencies that affect behavioral outcomes, then anyone carrying cultural hybridity cannot by themselves fix the probability in advance concerning whether or not a particular trait would be acted upon or to which direction that trait would lead.

There is additionally evidence suggesting that the other way around is also true. The degree of ambivalence in one's political efficacy and style can affect how much influence each different kind of cultural learning may have. In Table 6, for example, the difference in political efficacy between the ambivalent democrat and the ambivalent authoritarian is much clearer in the clusters of exit efficacy and full efficacy (39.7% vs. 50.1% and 13.7% vs. 6%) than in the clusters of mobilized and frustrated efficacy (31.7% vs. 33.3% and 14.9% vs. 10.6%). Similarly, in Table 9, the difference in political style between the ambivalent democrat and the ambivalent authoritarian is clearer in the clusters of the liberal believer and the determined believer (63.5% vs. 54% and 4.8% vs. 12%) than in the clusters of the legalist and expedient believer (28.4% vs. 28.3% and 3.3% vs. 5.7%). This implies that the more ambivalent one is in one's own political efficacy or in one's political style, the less impact one's orientation toward democracy and authority has on political efficacy and style.

If the kind of cultural hybridity affects one's political efficacy and style, and the kind of ambivalence in one's political efficacy and style affects the relevance of cultural hybridity, then how are cultural hybridity and the kind of ambivalence in political efficacy and style determined? In factor or regression analyses, one looks for correlations among variables. In cluster analysis, by contrast, one may additionally look to people, represented by clusters. Therefore, it could be the person in question that is the source of explanation. In other words, instead of trying to determine how all the people would act similarly in accordance with those to-be-discovered laws that tell how a macro-structure of variables impacts upon behavior, one may open up the field by allowing individuals engage in their own cultural learning. These micro-learning experiences are necessarily coincidental and contingent upon situations, thus resulting in different kinds of cultural hybridity and

ambivalence. Once the kinds of hybridity and ambivalence are determined, one could proceed with factor and regression analysis to discover the law that applies in each different kind. However, a further problem would be that cultural learning does not have to stop, making the search for laws that regulate democratic transition and consolidation obsolete.

### **Democratic Participants in Kind**

Instead of seeing participants of democracy determining the quality of democracy, this paper turns the problematique around and asks how electoral, institutional as well as theoretical democratization has created different kinds of democratic participants. The close-to-perfect type of participant nonetheless appears in Taiwan. Roughly 12.3% of the respondents can be qualified as carrying a democratic personality. (Table 10 here) The intersection of liberal believers and respondents with full efficacy is a group of respondents who are prone to respect minority opinion, believe in their own knowledge of governing, and see the defects of the current government. Determined believers are less likely to feel the sense of efficacy (38.7 percent compared with 44.3%, 45.1% and 47.5% of the other three). By contrast, 9.5% (=7.2+2.3) of the total respondents who appear to respect procedures in pursuing their ideals are also those who enjoy full efficacy. They are almost nineteen times as numerous as the expedient and the democratic believers (0.5%=0,2+0,3), who bypass procedures when needed.

Expedient believers are the most likely to fall in the category of frustrated efficacy (18.6% compared with 12.8%, 12.8% and 8.1%). These are the respondents who neglect procedures. It is not clear what the significance of this cell can imply—perhaps tolerant goal pursuers cannot develop the sense of efficacy, or perhaps someone without the sense of efficacy can become a tolerant goal pursuer. Note that the cell containing liberal believers and exit efficacy includes the largest number (26%). In addition, at least 30.7% of the liberal believers may wrongly regard their own ability to participate as high. Since the respondents of both exit and mobilized efficacy accept that the government is not trustworthy, the self-deception of this 30.7% is possibly caused by the hybrid values as most liberal believers seem to fall in the clusters of modest modernist.

