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**Panel VI**

Youth, Women and Minorities and the Politics of Inclusion

**Are East Asian Women Democratic Citizens or Subjects?**

**Gender and Democratic Citizenship in East Asia**

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The image of women in East Asia is heavily intertwined with negative stereotypes. Women in East Asia are often portrayed as passive, easily manipulated and thus political followers. This image of women as subjects rather than citizens extends into an analysis of democratic citizenship. Women are believed to be less democratic in political engagement, attitudes and behavior. Research on women in Asia consistently focuses on the gaps and shortcomings in women's participation, although in recent years there have been gains in the level of participation in legislatures (Iwanaga, 2008; UNDP 2010). How true is this negative stereotypical view of East Asian women and democratic citizenship? Are men in East Asia in fact more likely to be democratic citizens?

This paper examines the interrelationship between gender and democratic citizenship. It focuses on three different aspects of democratic citizenship – civic engagement (political interest and efficacy), attitudes toward democracy and behavior in the form of political participation. The aim of the paper is to examine whether in fact there is a democratic citizenship gender gap and, if so, to explore why this might be the case. In looking at the reasons for a possible gender gap we draw from previous studies of how gender shapes political attitudes and behavior, largely conducted outside of Asia. We also look at the differences among women to understand why women in East Asia may be less inclined to democratic citizenship compared to men.

The analysis is based on the third wave of the Asia Barometer Survey conducted from 2010-2012 in twelve East Asian countries. Founded in 2001, these robust public opinion surveys provide a valuable resource to understand political attitudes and behavior across East Asia. The paper begins by defining democratic citizenship, lays out the gender-related findings, and explores factors that help us understand gender differences, including variation within women themselves.

*Assessing Democratic Citizenship:*

Informed and active citizens have long been viewed as vital for democracy. Support for democratic processes and governance is equally as important. In the West, and more recently in East Asia, there has been increasing attention to declining support for democracy, as citizens are seen to be more critical of their governments, especially in more developed and democratic countries. This trend has coincided with more reports of citizens disengaging from politics, becoming less engaged and participatory in

politics. These trends, largely identified in the West, have fostered intensive debate on the meaning and evolution of democratic citizenship. (Bernhagen 2007, Dalton 2008) Scholars such as Pippa Norris (2005, 2011) have identified 'critical citizens' as the foundation of contemporary democratic citizenship, where being informed and active, but critical of the system is seen to be essential for democratic governance. Others point to the evolution in the form of political participation, suggesting that looking at traditional forms of political participation such as voting fails to capture the socially media connected masses. In all of these debates, the core assumptions of active, informed and democratically inclined citizenry remains central.

In this paper, the analysis builds on these three components of democratic citizenship – cognitive engagement, attitudes toward democracy and behavior in politics. The elements explored are the level of civic engagement, namely political interest and efficacy, how democracy is understood and whether it is supported as a political system and political participation in both electoral and non-electoral forms. The concepts measured are outlined below.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The questions are drawn from the ABS3 core questionnaire. Cognitive civic engagement includes both political interest and political efficacy. These questions include: Q43 How interested would you say you are in politics?, Q44 How often do you follow news about politics and government?; Q133 I think I have the ability to participate in politics., Q134 Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on. Q135 People like me don't have any influence over what the government does; In looking at support for democracy, the questions included: With regard to 'meaning of democracy' respondents were asked to choose one in four from the following four questions: Q85 1. Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor. 2. People choose the government leaders in free and fair election. 3. Government does not waste any public money. 4. People are free to express their political views openly Q86 1. The legislature has oversight over the government. 2. Basic necessities, like food, clothes and shelter, are provided for all. 3. People are free to organize political groups. 4. Government provides people with quality public services. Q87 1. Government ensures law and order. 2. Media is free to criticize the things government does. 3. Government ensures job opportunities for all. 4. Multiple parties compete fairly in the election. Q88 1. People have the freedom to take part in protests and demonstrations. 2. Politics is clean and free of corruption. 3. The court protects the ordinary people from the abuse of government power. 4. People receive state aid if they are unemployed. Q124 Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime. Q112 To what extent is the legislature capable of keeping government leaders in check?; Q126 If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important? Q128 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government." For political participation the following questions were used: Q32 In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you? Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]? Q34 Did you attend a campaign meeting or rally? Q69 Got together with others to try to resolve local problems; Q70 Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition. Q67 Contacted other influential people outside the government.

