

ASIAN  BAROMETER

A Comparative Survey of

DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

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Quality of Governance

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Quality of Governance

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In this essay we examine how well or badly East Asians think their country is governed. Moreover, we explore whether individual life circumstances influence their perceptions of the quality of governance. In addition, we examine whether perceived quality of governance shapes allegiance to the system of government. Perceptions of the quality of governance refer to cognitive evaluations of the extent to which state institutions possess properties of good governance. It is assumed that a lack of such properties should weaken citizen allegiance to the system and ultimately undermine system viability.

Governance can be defined in many ways. One of the most influential definitions is provided by Kaufman et al (2007). They define governance as “the tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. More specifically, it includes “the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and the respect of citizens and the state of the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” On the basis of this conceptualization, they develop the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) which captures the quality of governance in terms of six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.¹

The WGI reveals expert-based assessments of how well or badly a country is governed relative to other countries.² According to the most recent report (see Table 1), Japan, South

¹ First, voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Second, political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Third, government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Fourth, regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Fifth, rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Lastly, control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

² Country rankings are provided with the point estimates that have an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of one and thus range from -2.5 to +2.5. The percentile ranking points to each state's relative strengths and shortcomings as compared to the other states assessed by the WGI.

Korea, and Taiwan received positive ratings for all six dimensions. Thailand received positive ratings for only two dimensions (government effectiveness and regulatory quality). Mongolia received positive ratings for only one dimension (political stability). Indonesia and the Philippines received no positive ratings, even though both of them were considered electoral democracies. In contrast, although Malaysian and Singapore were not considered electoral democracies, Malaysia received positive ratings for all six dimensions and Singapore, five dimensions except for voice and accountability. Of full authoritarian regimes, Cambodia received no positive ratings. Vietnam received positive ratings on two dimensions (political stability and government effectiveness) while China, one dimension (government effectiveness). Notable is that Singapore led East Asia in most dimensions of governance and that Malaysia also fared better than some democracies in most dimensions. Even Vietnam and China, single-party authoritarian regimes, fared better than some democracies in some dimensions. This finding indicates that some properties of good governance may be compatible with non-democracies and that a country's quality of governance does not necessarily improve as it becomes more democratic.

The percentile ranking points to each country's relative strengths and shortcomings. Japan and Taiwan maintained high quality governance with no notable weaknesses. South Korea was a high performer in every dimension except for political stability where it was a middling performer. Mongolia was a middling performer in most dimensions except for control of corruption where it was a low performer. Thailand was a middling performer in many dimensions except for voice and accountability and political stability where it was a low performer. Indonesia and the Philippines were middling performers in voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality while low performers in political stability, the rule of law, and control of corruption. Malaysia was a high performer in government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law whereas a middling or low performer in voice and accountability, political stability, and control of corruption. Singapore was a high performer in every dimension of governance except for voice and accountability where it was a middling performer. Cambodia was a low performer of governance with no strengths. Vietnam was a low performer in many dimensions except for political stability and government effectiveness where it was a middling performer. China was a middling performer in government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law whereas a low performer in voice and accountability, political stability, and control of corruption.

Overall, government effectiveness appears to be the common strength of state institutions of East Asian countries, democratic or non-democratic. Political stability and control of corruption were most lacking elements of governance, especially in new democracies. As expected, voice and accountability was the greatest shortcoming of state institutions of the region's non-democracies. As compared to these expert-based assessments, how do citizens of each East Asian country evaluate the quality of their state institutions? We now turn to this question.

Good Governance: Democratic and Law-based

What constitutes good governance? As noted above, the WGI includes six elements: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,

and control of corruption. In a recent effort to develop better measures of governance, Fukuyama (2013) defines governance as “a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” He excludes democratic accountability from the definition of governance and confines it to the executive or administrative function of government. After discussing four approaches to evaluating the quality of governance (procedural measures, input or capacity measures, output measures, and measures of bureaucratic autonomy), he views the quality of governance as a function of the interaction of capacity and autonomy.

In a recent study on developmental consequences of democratic governance, Norris (2012) combines democracy (voice and accountability) and governance (state capacity) to develop four regime types. The democracy dimension refers to the extent to which citizens have the capacity to express their demands and to hold elected officials to account. On the other hand, the governance dimension refers to the extent to which state agencies have the capacity to enforce laws and implement policies. She argues that “expanding either the demands of democracy or the supply of governance alone is regarded as insufficient; instead the combination of both factors working in tandem is predicted to provide the conditions most conducive to prosperity, welfare, and peace.”

Following this line of inquiry, we consider the accountable and effective exercise of public authority for the collective goods as the key feature of good governance. In this regard, we distinguish between two sets of institutions and norms of good governance. One set of institutions and norms is associated with enforcing rules and implementing decisions. The other set is associated with holding state agents accountable to the execution and implementation. Good governance requires a set of rule of law institutions which ensures effective law enforcement against state officials, absence of official corruption, and impartial treatment for every citizen. Good governance also requires a set of institutions and norms which ensures competitive elections, popular control, and accountability. The former emphasizes the process by which public authority is exercised. The latter emphasizes the process by which the use of public authority is made accountable. These two dimensions of governance consist of several elements of democratic quality identified by Diamond and Morlino (2004).³ Both dimensions of good governance play a role in limiting the state’s power, by “forcing it to use its power according to certain public and transparent rules, and by ensuring it is subordinate to the will of the people.”

Perceived Quality of Democratic Governance

In this section we examine how well or badly East Asians think their institutions of accountability work. We consider three aspects of state institutions which make the exercise of public authority subordinate to the will of the people: electoral competition, vertical accountability, and horizontal accountability.

³ They include rule of law, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, and equality. Most of them except for equality are procedural qualities.

Competitive elections

The key properties of a “thin” definition of democracy include free, fair, and competitive elections, full adult suffrage, and protection of civil liberties and political rights. This “Schumpeterian” definition primarily emphasizes competitive elections. Competitive elections require the existence of a level playing field between incumbents and opposition. Competitive elections with meaningful choices serve as people’s ultimate means to hold incumbents accountable to their decisions.