In the factor analysis, one is interested primarily in causal relationships, expecting stable behavioral patters that can be attributed to specific cultural traits. The probabilities of those with certain traits to display certain attitudinal patterns are considered universal once statistically demonstrated. By contrast, the cluster analysis is equally, if not more, concerned with possibility vis-à-vis probability. Through the cluster analysis, although one can still take a deductive approach to sketch a causal linkage between traits, one does not have to. On the contrary, one can study how different cultural traits can combine into a personality type. The ways of combination are so various and creative that they cannot be predicted by any theory of democracy proposed to date. The Chinese Mainlanders' combination and Taiwanese' combination are quite different, even if there are occasionally similarities. If the person is the focus, then the causal thinking can be completely reserved. Instead of seeing the democratic attitudinal pattern as a dependent variable and the cultural trait as an independent variable, one can treat democratic attitudinal pattern as the independent variable to explain the emergence of the ostensible causal linkage in a regression analysis.

From the vantage point of a cluster analysis, both because the combination of traits is not externally determined and because, once a type of person emerges, the ways in which each of the traits will influence behavior is also not determined, then one's decision is in oneself the source of behavior. The individual cannot help but make unique decisions in each unique context. Nevertheless, looking from a macro-level, we could aggregate the micro-level decisions and determine how each trait is linked with behavioral results, resulting in a series of propositions that

an increased strength in a certain trait should lead to an increased probability of a certain behavior. However, this is exactly what this paper is not about. Instead of arguing that cultural traits shape democratic attitudes, this paper raises the possibility that it is the individual decisions that lead to the emergence of a seeming pattern of traits that are associated with democratic attitudes. Since this is about decisions, not about causal linkage, the statistically identified pattern is allowed to shift overnight.

I choose the cluster analysis in light of Taiwan's postcolonial condition, which witnesses the quick, unplanned mix of values imposed historically by the intruding Japanese colonial forces as well as the more contemporary cold war/anti-communist/modernist discourses. The resultant traits are like transplanted genes, which do not move Taiwanese political culture toward one future destiny, but open up a whole range of possibilities that are not within the lieu of democracy theory.<sup>15</sup> Taiwan could be a society permanently in transition. Look at the predominance of liberal believers and the relative majority of exit efficacy at the same time. Due to the unfamiliar combination of values and traits, the respondents have to learn and adapt mostly through their own trial and error. This means that, in the long run, one would not expect any move en masse toward a democratic destiny or any stable attitudinal pattern since there is always the possibility of triggering another pattern of traits. Personal factors, not structurally derived outcomes, determine how any specific trait within this pattern impacts behavior. Without a systematic discourse or indoctrination coping with Taiwan's postcolonial conditions, individual decisions are constantly called for. Accordingly, momentary changes in patterns are highly likely to occur, making any patterns ephemeral at best and entirely false at worst.

There is no denying that individuals can learn, and under the continuous democratic indoctrination, they have learned to be more modern and liberal. Indeed the age structures suggest that the elderly in Taiwan are most widely conservative. They are more likely to subscribe to filial piety or fatalism, as they are more likely to fall in the category of gender-neutral conservative (42.3% compared with 10.8, 20.5 of the other age groups) and the upright Confucian (15.4% compared with 6.6 and 9.6 of the other age groups) (Table 11 here) and much more likely to be supportive of the government's moral leadership (74.1%, compared with 41.8 and 51 of the other two) (Table 12 here). On the other hand, they are less likely to enjoy full efficacy (4.4% compared with 10.8 and 10.3 elsewhere), (Table 12 here) and more likely to be harsh on minority opinion (17.3% compared with 7.6 and 6.6 elsewhere). (Table 15 here) This said, note that an absolute majority of them remains tolerant (75.2%=42.3+33). This makes one wonder if the relatively liberal tendency of the younger generations is less about liberalism than about their lack of experience, which prompts them toward the modernist discourse. Granted, there may be a certain amount of learning taking place, but the elderly becoming more conservative is nonetheless a sensible response to Taiwan's democratic conditions. Younger generations' negative orientation toward tradition may be responsible for lack of security felt by the elderly.

