



A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

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Traditional Social Values, Democratic Values, and
Political Participation

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A Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development

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Traditional Social Values, Democratic Values, and Political Participation¹

by Andrew J. Nathan
with the assistance of Tse-hsin Chen

prepared for the Conference on
The Transformation of Citizen Politics and Civic Attitudes in Three Chinese Societies
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Other papers for this conference will have shown how political participation in three Chinese societies in 1993 was shaped both by political institutions and by social and psychological variables associated with modernization. This paper asks whether, when all those influences are taken into account, an additional influence is exercised on citizens' participatory behavior by certain attributes of political culture. Somewhat to our own surprise, our findings are negative: political culture -- as measured by two batteries tapping traditional social values and democratic values -- exerts virtually no influence on the frequency of political participation, measured as a sum of diverse political acts in the electoral and non-electoral arenas. This poses for future analysis the question of whether sub-dimensions of culture affect specific modes of participation or whether cultural values affect other behaviors or other significant attitudes. But pending the more fine-grained analyses required to answer these questions, our findings here suggest that institutional differences across systems, and socio-demographic differences among citizens, are the important shapers of patterns of political participation, while political culture is not.

Political culture is understood here as the distribution in a society of attitudes, values, and beliefs about politics. This paper focuses on two relatively deep-seated, slowly-changing syndromes of norms and values that we label, respectively, "traditional social values" and "democratic values." Our guiding question is whether citizens holding relatively strong traditional social values, or relatively strong democratic values, participate in politics at a different rate from those whose belief in those values is weaker. Or are differences in patterns of political participation fully explained by differences in institutional frameworks and levels of modernization across societies?

The paper starts by describing the distribution of these two syndromes of belief across the three systems. It analyzes the socio-demographic characteristics of those holding stronger traditional social values and of those holding stronger democratic values. It then asks whether people with different value commitments select different patterns of political behavior, even when other attributes are held in common.

¹ To be published in Yun-han Chu, Hsin-chi Kuan, Andrew J. Nathan, Tianjian Shi, and Huoyan Shyu, *Political Participation in Three Chinese Societies* (in preparation). Thanks to Chen Tse-hsin for extensive, skilled, and indispensable research assistance, and to Yun-han Chu, Tianjian Shi, Hsin-chi Kuan, and Huoyan Shyu for much help and advice.

The data used in this paper come from parallel random sample surveys on political culture and political participation carried out in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 1993. For methodological details on the three surveys, see Appendix A.

Social and Political Values in Three Chinese Societies. Our questionnaires contained ten questions designed to measure respondents' adherence to traditional social values, and eight questions designed to measure their belief in democratic values (fewer questions were asked in each battery in Hong Kong). See Appendices B and C for theoretical justifications for each of these scales, details on how they were coded statistically, and evidence of their qualities as measures.

The tables *Traditionalism Frequencies.xls* and *Democratic Values Frequencies.xls* display the percentage of respondents in each society, among those answering, who gave the more traditional and the more democratic response to each question.

Tables
Traditionalism Frequencies.xls
Democratic Values Frequencies.xls
 about here

As the tables show, in their attitudes toward traditional social values the three societies have much in common. The last line of the traditionalism table shows that average levels of support for traditional-minded propositions are fairly similar across the three societies, with above one-third and below one-half of each society's population holding a traditional-minded position on the average across all the items of the traditionalism scale. China's culture is, overall, the most traditional of three and Hong Kong's the least.

This is not true, however, with regard to all attitudes. On two items ("get ahead to honor ancestors" and "maintain broken marriage"), Taiwan residents are more traditional-minded than mainland residents. This suggests that the rates of value change under conditions of modernization and democratization are not the same across all dimensions of traditional social values – a subject worthy of further exploration using these and related datasets.

In contrast to positions on traditional social values, the three societies seem more different than similar in their patterns of belief in democratic values. No single pro-democracy value commanded majority support in China, while all but one of the pro-democracy values that we asked about commanded strong majority support in Hong Kong. Standing between the other two societies, Taiwan showed majority support for half of the values tested and sub-majority but reasonably strong support for the other half. In average levels of support (the last line of the table), the gap between China and Hong Kong is a full thirty percent, compared to a gap of only ten percent in the average levels of support for traditional social values.

These overall patterns of similarities and contrasts among the three societies in their support for traditional and democratic values are graphically represented in *Tradlsm Three Chinas.wmf* and *Demo Values Three Chinas.wmf*. These figures show what

percentage of respondents in each society located themselves at each point along a plus-or-minus-ten point scale of belief in traditional social values and democratic values.

Figures
Tradlsm Three Chinas.wmf
Demo Values Three Chinas.wmf
 about here

On the traditional values scale, the overall shapes of the distributions in the three societies are similar. There are few people at either the pro-traditional or anti-traditional extremes of the curve in any of the three societies. Instead, the bulk of all three populations cluster around the mean between 0 and -1. This means that on the average, respondents were slightly more modern- than traditional-minded in terms of our scale, but not markedly so. The main difference among the three societies is that China is more traditional-minded than Hong Kong and Taiwan.² In addition, the Chinese and Hong Kong respondents are a bit more consistent in their opinions, while Taiwan respondents are slightly more divided among themselves.³

By contrast, the patterns of democratic values in the three societies are markedly different from one another. Chinese respondents cluster to the left, in the anti-democratic direction, and Hong Kong respondents to the right, in the pro-democratic direction. Taiwan respondents are divided, with more respondents positioning themselves on the pro-democratic side of the line, but a wide range of scores across the spectrum from anti- to pro-democratic.⁴

Returning our attention to the tables, and looking at the percentage responses to individual items within each battery, we see that when it comes to traditional social values the three societies all give their highest level of approval to the first four propositions, which have to do with avoiding open conflict in the family and the community. This is evidently a core value that remains influential in these three culturally Chinese societies regardless of the inroads of modernization and democratization. On the other hand, the last three propositions command relatively low levels of agreement in all three societies. These propositions have in common a link to the traditional extended family system dominated by older males, who used to decide on their children's marriages and careers and cultivate social networks to advance the family's common fortunes. It appears that this traditional system is no longer as robust as it once was. The level of agreement with these values hovers around one-third in China and below that in the other two societies.

² The Hong Kong mean falls within a 95% confidence interval of -1.08 to -.78, while the Taiwan mean falls within a 95% confidence interval of -.92 to -.64. Since the two overlap, they are difficult to distinguish statistically. The China mean falls between a 95% confidence interval of -.40 to -.25, which does not overlap with the other two confidence intervals of the means. China is thus distinctively more traditional, although not by a large amount on our scale.

³ That is, the variance is smaller in China (at 4.29) than in Hong Kong (4.32) and largest in Taiwan (5.36). But since the difference among the variances is only about one point on a ten-point scale, the societies are more similar than different in the dispersion of attitudes.

⁴ The 95% confidence intervals for the means are -1.23 to -1.05 for China, .42 to .79 for Taiwan, and 1.05 to 1.37 for Hong Kong. The variances are 3.59 for China, 6.80 for Taiwan, and 5.66 for Hong Kong.

