【Panel I : Paper 3】

The Youth in the Context of Globalization: Foreign Exposure, Economic Openness and National Pride

Organized by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS)
Co-sponsored by Asian Barometer Survey
September 20-21, 2012 Taipei
IPSAS Conference Room A
(5th floor, North, Building for Humanities and Social Sciences)
The Youth in the Context of Globalization:
Foreign Exposure, Economic Openness and National Pride

Chin-en Wu
Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica
chinen@gate.sinica.edu.com

This is only a rough draft. Please do not quote without author’s permission.
Paper prepared for delivery at the conference “Democratic Citizenship and Voices of Asia’s Youth”, organized by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, and co-sponsored by Asian Barometer Survey, National Taiwan University, September 20-21, 2012, Taipei, Taiwan.
The Youth in the Context of Globalization: Foreign Exposure, Economic Openness and National Pride

Chin-en Wu

Introduction

The classical model of democracy assumes that for such a system to work, citizens must become aware, knowledgeable, and active in public affairs, engaged with other citizens and psychologically attached to their communities and nations. Democratic citizenship comprises several desired characteristics of “good citizens”. The first one is participation, or the behavioral aspect of democratic citizenship. Participation, both voting and alternative forms, are a prime criterion for defining the democratic citizen and his or her role within the political process, and it is central to the theoretical literature on democracy. The second one is critical and deliberative aspect of democratic citizenship. This dimension involves the citizen’s autonomous role in being sufficiently attentive to and informed about government to exercise a participatory role. The third one is allegiance, or the affective and normative aspect of democratic citizenship. Allegiance refers to the affection for one’s national community, compassion for other fellow citizens (and concern for their well-being), and normative commitment to the organizing principles of a democracy. While the importance of normative commitment to democratic values and norms are well known, allegiance to the national community is especially important to democracies that are struggling with the nation-building process.

In the wake of globalization, in each country the characteristics of good democratic citizens are facing challenges. First of all, exposure to foreign media and global affairs directly influence people’ cultural and national identity and also their attachment to traditional culture. Next, globalization entails international division of labor, hurting the unskilled labor in the developed countries and increasing income
inequality within and between countries. Without secure income, it is difficult to image that citizens are willing and able to participate, be autonomy, and allegiant to certain norms. The cultural and economic shocks are likely to be more salient among the young generation because people of this age are still in the process of socialization and are at the beginning of their careers.

Globalization creates double challenges facing the youth. First of all, globalization of economic exchanges increases the economic fluctuation. In addition, the division of labor induces the relocation of manufacturing bases from rich countries to countries with cheap labor. Globalization of production along with the process of automated manufacturing greatly hurt the youth in the developed countries. On the other hand, it ensures the high employment rate in the developing countries by drawing the youth from the rural to the factories surrounding the cities. It creates alienation and disorder among the workers. Will the economic shocks affect young citizens’ satisfaction with and support for democracy and demand for political changes? In addition, what are their attitudes toward economic openness?

Globalization also creates the cultural identity tension. Facing the culture shocks, people are likely to have either one of the two types of responses. First, exposure to foreign media and foreign affairs are likely to weaken people’ attachment to national community. The incoming global information and interests may also intrigue anti-globalization sentiment which reinforces protectionism and indigenous cultural identity. We will empirically examine the two possibilities. In addition, we will examine whether the strength of this attachment of the youth generation stronger or weaker than older generations. Are there differences within the youth generation? What is the impact of education, urban residence, family’s economic condition and Internet use on this attachment?

East Asia is one of the few regions in the world today where the bulk of the
countries are still governed by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. In addition to the divergent political regimes, the levels of developments also differ greatly across countries. Finally, the exposure to foreign trade also differs across countries. The share of trade as a percentage of GDP in some countries exceeds 100 percent. The divergence allows us to explore different response patterns across the region.

On the other hand, although the youth unemployment rate in East Asia is comparatively lower than other regions of the world, it is still higher than the adult unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for youth was 2.8 times than that of the adult (International Labor Office 2012). We want to know whether job status influence people’s evaluation of the political and trade regimes.