To ascertain public perceptions of the existence of a level playing field, the ABS III asked respondents whether political parties or candidates had equal access to the mass media during the election period. As shown in Table 2, in all eleven East Asian countries surveyed except for China where the question was not asked,⁴ majorities of the electorates made favorable evaluations. Surprisingly, Cambodia where elections are conducted regularly but under repressive conditions displayed the highest level of public approval. It was followed by Mongolia and Thailand, third-wave democracies. Singapore, where the ruling PAP dominates the political process, displayed the lowest level of public approval. Japan, where the center-right LDP dominated for more than a half century, also displayed the equally lowest level of public approval.⁵ In contrast, in Malaysia where opposition parties remained unable to compete on equal terms with the BN, a two-thirds majority believed that competing political parties had equal access to the media during elections. Regardless of regime types, majorities of East Asians believed that opposition parties had fair and even access to media during elections. Even in Vietnam where the CPV is the only legal political party, more than a two-thirds majority thought that competing political parties had fair access to media during elections. In the minds of East Asians, an uneven playing field was by no means a weakness of their political institutions.

In contrast, East Asians remained more concerned about the meaningfulness of electoral contests. The ABS asked respondents how often their elections offered the voters a real choice between different parties or candidates. As presented in Table 2, in ten of twelve countries surveyed majorities of voters gave favorable responses. Two exceptions were Mongolia and Singapore where only a small minority of voters considered elections to offer meaningful choices. In Singapore whose electoral system effectively bolsters the majority of the dominant party, its citizens were skeptical of electoral competition which failed to produce alternation of power. Experiencing frequent changes in the parliamentary electoral system between multimember and single-member districts, Mongolians seemed frustrated by a lack of genuine alternatives although they considered electoral contests fair. Interestingly, Malaysia displayed higher levels of public approval although its political regime may be characterized by an uneven playing field. Oddly, even in one-party authoritarian regimes such as Vietnam and China a small or large majority of voters believed that elections offered real choices between

⁴ In China the CCP has a monopoly on political power and no opposition groups are allowed to compete for power.

⁵ In Japan a two-party system began to develop after the DJP’s victory in the 2009 elections to the House of Representative Elections.

candidates, if not political parties. Contrary to everyone's expectations, in Japan where the LDP dominated for more than a half century and South Korea where electoral support was largely based on regional identity and personal loyalties, only a bare majority of voters considered elections to offer real choices. This finding suggests that simple rotations of power hardly improve public evaluations of the meaningfulness of elections.

Combining responses to both questions indicates overall evaluations of the quality of elections. As shown in Table 2, only minorities of voters in most East Asian countries viewed elections as both fair and meaningful. In six of seven democracies only less than half had favorable evaluations. The exception was Thailand where more than half considered electoral contests fair and meaningful perhaps since the country's most recent elections yielded a victory for the opposition and replaced a government that lacked a popular mandate. As expected, competitive authoritarian regimes, especially Singapore, fared badly. In fact, Singapore displayed the lowest level of public approval. Rather surprisingly, however, non-democracies such as Cambodia and Vietnam fared better than even democracies in the eyes of voters. Cambodia where elections often featured violence and voter intimidation displayed the highest level of public approval. It was followed by Vietnam, another instance of full authoritarianism.

Vertical accountability

Political accountability is one of the hallmarks of democratic governance. Two types of accountability can be distinguished: vertical and horizontal. Vertical accountability concerns the relationship between citizens and government leaders (Diamond and Morlino 2005). Although electoral punishment or reward constitutes the ultimate means of vertical accountability, venues of popular control extend beyond elections and include the interaction between voters and their elected representatives and civil society organizations. This non-electoral form of accountability or "societal accountability" takes place in between elections.

To ascertain public perceptions of people's ability to throw the rascals out, the ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "People have the power to change a government they don't like." As presented in Table 2, East Asians tended to believe that they were able to replace incumbents. In all seven democracies surveyed large or small majorities of citizens believed that they could reward or punish government leaders. Among democracies, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan fared worse than Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, suggesting that a threat of popular electoral punishment was less credible in affluent democracies than poor democracies. Among them the Philippines, where popular people power movements overthrew its long-standing dictatorship, displayed the highest level of public approval. It was closely followed by Mongolia and Thailand, where transfer of power through elections occurred.

Notable is that Malaysia was distinguishable from Singapore in evaluations of people's ability to replace incumbents: four in five Malaysians believed that they were able to throw rascals out whereas only two in five Singaporeans did so. In Malaysia the ruling BN lost its two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament in the 2008 elections for the first time since 1969, which seemed to strengthen the belief in popular control. In Singapore the ruling PAP remained in control of the legislature despite opposition parties made unprecedented gains in 2011

parliamentary elections, which seemed to fail to foster the belief in popular control.

Although their political regimes were full authoritarian regimes, Cambodians were distinguishable from Vietnamese in perceptions of people's ability to throw the rascals out: more than four in five Cambodians considered a threat of punishment against incumbents credible whereas only one in three Vietnamese did so.

In contrast, public perceptions of the non-electoral form of vertical accountability were less favorable across much of the region. The ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "Between elections, the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions." As presented in Table 2, in most East Asian countries surveyed only small or large minorities of voters gave favorable responses. The only exception was Malaysia where one in two viewed it favorably. Among democracies, Mongolia displayed the lowest level of public approval. It was followed by Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. Despite a vibrancy of civil society organizations, perceptions of "societal accountability" proved to be weak in the eyes of voters in Japan and South Korea. Oddly, competitive authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia and Singapore fared better. Malaysia displayed the highest level of public approval. Singapore displayed the third highest level. Vietnam was distinguishable from Cambodia in perceptions of the non-electoral form of vertical accountability. In Vietnam, a Communist-ruled state, nearly one in two believed that they had non-electoral means to hold incumbents accountable. In contrast, in Cambodia only one in four considered the non-electoral form of vertical accountability present.