In the democratic values battery, the set of ideas enjoying the strongest support in both Taiwan and Hong Kong are those involving the liberal values of equality and freedom (the government should not decide the trend of thought, the educated should not have a greater right to speak than the uneducated, and government officials should not enjoy paternalistic authority). By contrast, Taiwan and Hong Kong respondents give weaker support to values supporting institutional limitations of government power and political pluralism. Put otherwise, the pattern of responses in these two free-market societies supports individual freedom more strongly than it supports limited government. That pattern is reversed in mainland China, where respondents give stronger support to values relating to democratic institutions and weaker support to the values of individual equality and freedom. Chinese respondents seem willing to rein in government without wanting to give more freedom to individuals.

While residents of the three societies have diverse views, society-wide patterns emerge. On average, China is a more traditional-minded and less democracy-minded society than Taiwan, and Taiwan in turn more traditional-minded and less democracy-minded than Hong Kong. Certain values are strongly accepted in one, two, or even all three of these culturally Chinese societies (e.g., the belief in accommodating other people). Other values are strongly rejected in all three societies (e.g., the belief that a son is better than a daughter). Still other values divide respondents almost evenly both within and across societies (e.g., the idea that interest groups harm everyone).

These complex patterns open the door to further analysis of the subdimensions of the traditional and democratic value complexes. Except for the brief discussion in Appendix B, however, due to limitations of space, this paper does not pursue that line of analysis. Instead, it explores another issue: are there identifiable constituencies in each society who hold distinctive patterns of values?

Who are the Traditionalists, Who Are the Democrats? Even though respondents in the three societies disagree with one another in their attitudes toward each of the eighteen value items we presented to them, certain patterns are discernible among the responses. For one thing, as shown in the factor analyses reported in Appendix B, there was sufficient coherence in the factor analysis of both batteries to support the view that they effectively measured underlying theorized dimensions of traditional and democratic thinking respectively. Further supporting this claim, patterns of responses were correlated across the two batteries. The Pearson's R correlation coefficient between respondents' scores on the traditional social values battery and the democratic values battery was -.438 in mainland China, -.427 in Taiwan, and -.477 in Hong Kong. In other words, people with traditional values in all three societies were highly unlikely to hold democratic values and vice versa.⁵

In such ways the complexity of individualized responses to the 18 questionnaire items resolves into a pattern, in which respondents were likely, with a high degree of statistical significance, to hold consistent patterns of views. In each of the three societies,

⁵ Pearson's R describes how much increase in the value of y, as a proportion of one standard deviation in y, is associated with an increase of a given proportion of one standard deviation in x. The value of Pearson's R ranges from zero to one. Thus a Pearson's R of -.4 shows that as a respondent's score on the traditionalism battery increases by one standard deviation, his or her score on the democratic values battery decreases by nearly half a standard deviation.

there existed one constituency that gave greater favor to pro-traditional as well as anti-democratic values, and another constituency with the opposite set of leanings.

Who are the traditionalists, and who are the democrats? Are they the same kinds of people in all three societies, or do their attributes differ? The table *Correlates of Traditionalism and Democratic Values.xls* profiles the two constituencies in each of the three societies. (For a fuller version of this table including n's and comparison of these results with those using scales calculated with fewer missing cases, see the table in Appendix B, *Correl of regular and minmis variables compared.xls*.) The entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients, which express the extent to which change in one variable is associated with change in the other (see footnote 5 above). Only statistically significant correlations are displayed. Almost all the correlation coefficients are robust both in size and in statistical significance. The signs are all positive for democratic values and almost all negative for traditional values, consistent with the tendency across all three societies for traditionalists not be democrats and vice versa. Put otherwise, in each society the same constituency takes an opposite view on the two value complexes.

Table
Correlates of Traditionalism and Democratic Values.xls
about here

The predictor variables in the table fall into two types, socioeconomic status and psychobehavioral capital. The former category reflect conditions of life, often of long standing, that are likely to have helped shape a person's attitudes toward deeply rooted cultural values as well as the way in which he or she approaches political life. The latter category of variables may not only shape, but be shaped by, cultural values. We include both sets of variables in the table not to make a causal argument, but to explore the social, psychological, and behavioral profile of people holding the two different syndromes of values.

As a whole, the table speaks of divided societies. In all three places, the less traditional and more democratic-minded people tend to be younger, better-educated city dwellers, with higher incomes, who have white collar jobs. Their opposite numbers, who are more traditional-minded and less committed to democratic values, tend to be older, to dwell in the rural areas, to have lower incomes, and to work in blue collar jobs or in agriculture.⁶ The more modern- and democracy-minded constituency also possesses greater psychological and social capital. It reports itself to be more interested in politics, to use the media more, to be better informed about politics, and to participate more extensively in social organizations than does the group that holds the reverse set of values.

Of all the variables investigated, education shows the strongest correlation with values. In all three societies, persons with more years of formal education are far more likely to hold democratic values and far less likely to hold traditional values than persons with fewer years of formal education. As education increases, belief in traditional values declines steadily and markedly, and belief in democratic values increases in the same way. The pattern holds true across all three societies. In comparison to the other two societies,

⁶ This mirrors the findings with respect to cleavages in the Chinese public in 1990 over government policy priorities in Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, "Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China," *World Politics* (July 1996) 48:4, pp. 522-550.

the impact of education on democratic values in Taiwan is the least strong of the six correlation coefficients involving education that are displayed. This suggests that the gap in belief in democratic values across educational groups is slightly less pronounced in Taiwan than in the other two societies, nor is it as pronounced in Taiwan in regard to democratic values as it is in regard to traditional values. Put otherwise, democratic values in Taiwan are more widely shared across the educational class spectrum than in the other two societies.

The next most influential of the socioeconomic variables is age, but its impact is inconsistent across the three societies and between the two value complexes. Younger people have departed radically from traditional values in Taiwan and Hong Kong, but the age effect on traditionalism is less marked, although still noticeable, in China. In all three societies younger people are more democratic in their value beliefs. The magnitude of the effect is similar across societies but less dramatic than the impact of age on traditionalism in Taiwan and Hong Kong.⁷

Interpreted in dynamic perspective, the table suggests that modernizing change in all three societies had by 1993 helped shift the mainstream of social and political values away from traditional values toward those that are more democratic. Generational change, rising education and income levels, urbanization, and structural shifts in the economy are among the forces associated with more modern- and democracy-minded attitudes. The effect of these sociological trends was reinforced by increasing media use and increasing social capital by the more educated and urban respondents, and, in turn, by the increase in political interest and political knowledge that these engender.

As a preliminary test of this modernization hypothesis about value change, we conducted OLS regressions to analyze the impact of six socioeconomic-status variables that are associated with modernizing change upon traditional social values and democratic values.⁸ The independent variables were sex, age, years of education, income, occupation, and urban registration (in China) or urban residence (in Taiwan; there is no urban variable for Hong Kong). In these regressions (not shown due to limitations of space), the socioeconomic variables were able to explain 21.8% percent of the variance in traditional social values in China, 27.7% in Taiwan, and 21.4% in Hong Kong. They were able to explain 21.0% percent of the variance in democratic values in China, 15.2% in Taiwan, and 19.3% in Hong Kong.