Literature Review

Globalization and Economic Shocks

Globalization mainly comprises two integrations: economic and cultural. Both types of integrations have important impacts on the youth’ life. The backbone of the economic globalization is the global division of production. Because the relocation of production bases to countries with cheap labors, workers of the industrialized countries suffer the most. High unemployment rates and worsening income distribution has been characterizing the western democracies during the era of globalization (Kapstein 2000; Bowlus and Robin 2004). Unskilled laborers suffer most seriously from the international division of labor. Scholars have empirically confirmed that the unequal distribution of income decreases satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe (Wagner, Dufour, and Schneider 2003). Similarly, although most East Asian countries have recovered from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, rising income inequality is also a significant trend in this region.

Because the erosion of the manufacturing jobs in the industrialized countries and
being less experienced, many young workers are more likely to accept short-term jobs or jobs with low wage and minimal benefits (World Youth Report 2007). Young people trapped in such type of works have difficulties shifting to more permanent and better-paid positions (International Labor Office 2012).

Unemployment, dead-end jobs, and poverty in many cases tend to frustrate the youth. This social discontent in many countries results in social unrest and sometimes the youth violence and crimes (Hugo 2003). In addition, it is likely that such frustration may reduce young adult’s satisfaction with and support for democracy and may even spark demands for political changes. While in the developing countries, young workers who often migrate from the rural area to the cities and work in poor conditions and lack adequate social protection. Although employed, they are also likely to be discontent with the current political and economic system (International Labor Office 2012).

Along with the globalization is economic modernization, which tends to accompany the change in family structure from extended families to nuclear families. This change reduces the traditional family control power over the youth but at the same time reduce the protection the extended families can provide in times of difficulties (World Youth Report 2007).

Globalization and Identity Shocks
The integration of culture is characterized by the cross-border information and communication flows, which come mainly from the developed countries to the developing countries. The spread of Western culture increases the public concerns about the erosion of the attachment to national community and the integrity of the traditional values (World Youth Report 2007).

Because the youth are still undergoing the socialization process, they are
amenable and sometime vulnerable to culture shocks. The crash of cultures may cause
disorientation among the youth. As the youth are exposed to the globalization of
culture, there are two possible reactions. One is that the youth develop a biculture
identity (Arnett 2005). They may still have the existing identity but at the same time
they develop a global consciousness (Giddens 1991). The other reaction is that the
youth perceive the invasion of foreign culture as a threat. As a result, they tend to
embrace their own culture identity more firmly and try to defend it.

The globalization of culture tends to spread from the Western countries or
affluent countries to the developing countries. The cultures in the former countries are
characterized by individualism and free market, which are often in start contrast with
the collectivism which dominant the societies in the developing countries (Arnett
2055). In a relatively backward economy, people often live in a subsistence level, and
mutual assistances are an important mechanism to ensure mutual survival (Schlegel
and Barry 1991). One can test whether frequent exposure to foreign culture induces
people to reject traditional social values and turn to the liberal democratic values. In
addition, we can check if exposure to foreign culture influence induces the young
people to embrace the idea of free trade and endorse economic openness.

DATA
We use ABS Wave-3 as the primary data source. There is no uniform definition of the
Youth. In job statistics, the youth typically refer to people age between 15 and 24. In
other cases, the definition of youth could be extended to below 40 years old. Here we
use people under 30 years old as the definition of the youth and refer the rest of
respondents as the adult. Because of the big divergence in East Asia in terms of their
political system and level of development, we can classify our country cases into four
broad categories of regime types: (1) Liberal Democracy (LD): Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan; (2) Electoral Democracy (ED): Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand; (3) Electoral authoritarian regime (EA): Malaysia and Singapore and (Hong Kong); and (4) One-Party Authoritarian regime (OA): China, Vietnam and (Cambodia). The Hong Kong and Cambodia data are not available yet.