Comparing responses to both questions reveals that public evaluations of the non-electoral form of popular control were far less favorable than those of people's ability to replace incumbents through elections. Two cases were particularly notable. Cambodia displayed the highest approval level for people's ability to replace incumbents while the second lowest approval level for the non-electoral form of vertical accountability. Mongolia displayed the third highest approval level for people's ability to replace incumbents while the lowest approval level for the non-electoral form of vertical accountability.

Considering responses to both questions simultaneously, in all countries surveyed only minorities of citizens believed in people's ability to replace incumbents as well as people's ability to hold incumbents accountable in between elections. As expected, Singapore and Vietnam displayed the lowest level of public approval. Unexpectedly, these non-democracies were followed by South Korea, Japan, and Mongolia, all democracies. Oddly, Malaysia displayed the highest level of public approval. In the eyes of citizens poor democracies fared better than affluent democracies. Overall, a lack of vertical accountability remained public concern across most of the region.

Horizontal accountability

Horizontal accountability concerns the relationship between autonomous state institutions and requires that agents of one state institution are answerable to other state institutions. Its key benchmarks include the separation and balances of power. Authoritarian regimes lack this form of accountability because its authority relations are organized in favor of the executive (Cardoso 1979). This institutional arrangement eliminates or sharply curtails the role of the legislature

and places the judiciary under control of the executive. It manifests the institutional predominance of the executive over the legislature and the judiciary.

To ascertain public perceptions of horizontal accountability, the ABS asked respondents the extent to which the legislature was capable of keeping government leaders in check. As presented in Table 2, the level of public approval varied greatly across the region. Among democracies the Philippines displayed the highest level of public approval. Although a number of lawmakers often defected to join the new president's party, three in four Filipinos considered their bicameral Congress capable of keeping the executive in check. In two more democracies a majority of citizens viewed legislative oversight effective. They were Indonesia and South Korea. They all have presidential systems of government. In other democracies, by contrast, less than half of citizens considered legislative control effective. Notable is that Mongolia and Japan displayed the lowest level of public approval. Both of them have parliamentary systems of government. In Mongolia the prime minister who holds most executive power, is nominated by the party or coalition with the most seats in the State Great Hural. In Japan the prime minister, the head of Cabinet, leads the majority party or coalition in the National Diet's lower chamber. This finding suggests that system-level characteristics shape evaluations of the effectiveness of legislative control.

Non-democracies fared better in the eyes of citizens. Despite the executive predominance over the legislature, more than two-thirds majorities believed that the legislature was capable of keeping government leaders in check. Of twelve countries surveyed Singapore displayed the highest level of public approval. Considering its parliamentary form of government as well as the ruling PAP's political dominance, this finding is rather surprising. Similarly, although its form of government is parliamentary and the BN, a multi-party coalition, dominates the political process, Malaysia also displayed higher level of public approval. Perhaps since the legislature controlled by a party or party coalition oversees heads of executive agencies, if not the head of government, ordinary people appeared to overstate the effectiveness of legislative control.

The independent judiciary is one of the key institutional guarantees of horizontal accountability. To ascertain public perceptions of judicial control, the ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that when government leaders broke the laws, there was nothing the court could do. As presented in Table 2, Mongolia displayed the lowest level of public approval: only one in ten considered judicial control effective. In view of that the judiciary in Mongolia is viewed as independent, this finding is rather surprising. Perhaps it may have to do with widespread corruption among judges. In two third-wave democracies, South Korea and Taiwan, only less than half considered the judiciary to hold law-breaking government leaders responsible. Among democracies Indonesia displayed the highest approval level. It was followed by the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan. In these old and new democracies more than half considered the judiciary capable of holding law-breaking officials responsible.

In Malaysia where judicial independence appears to be undermined by extensive executive influence and Singapore where the government succeeded in most court cases, nearly two in three considered the courts capable of keeping government leaders in check. In fact, these

competitive authoritarian regimes fared better than democracies in the eyes of their citizens. In contrast, full authoritarian regimes fared worse than competitive authoritarian regimes, but better than a few democracies. In Cambodia, Vietnam and China just half or less than half considered judicial control effective.

Comparing responses to both questions reveals that in non-democracies the level of approval for legislative control was higher than that for judicial control. In contrast, the results were mixed for democracies. In some democracies the level of approval for legislative control was higher than that for judicial control whereas in other democracies the opposite was the case. Notable is that in Japan the level of approval for judicial control was far higher than the level of approval for legislative oversight, suggesting that political control was far weaker than legal control. In one-party authoritarian regimes the level of approval for judicial control was far lower than that for legislative control.

Combining responses to both questions together shows that in all democracies only small or large minorities considered checks and balances effective. Among them the Philippines displayed the highest level of public approval. It was immediately followed by Indonesia. In contrast, Mongolia displayed the lowest level of public approval. Only a few Mongolians considered vertical accountability effective. It was followed by Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. Competitive authoritarian regimes fared better than democracies. In fact, of twelve countries surveyed Singapore displayed the highest level of public approval. Oddly, even one-party authoritarian regimes fared better than most democracies in horizontal accountability.

Perceived Quality of Law-based Governance

In this section we examine how much East Asians think public authority is exercised according to certain public and transparent rules. We consider three aspects of law-based governance: rule of law, absence of corruption, and impartiality. Law-based governance indicates that the law is enforced toward everyone, especially government leaders, official corruption is controlled and minimized, and the government treats every citizen impartially.

Rule of law

Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which public officials are subordinate to law. Binding public officials to rule by law is considered the sine qua non of the rule of law. This protects citizens from officials' arbitrary use of power. A government bound by law must act through pre-written laws in exercising its authority (Kleinfeld 2006). No one is above the law and so impunity should not be given to law-breaking public officials.