Theories of democracy typically attend to the factor analysis or rely on the regression of behavior to variables, therefore sharing the same causal epistemology of the factor analysis. This is probably why democratic theory needs an extension into democratic consolidation theory to cope with the unstable pattern shown in those once-acknowledged, yet shaky democracies. However, the determination of some of the constituency in expecting their leaders to disregard established procedures, traits which leaders naturally share, makes the institutional progress along the consolidation path irrelevant as long as the situation is ripe for the determined leadership to

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<sup>15</sup> Lily H. M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih, "Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan," (co-author) *Review of Politics* 60, 1 (Winter 1998).

pursue its goal at the sacrifice of procedures, majority and/or minority opinion. That a majority acquiesces the leaders that are either the expedient believers or the legalist believers, who are tolerant on one dimension but not on the other, may shift the political style of the polity in minutes. The cluster analysis opens up room to understand this possibility by allowing the individual actors to pursue an ontologically undecidable identity in which no single trait can determine a certain pattern of behavior with a fixed probability.

**Table 1. Traditional Value Clusters (Taiwan)**

**Final Cluster Centers**

|   | Cluster          |                             |                   |              |
|---|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
|   | Modest modernist | Gender-neutral conservative | Upright Confucian | Small family |
| Q064 Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.   | disagree         | agree                       | agree             | disagree     |
| Q065 When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends. | disagree         | agree                       | disagree          | disagree     |
| Q066 When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.                  | disagree         | agree                       | agree             | disagree     |
| Q067 Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate.  | disagree         | agree                       | agree             | disagree     |
| Q068 A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.   | disagree         | agree                       | agree             | agree        |
| Q069 For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.                                       | agree            | agree                       | agree             | agree        |
| Q070 A man will lose face if he works under a female supervisor.  | disagree         | disagree                    | disagree          | disagree     |
| Q071 If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute.  | agree            | agree                       | disagree          | agree        |

**Number of Cases in each Cluster**

|         |   | Unweighted | Weighted |
|---------|---|------------|----------|
| Cluster | 1 | 612.000    | 591.900  |
|         | 2 | 244.000    | 276.610  |
|         | 3 | 130.000    | 130.020  |
|         | 4 | 424.000    | 411.570  |
| Valid   |   | 1410.000   | 1410.100 |
| Missing |   | 5.000      | 5.390    |

**Table 2. Traditional Value Clusters (China)**

**Final Cluster Centers**

|  | Cluster          |                         |                   |                     |
|--|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
|  | Unsure modernist | Socially mediated actor | Disciplined actor | Pseudo-conservative |
| Q064 Children obey parents                 | disagree         | disagree                | agree             | disagree            |
| Q065 First hire relative/friend            | disagree         | agree                   | disagree          | agree               |
| Q066 Accommodate other people/neighbors    | agree            | disagree                | agree             | agree               |
| Q067 Success determined by fate            | disagree         | disagree                | disagree          | agree               |
| Q068 Accommodate other people/co-workers   | agree            | disagree                | agree             | disagree            |
| Q069 The interest of family are superior   | agree            | agree                   | agree             | agree               |
| Q070 Shameful to work under female leaders | disagree         | disagree                | disagree          | disagree            |
| Q071 Senior people resolve conflict        | agree            | agree                   | agree             | agree               |

**Number of Cases in each Cluster**

|         |   |          |
|---------|---|----------|
| Cluster | 1 | 2206.000 |
|         | 2 | 224.000  |
|         | 3 | 432.000  |
|         | 4 | 302.000  |
| Valid   |   | 3164.000 |
| Missing |   | 19.000   |

**Table 3. Authoritarian Orientation Clusters**

**Final Cluster Centers**

|  | Cluster             |                          |
|--|---------------------|--------------------------|
|  | Ambivalent democrat | Ambivalent authoritarian |
| Q132 -People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.                                      | disagree            | disagree                 |
| Q133 Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.   | disagree            | agree                    |
| Q134 The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.  | disagree            | disagree                 |
| Q135 Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.   | disagree            | agree                    |
| Q136 When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.  | disagree            | agree                    |
| Q137 If the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. | agree               | agree                    |
| Q138 If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.  | disagree            | agree                    |
| Q139 If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.  | agree               | agree                    |