Economic Status of Youth

We first examine the economic status of the youth by looking at the self-reported income and job status. One can find that the youth has somewhat higher income than the adult.

On the other hand, more youth said that they can save. It is likely because that youth at this stage do not have families and thereby do not bear the cost of raising family.
On average, the youth have higher unemployment rate than the adult. Especially in the relative affluent countries of LD and EA, jobless rate is two times higher among the youth than the adult. The youth have higher percentage of students but lower percentage of homemakers.
The survey also asks the respondents whether they think wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate. We find that the young respondents' attitudes differed from the rest of the population. On average, the youth believe less in fate in LD, EA, and OA.
Studies have indicated that the meaning of democracy vary across citizens. Popular understandings of democracy range from “social equity”, “good government”, “norms and procedures”, to “freedom and liberty”. We check if youth think differently about the essential characteristics of democracy. The survey question asks respondents to choose only one from each four sets of statements as the most essential characteristics of a democracy. In one set of statement, the question list four statement: (1) Government ensures law and order; (2) Media is free to criticize the things government does; (3) Government ensures job opportunities for all; and (4) Multiple parties compete fairly in the election.
In liberal democracies, more young respondents name job opportunities as the most essential characteristics of a democracy than the adult respondents. This reflects the labor market uncertainty facing the young generation and is consistent with the higher unemployment rate among the youth cohort. In electoral democracies and especially one-party authoritarian regimes, by contrast, which have relatively low GDP per capita and the unemployment rate for youth is comparatively much lower. Fewer youth think ensuring job opportunities is the most essential characteristic of democracy.

The emphasis on job opportunities, however, does not mean that the youth demand greater equality in general. With respect to the other three sets of questions regarding the most essential characteristics of democracy, their opinions do not significantly differ from the rest of the respondents. The statements related to income equality include “government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor” and “basic necessities, like food, clothes and shelter, are provided for all.” In addition, the
youth do not particularly perceive the idea of “people receive state aid if they are unemployed” as the most essential characteristics of democracy. The story is clear. The youth do not believe in fate and do not particularly demand social welfare and unemployment benefits. They just need job opportunities.

Furthermore, one can easily assume that the youth would demand greater government intervention in providing job security if they have fewer family supports. We examine this assumption by link the generations of family members live in this household and the youth’s demand for government intervention in job security. The figure show a pattern that family factor play an important role in the youth’s attitudes toward democracy. In the relative less affluent part of OA and ED young respondents tend to see job security as the most essential characteristic of democracy if fewer generations of family members live in the same households. Families in East Asia provide a strong support that ameliorates the unemployment threats.

The following question is whether the youth’s economic status may affect their
regime preferences and to the whole political economic system. In LD and OA, unemployed youth tend to support democracy less.

Compared with the adult respondents, the youth are prone to system change. Because of the discontent, the unemployed youth are more likely to accept the idea of system change.
The Youth’s Attitudes toward Globalization

Across countries, youth are less loyal to their countries in liberal democracies. In contrast, young respondents in China and Mongolia tend to agree citizens should always remain loyal only to his country, no matter how imperfect it is or what wrong it has done. Comparing the young and adult respondents, their opinions do not differ significantly in liberal democracies. Young respondents are less loyal to their countries in ED, EA, and OA. As to the question of being proud to be a citizen of a country, there is no significant differences across countries and age groups.
Compared to the rest of the East Asian Countries, greater percentage of young respondents in liberal democracies replies that they are willing to live in another country if they get the chance. Comparing the adult and the young respondents, it is clear that across East Asia the young generation is more willing to go and live in another country.
Young respondents in liberal democracies follow major events in foreign countries more closely than respondents in other part of the region. Young respondents follow such events more closely than the adult respondents in ED and EA.
Young respondents watch or listen to foreign programs in television, DVDs, movies, or radio more often than the adult.