In five of these six regressions, education was the most powerful predictor of values, with the absolute values of betas ranging from .187 to .325,⁹ always at high levels of statistical significance. (Age outstripped education as a predictor for democratic values in China but here too, education remained an important predictor.) In other respects, however, the three political systems displayed different patterns in the ways in which modernization influenced attitudes. In addition to education, the most powerful

⁷ Because of the strength of the correlation coefficients for age, we have assumed that the relationship between age and traditionalism is a straight line. But age-squared also shows a strong coefficient with traditionalism, so in the future we need to explore further whether the relationship is linear.

⁸ Since a hypothesis about dynamic causes of change is best tested with diachronic data, we call this test using synchronic data a preliminary test of the hypothesis. Traditional social values and democratic values in the equations were represented by the respondent's score on the plus-or-minus ten point scales described in Appendices B and C.

⁹ The sign of education coefficients in regressions with d.v. "traditional social values" is negative and the sign of education coefficients in regressions with d.v. "democratic values" is positive.

predictors of both traditional social values and democratic values in China were age and urban residence (with older people and rural residents holding more traditional and less democratic attitudes). In both Taiwan and Hong Kong, traditional social attitudes were influenced by sex, with males (perhaps surprisingly) holding more traditional attitudes. In Taiwan, democratic values were also affected by white collar occupation. In summary, the force of education in changing attitudes is a strong general sign of modernization's impact, while the workings of other modernization-related variables in changing values varies to some extent across the three societies.

Consequences of Traditional and Democratic Values. We have shown that in these three societies culture – as measured by two value syndromes – varies, and does so in patterns that make sense. We have also shown that culture changes with modernization. But do changes in culture matter for political behavior, or is behavior influenced only by institutional or socio-economic change, with changes in culture exerting no additional effect on changes in political behavior? This question is important for the discipline of political science, in which a major debate has been conducted for years over whether “culture matters” (Huntington and Harrison CITE TK; Inglehart CITE TK). It is also important for policy analysts, who want to know whether the changing cultural attitudes that come with modernization will generate changes in political demand-making, thus rebounding back on institutions and bringing pressure for change.

In the context of the present study, we want to know whether, when other causes like education are held constant, citizens' preferences for traditional or non-traditional, democratic or non-democratic values have an impact on their political behavior. Our dependent variable is frequency of political participation. As explained in another paper for this conference, our survey asked respondents whether they had engaged in 38 acts of participation in China, 28 in Taiwan, and 25 in Hong Kong. For purposes of analysis we divided these acts into six types, and also constructed a variable reflecting the respondent's total level of political participation in all acts. Thus each of the six types (or modes) of participation, as well as the total participation score, can be treated as a dependent variable for the purposes of analysis. Statistically, regression analysis is the tool of choice for disentangling different causal influences on these dependent variables..

Since reporting the full results takes too much space, here we focus on reporting the results when the dependent variable is total participation. As a matter of fact, surprisingly,¹⁰ the R-squareds are with few exceptions most robust when this dependent variable is used and less robust for each of the modes of participation (separate regression analyses are not shown here for reasons of space). We have thus stuck to the total participation rate as our dependent variable in the analysis.

To explore the relationships between socio-demographic variables, cultural variables, and participation, we developed a series of four regression models in which traditional values and democratic values figured in what we believe from a theoretical

¹⁰ Surprisingly, because we might have expected value syndromes to have stronger effects on some modes of participation than others. For example, one might hypothesize that traditional social values will incline an individual to use contacting rather than protest as his preferred mode of participation. One might hypothesize, with Verba, Nie, and Kim (CITE TK), that since voting is an easy act and often a mobilized act, it will be less influenced by differences in cultural values. One problem with testing these hypotheses is that some modes of participation have low frequencies that make multivariate analysis statistically impossible.

standpoint to be appropriate ways. In each of these models, our dependent variable is total political participation. In the first of these models, designated as Model I, we explore the effects upon political participation of a series of socio-demographic variables. These variables -- sex, age, years of education, income, occupation, and urban registration or residence -- belong in Model I because they are in a theoretical sense “prior” to traditional social values: they are more likely to affect the respondent’s degree of belief in traditional social values than to be affected by it. In Model II, we add traditionalism as an independent variable.¹¹ Once the individual is socially situated in terms of the variables in Model I, he or she is likely next to develop an orientation toward traditional social values which will remain more or less stable as he enters into further social interaction. Model III adds psychological variables, social capital, and media use – aspects of belief and social behavior which are likely to be influenced both by the socio-demographic factors in Model I and by the individual’s orientations toward traditional social values which were entered into the analysis in Model II. Finally, Model IV adds democratic values as an independent variable. Because all three societies in 1993 were undergoing rapid political changes that could affect respondents’ attitudes toward values related to politics, we modeled democratic values as influenced by all three sets of variables that preceded it but not reciprocally influencing these prior sets of variables.

Table
Incremental R Square of Total Participation.xls
about here

The results are displayed in *Incremental R Square of Total Participation.xls*. The table offers a somewhat surprising conclusion.¹² Each increment to the regression analysis of a strictly “cultural” variable (traditionalism and democratic values) makes almost no difference to the explanation of political participation in any of the three societies. Put otherwise, the causal path to participation is similar in the three societies, in that favorable socioeconomic resources encourage participatory activities, and favorable psychological and social-capital resources give a further boost to such activities. But the fact that the respondent holds traditional values or democratic values does nearly nothing to affect his or her rate of participation positively or negatively in any of the three societies.

Provisional Conclusions. It would be premature to conclude from this finding that “culture doesn’t matter.” Culture clearly matters, for one thing, as we showed, in defining sharply opposed value constituencies in the three political systems, which can be expected to hold different views on a host of political issues. This is a line of analysis we need to explore further. As noted, further analysis may also discover that culture matters for certain modes of political participation even it does not matter for total participation.

¹¹ In the regression we used the minimal-missing-values version of our traditionalism scale in order to reduce the number of missing cases in the analysis. See Appendix B for details.

¹² It is not, however, totally surprising since it is consistent with the findings reported from the same datasets, but using somewhat different operationalizations, in Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai, “Traditional Orientations and Political Participation in Three Chinese Societies,” *Journal of Contemporary China* (2002) 11 (31), pp. 297-318.

Third, we need to explore whether culture matters for other attitudes like trust in institutions or support for democracy. Fourth, we should study whether sub-dimensions of our cultural variables (noted in the factor analyses in Appendices B and C) have more notable effects on participation or other behaviors than do the two value syndromes as wholes. Fifth and finally, the availability of the eight-nation Asian Barometer surveys from 2002 will enable us to extend our search for the influence of culture to a later decade and additional countries.

While we are only at the beginning of an investigation of how much culture matters in Asia and for what, the implication of our findings in this paper are already significant. Two major syndromes of cultural values have been shown not to affect rates of political participation in three culturally Chinese political systems in the early 1990s. Other variables shaped the rates of participation. These were institutionally-constrained incentives and opportunities, and the forces associated with modernization.