To ascertain public perceptions of rule of law, the ABS asked respondents how often they thought government leaders broke the law or abused their power. As presented in Table 3, the level of public approval differed greatly even within the same regime type. In only five of twelve countries surveyed majorities of ordinary people made favorable evaluations of law-abidingness. They included Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, and Vietnam, two democracies and three non-democracies. Singapore, known to be most effective on law and order, displayed the highest level of public approval. The abuse of state power was hardly a matter of public concern. Surprisingly, it was followed by Cambodia where state leaders often

abused their positions for private gains.

In all third-wave democracies except for Thailand only small minorities considered their government leaders law-abiding. Mongolia whose police force was known to make arbitrary arrests displayed the lowest level of public approval: only one in five Mongolians considered government leaders law-abiding. It was followed by South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Most non-democracies fared better than most democracies. The exception was China where corruption remained endemic. It displayed the second lowest level of public approval: only one in four considered government leaders law-abiding. Malaysia where law enforcement agencies often suffered corruption scandals distinguished itself from Singapore: only one in two Malays considered government leaders law-abiding.

Another aspect of rule of law includes a lack of impunity. It emphasizes that public officials enjoy no arbitrary legal exemptions. Legal impunity violates a principle of equality before the law. To ascertain public perceptions of the extent to which government leaders enjoy impunity, the ABS asked respondents how much of the time public officials who committed crimes went unpunished.

In three of seven democracies surveyed majorities of citizens considered law enforcement toward public officials effective. They included Japan, Indonesia, and Thailand. Japan, strong in the legal state tradition, displayed the highest level of public approval: two in three believed that law-breaking public officials seldom escaped from punishment. By contrast, in Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines only small or large minorities of citizens considered law enforcement toward public officials effective. Mongolia displayed the lowest level of public approval: nearly one in four believed that law-breaking public officials were brought to justice.

As in official law-abidingness, Singapore displayed the highest level of public approval: more than four in five considered official impunity largely absent. In Cambodia, China, Vietnam, and Malaysia small, if not large, majorities of citizens believed that law-breaking officials seldom escaped from legal punishment, although prosecution in these countries was often selective and arbitrary. In the eyes of citizens non-democracies appeared to fare better than most third-wave democracies.

Comparing responses to both questions, public perceptions of a lack of impunity were largely more favorable than those of law-abidingness across much of the region. Notable examples were China and Indonesia where evaluations of a lack of impunity were far more favorable than those of law-abidingness. Chinese and Indonesians were more skeptical of government bound by law but more confident in law and order. The exception to the pattern was Cambodia where evaluations of law enforcement were less favorable than those of law-abidingness.

Considering responses to both questions together reveals that rule of law was a common weakness of state institutions of East Asian democracies. In none of seven democracies surveyed a majority of citizens made favorable evaluations. In all democracies except for Japan and Thailand less than one in four considered the government bound by law and effective in law enforcement. Notable is that only one in ten Mongolians gave affirmative responses to both questions. Singapore displayed the highest level of public approval: four in five Singaporeans considered the government law-abiding and law-enforcing. Malaysia, the other competitive authoritarian regime in the region, fared better than most democracies including South Korea

and Taiwan. Notable is that China displayed the second lowest level of public approval, suggesting public resentment against lawlessness in government.

Control of Corruption

Although control of corruption is closely related to rule of law, we distinguish between them because control of corruption is an end in itself. Control of corruption here reflects the extent to which public power is exercised for private gains (Johnston 2001). It includes control of corruption at the national and local level. Corruption at the national level tends to be grand forms involving high-level officials and policy formulation. By contrast, corruption at the local level tends to be petty forms involving low-level officials and the delivery of public services.

To ascertain public perceptions of control of corruption at the national level, the ABS asked respondents how widespread they thought corruption and bribe-taking were in the national government in their capital city. The fourth column of Table 3 shows the percentage choosing either “hardly anyone is involved” or “not a lot of officials are corrupt” in the sample countries except Vietnam where the question was not asked.

In only two of seven democracies, Japan and Thailand, a majority of citizens gave favorable responses. In Japan three in four considered the national government free of corruption. In Thailand only one in two believed that “hardly anyone” or “not a lot of officials” in the national government were corrupt. Among democracies and non-democracies altogether Mongolia displayed the lowest level of public approval: only less than one in five Mongolians considered the government in Ulaanbaatar free of corruption. This finding resonates with popular views that corruption remained a serious problem Mongolia increasingly faced. Moreover, in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Indonesia high-level, grand forms of corruption also appeared to be a grave public concern.

Singapore fared far better than democracies including even Japan: more than four in five Singaporeans answered “hardly anyone is involved” or “not a lot of officials are corrupt.” Despite that government agencies suffered a series of corruption scandals, Malaysia fared better than most democracies except for Japan: three in five Malays considered the national government in Kuala Lumpur free of corruption. In the eyes of citizens even China fared better than most democracies including Taiwan: one in two Chinese considered government officials in Beijing free of corruption.

To ascertain public perceptions of control of corruption at the local level, the ABS asked respondents how widespread they thought corruption and bribe-taking were in their local or municipal government. As in control of corruption at the national level, the fifth column of Table 3 shows the percent choosing either “hardly anyone is involved” or “not a lot of officials are corrupt” in the sample countries except for Singapore where the question was not asked.

The pattern of responses was hardly different from that found for evaluations of control of corruption at the national level. In only two of seven democracies, Japan and Thailand, a majority of citizens considered their sub-national government free of corruption: four in five Japanese and two in three Thais gave favorable responses. Among democracies and non-democracies together, Taiwan displayed the lowest level of public approval: only one in three considered their sub-national government free of corruption. It was closely followed by China.

Although their political systems differed greatly, Taiwanese and Chinese held similar views of the extent of corruption in their respective local governments. Most non-democracies except for China fared better than most third-wave democracies. In Malaysia and Vietnam two in three had favorable evaluations of control of corruption at the local level. Excluding Singapore where the question was not asked, Japan turned out to be least corrupt at the local level in the eyes of its public.