*Table 1: Measuring Democratic Citizenship*

Dimensions of Democratic Citizenship	Measures
Civic Engagement	Political Interest, Follow Politics, Political Efficacy
Meaning of Democracy	Four different conceptualizations: Equality, Procedural, Governance & Freedom Dimensions
Support for Democracy	Support for Democracy as a System, Solver of problems, Prioritization of Democracy over Economic Development
Political Participation	Voting, Persuade Others in Campaign, Sign Petition, Connect to Solve Local Problems, Contact Representative

The focus is not just on assessing the level of democratic citizenship, but on whether there is indeed a gender gap between women and men in these areas. Generally, following the trend in current literature in Asia and elsewhere, we expect that the level of democratic citizenship in East Asia to be comparatively low, with women less likely to be democratic citizens compared to men. In other words, we expect more women ‘subjects’. We then move to look at possible factors that might explain the gender gap in democratic citizenship, and are shaping how women embrace citizenship in East Asia.

*Gender and Democratic Citizenship: ABS3 Empirical Findings*

Interestingly, we find that there are indeed gender gaps when we examine democratic citizenship in East Asia. Two of the different dimensions of democratic citizenship do vary significantly along gender lines. The factors that involve cognitive civic engagement and political participation, are more varied than the attitudinal measures of how democracy is conceptualized and supported. Each are described below:

Cognitive Civic Engagement

East Asian women engage politics considerably less than men. This begins in the area of political interest and extends into the area of political efficacy. Studies have shown globally that women are less interested in politics and consistently feel they lack political efficacy, and this pattern is present in East Asia as well. (Mendes & Osborn, 2009, Mestre & Marin 2012, Mondok & Anderson 2004, Van Deth 1990, 2006) The results for cognitive civic engagement are outlined in Table 2 below. They show that there is no distinct pattern in the levels of cognitive civic engagement according to regime type. In fact, the pattern is one of variation across the region. We find that an overwhelming majority of East Asians follow the news, but fewer are interested in politics and even fewer feel a sense of efficacy in politics. Generally in the area of cognitive civic engagement, East Asians do not score highly as democratic citizens, especially in political efficacy.

Table 2: Civic Engagement in East Asia across Genders

	<i>Interested Politics</i>		<i>Follow News</i>		<i>Able Participate</i>		<i>Politics Not Too Complicated</i>		<i>Can Change System</i>	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Authoritarian</i>										
China	43.9	60.5	85.7	75.2	42.7	29.6	25.2	17.4	25.2	17.4
Singapore	37.7	28.8	78.9	70.9	40.1	37.5	40.5	32.9	40.5	32.9
Vietnam	82.9	68.9	92.3	87.1	66.5	46.9	50.1	38.6	50.1	35.6
<i>Electoral Authoritarian</i>										
Cambodia	58.9	52.9	71.9	58.3	69.5	69.2	19.5	13.5	19.5	13.5
Malaysia	56.5	40.9	78.6	70.9	47.1	36.4	35	28.7	35	28.7
<i>Democracies</i>										
Indonesia	40.1	32.1	63.8	54.1	35.1	27.2	28.5	23.4	28.5	23.4
Japan	76	64.9	96.5	92.4	25.8	15.6	49.6	39.6	49.6	33.6
Korea	51.9	31	93.8	88.4	38.4	28.1	45.6	33.2	45.6	33.2
Mongolia	56.4	43.5	93.6	90.1	59.6	54.3	34.8	32.7	34.8	32.7
Philippines	75.4	74.2	88.1	85.7	46.2	40.2	39.9	42	39.9	42
Taiwan	37.3	22.1	75.5	65.3	43.5	37.4	30.4	20.2	30.4	20.2
Thailand	79	64.5	91.8	84.8	71.5	69	10.9	7.7	10.9	7.7


The findings above also show sharp gender differences. Figure 1 below illustrates the gender gap between men and women for the first three questions in Table 2. We find that the gender gap is the largest with regard to political interest. Overall, except in China, women are less interested in politics compared to men. These differences are significant for the entire region, except in the Philippines, and substantively large. Korea tops the list in the gender gap for political interest, followed by China, Malaysia and Taiwan. Of all of the different dimensions of democratic citizenship, political interest has the largest gender differences. The gender gap is also significant with regard to political efficacy, as women generally feel less able to participate in politics, more frequently conceive of politics as more complicated than men and feel less able to change the system. The findings show sharper gender differences across the region, but consistently in Korea, Vietnam, China and Malaysia. From the perspective of democratic citizenship with regard to cognitive civic engagement, women are less democratically engaged than men in East Asia.