Appendix A Sampling Methodologies of the 1993 Three-China Surveys

China: The mainland data come from a survey conducted in China between September 1993 and June 1994 in cooperation with the Social Survey Research Center of People's University of China. The sample represents the adult population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.¹³ A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.

The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) employed in the sample design are counties (*xian*) in rural area and cities (*shi*) for urban areas.¹⁴ Before selection, counties were stratified by region and geographical characteristics and cities by region and size. A total of forty-nine counties and eighty-five cities were selected as the primary sampling units. The secondary sampling units (SSUs) were townships (*xiang*) and districts (*qu*) or streets (*jiedao*). The third stage of selection was geared to villages in rural areas and neighborhood committees (*juweihui*) in urban areas, and a total of 551 villages and neighborhood committees were selected. Within each sampled village and neighborhood, the project obtained population or household data from local authorities and then, in the fourth stage of sampling, selected respondents randomly from the population (in rural areas) or from the list of households (in urban areas).

Retired high school teachers were employed as interviewers for most of the survey. Before the interview began, letters were sent to all the sampling spots to check whether there were any changes in addresses. We then removed all invalid addresses from our sampling frame and thereby eliminated the majority of noncontacts. The project

¹³ To conserve resources, we decided to exclude Tibet from this study. First, many Tibetans do not speak Chinese. Second, transportation in Tibet is extremely difficult since there is no railroad and the highway system is not well developed. And third, it is difficult to find qualified interviewers who can work there effectively.

¹⁴ Data for the sampling frame were obtained from Ministry of Public Security, comp., *Zhongguo chengxian renkou tongji* (Population statistics by city and county of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Ditu chubanshe, 1987).

scheduled interviews with 3,425 people, and 3,287 of the prospective respondents contacted by interviewers answered our questions, for a response rate of 94.5 percent.

The data were weighted by gender, age, education, and region to create distributions identical to those of the population.

Taiwan: The Taiwan data come from a survey conducted between July and August 1993 by a National Taiwan University research team led by Profs. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu of the Department of Political Science. The sample represents all eligible voters on the island. A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample. The first step in the sampling process was to divide the target population into several strata. We used multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) and cluster analysis to divide Taiwan's electorate into six strata according to different parties' vote shares in previous elections. A total of thirty-three *hsiang*, *chen*, *shih*, and *ch'ü* were sampled from the six strata. In the last step, several polling stations were selected from each designed *hsiang*, *chen*, *shih*, and *ch'ü*.

In order to ensure that there were enough eligible respondents to reach the target of 1400 interviews, we drew a sample nine times the size of the target sample. The success rate of interviews from the first drawn sample before replacement was 43.4%. A sampled respondent who had moved, refused to be interviewed, or could not be successfully interviewed for some other reason, was replaced with a person from the supplementary pool chosen by random selection from the same ten-year-interval age cohort, of same gender, and from the same village or neighborhood. Chi-squared tests showed no statistically significant differences on a number of variables of interest between the respondents drawn from the original sample and those selected from the supplementary pool.

Students from National Taiwan University were employed as interviewers for the survey. Before the interview began, a training session was held at National Taiwan University to teach them interview techniques. For quality control purposes, all respondents with telephone numbers were contacted over the phone by supervisors to verify the identity of the interviewee and the time, place, and duration of the face-to-face interview. Fifteen percent of the respondents were randomly selected for a re-interview by supervisors, using an abridged version of the questionnaire. All completed questionnaires were closely examined for traces of forgery.

The sample reflected the characteristics of the target population on dimensions of sex, age, and education closely enough not to require weighting.

Hong Kong. The target population of the survey was Hong Kong Chinese aged 18 or over. For practical reasons, those who resided in temporary structures in non-built-up areas and in marine areas were excluded from the sample frame.

The project undertook a territory-wide household survey. The sample was prepared by means of a multi-stage design. In the first stage, since no listing of adult residents of Hong Kong existed, we used the list of permanent residential addresses maintained by the Census and Statistics Department's computerized Sub-frame of Living Quarters as our sampling frame. With the assistance of that Department, a systematic sample of 2065 addresses was selected from the list of addresses. After excluding

unused, vacant, demolished, and unidentifiable addresses, and addresses without Chinese inhabitants, the sample size was reduced to 1633 addresses.

In the second and third stages of sampling, interviewers selected households and eligible respondents within them. Interviewers were required to call at each address and list all households residing there. If there were two or more households, the interviewer would select one according to a random selection table pre-attached to each address assignment sheet. Having selected the household, the interviewer listed all eligible household members aged 18 or over in a pre-determined order by sex and age. The respondent was then selected based on a random selection grid (a modified Kish Grid) pre-attached to each address assignment sheet.

Face-to-face interviews with structured questionnaires were carried out by the interviewers, who were students at local tertiary institutions, mainly the Chinese University of Hong Kong. One hundred twenty-one interviewers participated in the fieldwork. All the interviewers were required to attend a half-day training session covering the content of the questionnaires, sampling procedures and interviewing techniques. About 90% of the interviews were conducted during May-July, 1993, with the remainder carried out during August-October, 1993. Each interview took 35.5 minutes in average. Of 1,633 individuals selected by the sampling procedure, 892 interviews were successfully completed for a response rate of 54.6%.

Acknowledgments. For financial support, we wish to thank the National Science Foundation (NSF-SBR-94-96313), the Henry Luce Foundation, and the China Times Foundation.

Appendix B

Measuring Belief in Traditional Asian Values

It is widely believed that most members of Asian cultures hold certain social and political values different from those dominant in the West. In recent years, this hypothesis has been given fresh prominence in the debate over so-called “Asian values” (Bauer and Bell 1999; Inoue 1999; Donnelly 1999; Sen 1999).¹⁵ To be sure, few Asians today think of themselves as Confucianists. Nonetheless, at the core of Asian values lie a series of beliefs thought to be associated with the Confucian tradition of China. Our 1993 surveys attempted to measure the prevalence of these traditional Asian social values in the three Chinese regions. This Appendix describes how our scale of Traditional Asian Values was created.

Theoretical rationale for the battery. The first step was to reduce broad theories about Asian values into questionnaire items. Chinese traditional attitudes were shaped, sociologically, by the strong family system, and ideologically by Confucianism (Pye DATE; Solomon DATE; Bond DATE; Lau and Kuan DATE; Rozman 1991). Values

¹⁵ The theoretical section of this appendix draws, with permission, from “Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy? The Case of South Korea,” by Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin, Paper prepared for the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in San Diego, March 4-7, 2004, and from an unpublished paper by Tianjian Shi, citation TK.

widely cited as Asian or Confucian include the importance of family, the concern for duties in preference to rights, the primacy of the group over the individual, the primacy of unity or harmony, the importance of hard work and thrift, and the commitment to education (Zakaria 1994; Tu 1996; Bauer and Bell 1999). Because our study focused on politically relevant values, we did not try to measure economic and social values such as hard work, thrift, and the importance of education, but focused on social and political values.

Three clusters of social and political attitudes in particular have been identified by scholars as prevalent in Chinese societies.