**Number of Cases in each Cluster**

|         |   | Unweighted | Weighted |
|---------|---|------------|----------|
| Cluster | 1 | 705.000    | 653.040  |
|         | 2 | 681.000    | 730.680  |
| Valid   |   | 1386.000   | 1383.720 |
| Missing |   | 29.000     | 31.770   |

**Table 4. Political Efficacy Clusters**

|  | Cluster       |                    |                     |               |
|--|---------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------|
|  | Exit efficacy | Mobilized efficacy | Frustrated efficacy | Full efficacy |
| Q126 Do you agree the following statement-I think I have the ability to participate in politics.   | agree         | disagree           | agree               | disagree      |
| Q127 Do you agree the following statement-Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. | agree         | agree              | disagree            | disagree      |
| Q128 Do you agree the following statement-The nation is run by a powerful few and ordinary citizens cannot do much about it.                                     | agree         | agree              | disagree            | disagree      |
| Q129 Do you agree the following statement-People like me don't have any influence over what the government does.   | agree         | agree              | agree               | disagree      |
| Q130 Do you agree the following statement-Whatever its faults maybe, our form of government is still the best for us.  | agree         | agree              | disagree            | disagree      |
| Q131 Do you agree the following statement-You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.   | disagree      | disagree           | disagree            | disagree      |

**Number of Cases in each Cluster**

|         |   | Unweighted | Weighted |
|---------|---|------------|----------|
| Cluster | 1 | 610.000    | 626.220  |
|         | 2 | 446.000    | 449.250  |
|         | 3 | 177.000    | 172.320  |
|         | 4 | 152.000    | 131.890  |
| Valid   |   | 1385.000   | 1379.680 |
| Missing |   | 30.000     | 35.810   |

**Table 5. Tradition-Efficacy Cross-tabulation**

**TRAD4\*EFFI4 Crosstabulation**

|       |                             |              | EFFI4 |           |            |        | Total  |
|-------|-----------------------------|--------------|-------|-----------|------------|--------|--------|
|       |                             |              | Exit  | Mobilized | Frustrated | Full   |        |
| TRAD4 | Modest modernist            | Count        | 256   | 175       | 82         | 71     | 584    |
|       |                             | %withinTRAD4 | 43.8% | 30.0%     | 14.0%      | 12.2%  | 100.0% |
|       |                             | %of Total    | 18.6% | 12.7%     | 5.9%       | 5.1%   | 42.3%  |
|       | Gender-neutral conservative | Count        | 127   | 97        | 32         | 5      | 261    |
|       |                             | %withinTRAD4 | 48.7% | 37.2%     | 12.3%      | 1.9%   | 100.0% |
|       |                             | %of Total    | 9.2%  | 7.0%      | 2.3%       | .4%    | 18.9%  |
|       | Upright Confucian           | Count        | 62    | 42        | 10         | 12     | 126    |
|       |                             | %withinTRAD4 | 49.2% | 33.3%     | 7.9%       | 9.5%   | 100.0% |
|       |                             | %of Total    | 4.5%  | 3.0%      | .7%        | .9%    | 9.1%   |
|       | Small family                | Count        | 181   | 135       | 48         | 44     | 408    |
|       |                             | %withinTRAD4 | 44.4% | 33.1%     | 11.8%      | 10.8%  | 100.0% |
|       |                             | %of Total    | 13.1% | 9.8%      | 3.5%       | 3.2%   | 29.6%  |
| Total | Count                       | 626          | 449   | 172       | 132        | 1379   |        |
|       | %withinTRAD4                | 45.4%        | 32.6% | 12.5%     | 9.6%       | 100.0% |        |
|       | %of Total                   | 45.4%        | 32.6% | 12.5%     | 9.6%       | 100.0% |        |