Attitudes about defending a country’s way of life do not vary significantly across the youth and the rest of the respondents. In liberal democracies, fewer people agree this need to defending lifestyle instead of becoming more and more like other countries. Across the region, young generation is slightly less willing to defend the existing way of life.
As to people’s view toward foreign good, young respondents tend to favor less trade barriers. Fewer young respondents in the liberal democracies, electoral authoritarian, and one-party authoritarian regime agree that the governments should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods. Only respondents in the electoral democracy tend to agree the need to restrict the import of foreign products.
In addition, young respondents are also more likely to reject the statement that foreign goods are hurting the local community. In sum, young respondents on average are more likely to welcome free trade.
Information Exposure and people’s Attitudes

Here we examine the relationship between exposure to foreign information and the youth’s political attitudes. By political attitudes, we look at attachment to national identity and toward the progress of globalization. The young respondents who expose to foreign programs are not more likely to think citizen should always remain loyal only to his country or be proud of his country.

On the other hand, young respondents who follow foreign events or watch foreign programs more often are more willing to go and live in another country, if given the chance.
In liberal democracies and one-party authoritarian regime, young respondents who follow major events in other countries are less likely to endorse trade barriers that restrict importing manufacturing products. Respondents who watch foreign programs are more likely to endorse economic openness.
Next, a respondent who think a citizen should always remain loyal only to his country is more likely to defend the country’s way of life. This relationship is a bit tautology. In addition, a respondent who disagree that a citizen should always remain loyal only to his country is also more likely disagree the two statements that “we should protect our farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods” and “foreign goods are hurting the local community”.
Finally, young respondents who are proud of one’s country are important are more likely to defend the country’s way of life in all sub-regions. In addition, such respondents are more likely to endorse erecting trade barriers that restrict importing
agriculture and manufacturing products across all regimes.

As indicated, the western culture is characterized by individualism. The globalization of western culture is likely to have an impact on citizens’ social values.
Empirically, the association between following foreign events and watching foreign programs are not significantly associated with democratic values and traditional social values. One possible reason is that the two questions ask foreign events and programs but not the Western events and programs. If one is only exposed to information with the region, we will not expect to observe the individualized effect.

Social Economic Status and people’s Attitudes

In LD, there is an interesting pattern. For the youth, it is the poorest youth who are more willing to go and live abroad. For the adult, it is the richest who want to go and live abroad. Many young people in these countries have difficulties finding decent jobs. Work in the other countries becomes a natural way to escape the trap. In contrast, the ability and willingness of the adult to move to other countries are much lower. The wealthy are more interested in migrating by investment.

Table 23 Youth, Income, and Live Abroad

The relationships between job status and attachment to national community
exhibit contrasting patterns in different part of the region. In LD, unemployed youth
are more loyal to their countries, be proud of their countries, and willing to defend the
existing way of life. In contrast, in ED and OA, unemployed youth are less loyal, not
proud of their countries, and not willing to defend way of life. Compared with
employed youth, the unemployed youth do not support free trade less.

In general, better educated respondents are more willing to go and live in another
country if they are given the chance. The trend is more clear among the adult
respondents.

IN EA and OA, educated young respondents are less willing to support the idea
to protect farmers and workers by limiting the import of foreign goods. They also are
less likely to agree on the statement that foreign goods are hurting the local
community.
Urban youth are less loyal to their countries in EA. They are less proud to be citizens of their country in EA and OA. Urban youth across the region are more willing to live abroad.
Finally, we check the effect of internet use. In LD and OA, young frequent internet users are more likely to reject the idea that a citizen should always royal to his country. In ED, frequent internet users, however, endorse such idea. In EA, frequent internet users are less proud to be citizens of their countries. In ED and EA, this group is more willing to live abroad.

Frequent internet users in LD, EA, and OA are more willing to remove restrictions on foreign goods and do not consider foreign goods a threat to the local community.
Conclusion

As the youth see job opportunities as the most essential characteristic of democracy, it is important to providing job opportunities. Labor market deregulation and freedom of transfer of personnel across the borders would be some of the policies that facilitate jobs creations.