#### Attitudes Toward Democratic Citizenship

The differences among men and women are much less prominent when it comes to attitudes toward democracy. We began by looking at how women and men define democracy, as shown in Table 3 below. The results show that each country has a specific pattern, but overall there is greater prioritization of

governance and equality rather than procedures and freedom elements in defining democracy. The country that stands out as the exception is the Philippines, which places more of a premium on freedom. These differences underscore that East Asians conceive of democracy in different ways that is found in the West, especially the United States. (Chu, Diamond, Nathan, Shin 2008) In understanding democratic citizenship in East Asia, one has to appreciate that there are different starting points in how democracy is conceived.

Figure 1: Civic Engagement and the Gender Gap



This different outlooks extends to men and women as well, although the differences are not as sharp as they are with cognitive civic engagement. We find three patterns. The first and most common is consistency within countries across gender in how they conceptualize democracy. This reinforces the one important finding of our analysis, namely that gender differences are less prominent with regard to attitudes than with cognitive engagement and behavior. While there are variations across countries, with regard to support for democracy, men and women in a particular country often have similar views. A second pattern, found in Vietnam, Taiwan and Thailand, is slightly different prioritization in how they conceive democracy. In all of these cases, they prioritize the same elements in defining democracy, but vary in ordering of the two most prominent elements. The third and most unusual pattern is actual differences in the prioritization and conceptualizations of democracy across genders. We found this in Cambodia and Mongolia, where the mean scores for the different elements of democracy are not only significantly different in terms of ordering but also vary in what elements were seen as important. Women in Cambodia valued equality, while men placed greater emphasis on procedures. In Mongollia,

while both men and women valued governance as their top priority, women chose freedom as their second element while men opted for procedures. This suggests that in these less developed East Asian countries, both with some semblance of democratic processes, that gender-related socialization and experience is shaping how democracy is defined, at least to a degree. Overall, however, gender was not as significant a factor shaping how East Asians conceive of democracy compared to other dimensions of democratic citizenship.

Table 3: Meaning of Democracy across Genders

Countries	Equality		Procedural		Governance		Freedom	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Post-Communist</i>								
China	1	1			2	2		
Vietnam	2	1			1	2		
<i>Electoral Authoritarian</i>								
Cambodia	1			1	2	2		
Malaysia	2	2			1	1		
<i>Democracies</i>								
Indonesia	2	2			1	1		
Japan	2	2			1	1		
Korea			2	2	1	1		
Mongolia			2		1	1		2
Philippines	2	2					1	1
Taiwan	2	1			1	2		
Thailand	2	1			1	2		

We now turn to specific support for democracy. Generally, the ABS third wave data highlights that there is limited support for democracy when citizens are asked to chose democracy always, assess whether democracy is capable of solving problems and prioritize democracy over economic development. Attitudinally, support for democracy is low. We do find, however, that when East Asians were asked whether democracy is still the best system, they overwhelming support democracy.

With regard to gender, the dominant pattern is one of consistency in views across genders within countries. Where there are significant differences, highlighted in Table 4 below, we find that women are less inclined toward democratic citizenship compared to men. These differences are not frequent and not as prominent as with regard to cognitive civic engagement, but nevertheless point to less democratic citizenship among women than men in East Asia.