**Table 6. Authority-efficacy Cross-tabulation**

**AUTH2 132-139(2)\*EFFI4 126-131(4) Crosstabulation**

|                         |                             |                                     | EFFI4 126-131(4) |              |              |             | Total          |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|
|                         |                             |                                     | Exit             | Mobilized    | Frustrated   | Full        |                |
| AUTH2<br>132-<br>139(2) | Ambivalent<br>democrat      | Count<br>%withinAUTH2<br>132-139(2) | 259<br>39.7%     | 207<br>31.7% | 97<br>14.9%  | 89<br>13.7% | 652<br>100.0%  |
|                         | Ambivalent<br>authoritarian | Count<br>%withinAUTH2<br>132-139(2) | 359<br>50.1%     | 239<br>33.3% | 76<br>10.6%  | 43<br>6.0%  | 717<br>100.0%  |
| Total                   |                             | Count<br>%withinAUTH2<br>132-139(2) | 618<br>45.1%     | 446<br>32.6% | 173<br>12.6% | 132<br>9.6% | 1369<br>100.0% |

**Table 7. Political Style**

**Final Cluster Centers**

|  | Cluster          |                   |                    |                     |
|--|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
|  | Liberal believer | Legalist believer | Expedient believer | Determined believer |
| Q145 The most important thing for a political leader is to accomplish his goals even if he has to ignore the established procedure.    | disagree         | disagree          | agree              | agree               |
| Q146 If a political leader really believes in his position, he should refuse to compromise regardless of how many people disagree.     | disagree         | disagree          | disagree           | agree               |
| Q147 A political leader should tolerate the views of those who challenge his political ideals.   | disagree         | disagree          | disagree           | agree               |
| Q148 As long as a political leader enjoys majority support, he should implement his own agenda and disregard the view of the minority. | disagree         | agree             | disagree           | agree               |

**Number of Cases in each Cluster**

|         |   | Unweighted | Weighted |
|---------|---|------------|----------|
| Cluster | 1 | 776.000    | 770.530  |
|         | 2 | 385.000    | 370.770  |
|         | 3 | 57.000     | 59.390   |
|         | 4 | 104.000    | 112.840  |
| Valid   |   | 1322.000   | 1313.530 |
| Missing |   | 93.000     | 101.960  |

**Table 8. Tradition-Style Cross-tabulation**

**TRAD4\*BELI4 Crosstabulation**

|       |                                    |              | BELI4   |          |           |            | Total  |
|-------|------------------------------------|--------------|---------|----------|-----------|------------|--------|
|       |                                    |              | Liberal | Legalist | Expedient | Determined |        |
| TRAD4 | Modest<br>modernist                | Count        | 358     | 153      | 17        | 39         | 567    |
|       |                                    | %withinTRAD4 | 63.1%   | 27.0%    | 3.0%      | 6.9%       | 100.0% |
|       |                                    | %of Total    | 27.3%   | 11.7%    | 1.3%      | 3.0%       | 43.2%  |
|       | Gender-<br>neutral<br>conservative | Count        | 110     | 62       | 16        | 39         | 227    |
|       |                                    | %withinTRAD4 | 48.5%   | 27.3%    | 7.0%      | 17.2%      | 100.0% |
|       |                                    | %of Total    | 8.4%    | 4.7%     | 1.2%      | 3.0%       | 17.3%  |
|       | Upright<br>Confucian               | Count        | 60      | 40       | 8         | 10         | 118    |
|       |                                    | %withinTRAD4 | 50.8%   | 33.9%    | 6.8%      | 8.5%       | 100.0% |
|       |                                    | %of Total    | 4.6%    | 3.0%     | .6%       | .8%        | 9.0%   |
|       | Small<br>family                    | Count        | 242     | 116      | 18        | 25         | 401    |
|       |                                    | %withinTRAD4 | 60.3%   | 28.9%    | 4.5%      | 6.2%       | 100.0% |
|       |                                    | %of Total    | 18.4%   | 8.8%     | 1.4%      | 1.9%       | 30.5%  |
| Total |                                    | Count        | 770     | 371      | 59        | 113        | 1313   |
|       |                                    | %withinTRAD4 | 58.6%   | 28.3%    | 4.5%      | 8.6%       | 100.0% |
|       |                                    | %of Total    | 58.6%   | 28.3%    | 4.5%      | 8.6%       | 100.0% |