The first is a group orientation. Confucian morality emphasizes loyalty to the family. Within the family, interpersonal relations are based on the principles of filial piety and loyalty (Chung 1997; Hahm 1996). Personal conduct is judged on the basis of whether it promotes the good of the family as a whole. It is considered ethically desirable to favor relatives over strangers, rather than to act impartially. The family is envisioned as a microcosm of society and politics and idealized as the prototype of good governance. Looking beyond the immediate family, Confucian morality assumes that the person is inherently connected to others (Marsella, De Vos and Hsu 1985; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus and Nisbett 1998). In Confucianism, the ideal self is defined and established in terms of one's relationship to others. Because the individual is not seen as separate from other people, he or she is obligated to work through the groups to which he belongs. Therefore, a person's concern for his or her own needs and rights is supposed to be kept secondary to his or her social duty and to the welfare of the group.

If the ideal of social control in Chinese political culture "rested upon self-discipline" (Pye 1992:86) and the Chinese "shun the adversarial logic of the West" (Bond 1991:66), we can expect people under the influence of the traditional political culture to be willing to sacrifice their own interests to preserve the harmony of society. When they found the government to be nonresponsive to their requests, they voluntarily forfeited their private interests rather than blaming the government.

Another aspect of Chinese political culture is its unique handling of conflict management. An enduring characteristics of Chinese political culture is the fear of *luan* (chaos), many people believe initiating disputes with others is an invitation to chaos. Social psychologists have found in situations where one person's interests clash in important ways with those of another, the Chinese to a greater extent than people in other cultures, opt for nonconfrontational approaches to resolving the conflict. Experimental research shows that the Chinese tend to cooperate even when it is their own interest not to do so (Bond 1991:66).

The third is a dependent or deferential attitude towards power and authority. Rather than considering the relationship between individuals and state as "a reciprocal one in which the obligations of obedience and respect were contingent upon the model behavior of those with power," traditional culture in China defines such relationship as hierarchical. As illustrated by Pye, Chinese culture never confers on the general populace the expectations that favorable responses by government *should* be forthcoming. If people do not expect government to have obligations to meet their requests, an unfavorable response by the government is unlikely to make them withdraw support. The nonresponsiveness of government to people's demands can have different impacts on people with different orientations toward power and authority. While such behavior by

government will alienate those who perceive their relationship with authority as reciprocal, it may not produce similar effects on those who perceive such a relationship as hierarchical.

An important study of Chinese social values is Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1988). This reports on two surveys conducted in Hong Kong in 1985 and 1986. The work contains an excellent literature review/conceptual chapter on the features of the traditional Chinese social order, and the questionnaire items are explicitly developed with this literature in mind. The focus falls on such issues as individualism, rights, egalitarianism, conflict, political order, deference to authority, the moral quality of leadership, and substantive versus procedural justice. What Kuan and Lau define as Chinese traditionalism is nearly identical with what most writers think of as "Asian Values." These include "moral state" and "trust in political institutions."

The most extensive operationalization of Chinese traditional values has been undertaken by Yang Kuo-shu, a social psychologist who has conducted most of his research in Taiwan. Yang developed a Multidimensional Scale of Chinese Individual Traditionality (MS-CIT) and a Multidimensional Scale of Chinese Individual Modernity (MS-CIM), both constructed in the early 1990s to substitute for his former traditionality-modernity scale. According to Yang, traditional Chinese values cluster around two central values, familism and order.¹⁶

- Familism includes the following ideas. The family is the most important group. Filial piety is the supreme value on which other loyalties are built. One has to get ahead for the glory of the ancestors and the family. To maintain the continuity of a family it is important to have a child, especially a son. Kinship relations serve as the most important form of link, reflected in nepotism and personalism, in Chinese referred to as *guanxi* or connections. Saving face or avoiding the humiliation of being shamed is necessary for both sides in maintaining good *guanxi*.
- Order (or harmony) includes the values of conformity and conflict-avoidance. Conformity is a belief that social rules have to be followed, because compliance is the best way to maintain order and harmony. Conflict-avoidance includes controlling one's emotions and not interfering in others' business. A traditional way to resolve a conflict situation is to appeal to the most senior person to settle the matter.

¹⁶ Yang, Kuo-shu, *Zhongguoren de tuibian* (The transformation of the Chinese) (Taipei: Guiguan tushu gufen youxian gongsi, 1988); "Will Societal Modernization Eventually Eliminate Cross-Cultural Psychological Differences?" in Michael Harris Bond, ed. *The Cross-Cultural Challenge to Social Psychology* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publishers, 1988), pp. 67-85; "Chinese Personality and Its Change," in M.H. Bond, ed., *The Psychology of the Chinese People* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, DATE), pp. 106-170, "Chinese Social Orientation: An Integrative Analysis." in Tsung-yi Lin, Wen-shing Tseng, and Eng-kung Yeh, eds. *Chinese Societies and Mental Health* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 19-39; "The Psychological Transformation of the Chinese People as a Result of Societal Modernization." Manuscript version, to appear in M. H. Bond, ed., *The Handbook of Chinese Psychology* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, UPDATE CITE).

Operationalization. With these works in mind, the three-Chinas survey asked ten questions (nine in Hong Kong) to estimate the levels of attachment to traditional social values. The battery read as follows.

We would like to know your opinions on the following statements. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

If any conflict occurs, we should ask senior people to uphold justice.

Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children should still do what they ask.¹⁷

The most important reason for working hard to get ahead is to bring honor to one's ancestors.

When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother.

When one has a disagreement with someone, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.

Even if a person has ability, he should not make a big show of it.

Wealth and poverty, honor and humiliation, success and failure are all determined by fate.

If only one child is allowed, it is better to have a son than a daughter.

When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given first to relatives and friends.

Even if husband and wife have broken with one another emotionally, they still should maintain the marriage.

Coding issues. We recoded the responses on a point-five based scale, so that "strongly agree" was coded 1.5, "agree" was coded 0.5, "disagree" was coded -0.5, and "strongly disagree" was coded -1.5. This placed the four response categories equidistant from one another, a coding decision that we considered a reasonable approximation of the meaning of these response categories to the respondents. The individual's score on the democratic values battery consisted of the sum of his or her scores on the ten items (nine items in Hong Kong multiplied by ten-ninths to standardize the Hong Kong scale to the same scale of plus or minus ten.)

We treated don't know (DK) answers as missing values, because cross-tab analysis of the DK responders showed them to be disproportionately female, rural, older, and less educated. This suggested to us that DK could not legitimately be coded as a neutral, or zero, response.

This meant that any individual who answered DK to any of the questions became a missing case for the purpose of further statistical analysis. We had 654 missing cases in China, a high number out of the total of 3296 cases – and similar proportions of missing cases in Taiwan and Hong Kong. We therefore created a second scale of traditional values consisting of the several questionnaire items with the lowest number of DK responses (five items in China, three items in Taiwan, three items in Hong Kong). This subscale had only 175 missing cases in China and similarly low levels of missing cases in the other two locations. We ran the same correlations and regressions with the full and

¹⁷ Not asked in Hong Kong.

the minimal-missing versions of the democratic values battery to see whether the full battery performed significantly differently from the minimal-missing-cases battery. The correlation coefficients for the minimal-missing batteries were weaker than those for the full batteries but the same in direction and statistical significance and close in order of magnitude.