Table 4: Support for Democracy across Genders

	Democracy Always		Democracy Capable		Democracy First		Democracy Still Best	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Authoritarian</i>								
China	13.6	13.2	17.1	20	29	23.4	89.6	87.7
Singapore	35.6	28.4	32.4	31.9	17.9	13.2	84.1	83.7
Vietnam	7.7	4.6	7.8	5	21.5	23.1	95.8	95.2
<i>Electoral Authoritarian</i>								
Cambodia	12.5	11.9	8.5	7.5	27.9	26	92.9	95.1
Malaysia	10.6	8.5	12.4	12.3	20.7	19.3	90.4	90.6
<i>Democracies</i>								
Indonesia	18.1	13	17.9	19.6	8.9	10.7	89.9	89.1
Japan	22.2	16.9	24.5	30.2	40.3	37.8	93.6	92.4
Korea	23.7	18.7	25	18.1	24.4	22.7	86.7	86.7
Mongolia	33.6	32.2	20.8	24.2	32.1	26.1	88.7	86.5
Philippines	23.1	21.4	44.3	42.2	23.9	22.6	77.2	76.2
Taiwan	27.1	22.7	33.7	34.7	19	12.3	93	87.5
Thailand	12.2	15.9	15.6	14.2	22.2	19.2	96.2	95.9

### Political Participation


This gender gap in democratic citizenship is also present in the findings on political participation. East Asian women are less likely to actively participate in politics compared to men. Table 5 outlines the gender variation in political participation, including electoral participation (voting and attending a campaign rally) and non-electoral forms (signing a petition, working to solve local problems, and contacting influential people). We find that East Asians vote in high numbers, higher than their Western counterparts, but in other forms of participation they are less active. East Asians are less participatory in non-electoral forms of political participation in particular.

Table 5: Political Participation across Genders

	Voting		Campaign		Local Problems		Sign Petition		Never Contact Influential Person	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Authoritarian</i>										
China	72.3	71.2	45.2	41	17.7	12.1	7.9	5.7	67	75.2
Singapore	59.1	61.1	11.2	4.8	9	5.9	6.9	5.7	94.9	96.8

Vietnam	90.8	88.7	67.9	62.4	54.4	45.6	27.2	24.9	54.1	53.4
<i>Electoral Authoritarian</i>										
Cambodia	78.6	78.2	47.4	38.1	26.6	12.9	11.9	7.8	90.1	93.7
Malaysia	80.3	75.2	23.2	31.7	51.9	33.4	24.3	15.5	69.3	83.6
<i>Democracies</i>										
Indonesia	90.9	91.8	32.2	21.3	49.5	36.6	20	15.6	77.6	88.8
Japan	83.9	81.8	16.3	13.1	28	21.4	35.1	34.9	82.6	93.1
Korea	80.4	83.2	18.9	11	17.3	10.4	16	13.3	90.1	91.4
Mongolia	85.4	88	55.6	49.6	23.9	19.9	12.5	11.3	90.8	91.5
Philippines	79.8	80.3	26	21.1	24.4	19.3	15.1	8.8	82.9	88.9
Taiwan	85.6	87.5	10.6	10.9	17.8	12.1	11.9	11.7	88.2	92.2
Thailand	96	95	59.7	49.5	65.6	56.7	12.8	10.8	90.6	94.3

Figure 2: Gender Gap in Political Participation



In assessing the gender differences, outlined in Figure 2 above, we find that women are as likely to vote in elections as their male counterparts. In fact, in a number of countries, including Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam and Indonesia, East Asian women are slightly more likely to vote than men.

Where the gap is largest is in other forms of participation. With regard to campaigning, a gender gap emerges, notably in Thailand and Korea. The broad pattern is women are less likely to campaign compared to men, except in Malaysia. In Malaysia, the mass political parties actively recruit women, especially the dominant party of UMNO, contributing to higher campaign participation. (Baruah, 2012) The non-electoral participatory differences across genders are more pronounced in the region as a whole, with sharper gender divides over signing a petition and solving local problems. The gender difference is narrower with regard to contacting officials, as the pattern is that the majority in East Asia do not contact influential people, especially in the more democratic countries in the region. The findings conform to patterns elsewhere, where there is a narrow divide between women and men in voting and wider divide with regard to non-electoral participation. The one area where women have usually participated more than men is in local politics, but this does not appear to be the case in East Asia. In assessing the findings, the common theme is that women are less active politically, less engaged in democratic citizenship, than their male counterparts.