Comparing responses to both questions shows that evaluations of corruption at local level were more favorable than those of corruption at the national level. A rare exception was China where public evaluations of corruption at the local level were far less favorable than those of corruption at the national level, indicating that petty forms of corruption were more prevalent than grand forms of corruption. In contrast, Mongolia displayed exactly the opposite pattern, suggesting that high-level political corruption in Ulaanbaatar were seen as more widespread than local bureaucratic corruption.

Considering responses to both questions simultaneously, corruption remained a serious governance problem for most East Asian democracies. The only exception was Japan where three in four considered both types of corruption hardly a public concern. Corruption was a serious problem facing Mongolia. This young democracy displayed the lowest level of public approval. It was followed by fellow third-wave democracies, the Philippines and Taiwan where a serious of corruption scandals caused public outrage. Besides Japan, Malaysia was the only country where a majority of citizens gave affirmative responses to both questions, despite a series of government corruption scandals.

Equal Treatment

The last aspect of rule of law emphasizes that the law is impartially and fairly applied to every citizen. The formal equality of all citizens means equal treatment for every citizen by government. Among various potential threats to equal treatment from government such as gender, race, religion and political orientations, we focus on two, wealth and ethnicity. Evaluations of equal treatment capture perceptions of the impartiality of government in implementing policy or impartial administration.

First, to ascertain public perceptions of equal treatment for the poor, the ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "Rich and poor people are treated equally by the government." The seventh column of Table 3 shows the percentage giving affirmative responses to the question. In five of twelve countries surveyed only small minorities of ordinary people believed that their government treated the rich and the poor equally. They included Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia and the Philippines, all democracies. South Korea displayed the lowest level of public approval, followed by Japan and Taiwan, all affluent democracies in the region. By contrast, in Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia large majorities (more than two-thirds) made favorable evaluations. Although its distribution of wealth showed greater disparity, Thailand displayed the highest level of public approval: nine in ten Thais considered government to treat the rich and poor impartially.

In affluent democracies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan impartial treatment for the

poor was considered a weakness of state institutions. By contrast, in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and China the existing structure of economic inequality hardly threatened impartial administration in the eyes of ordinary people. Although income, if not wealth, inequality was found worse in Thailand, Malaysia, and China than in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, equal treatment for the poor fared better in the former in the eyes of their citizens. The findings suggest that most democracies, affluent and poor, were viewed as having failed to promote equal protection for the economically disadvantaged.

Second, along with discrimination against women, discrimination against ethnic minorities has been a major threat to impartial government in many parts of East Asia. To ascertain public perceptions of equal treatment for ethnic minorities, the ABS asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "All citizens from different ethnic communities are treated equally by the government." As in equal treatment for the poor, the eighth column of Table 3 shows the percentage giving affirmative responses to the question.

In four of the twelve countries surveyed only minorities of citizens considered their government impartial in dealing with members of ethnic communities. They included South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, all democracies. Surprisingly, South Korea, the most ethnically homogenous society in the region, displayed the lowest level of public approval: one in three South Koreans gave favorable evaluations. It was followed by the Philippines with multiple ethnicities and cultures. In the other eight countries, democratic or non-democratic, large majorities of citizens gave favorable evaluations. Thailand, one of the most ethnically fractionalized societies in the region, displayed the highest level of public approval: nearly nine in ten Thais gave favorable evaluations. It was followed by Mongolia, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia where more than a three-quarters majority considered government impartial toward ethnic minorities. Notable is that they included not only more ethnically homogenous Mongolia, Cambodia, and Vietnam but also more ethnically heterogeneous Singapore and Indonesia. In South Korea and Japan, ethnically homogenous societies with a growing number of migrant workers and mixed marriages, impartial treatment for ethnic minorities turned out to be a matter of public concern. By contrast, in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, ethnically most fractionalized societies, the government's treatment for ethnic minorities was viewed as largely impartial.

Comparing responses to both questions shows that public evaluations of equal treatment for the poor were generally less favorable than those of equal treatment for ethnic minorities, suggesting that economic inequality may be a potential threat to governance than ethnic diversity. It is particularly the case in Taiwan, Mongolia, and Cambodia where those who considered treatment for the poor impartial were far outnumbered by those who considered treatment for ethnic minorities impartial.

Considering responses to both questions simultaneously, in only two of seven democracies surveyed large majorities of citizens gave favorable evaluations. They were Thailand and Indonesia, less affluent and more ethnically fractionalized countries in the region. By contrast, in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as well as Mongolia and the Philippines only small minorities considered government treatment for the poor and ethnic minorities impartial. Competitive authoritarian regimes fared better than most democracies: three in five

Singaporeans or Malays considered government treatment impartial. Notable is that in Vietnam and China, single-party socialist states advocating communism, majorities of citizens viewed government treatment for the poor and ethnic minorities impartial.

Social Bases of Perceived Quality of Governance

Do individuals' views of the quality of governance differ as their life circumstances or social positions differ? In this section we examine whether age, education, and occupation⁶ is related to perceptions of the quality of governance (see Table 4 and 5). Individuals may differ in their perceptions of the quality of governance because they use different criteria or standards of evaluation; or they have different expectations of politics and government; or they possess different amount of information about politics and government they possess. So, it may be hypothesized that young citizens, the more educated persons, and white-collar workers are more critical of the quality of governance than senior citizens, the less educated persons, and blue-collar workers. However, system-level and contextual factors could confound these individual-level relationships.

Bearing these in mind, we first turn to three affluent democracies - Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Japan young citizens are more critical of the quality of state institutions than senior citizens, if not adults. The former were more critical of both democratic and law-based governance than the latter. This finding indicates a generation gap in views of state institutions in the most aged society in the world.

In South Korea there seemed no social divide in views of democratic governance. In contrast, there existed social divide in views of law-based governance. As expected, younger persons, the more educated persons, and white-collar workers were more critical of law-based governance than older persons, the least educated persons, and blue-collar workers.