Table
Correl of regular and minmis variables compared.xls
about here

For the regression analyses reported in the main paper, we used the minimal-missing-values version of the traditionalism scale. In addition, we used a case screening procedure to screen out any case that had a missing value on any of the independent variables in any of the regression models. This allowed us to compare Models I, II, III, and IV using the same populations in running each model.¹⁸

Measurement qualities of the battery. To test the measurement qualities of the battery, we conducted Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Cronbach's Alpha tests, and conducted factor analyses and external validity assessments. The KMO test measures the degree of common variance shared by a set of variables and thus assesses the degree to which they measure a common underlying factor; scores above .7 are considered acceptable. Cronbach's alpha measures the average inter-item correlation of a set of variables; scores above .5 are considered acceptable. Factor analysis can be used as a guide to how coherently a set of variables relate to a hypothesized underlying dimension that they are all being used to measure. External validity analysis assesses whether the scale that has been constructed performs as theoretically expected in correlation with other variables to which it is expected to be related.

Table
Traditionalism FA DK=sysmis.xls
about here

For China, the scale had a KMO score of .863 and an alpha of .746. The factor structure as shown in the table, *Traditionalism FA DK=sysmis.xls*, was clear and interpretable. External validity tests were strong, as seen in *Correl of regular and minmis variables compared.xls*.

For Taiwan, the scale had a KMO score of .817 and an alpha of .729. The factor structure produced a three-factor solution, but when a two-factor solution was forced the output was interpretable, as seen in the table. The external validity tests were again strong.

For Hong Kong, the scale had a KMO score of .776 and an alpha of .690. The factor structure was clear and the external validity tests were likewise strong.

¹⁸ In the future we need to run tests to estimate the biases that may have been introduced into the analysis by this procedure. The alternative, however, is undesirable, because it would leave us comparing regression models that had been estimated using different populations.

As noted in the paper, the factor structures revealed here offer the opportunity for further analysis of the impact of culture on political behavior. Although the traditional social values scale as a whole had no marginal impact on frequency of total political participation, separate scales constructed out of the two factors may show a different pattern in relation either to total participation, or to specific modes of participation. One might hypothesize, for example, that familism is connected to contacting behavior while conflict avoidance might be related negatively to protest behavior.

Appendix C Measuring Belief in Democratic Values¹⁹

According to Fu Hu's original formulation (1998), the organizing principle of a political regime consists of three basic dimensions: (1) the legitimate power relationship among members of the political community; (2) the legitimate power relationship between the authorities and citizens; and (3) the legitimate power relationship among the government authorities themselves.²⁰

The value orientation toward *political equality* corresponds to the first dimension. It is a set of beliefs that all member of the political community should be equal and entitled to the same citizen rights regardless of differences of race, gender, education, religion, class, social-economic background, political affiliation, and so on. In contrast, in some societies a majority of people believe in a hierarchical and/or exclusionary order, in which it is considered legitimate for certain groups to be privileged and others to be disfranchised or discriminated against.

The value orientation toward *political liberty, pluralism* and *popular sovereignty* corresponds to the second dimension. The second dimension should be tapped by more than one set of beliefs because conceptually it can be subdivided into three subdimensions: (1) the value orientation toward political liberty is a set of beliefs that there is a realm of individual liberty which should be free from state intrusion and regulation; (2) the value orientation toward pluralism is a set of beliefs that there should be a realm of civil society in which civic organizations can freely constitute themselves and establish arrangements to express themselves and advance their interests without state interference; and (3) the value orientation toward popular accountability refers to a set of beliefs that government authority should be accountable to the people and that there should be some effective means for popular control and consent. In contrast, in some societies people believe that individual liberty should be minimized, civil society should be subject to state guidance and control, and the assertion of popular control over authority is unacceptable and even dangerous.

¹⁹ The first section of this appendix comes with slight changes from Yun-han Chu, Yu-tzung Chang and Fu Hu, "Regime Performance, Value Change and Authoritarian Detachment in East Asia, Paper prepared for delivery at an international conference on "How East Asians View Democracy: The Region in Global Perspective," organized by the Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes in East Asia Project, National Taiwan University and co-organized by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, December 8-9, 2003, Taipei, Appendix A.

²⁰ Hu, Fu *Political Culture and Political Life* (Taipei: Sun-ming Publishers, 1998). (*in Chinese*) Need Chinese citation. Is it Zhengzhi wenhua yu zhengzhi shenghuo? Correct romanization of publisher?

The value orientation toward *separation of power* corresponds to the third dimension. It is a set of beliefs that governing authority should be divided among various branches of government and that a good polity is achieved through a design of check-and-balance or horizontal accountability. In contrast, in some societies people believe in the necessity and the desirability of the supremacy of executive power or the fusion of legislative, executive and judicial authority.

Thus, we build our measures of legitimacy orientation toward the regime around the five essential elements of democratic norms, or, in Professor Hu Fu's original formulation (1998), the five dimensions of democratic value-orientation towards power:²¹

1. Political equality;
2. Popular accountability;
3. Political liberty;
4. Political pluralism;
5. Separation of power (horizontal accountability).

We recognize that most modern authoritarian regimes do not challenge or repudiate democratic norms in principle; rather, the lines of defense for an authoritarian arrangement (or the lines of subtle offense against democratic norms) typically fall into one of two types:

1) The *Desirability Argument*. The country should develop a different form of democracy (people's democracy, socialist democracy, guided democracy), local-style democracy which best suits itself and which might be superior to Western democracy.

2) The *Feasibility Argument*. The country is not ready for a full democracy because of lack of a civic culture, low level of socio-economic modernization, the urgency of other national development priorities, or imminent external threat. If the country had acquired Western democracy before its time, the society would pay a high price in terms of inefficiency, insecurity, and disorder.

We therefore, in contrast to others,²² do not think it is useful to ask respondents to agree or disagree with democratic norms stated in a straightforward, abstract way. Indicators of this sort will draw almost uniform positive answers and will fail to distinguish among respondents. In this sense, we understand orientations toward legitimate power relationships as something conceptually distinct from expressed support for democratic ideals. Although the two may be correlated, we expect to see greater variance in the distribution of what we call democratic values than we expect to see in agreement with abstract democratic norms or ideals.

The scale we have developed works by identifying a cluster of beliefs and attitudes that are typically nurtured under authoritarian or anti-democratic regimes. These attitudes are compatible with authoritarian arrangements and inimical to the development of democratic values and institutions. Disagreement with these propositions indicates pro-democratic values. We thus see the scale as placing the respondent on a continuum from believe in pro-authoritarian legitimacy orientations to a converse set of beliefs in pro-democratic legitimacy orientations.

²¹ The principle of majority rule is not explicitly included in our conceptual formulation. If Arend Lijphart (1984) is correct, then the majoritarian rule is not a first-order principle of Western democracy, or at least it is always qualified by the respect for minority and requirement of consensus.