### *Gender and Democratic Citizenship: Debates and Interpretations*

How then can we understand this gender democratic citizenship puzzle? What accounts for why women are less likely be cognitively engaged in politics and adopt different behavior with regard to political participation, but not vary significantly in their attitudes toward democracy? In order to understand why women are less likely to be democratic citizens cognitively and behaviorally, as opposed to attitudinally, we need to analyze a variety of explanations for each these dimensions of democratic citizenship.

Cognitive civic engagement is been seen to be tied closely to political socialization. Gender roles and values towards politics are inculcated early on in life through political socialization. (Hoouge & Stolle 2004, Trevor 1989, Norrande & Wilcox 2004) ) Studies of gender highlight the central role of political socialization in shaping why women do not become political candidates, and they are not interested in politics. (Duverger, 1955, Balch 1974, Bennett 1989, Kellstedt, Peterson & Ramirez 2010) These studies showcase the lack of incentives for women to engage in public life, as women are encouraged to be mothers and housewives in line with traditional gender roles. (Hayes & Bean, 1992) They also point to the need to avoid conflict and the public limelight in keeping with a traditional view of women. (Goot & Reed 1984, Wade & Jin 1996) These views of gender roles in politics were particularly pronounced in the past. Thus we would expect that women who are older would be more subjected to political socialization of traditional gender roles and values. Education also shapes the adoption of more traditional roles through socialization, with higher levels of education associated with moving away from traditional positions. Modernization generally is expected to transform the traditional pattern of political socialization and is associated with a breakdown in the gender gap between men and women in their cognitive outlooks toward politics. Rural life is held to be more traditional, and thus more associated with a more prominent gender divide. Thus, in understanding cognitive civic engagement we need to look at the socio-economic indicators of education, age, income and rural-urban status. We expect to find that these factors help us understand why women adopt less democratic cognitive civil engagement than men.

Another paradigm assessing cognitive civic engagement is the everyday experience of women. Studies have pointed to time commitment of women for care-giving and housework as reasons women are less politically engaged. (Burns 2002, Conover 1988, Coffe 2010) The logic is as follows, the more the obligations a woman has, the less time she has to engage in politically, either cognitively or in behavior. While the ABS data does not provide clear measures of daily time allocations, we are able to use a proxy of marital status to assess the impact of family obligations on the gender gap. The assumption is that married women are seen to have more obligations than single women.

Studies of gender also point to the importance of social connectivity as a determinant of civic engagement. (Burns, Schlozman, Verba 2001) The range and form of networks of women, namely their social capital, shape their civic engagement by reinforcing interest and efficacy in politics. In the modern era, the internet serves as a tool for connecting people, with social media building ties. Internet use thus could also be seen to enhance political engagement. While studies show women are less likely to use the internet than men, those that use the internet frequently would have more opportunity to access information and forge relationships. We thus would expect social capital and internet usage to be influential in explaining the gender gap.

In looking at political attitudes toward democracy, political socialization is also important. The puzzle here is that there are relatively consistent views in these attitudes across genders. While there are instances where men are more democratic, the gender gap is less noticeable and significantly narrower. Why would this be the case? The responses to these questions appear to follow a country-specific pattern, rather than one shaped primarily by gender. This suggests that attitudes toward support for democracy are shaped by context to a greater extent than political socialization. We see, for example, in the ABS3 views of democracy of Thailand extremely low figures, influenced by political polarization and instability in democratic governance since 2006. Studies of support for democracy identify traditional attitudes as an influential factor. We expect to see a link between social traditional values in accounting for some of the variation between men and women, but given the consistency of views across genders it is necessary to look at other factors besides gender as shaping this dimension of democratic citizenship.

Of all the dimensions of democratic citizenship and gender, the most studied has been political participation. (Vassallo 2006, Schlozman, Burns, Verba 1004, Norris 1988, 1991, 2007, Verba, Burns, Schlozman 1997, Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, Welch, 1977) Political socialization tied to socio-economic status, family obligations and social capital/connectivity have been argued to contribute to gender differences in political participation along the lines noted above. There has been more in-depth research exploring different types of participation. It is seen, for example, that voting, which is irregular and involves limited commitment of time, has less of a gender gap than other forms of participation. (Inglehart & Norris 2000 & 2003, Jennings 1983, Burns, Schlozman, Verba 1997, Chaney and Nagler 1988) Women are also seen to participate closer to home, shaped by the family-oriented/community composition of their social capital and limited time commitments. (Burns, Schlozman, Verba 2001) We thus would expect to see an interrelationship between social capital/internet connectivity and the political participation findings.