In Taiwan age emerged as the most consistent factor shaping views of the quality of governance. Rather surprisingly, young citizens were less critical of institutions accountability than senior citizens, if not adults in general. Yet, the former were more critical of law-based governance than the latter.

We now turn to four poor democracies - Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In Mongolia class hardly shaped views of state institutions. In contrast, age and education influenced evaluations of the quality of governance, although the direction remained mixed. Young citizens were less critical of both forms of accountability than senior citizens. Similarly, the more educated persons were less critical of electoral competition and horizontal accountability than the less educated. Moreover, the former were less critical of rule of law and equal treatment than the latter. In contrast, young citizens were more critical of control of corruption and equal treatment than senior citizens. This finding suggests that educated Mongolians constituted a bastion of the current regime.

⁶ Education, income, and occupation are three components of socioeconomic status. Although they are themselves highly correlated, they are sufficiently different to treat them separately. Lacking a reliable data on objective income, we focus on education and occupation. For occupation we follow a traditional distinction between white-collar and blue-collar workers.

In Indonesia there was no generational or education differences in evaluations of democratic governance. Class had mixed results. White-collar workers were less critical of vertical accountability than blue-collar workers. Yet, the former were more critical of horizontal accountability than the latter. In contrast, there existed a generational gap in evaluations of law-based governance. Young citizens were more critical of rule of law, control of corruption, and equal treatment than senior citizens, if not adults in general. This finding indicates that young citizens were more often disaffected with law-based governance, if not democratic governance.

In the Philippines there existed little socio-demographic difference in evaluations of the quality of governance. Young citizens, the more educated persons, and white-collar workers were as favorable toward democratic governance as senior citizens, the less educated persons, and blue-collar workers. Similarly, the former were as unfavorable toward law-based governance as the latter. Filipinos shaped their views of state institutions regardless of their individual life circumstances or social positions.

In Thailand there was no generational difference in views of state institutions. In contrast, there existed some educational and class differences. The more educated persons were more critical of electoral competition and horizontal accountability than the less educated persons, but the former were less critical of vertical accountability than the latter. White-collar workers were less critical of vertical accountability than blue-collar workers but the former were more critical of horizontal accountability than the latter. This finding suggests that persons with higher socioeconomic status were more critical of horizontal accountability than persons with lower socioeconomic status but the former were less critical of vertical accountability than the latter. Notable is that white-collar workers were more critical of rule of law and control of corruption than blue-collar workers. The more educated persons were more critical of control of corruption than the less educated individuals. All the findings suggest that class position shapes views of state institutions: middle classes were more critical of the prevailing system of government than working classes.

We now turn to five authoritarian regimes. Although all of them were viewed as non-democracies, Malaysia and Singapore may be distinguished from Cambodia, Vietnam, and China in that “constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power” (Levitsky and Way 2010). In Malaysia, there was little socio-demographic difference in evaluations of democratic governance. Young citizens, the more educated persons, and white-collar workers were as favorable toward institutions of popular control as senior citizens, the less educated persons, and blue-collar workers. By contrast, there existed some generational and educational difference in evaluations of law-based governance. Young citizens were less favorable toward rule of law and control of corruption than senior citizens, if not adults in general. The more educated persons were less favorable toward rule of law and equal treatment than the less educated.

In Singapore young citizens and the more educated persons were less favorable toward electoral competition and vertical accountability than senior citizens and the less educated; white-collar workers were less favorable toward vertical accountability than blue-collar workers; young citizens were less favorable toward rule of law and equal treatment than senior citizens; the more educated persons were less favorable toward equal treatment than the less educated.

All the findings suggest that there existed a generational gap in views of state institutions in this affluent non-democracy with a façade of competitive elections.

In Cambodia there was generational difference in evaluations of the quality of governance. Younger persons were more favorable toward vertical and horizontal accountability than older persons. The former were also more favorable toward control of corruption than the latter. Surprisingly, Cambodian youths appeared to be a bastion of the prevailing political order.

In Vietnam a person's social position hardly shaped his or her evaluations of law-based governance. Yet, it appeared to shape evaluations of democratic governance. Younger persons were less favorable toward electoral competition and vertical accountability than older persons. The more educated persons were less favorable toward vertical accountability than the less educated persons.

Finally, in China individuals' life circumstances shaped their evaluations of state institutions. Younger persons and the college educated persons were less favorable toward vertical accountability than older persons and the no-college educated; the college educated persons were less favorable toward law-based governance than the least educated persons; young citizens were less favorable toward law-based governance than senior citizens, if not adults in general. All the findings suggest that individuals' evaluations of the quality of governance varied more often as their life circumstances differed.

As hypothesized, young citizens, the more educated persons and white-collar workers were more often found to be more critical of the quality of state institutions than the senior citizens, the less educated persons, and blue-collar workers. Yet, the pattern of relationships seemed to vary depending on contextual factors such as the level of socioeconomic development and types of regime. In affluent democracies one's perceptions of the quality of governance were often shaped by his age or educational attainment. In poor democracies as well as non-democracies one's perceptions of the quality of governance did not vary much as his or her social position changed. A notable finding is that people with college education were more critical of the quality of state institution than those without. The relationship was found to exist across much of East Asia, suggesting that education emerges as one of the factors in making citizens critical of state institutions. Why? It may be because differences in educational attainment are associated with differences in criteria of evaluations as well as the level of information. Persons with higher education are more likely to possess greater information about politics and government and to use higher standards of evaluation derived from the ideal of liberal democracy.

Another notable finding is that social class, as measured by occupation, was hardly a major source of views of state institutions. The exception was Thailand and South Korea. These findings may suggest that class differences could be significantly associated with institutional discontent in class-based party systems than in heterogeneous systems. In Thailand and South Korea where party politics reflected class conflict, one's class position shaped his perceptions of the quality of governance. By contrast, the heterogeneous character of political parties in many East Asian countries seemed to weaken the influence of class on evaluations of the quality of governance.