²² E.g., Booth and Seligson 1986; Dalton 1991. Citations TK.

Operationalization. The democratic values battery in the three-Chinas survey consisted of eight questions (six of them were asked in Hong Kong). To avoid response set, the questions were scattered in several places in the questionnaire, with different prompts. One prompt asked, “Do you agree strongly, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?” The other prompt asked, “We would like to know your opinions on the following statements. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?” The questionnaire items were as follows (mainland versions are given):

People with higher levels of education have more right to speak on matters of politics.

Top government officials are like the head of a big family. Their decisions on national issues should be followed by everyone.

If only we had leaders who were morally upright, we could leave everything to them.

Whether or not a trend of thought should be allowed to spread among the public should depend on the decision of the government.

When various interest groups ask the government to satisfy their own interests, some asking the government to do one thing, some another, it damages everyone’s interests.²³

Too many political parties in a country will bring chaos.²⁴

The court should follow the opinion of local government when dealing with important cases.²⁵

If the people’s congress interferes in government decisions, it will be hard for the government to get anything done.

Coding issues. Our main scale of democratic values was generated out of the full set of eight variables. We coded the responses on a point-five based scale, so that “strongly agree” was coded 1.5, “agree” was coded 0.5, “disagree” was coded -0.5, and “strongly disagree” was coded -1.5. This placed the four response categories equidistant from one another, a coding decision that we considered a reasonable approximation of the meaning of these response categories to respondents. The individual’s score on the democratic values battery consisted of the sum of his or her scores on the eight items, multiplied by a factor to locate the measure on a plus-or-minus-ten point scale for ease of comparison with the traditional social values scale. Since we were trying to measure democratic values, and since the questionnaire items asked for agreement with non-democratic values, as a final step we multiplied by -1 to reverse the polarity of the respondent’s score.

As with traditional social values, we treated don’t know (DK) answers as missing values, and for the same reasons. We had 1310 missing cases in China out of the total of 3296 cases – and similar proportions of missing cases in Taiwan and Hong Kong. We therefore created a second scale of democratic values – as we did for the scale of traditional social values -- consisting of the several questionnaire items with the lowest

²³ Taiwan version: “If there are groups here and groups there, it will affect the locality’s stability and cooperation.” HK version TK.

²⁴ Not asked in Hong Kong.

²⁵ Not asked in Hong Kong.

number of DK responses (three items in China, two items in Taiwan, two items in Hong Kong). This subscale had only 40 missing cases in China and similarly low levels of missing cases in the other two locations. We ran the same correlations and regressions with the full and the minimal-missing versions of the democratic values battery to see whether the full battery performed significantly differently from the minimal-missing-cases battery. The correlation coefficients for the minimal-missing batteries were weaker than those for the full batteries but the same in direction and statistical significance and close in order of magnitude. See *Correl of regular and minmis variables compared.xls* in Appendix B.

As with the traditional social values battery, a case screening procedure was used for the regression analysis to screen out any case that had a missing value on any of the independent variables we were using.


Measurement qualities of the battery. For China, the democratic values scale had a KMO score of .768 and an alpha of .608. The factor structure as shown in the table, *Democratic Values FA DK=sysmis.xls*, was clear and interpretable. External validity tests were strong, as seen in *Correl of regular and minmis variables compared.xls*.

For Taiwan, the scale had a KMO score of .805 and an alpha of .708. The factor structure generated one strong and interpretable factor and a second factor on which several variables loaded weakly and in a pattern not easy to interpret – put otherwise, the battery performs very strongly in Taiwan by loading heavily on a single factor. The external validity tests were strong.

For Hong Kong, the scale had a KMO score of .743 and an alpha of .646. The factor analysis produced a single factor solution, with no second factor. External validity tests were again strong.

Table
Democratic Values FA DK=sysmis.xls
 about here

Figures
Tradlsm Three Chinas.wmf



Figures
Demo Values Three Chinas.wmf




Table
Traditionalism Frequencies.xls

Traditionalism in Three Chinese Societies
(% of those answering who agree)

Item	China	Taiwan	Hong Kong
Senior people resolve conflict	83.1	74.9	42.1
Accommodate other people	64.5	51.3	69.2
Should not make show of ability	64.4	53.3	64.4
Wife should obey mother	57.5	52.9	35.4
Get ahead to honor ancestors	42.8	45.5	30.4
Maintain broken marriage	41.5	55.6	37.5
Children obey parents	35.9	25.4	n.a.
First hire relative/friend	34.8	19.3	20.8
Success determined by fate	32.1	29.4	30.1
Son better than daughter	31.1	21.2	19.6
Average	48.77	42.88	38.8

Notes:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Percentages agreeing among those who answered the question.

Percentages at or above 50% in boldface.

N.a.=not asked.

Table
Democratic Values Frequencies.xls

Democratism in Three Chinese Societies
(% of those answering who disagree)

Item	China	Taiwan	Hong Kong
Legislature should not interfere government	48.7	43.9	47.1
Interest groups harm everyone	40.0	32.8	54.0
Too many parties bring chaos	36.4	34.1	n.a.
Government decide trend of thought	28.1	64.4	71.2
Court follow government's opinion	27.5	73.6	n.a.
Leave everything to upright leaders	25.0	43.4	70.1
The educated have right to speak	22.7	64.0	52.5
Government officials like family head	19.9	64.9	74.2
Average	31.0	52.6	61.5

Notes:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Percentages disagreeing among those who answered the question.

Percentages at or above 50% in boldface.

N.a.=not asked.

Table
Correlates of Traditionalism and Democratic Values.xls

Correlates of Traditional and Democratic Values

	Socioeconomic status						Psychobehavioral capital			
	Male	Better educated	Urban	Younger	Higher income	White collar	Politically informed	Politically interested	Media use	Social capital
CHINA										
Traditional values	-.040	-.439	-.314	-.189	-.117	-.244	-.390	-.234	-.287	-.296
Democratic values	.109	.405	.317	.223	.197	.229	.372	.201	.324	.301
TAIWAN										
Traditional values	.124	-.496	-.200	-.425	-.273	-.187	-.337	-.318	-.276	
Democratic values	.090	.321	.149	.224	.196	.214	.263	.260	.189	
HONG KONG										
Traditional values	.076	-.409	n.a.	-.410		-.230	-.167	-.277	-.211	-.077
Democratic values		.419	n.a.	.309		.219	.228	.266	.147	.108

NOTES:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients.

Unbolded numbers are significant at the .05 level.

Boldfaced numbers are significant at or above the .001 level.

Blank cells indicate correlations without statistical significance.

N.a.=not applicable.

Urban, in mainland, is type of household registration; in Taiwan, place of current residence.

Media use=the sum of times respondent listened to radio, watched TV, and read the newspaper in a week.

Social capital=number of organizations belonged to.

Traditional and democratic values are measured as scores on a scale ranging from -10 to +10.

Better educated=has more years of education.

Younger=lower age in years.

Higher income=has more annual income.

White collar=administrative and managerial positions.