*Analyzing the Gender Gap:*

To assess the importance of these factors in understanding the gender gap, specifically with regard to civic engagement and political participation, we adopted an interactive statistical model that examined the relationship among gender and the different factors noted above, age, education, income, rural-urban, marital status, social capital and internet usage, for the individual levels. Consistently, except in China where socio-economic measures such as education and age were significant in explaining the gender gap, we found that these factors did not have any explanatory power. We expanded the statistical model to include political attitudes in areas such as social and political traditionalism and here too we were not able to find any clear explanatory relationship.

In looking at the gender gap, therefore, we remain unclear why there are differences between men and women over democratic citizenship. Many of the elements of political socialization and attitudes towards gender roles are not easily measured through the survey questionnaire. We welcome suggestions on alternative approaches to assess the gap. For now, the existing frameworks from gender studies do not help us understand the differences between men and women in the area of democratic citizenship in East Asia.

#### *Differences among East Asian Women:*

In tackling this puzzle, however, our approach was to move the analysis away from looking at men versus women and look within women themselves. In our view, we felt that the answers to the research puzzle of why women have lower democratic citizenship compared to men may lie within women themselves. Studies have shown that the broad gender categories of men and women often obscure rather clarify. To assess differences among women we used the same set of variables noted above, socio-economic indicators shaping political socialization, marital status as a proxy for family obligation and social connectivity in the form of social capital and internet usage. Unlike the approach focused on differences between men and women, we found that these explanations have important resonance in understanding variation within women. The statistical analysis is detailed in Appendix A for each of the twelve countries. We focused on key areas where there was variation between men and women in democratic citizenship.

Our analysis points to three findings. First of all, socio-economic differences in education, age and to a lesser extent income and rural-urban divisions help us understand cognitive civic engagement among women. Generally, the higher the level of education, the higher the level of political interest and political efficacy. We find this true in many of the countries, except China, where in fact lower levels of education are associated with political interest. This in part may help us understand why China did not follow the norm in the region or globally with regard to political interest, with more women interested in politics than men.

On age, the pattern is less clear. It appears important to differentiate between political interest and efficacy. In the case of efficacy, younger women are more likely to feel greater efficacy, such as in Indonesia and Thailand. This is not the case, however, for all the countries, such as Japan. With regard to political interest, there is variation across countries and in how it influences political efficacy. Age, however, emerges as an ingredient shaping differences in civic engagement among women. Income and

rural-urban status mattered as well, although with much less consistently and in more country-specific ways. For example, in Korea, Cambodia and Thailand rural-urban differences are significant for explaining differences in political interest, while income was important in Japan. The statistical regression analysis reinforces the importance of SES variables in understanding variation among women with regard to civic engagement. The explanatory power of these SES variables was less powerful when it comes to looking at political behavior.

The factor that has the most explanatory power across the two dimensions of democratic citizenship in accounting for differences among women is social capital. This is not only pertinent for civic engagement, but also for political participation, including non-electoral forms of political participation. Consistently across multiple countries social capital helps us understand why some women are democratic citizens compared to others. In fact this form of connectivity is more important than internet usage. While internet use is significant in countries where the internet provides alternative (non-government) information, such as Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia, this primarily shapes political interest, not other dimensions of democratic citizenship. Given the salience of social capital as an explanatory variable, one key to understanding the overall lower affinity of women towards democratic citizenship lies with how and the degree they are connected with others.

### ***Concluding Reflections:***

This preliminary analysis has shown that generally women are less inclined to be democratic citizens than men, that in fact the stereotypical view of women as subjects rather than citizens may have an element of truth. Yet, this should not be overstated, as there is considerable variation across the different dimensions of democratic citizenship, with cognitive civic engagement and behavior in political participation (except voting) considerably lower than attitudes toward democracy. Women may be less likely to be democratic citizens individually, but they are not necessarily more likely not to support democracy and understand democracy usually along the same line as men in their specific countries.