Perceived Quality of Governance and System Affect

So what? In this final section we deal with political consequences of good governance. Since good governance is expected to contribute to system legitimacy, we turn to the relationship between perceived quality of governance and support for the prevailing system of government.⁷

As presented in Table 6, most dimensions of governance were significantly linked to system affect. The most notable exception was vertical accountability. In three affluent democracies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan vertical accountability was significantly linked to system affect. In some other countries, by contrast, vertical accountability was not linked to system affect. In still some other countries vertical accountability was negatively related to system affect. For instance, in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam those who disapproved of vertical accountability were more supportive of the prevailing system of government.

The aspects of governance strongly associated with system affect varied from one country to another. In Japan electoral competition, horizontal accountability and equal treatment were strongly linked to system affect, suggesting that democratic governance played a greater role in generating citizen allegiance to the system. In South Korea control of corruption only was most strongly related to system affect, indicating that law-based governance was more important than democratic governance. In Taiwan rule of law, control of corruption, equal treatment, and horizontal accountability were strongly linked to system affect, suggesting that law-based government mattered more often to citizen allegiance to the system.

In four poor democracies such as Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand most aspects of governance were weakly related to system affect. Moreover, some aspects of democratic governance were unrelated to or even negatively related to system affect. In Mongolia system affect was more strongly related to aspects of law-based governance than those of democratic governance. In Indonesia and Thailand system affect was more often related to law-based governance than democratic governance. In the Philippines system affect was more often and more strongly related to law-based governance than democratic accountability. As noted above, one aspect of democratic governance, vertical accountability, was even negatively linked to system affect.

In competitive authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia and Singapore vertical accountability was negatively or weakly related to system affect. Yet, system affect was linked to aspects of law-based governance as often as to those of democratic governance. In Malaysia system affect was strongly related to equal treatment and electoral competition. In Singapore, system affect was strongly linked to horizontal accountability.

In full authoritarian regimes such as Cambodia, Vietnam, and China vertical accountability

⁷ Support for the prevailing system of government, system affect, was measured by combining responses to five questions (four agree-disagree and one closed-ended): "Over the long run, our system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces," "Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government," "A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves the people's support," "I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of," and "Compared with other systems in the world, would you say our system of government works fine as it is, needs minor change, needs major change, or should be replaced?" An overall index of system affect was constructed by simply adding the values of these items and then divided by 5.

was unrelated or negatively related to system affect. In Cambodia system affect was found more often and more strongly related to aspects of law-based governance than those of democratic governance. In Vietnam no aspect of governance was strongly related to system affect. In China control of corruption, horizontal accountability, and equal treatment were strongly related to system affect.

Overall, system affect was found most often related to horizontal accountability as well as impartial treatment. They were followed by control of corruption. These findings suggest that impartiality, accountability, and absence of corruption are important components of citizen allegiance to the system of government.

Conclusion

In this essay we examined public perceptions of the quality of governance across East Asia. Governance can be defined in many ways but it is defined here as the institutions and norms by which public authority is selected, monitored and exercised. Two dimensions of governance are emphasized: democratic and legal. The first dimension emphasizes the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced and consists of three components - competitive elections, vertical accountability, and horizontal accountability. The second dimension emphasizes the legality, transparency and impartiality of public authority. We examine the extent to which state institutions perform against these aspects of governance.

It was found that East Asians' evaluations of governance diverged from expert-based assessments. In the eyes of their publics, affluent democracies fared worse while competitive authoritarian regimes best. The more a country was democratic, the more likely its citizens were to be critical of the quality of governance. It could be the case that competitive authoritarian regimes actually performed better than democracies. It could also be the case that citizens living in democracies were better informed about politics and government than their counterparts living repressive authoritarian regimes. Moreover, what citizens expect of government might be higher in democracies than competitive authoritarian regimes because citizen expectations have risen with additional democratic improvement. In any case, East Asian democracies remained far short of citizen expectations of good governance. In particular, the region's third-wave democracies suffered from a weak rule of law and have yet to establish themselves as high-quality governance in the eyes of their publics.

It was found that some life circumstances shaped perceptions of the quality of governance: the more educated and youths tended to have more critical views across much of the region perhaps because they possessed greater information about politics and government and employed higher standards of evaluation. Social class largely failed to shape evaluations of state institutions because of the heterogeneous character of political parties in many East Asian countries.

Finally, it was found that the quality of governance mattered to citizen allegiance to the prevailing system of government. In democracies law-based governance appears to be more relevant for system affect than democratic governance. Impartiality, accountability, and absence of corruption proved to be important components of citizen allegiance to the system.

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Table 1 Quality of Governance by the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2011

	Voice and accountability		Political Stability		Government effectiveness		Regulatory Quality		Rule of law		Control of corruption	
	Point Estimate	Percentile Rank	Point Estimate	Percentile Rank	Point Estimate	Percentile Rank	Point Estimate	Percentile Rank	Point Estimate	Percentile Rank	Point Estimate	Percentile Rank
	Japan	+1.02	77.9	+0.97	79.2	+1.35	87.7	+0.90	78.2	+1.27	86.9	+1.50
South Korea	+0.71	68.5	+0.23	55.2	+1.23	86.3	+0.95	79.1	+1.01	80.8	+0.45	70.1
Taiwan	+0.88	74.2	+0.89	76.4	+1.17	83.4	+1.17	84.4	+1.04	82.6	+0.90	77.7
Mongolia	-0.01	49.3	+0.55	64.6	-0.62	31.3	-0.22	44.5	-0.34	45.5	-0.68	27.0
Indonesia	-0.08	46.9	-0.82	21.2	-0.24	46.9	-0.33	41.7	-0.65	31.0	-0.68	27.5
Philippines	-0.01	48.8	-1.39	9.0	0.00	55.9	-0.26	43.6	-0.51	34.7	-0.78	22.7
Thailand	-0.45	33.3	-1.02	16.5	+0.10	59.7	+0.24	56.4	-0.24	48.4	-0.37	44.5
Malaysia	+0.44	33.8	+0.16	52.4	+1.00	81.0	+0.66	74.4	+0.52	66.2	+0.00	57.8
Singapore	-0.19	42.7	+1.21	90.1	+2.16	99.1	+1.83	97.2	+1.69	93.4	+2.12	96.2
Cambodia	-0.91	24.9	-0.44	33.0	-0.75	25.6	-0.45	35.1	-1.03	15.5	-1.10	12.8
Vietnam	-1.48	8.5	+0.17	52.8	0.28	45.0	-0.61	29.4	-0.46	39.9	-0.59	33.6
China	-1.64	4.7	-0.70	25.0	+0.12	60.7	-0.20	45.5	-0.43	41.8	-0.62	30.3

Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators

Table 2 Perceptions of Quality of Democratic Governance

	Electoral competition			Vertical Accountability			Horizontal Accountability		
	Equal access to media	Genuine choices	Both	Turnover of power	Non-electoral control	Both	Legislative control	Judicial control	Both
Democracy									
Japan	57	52	34	57	32	19	21	52	14
South Korea	65	51	35	52	35	17	51	41	22
Taiwan	70	57	43	57	40	26	48	48	32
Mongolia	78	38	31	76	23	18	20	12	4
Indonesia	61	71	47	64	40	26	58	64	41
Philippines	67	61	42	80	46	34	73	56	42
Thailand	78	63	52	74	35	27	42	53	26
Non-democracy									
Malaysia	67	54	38	79	50	40	73	63	48
Singapore	57	35	25	37	44	14	79	68	57
Cambodia	83	67	58	83	27	21	75	46	37
Vietnam	73	67	51	34	48	14	73	50	41
China	NA	57	NA	NA	NA	NA	67	47	38

Entries are the percentage of those having favorable responses.

Source: 2010-2012 ABS III

Table 3 Perceptions of Quality of Law-based Governance

	Rule of law			Control of corruption			Equal treatment		
	Law-abidingness	No legal impunity	Both	National government	Local government	Both	Poor	Ethnic minorities	Both
Democracy									
Japan	57	63	44	75	82	72	25	42	19
South Korea	29	40	17	42	45	35	19	33	12
Taiwan	38	37	24	33	32	23	25	46	20
Mongolia	19	27	9	17	40	12	38	80	34
Indonesia	32	53	22	37	48	29	67	77	62
Philippines	33	44	20	30	39	21	29	40	20
Thailand	56	58	39	51	65	44	92	87	84
Non-democracy									
Malaysia	48	51	37	60	68	52	67	70	59
Singapore	88	85	79	83	NA	NA	71	78	62
Cambodia	75	60	50	42	57	35	50	78	47
Vietnam	54	56	43	NA	69	NA	80	78	72
China	24	59	11	50	34	28	61	70	57

Entries are the percentage of those having favorable responses.

Source: 2010-2012 ABS III

Table 4 Age, Education, Occupation and Perceptions of Quality of Democratic Governance

	Electoral competition			Vertical accountability			Horizontal Accountability		
	Age	Education	Occupation	Age	Education	Occupation	Age	Education	Occupation
Democracy									
Japan	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N
South Korea	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
Taiwan	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
Mongolia	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
Indonesia	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Philippines	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Thailand	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Non-democracy									
Malaysia	N	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
Singapore	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Cambodia	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
Vietnam	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
China	-	-	-	-	-	-	Y	Y	-

Y: chi-sq tests for the relationships are significant at the 0.05 level. N: not significant. - : No data

Age (1=<29, 2=30-59, and 3=60+), education (1=<high school, 2=high school, and 3=college+), occupation (1=white collar workers and 2=blue collar workers).

Source: 2010-2012 ABS III

Table 5 Age, Education, Occupation and Perceptions of Quality of Law-based Governance

	Rule of Law			Control of corruption			Equal treatment		
	Age	Education	Occupation	Age	Education	Occupation	Age	Education	Occupation
Democracy									
Japan	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N
South Korea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Taiwan	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
Mongolia	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
Indonesia	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
Philippines	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N
Thailand	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
Non-democracy									
Malaysia	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
Singapore	Y	N	N	-	-	-	Y	Y	N
Cambodia	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Vietnam	N	N	N	-	-	-	N	N	N
China	N	Y	-	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	-

Y: chi-sq tests for the relationships are significant at the 0.05 level. N: not significant. - : No data

Age (1=<29, 2=30-59, and 3=60+), education (1=<high school, 2=high school, and 3=college+), occupation (1=white collar workers and 2=blue collar workers).

Source: 2010-2012 ABS III

Table 6 Perceptions of Quality of Governance and System Affect

	Quality of democratic governance			Quality of law-based governance		
	Electoral competition	Vertical accountability	Horizontal accountability	Rule of law	Control of corruption	Equal treatment
Democracy						
Japan	.308**	.212**	.322***	.224**	.266**	.313**
South Korea	.183**	.124**	.260**	.227**	.300**	.284**
Taiwan	.238**	.183**	.386**	.387**	.314**	.365**
Mongolia	.144**	Ns	.139**	.212**	.218**	.266**
Indonesia	.117**	Ns	.221**	.168**	.213**	.217**
Philippines						
Thailand	.224**	Ns	.076*	.168**	.113**	.176**
Non-democracy						
Malaysia	.347**	-.200**	.281**	.282**	.215**	.437**
Singapore	.257**	.096**	.323**	.226**	Na	.253**
Cambodia	.373**	Ns	.329**	.368**	.366**	.402**
Vietnam	.289**	-.208**	.232**	.290**	Na	.276**
China	Na	Na	.331**	.055**	.384**	.309**

Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).

Ns: Not significant. Na: No data

Source: 2010-2012 ABS III