Table
Incremental R Square of Total Participation.xls

**Multivariate Regression Analyses of Total Participation:
 Incremental Adjusted R² (Pct. of Variance Explained)**

Variables Added	China	Taiwan	Hong Kong
Model I: Socioeconomic Status	.065	.087	.040
Model II: Traditionalism	-.001	.001	.008
Model III: Psychological variables, Social capital, and Media use	.107	.115	.150
Model IV: Democratic values	-.001	.000	.000
Cumulative adjusted R²	.170	.203	.198
N=	3052	1082	755

Notes:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Each entry is computed as an increment to the proceeding model. Model I i.v.'s are sex, age, age² years of education, income, occupation, and urban registration or residence (no urban variable in Hong Kong). Model II adds Traditionalism. Model III adds political information, political interest, internal efficacy, external efficacy, social capital, and media use. Model IV adds Democratic values.

Table
Correl of regular and minmis variables compared.xls
**Comparison of Correlation Coefficients for Full and Minimal-missing Version of
 Traditionalism and Democratic Values Scales**

Correlations		Years of				Annual income	White collar	Political information	Political interest	Media use	Social capital
		Male	education	Urban	Age						
Traditionalism	Pearson Corr.	-.040	-.439	-.314	.189	-.117	-.245	-.390	-.234	-.287	-.296
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.041	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	2642	2640	2639	2642	2642	2642	2642	2642	2642	2642
Tradit_minmis	Pearson Corr.	-.025	-.425	-.304	.235	-.130	-.224	-.364	-.220	-.269	-.286
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.155	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	3121	3118	3118	3121	3121	3121	3121	3121	3121	3121
Democratic values	Pearson Corr.	.109	.405	.317	-.223	.197	.230	.372	.201	.324	.301
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	1986	1983	1985	1986	1986	1986	1986	1986	1986	1986
Demo_minmis	Pearson Corr.	.092	.290	.243	-.131	.129	.182	.316	.101	.247	.277
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	3256	3254	3253	3256	3256	3256	3256	3256	3256	3256

Correlations		Years of				Annual income	White collar	Political information	Political interest	Media use	Social capital
		Male	education	Urban	Age						
Traditionalism	Pearson Corr.	.124	-.496	-.200	.425	-.273	-.187	-.337	-.318	-.276	-.274
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	1008	1000	1007	1008	748	1008	1008	1008	1008	1008
Tradit_minmis	Pearson Corr.	.021	-.386	-.180	.338	-.190	-.172	-.304	-.289	-.251	-.236
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.460	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	1284	1272	1282	1284	914	1284	1284	1284	1284	1284
Democratic values	Pearson Corr.	.090	.321	.149	-.224	.196	.214	.263	.260	.189	.224
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.011	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	791	785	790	791	614	791	791	791	791	791
Demo_minmis	Pearson Corr.	.045	.369	.155	-.292	.138	.185	.294	.286	.220	.245
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.131	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	1141	1130	1140	1141	832	1141	1141	1141	1141	1141

Correlations		Years of				Annual income	White collar	Political information	Political interest	Media use	Social capital
		Male	education	Urban	Age						
Traditionalism	Pearson Corr.	.076	-.409	n.a.	.410	.022	-.230	-.167	-.277	-.211	.007
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.044	.000	n.a.	.000	.557	.000	.000	.000	.000	.854
	N	705	698	n.a.	705	705	705	705	705	705	705
Tradit_minmis	Pearson Corr.	-.006	-.392	n.a.	.352	-.008	-.206	-.185	-.268	-.246	-.020
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.861	.000	n.a.	.000	.813	.000	.000	.000	.000	.571
	N	837	825	n.a.	837	837	837	837	837	837	837
Democratic values	Pearson Corr.	.013	.419	n.a.	-.309	.054	.219	.228	.266	.147	.119
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.735	.000	n.a.	.000	.170	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002
	N	658	651	n.a.	658	658	658	658	658	658	658
Demo_minmis	Pearson Corr.	.060	.363	n.a.	-.248	.010	.204	.231	.204	.158	.069
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.086	.000	n.a.	.000	.767	.000	.000	.000	.000	.049
	N	811	800	n.a.	811	811	811	811	811	811	811

Notes:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Coding: See the table, "Correlates of Traditional and Democratic Values"

Table
Traditionalism FA DK=sysmis.xls

**Dimensions of Traditionalism in Three Chinese Societies
 (Factor Loadings)**

Item	China		Taiwan		Hong Kong	
	Familism	Conflict avoidance	Familism	Conflict avoidance	Familism	Conflict avoidance
Success determined by fate	0.69		-0.55	0.44	0.62	0.41
Son better than daughter	0.68		-0.64		0.71	
First hire relative/friend	0.64		-0.69		0.73	
Get ahead to honor ancestors	0.62	0.43	-0.45	0.54	0.50	0.52
Maintain broken marriage	0.61	0.44		0.61		0.60
Accommodate other people		0.69	-0.40	0.50		0.46
Should not make show of ability		0.67	-0.60	0.30		0.53
Wife should obey mother	0.38	0.65		0.68		0.70
Children obey partents	0.50	0.53		0.63		
Senior people resolve conflict	0.30	0.43		0.53		0.65

Notes:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Oblimin factor analysis (non-orthogonal).

Respondents who answered "Don't know" are coded as missing

Values .3 and above are shown; loadings .5 and above are bolded.

Table
Democratic Values FA DK=sysmis.xls

**Dimensions of Democratic Values in Three Chinese Societies
(Factor Loadings)**

Item	China		Taiwan		Hong Kong
	Democratic values	Pluralism	Democratic values	Factor 2	Democratic values
Government officials like family head	0.67		0.70		0.68
Court follow government's opinion	0.65		0.47	0.46	n.a.
Government decide trend of thought	0.61		0.70		0.66
Leave everything upright leaders	0.59		0.48		0.61
PC Should not interfere government	0.57		0.58	-0.37	0.45
The educated have right to speak	0.56		0.51	0.48	0.62
Interest groups harm everyone		0.76	0.60	-0.46	0.63
Too many parties bring chaos		0.69	0.59	-0.39	.

Notes:

Source: 1993 3-China surveys.

Oblimin factor analysis (non-orthogonal).

Respondents who answered "Don't know" are coded as missing

Values .3 and above are shown; loadings .5 and above are bolded.

N.a.=not asked.

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In July 2001, the EABS joined with three partner projects -- New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometro and Afrobarometer -- in a path-breathing effort to launch Global Barometer Survey (GBS), a global consortium of comparative surveys across emerging democracies and transitional societies.

The EABS is now becoming a true pan-Asian survey research initiative. New collaborative teams from Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam are joining the EABS as the project enters its second phase (2004-2008). Also, the State of Democracy in South Asia Project, based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (in New Delhi) and directed by Yogendra Yadav, is collaborating with the EABS for the creation of a more inclusive regional survey network under the new identity of the Asian Barometer Survey. This path-breaking regional initiative builds upon a substantial base of completed scholarly work in a number of Asian countries. Most of the participating national teams were established more than a decade ago, have acquired abundant experience and methodological know-how in administering nationwide surveys on citizen's political attitudes and behaviors, and have published a substantial number of works both in their native languages and in English.

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