In searching for an answer to why women and men differ on dimensions of democratic citizenship, we were unable to find specific explanations that help us understand the areas of gender gap. In fact, the usual frameworks found to be explanatory elsewhere, SES variables shaping political mobilization, family obligations and social connectivity, did not emerge as important. In looking deeper, by studying variation among women themselves, these factors did emerge as important, especially social capital and certain SES variables, particularly for civic engagement. Marital status overall was not important, although internet use did have some salience with regard to civic engagement in specific countries. The importance of social capital suggests that our understanding of democratic citizenship in East Asia, at least along gender lines, needs to explore the importance of relationships. The connectivity and the substance of these connections may help us understand why indeed women may more likely be 'subjects' than democratic citizens.

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		Recent Voting	Contact with Influential people	Campaign Meeting	Solve Local Problems	Political Interest	Political Efficacy
Japan	Education	0.181**	0.103	-0.033	0.118*	0.045***	0.048***
	AgeLevel	0.982***	0.241	0.453*	0.6***	0.293***	0.157***
	Income	0.177*	-0.203	-0.06	0.03	0.059***	0.046**
	Urban-rural	0.28	0.029***	0.028	0.617***	0.03	-0.027
	InternetUsage	-0.098	-0.021**	-0.115*	0.04	0.009	0.022
	Married	0.142	-0.11*	0.246	0.6	-0.03	-0.21**
	SocialCapital	0.132	0.518***	0.263**	0.312***	0.039**	0.009
	N	736	752	794	752	752	749
Korea	Education	-0.149	-0.053	0.126	0.092	0.056***	0.032*
	AgeLevel	0.893**	0.118	0.613	0.652	0.13*	-0.041
	Income	0.187*	0.118	-0.114	0.025	0.001	0.011
	Urban-rural	0.286	-0.484	0.628	0.961**	-0.212***	-0.249***
	InternetUsage	0.077	0.08	-0.022	0.055	0.033**	0.029*
	Married	0.332	0.057	14.205	0.708	-0.004	-0.008
	SocialCapital	0.239	0.015	0.517***	0.545***	0.029	0.064**
	N	525	552	526	547	552	551
China	Education	-0.031	0.15***	0.164***	-0.004	-0.034***	0.028***
	AgeLevel	0.243	0.158	0.057	-0.357*	-0.069***	0.04*
	Income	-0.018	0.02	0.005	-0.212**	0.025**	0.017*
	Urban-rural	0.582***	0.219	-0.225	-0.029	-0.008	0.069**
	InternetUsage	-0.046	0.109***	-0.043	0.151**	0.01	0.019**
	Married	0.691**	0.072	0.534*	0.27	0.015	-0.056
	SocialCapital						
	N	689	960	713	949	959	921
Mongolia	Education	0.06	0.109**	0.009	0.071	0.021**	0.039***
	AgeLevel	0.085	0.224	0.558***	0.111	0.065*	-0.13***
	Income	-0.084	-0.081	0	-0.016	-0.004	0.022
	Urban-rural	0.578	0.33	0.37*	-0.011	-0.011	0.054
	InternetUsage	-0.114	-0.033	-0.115**	-0.013	-0.009	0.032*
	Married	0.834**	-0.094	0.568**	-0.043	0.087	-0.007
	SocialCapital	-0.03	0.42**	0.47***	0.408***	0.139***	0.03
	N	654	656	652	656	656	651
Philippines	Education	0.176***	-0.019	0.141**	0.007	0.003	-0.006
	AgeLevel	1.034***	-0.021	0.08	-0.076	-0.085**	-0.095**
	Income	-0.292**	-0.124	-0.279*	-0.027	-0.022	-0.009
	Urban-rural	0.654**	-0.031**	-0.079	-0.229	-0.01 0.051	-0.047
	InternetUsage	0.05	0.163	-0.058	0.073	0.003	-0.047**
	Married	0.464	0.035**	1.565**	0.264	-0.074	-0.075
	SocialCapital	0.176***	-0.019	0.141**	0.007	0.003	-0.006
	N	515	591	513	590	590	590
Taiwan	Education	0.122	0.078	-0.01	0.099	0.056***	0.021*
	AgeLevel	1.075***	-0.71**	0.477*	0.256	-0.005	-0.05
	Income	0.204*	0.064	-0.069	-0.017	0.031*	0.01
	Urban-rural	0.188	-0.529	-0.335	0.165	-0.08	-0.053
	InternetUsage	-0.115	-0.058	0.027	-0.002	0.006	-0.007
	Married	-0.158	0.778**	-0.036	0.28	0.041	-0.105*
	SocialCapital	0.045	0.364***	0.343***	0.523***	0.088***	0.043**
	N	655	683	679	683	683	672
Thailand	Education	0.252***	0.006	-0.045	0.044	0.024*	0.022**