**Table 9. Authority-style Cross-tabulation**

**AUTH2 132-139(2)\*BELI4 145-148(4) Crosstabulation**

|                     |               |              | BELI4 145-148(4) |          |           |            | Total  |
|---------------------|---------------|--------------|------------------|----------|-----------|------------|--------|
|                     |               |              | Liberal          | Legalist | Expedient | Determined |        |
| AUTH2<br>132-139(2) | Ambivalent    | Count        | 407              | 182      | 21        | 31         | 641    |
|                     | democrat      | %withinAUTH2 | 63.5%            | 28.4%    | 3.3%      | 4.8%       | 100.0% |
|                     |               | % of Total   | 31.1%            | 13.9%    | 1.6%      | 2.4%       | 49.0%  |
|                     | Ambivalent    | Count        | 361              | 189      | 38        | 80         | 668    |
|                     | authoritarian | %withinAUTH2 | 54.0%            | 28.3%    | 5.7%      | 12.0%      | 100.0% |
|                     |               | % of Total   | 27.6%            | 14.4%    | 2.9%      | 6.1%       | 51.0%  |
| Total               |               | Count        | 768              | 371      | 59        | 111        | 1309   |
|                     |               | %withinAUTH2 | 58.7%            | 28.3%    | 4.5%      | 8.5%       | 100.0% |
|                     |               | % of Total   | 58.7%            | 28.3%    | 4.5%      | 8.5%       | 100.0% |

**Table 10. Style-efficacy Cross-tabulation**

**BELI4\*EFFI4 Crosstabulation**

|            |               |               | EFFI4 |           |            |        | Total  |
|------------|---------------|---------------|-------|-----------|------------|--------|--------|
|            |               |               | Exit  | Mobilized | Frustrated | Full   |        |
| BELI4      | Liberal       | Count         | 339   | 235       | 98         | 94     | 766    |
|            |               | %within BELI4 | 44.3% | 30.7%     | 12.8%      | 12.3%  | 100.0% |
|            |               | %of Total     | 26.0% | 18.0%     | 7.5%       | 7.2%   | 58.7%  |
|            | Legalist      | Count         | 166   | 125       | 47         | 30     | 368    |
|            |               | %within BELI4 | 45.1% | 34.0%     | 12.8%      | 8.2%   | 100.0% |
|            |               | %of Total     | 12.7% | 9.6%      | 3.6%       | 2.3%   | 28.2%  |
|            | Expedient     | Count         | 28    | 17        | 11         | 3      | 59     |
|            |               | %within BELI4 | 47.5% | 28.8%     | 18.6%      | 5.1%   | 100.0% |
|            |               | %of Total     | 2.1%  | 1.3%      | .8%        | .2%    | 4.5%   |
| determined | Count         | 43            | 55    | 9         | 4          | 111    |        |
|            | %within BELI4 | 38.7%         | 49.5% | 8.1%      | 3.6%       | 100.0% |        |
|            | %of Total     | 3.3%          | 4.2%  | .7%       | .3%        | 8.5%   |        |
| Total      | Count         | 576           | 432   | 165       | 131        | 1304   |        |
|            | %within BELI4 | 44.2%         | 33.1% | 12.7%     | 10.0%      | 100.0% |        |
|            | %of Total     | 44.2%         | 33.1% | 12.7%     | 10.0%      | 100.0% |        |

**Table 11. Traditional Value by Age**

**AGE3\*TRAD4 64-71(4) Crosstabulation**

|       |          |             | TRAD4 64-71(4)   |                             |                   |              | Total  |
|-------|----------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------|
|       |          |             | Modest modernist | Gender-neutral conservative | Upright Confucian | Small family |        |
| AGE3  | 20-39    | Count       | 319              | 73                          | 45                | 240          | 677    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 47.1%            | 10.8%                       | 6.6%              | 35.5%        | 100.0% |
|       | 40-59    | Count       | 200              | 100                         | 47                | 141          | 488    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 41.0%            | 20.5%                       | 9.6%              | 28.9%        | 100.0% |
|       | above 60 | Count       | 73               | 104                         | 38                | 31           | 246    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 29.7%            | 42.3%                       | 15.4%             | 12.6%        | 100.0% |
| Total |          | Count       | 592              | 277                         | 130               | 412          | 1411   |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 42.0%            | 19.6%                       | 9.2%              | 29.2%        | 100.0% |