	AgeLevel	1.192***	0.025	-0.19	-0.221	-0.068	0.053
	Income	-0.058	-0.022	-0.271***	0.016	0.01	-0.035*
	Urban-rural	2.564***	0.409	0.917***	0.641***	-0.096	-0.144**
	InternetUsage	0.053	-0.002	0.014	0.027	0	0.027*
	Married	0.437	0.107	0.357	0.541**	0.078	-0.033
	SocialCapital	0.425**	0.359***	0.207***	0.181**	0.044**	-0.053***
	N	697	705	701	700	704	684
Indonesia	Education	-0.017	0.165***	-0.055	0.076*	0.051***	0.024***
	AgeLevel	1.117***	0.256	-0.247	0.1	-0.086**	-0.028
	Income	0.15	-0.038	0.087	0.157**	0.015	0.003
	Urban-rural	0.141	0.369	-0.066	0.022	-0.037	0.018
	InternetUsage	-0.177	0.065	-0.029	-0.042	0.073***	0.016
	Married	1.846***	-0.452	0.056	-0.103	0.145*	0.127**
	SocialCapital	0.044	0.092	0.128	0.283***	0.076***	0.006
	N	726	705	724	734	736	666
Singapore	Education	-0.127**	-0.076	0.302*	-0.038	0.045***	0.008
	AgeLevel	0.507*	0.413	-0.797	0.262	0.064	-0.092
	Income	0.16	0.005	-0.031	0.166	0.009	0.043
	Urban-rural						
	InternetUsage	0.144*	0.195	-0.073	0.088	0.044**	-0.029
	Married	0.984***	-0.188	2.01**	-0.001	0.159*	0.121
	SocialCapital	0.15	0.725***	0.539**	0.483***	0.085**	0
	N	308	351	340	349	349	348
Vietnam	Education	0.184*	-0.017	0.023	-0.053	0.043**	0.019
	AgeLevel	0.553*	-0.226	0.033	-0.103	-0.005	0.008
	Income	-0.207	-0.079	-0.285***	-0.118	-0.041	-0.03
	Urban-rural	0.038	0.856***	1.105***	0.71***	0.112	0.025
	InternetUsage	-0.189**	0.111	-0.11	0.088	0.102***	0.068***
	Married	0.602	0.312	0.504	0.254	0.154	0.066
	SocialCapital	0.349*	0.387***	0.42***	0.395***	0.166***	0.21***
	N	373	387	374	354	380	293
Cambodia	Education	-0.08	-0.182*	0.027	0.006	0.023*	0.009 0.013
	AgeLevel	1.621***	-0.156	0.795***	-0.014	-0.038	-0.074*
	Income	0.119	-0.003	0.042	-0.079	0.02	-0.016
	Urban-rural	0.308	-0.076	0.689**	-0.624**	0.139**	0.031
	InternetUsage	0.131	0.487***	-0.005	0.175	0.016	-0.052
	Married	1.526***	-0.433	0.69**	0.176	0.011	-0.06
	SocialCapital	0.695***	0.533**	0.868***	0.636***	0.14***	0.065*
	N	595	599	598	599	599	597
Malaysia	Education	-0.06	0.124***	-0.029	0.006	0	0.015
	AgeLevel	1.777***	0.213	0.323	-0.184	-0.016	0.081*
	Income	-0.013	-0.061	-0.071 0.105	-0.076	-0.019	-0.033
	Urban-rural	0.481**	-0.355*	0.18	0.01	0.113**	0.034
	InternetUsage	0.018	0.114**	-0.142**	-0.137**	0.015	0.034**
	Married	-0.659	0.307	0.115	0.079	0.208***	0.002
	SocialCapital	0.559**	0.558***	0.795***	0.742***	0.234***	0.09**
	N	509	596	594	596	594	586