## 12. Political Efficacy by Age

**AGE3\*EFFI4 126-131(4) Crosstabulation**

|       |          |             | EFFI4 126-131(4) |           |            |       | Total  |
|-------|----------|-------------|------------------|-----------|------------|-------|--------|
|       |          |             | Exit             | Mobilized | Frustrated | Full  |        |
| AGE3  | 20-39    | Count       | 292              | 234       | 69         | 72    | 667    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 43.8%            | 35.1%     | 10.3%      | 10.8% | 100.0% |
|       | 40-59    | Count       | 225              | 137       | 72         | 50    | 484    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 46.5%            | 28.3%     | 14.9%      | 10.3% | 100.0% |
|       | above 60 | Count       | 110              | 78        | 30         | 10    | 228    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 48.2%            | 34.2%     | 13.2%      | 4.4%  | 100.0% |
| Total |          | Count       | 627              | 449       | 171        | 132   | 1379   |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 45.5%            | 32.6%     | 12.4%      | 9.6%  | 100.0% |

**Table 13. Authority Orientation by Age**

**AGE3\* AUTH2 132-139(2) Crosstabulation**

|       |          |             | AUTH2 132-139(2)    |                          | Total  |
|-------|----------|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------|
|       |          |             | Ambivalent democrat | Ambivalent authoritarian |        |
| AGE3  | 20-39    | Count       | 358                 | 315                      | 673    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 53.2%               | 46.8%                    | 100.0% |
|       | 40-59    | Count       | 236                 | 246                      | 482    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 49.0%               | 51.0%                    | 100.0% |
|       | above 60 | Count       | 59                  | 169                      | 228    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 25.9%               | 74.1%                    | 100.0% |
| Total |          | Count       | 653                 | 730                      | 1383   |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 47.2%               | 52.8%                    | 100.0% |

**Table 14. Political Style by Age**

**AGE3\* BELI4 145-148(4) Crosstabulation**

|       |          |             | BELI4 145-148(4) |          |           |            | Total  |
|-------|----------|-------------|------------------|----------|-----------|------------|--------|
|       |          |             | Liberal          | Legalist | Expedient | Determined |        |
| AGE3  | 20-39    | Count       | 433              | 165      | 20        | 51         | 669    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 64.7%            | 24.7%    | 3.0%      | 7.6%       | 100.0% |
|       | 40-59    | Count       | 259              | 144      | 25        | 30         | 458    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 56.6%            | 31.4%    | 5.5%      | 6.6%       | 100.0% |
|       | above 60 | Count       | 78               | 61       | 14        | 32         | 185    |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 42.2%            | 33.0%    | 7.6%      | 17.3%      | 100.0% |
| Total |          | Count       | 770              | 370      | 59        | 113        | 1312   |
|       |          | %withinAGE3 | 58.7%            | 28.2%    | 4.5%      | 8.6%       | 100.0% |

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# Asian Barometer

## A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

The Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) grows out of the Comparative Survey of Democratization and Value Change in East Asia Project (also known as East Asia Barometer), which was launched in mid-2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education of Taiwan under the MOE-NSC Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of University. The headquarters of ABS is based in Taipei, and is jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science at NTU and the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica. The East Asian component of the project is coordinated by Prof. Yun-han Chu, who also serves as the overall coordinator of the Asian Barometer. In organizing its first-wave survey (2001-2003), the East Asia Barometer (EABS) brought together eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Since its founding, the EABS Project has been increasingly recognized as the region's first systematic and most careful comparative survey of attitudes and orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform.

In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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